作者：张致君
编辑：钟然 责任编辑：胡丽莉 翻译：吕峰
2025 年 9 月以来，知名教育指导网红张雪峰在“九三阅兵”相关言论中称若发生“解放军攻打台湾”时他将捐款数千万人民币，相关言论在社交平台迅速发酵并引发争议，随后其多个主账号被“禁止关注”或被各平台标注违规并短暂封禁，官方舆论将其长期以来“教育指导极端功利化”与此次言论联系起来予以批评。本张雪峰事件背后的政治逻辑是否是中共官方对“战争话语”的管控边界、中央与地方媒体的信号传递存在何种机制、中共政权对社会动员与节奏的把控如何、以及商业化网红在国家意识形态与市场竞争中的脆弱位置都是张雪峰事件中我们作为中台关系中应该思考的问题。
在纪念“九三阅兵”或相关大型阅兵讨论的语境中，张雪峰发表视频或直播言论，称若发生对台军事行动，他个人“至少捐款5000万，公司可捐1亿”的激烈表述，该言论在微博、抖音、快手等平台迅速传播并引起媒体与公众关注；随后河南省官媒等对其言论发表批评性评论并引发更广泛讨论。几周内，张雪峰旗下多个平台账号出现“禁止关注”或被标注“违反法律法规或社区公约”，并有官方或半官方媒体将其既往在教育领域的“功利化”导向与此次言论联系，认为其具有误导性或有损社会秩序。
要理解为何一个以教育咨询起家的网红会因煽动式战争言论而被“封关”，需从三条互相交织的政治逻辑出发：即国家对战争与对外行动叙事的节奏控制；对公共话语边界与“非官方动员话语”的排查；政治与商业化网红之间的利益与权力不对称。
对于台海战争话语的节奏，国家要控制“何时说、谁来说”。在权力高度集中的政治体系中，关于使用武力、对外军事行动的议题并非普通社会话题，它涉及外交策略、军事部署、国际法后果、以及国际舆论的节奏管理。官方通常需要在信息发布与行动之间保持严格的节奏控制与战略时机，任何在官方未授权的情况下出现“倒计时”式或过于激进的言论，可能造成三类风险从而干涉中共下一步政治行为：对外交与军事部署的“过早暴露”或误导外界判断，影响外交斡旋空间与行动灵活性；造成内部社会情绪的非理性提升或群体极端化；在国际与两岸舆论中形成复杂信号，引发不可控的危机升级或被中共内部的政治对手利用。
基于媒体对事件的报道，官媒对张雪峰言论迅速作出批评并在某些渠道删除相关批评，反映出中共官方在中台关系敏感议题上的高度敏感与快速反应机制。
中共通常允许并鼓励符合官方叙事、稳定社会的正面言论（例如宣传民族自豪感、文化自信等），但从目前中台关系来看，中共对“非官方的动员台海战争话语”持谨慎态度。张雪峰的言论具备“自发动员”和“募款暗示”的双重风险：一方面他以个人与公司名义宣称将为军事行动捐巨款，这实际上暗含着鼓动公众将战争视为某种消费或表演性的捐赠事件；另一方面，流量驱动的网红言论容易将极端情绪放大，形成社会情绪的自发蔓延。中共官方在整治 “极端对立情绪”时，会将此类言论视作需要清理的对象。多家评论指出其言论可能“挑动群体极端对立情绪、宣扬恐慌焦虑”，并将其与长期的“教育功利化”倾向并列批评，借此在道德与专业两层面削弱其公共话语的合法性。
观察本事件相关报道可以看到，张雪峰事件一方面出现了地方官媒（如河南大象新闻）对张雪峰公开点名批评的情况；另一方面有些媒体随后删除批评文章或调整措辞。此类现象反映出中央和地方媒体在敏感议题上的复杂互动：地方媒体有时会试图通过点名“顶流人物”来表现“维护社会秩序”的姿态，但一旦中央层面对该议题有更细腻或不同的节奏考量，地方媒体会被要求收回或软化表态。换言之，媒体既是信号发射器，也是信号接收器，地方官媒的迅速点名与随后处理，说明了在敏感外交军事议题上，媒体与政府之间存在即时的协调与纠偏机制。多家报道记录了官媒点名与删除的过程，更加显示这一点。
张雪峰作为“教育顶流”，依靠流量变现、付费课程与咨询等商业模式快速积累影响力，但这种影响力并不等同于政治保护。事实上，在权力体制面前，网红的流量既是资产也是风险：一旦言论被定性为“扰乱社会秩序”或“有不当导向”，平台、广告主与监管机关可以迅速切断其变现通道并限制传播。报道显示，张雪峰的多个账号被禁止关注，平台以“违反法律法规或社区公约”为由采取行动，更加反映出平台治理与国家治理之间的协同机制。对网红而言，参与政治色彩强烈的话题，尤其是在政府尚未统一节奏或表态前，极易将自己置于被动位置。而政府此前的社会性试探，对中台敏感话题的试探，只能从中共指定口岸输出，张雪峰事件恰是印证了这点。
中共官方控制媒体在批评张雪峰时，不仅针对其“鼓吹战争”的言论，也把其长期的教育主张列为批评对象，称其“教育指导极端功利化，可能动摇国家长远发展的人才根基”。这种将即时政治问题与长期社会影响并置的做法，有两重政治功能：从价值层面削弱其社会信誉：把争议话语同其长期的“错误导向”捆绑，使其既在政治上失据，也在专业信誉上受挫；从制度正当性层面强调“公共教育应服务国家战略”：以“国家发展的人才根基”为理由，强调教育话语应与国家发展目标一致，从而扩大对教育领域话语的政治监管范围。
这种策略既是舆论驳斥的手段，也是扩大监管合法性的政治技术。多篇官方评论与省级媒体的批评，正是以“教育功利化”为切入点进行的道德化指控。
张雪峰事件并非个例，包括近期被封禁的户晨风，在中共治理逻辑下，权力—话语—市场三角关系为维系政权稳定和为政治服务更加明显。
权利方面，中台关系和台海战争部署属于高度敏感话题，国家对敏感议题有高度节奏化掌控权。中共政府对战争、主权等重大问题保持信息发布的节奏与话语主导，任何非官方的言论都可能被迅速遏制。
话语权上，所有的社交媒体平台治理已成为延伸的政治治理工具，社交平台在监管敏感信息、限制账号功能方面具备可操作性，并在国家与平台间形成事实上的协同治理网络（例如通过“社区公约”“违反法律法规”标签实现快速处置）。
而有市场资源的商业化意见领袖在政治领域十分脆弱。流量与影响力虽然能在短期内带来利益，但在政治敏感点上，流量并不保证安全，反而放大了被监管的风险。通过道德化批评也成为扩大治理正当性的常用策略，中共在处理“网红”问题上把个体问题与“国家长期利益”等高价值命题绑定，能够更容易争取公众支持并拓宽治理边界。
张雪峰事件表面看是一起因“激烈言论”而被处置的舆论事件，深层则反映出在中共政治生态中：中共对敏感议题的话语节奏有高度掌控，地方与中央媒体在言论管控上存在即时的校准机制；商业化网红在国家安全与意识形态红线面前极为脆弱；官方通过道德化与专业化的批评话语来扩充治理正当性。
