——在中共“国退民进”时代的民主战略思考
作者：李保潭
编辑：邢文娟 责任编辑：罗志飞 校对：程筱筱 翻译：刘芳
完全的市场经济与中产阶层的壮大是中国走向民主与法治的经济基础。正如亚里士多德所言“最好的政治共同体是由中产阶级的公民组成的……中产阶级人数众多并且尽可能比其他阶层更强大，那么这样的国家通常治理得更好” 。在当前高科技时代，要让一个武装到牙齿的中共下台或真正政改，只有利用其政策最有效地削弱其独裁与反动的程度，从而最大化地发展民主与法治的生存空间。所以，揭批习近平开倒车，并助力推动习近平下台，力争改革派上台，是当前中国民主政治活动最迫切、最现实、最重大的任务，中国民运应紧紧抓住时代脉搏，高度关注中国中产阶级的力量，关注中国民营企业家的命运，深度思考民营企业家与中产阶级的政治需求，从而找到中国民主政治发展的最佳契机与机会。
引言：汪林朋坠楼与沉默的群体
2025年7月27日，一条简短的新闻在企业界、媒体圈和社交网络中掀起涟漪：居然之家董事长汪林朋，在接受司法调查期间，从北京某高层建筑坠亡。官方通报如往常般“简洁”，原因模糊，细节缺失。但对民营企业界而言，这不是孤立的偶然，而是一个趋势的最新注脚。
习近平上台以后，至少有几十位知名民营企业老板——从房地产、互联网到制造业——被迫逃往海外、或被抓捕判刑、或在被调查被限制自由期间突然 “意外身亡”，如肖建华、许家印、吴小晖、郭文贵、贾跃亭、孙大午、王健、段伟红、包凡、林生斌等。仅仅今年4月份开始就有四位知名民营企业家跳楼（见下表）。这些事件背后，是一个更深层的现实：民营经济，正遭遇自改革开放以来最严酷的政治与制度压力。
表1. 最近三个月连续跳楼的知名民营企业家
这份如此近似的清单，足以说明一个趋势：在“国进民退”的体制氛围中，民营企业家的安全感和存在感，正被一步步剥夺。
而更危险和令人担忧的是，中国的中产阶级与民营企业家——这一社会中间力量，在政治上没有代言人、没有保护伞，既无法在制度内自保，也没有在制度外发声的