张雪峰事件提示我们，在高度政治化的公共领域，言论的自由与市场的私利容易发生冲突，而对这些冲突的处理方式本身就是一种政治选择。政府、平台与媒体在此事件中的协同治理轨迹，以及对“教育导向”“战争话语”双重维度的政治敏感，是导致张雪峰快速被封禁的政治选择结果。
在中共，能说什么话，是要政府批准的。哪怕有些政治风向是中共提前释放出来试探社会反应的，作为普通民众连跟从的资格都没有。
“妄议”政治在中共政权下，是一道高压线。
From Zhang Xuefeng’s “Donation to Invade Taiwan” Remarks to His Nationwide Ban:
An Analysis of the Political Logic and Control Mechanisms Behind the Censorship
Author: Zhang Zhijun Editor: Zhong Ran Executive Editor: Hu Lili Translation: Lyu Feng
Abstract:Internet celebrity Zhang Xuefeng was banned across multiple platforms after his remarks about donating to support a war over the Taiwan Strait triggered public controversy. The incident reflects the CCP’s tight control over war-related discourse, the signaling adjustments between central and local media, and the fragile position of online influencers caught between politics and the market.
Since September 2025, well-known education influencer Zhang Xuefeng has sparked widespread controversy after making comments during the “September 3rd Parade” commemorations, stating that if the People’s Liberation Army were to “attack Taiwan,” he would personally donate tens of millions of RMB. His remarks spread rapidly across Chinese social media platforms, provoking heated debate. Shortly afterward, several of his main accounts were marked as “restricted” or “violating regulations” and were temporarily banned. State media outlets linked his long-standing “extremely utilitarian approach to education” with his recent comments, criticizing both.
Behind the Zhang Xuefeng incident lies a deeper set of political logics:the CCP’s control over the tempo and framing of war discourse;the mechanisms of signal transmission between central and local media;the Party’s management of social mobilization and emotional rhythm;and the fragile position of commercial influencers caught between ideology and market forces.
1. Control of War Discourse: “When to Speak, Who May Speak”
In a highly centralized political system, topics involving the use of force, military action, or Taiwan policy are not considered ordinary public subjects. They touch on diplomatic strategy, military deployment, international law, and the management of global opinion.
The CCP’s propaganda system maintains strict temporal control over when and how information is released. Any unofficial or excessively militant speech before the Party sets the official tone carries three key risks that can disrupt future political maneuvers:
Diplomatic and military leakage — premature or exaggerated statements may mislead foreign observers, reducing China’s diplomatic flexibility.
Domestic emotional escalation — unregulated nationalism can spiral into irrational mass behavior.
International signaling distortion — aggressive rhetoric may send confusing or escalatory signals, triggering crises or being exploited by internal Party rivals.
Media coverage shows that state outlets quickly condemned Zhang’s comments, and some later deleted their own criticisms — illustrating the CCP’s sensitivity and rapid feedback loop on cross-Strait issues.
2. The “Unofficial Mobilization” Problem
The CCP encourages expressions of patriotism that reinforce stability — such as promoting “cultural confidence” or “national rejuvenation.”But it remains wary of non-official calls for war.
Zhang’s remarks contained dual risks of “self-mobilization” and “quasi-fundraising for war”:
By promising personal and corporate donations (50 million RMB personally, 100 million corporately), he implicitly framed war as a charitable spectacle — a transaction between citizens and the state’s military actions.
As an influencer driven by online traffic, his emotional rhetoric risked amplifying extremist sentiment and triggering organic mass mobilization beyond official control.
Thus, authorities categorized his statements as “inciting confrontation” and “spreading social anxiety.” State media linked them to his “utilitarian educational philosophy,” discrediting him on both moral and professional grounds. This dual strategy erodes credibility while reaffirming ideological conformity.
3. The Signaling Mechanism Between Central and Local Media
The episode revealed the complex dynamics between central and provincial propaganda organs.For example, Henan’s official media (Da Xiang News) publicly criticized Zhang by name — yet later deleted the article or softened its tone.
This sequence demonstrates a top-down calibration mechanism:
Local media sometimes rush to denounce high-profile figures to demonstrate political loyalty or “maintain order.”
When central authorities later determine that the tone or timing is misaligned with broader strategy, they instruct retraction or moderation.
In essence, media outlets act as both transmitters and receivers of political signals.The rapid criticism and subsequent withdrawal underscore real-time coordination within China’s propaganda hierarchy, especially on military and diplomatic topics.
4. The Fragility of Commercialized Influencers
Zhang Xuefeng built his career around paid education consulting and livestreamed advice, monetizing immense social traffic. Yet in a political system where power overrides capital, traffic is both asset and liability.
Once speech is labeled “disruptive” or “misguided,”platforms, advertisers, and regulators swiftly act — cutting off revenue and visibility.Zhang’s accounts were blocked under vague citations such as “violating laws or community rules,” showing the alignment between platform governance and state censorship.
For online personalities, engaging politically charged issues — particularly before the government defines its line — is perilous.The CCP allows only designated “mouthpieces” to test public reaction on sensitive cross-Strait topics.Zhang’s self-initiated mobilization overstepped that boundary, proving the monopoly of the Party’s right to initiate national narratives.
5. “Moralization” and Expansion of Ideological Governance
In official commentary, the CCP did not merely target Zhang’s pro-war rhetoric. It reframed his long-term “utilitarian education style” as part of the same moral failure — claiming it “endangers the cultivation of talent essential to the nation’s long-term development.”
This fusion of immediate political fault with long-term social morality serves two functions:
Delegitimizing the individual — linking a specific controversy with supposed ongoing ideological deviance.
Expanding state legitimacy — asserting that education and public speech must “serve the nation’s strategic goals,” thus widening the scope of political supervision over social discourse.
This strategy converts censorship into moral pedagogy — turning governance into a narrative of “ethical correction for the national good.”
6. The Broader Triangular Framework: Power, Discourse, and Market
The Zhang Xuefeng incident is not unique. Similar cases — such as the recent ban of influencer Hu Chenfeng — reveal a repeating pattern:a triangular alignment between state power, discursive control, and market regulation, used to preserve regime stability.
Power: Topics like cross-Strait relations and war planning fall under top-level state control, strictly regulated by tempo and permission.
Discourse: Social media governance functions as an extension of political rule, using “community rules” and “law violations” as administrative pretexts for censorship.
Market: Commercial influencers, though economically successful, remain politically disposable. Their reach magnifies their vulnerability, not their safety.
By combining moral critique with regulatory action, the Party justifies suppression as serving “national interest,” thus broadening its ideological jurisdiction with public approval.
7. Conclusion: The Political Choice Behind the Ban
On the surface, the Zhang Xuefeng affair appears to be an “online incident triggered by extreme remarks.”In essence, it exposes the CCP’s political ecosystem:
Absolute control over the timing and tone of sensitive discourse;
A real-time correction mechanism between local and central media;
The precariousness of commercial influencers in an authoritarian information order;
The use of moralized rhetoric to expand the Party’s claim to legitimacy.
The case underscores how, in a highly politicized public sphere, the boundaries between speech, commerce, and ideology are constantly renegotiated — but always on the Party’s terms.
The state’s collaborative censorship among government agencies, media, and platforms — and its dual sensitivity to “education discourse” and “war rhetoric” — explain why Zhang Xuefeng was silenced so swiftly.
Under the CCP, what can be said — and who may say it — must first receive government approval.Even when the regime itself releases political signals to test public reaction,ordinary citizens have no right even to echo them.
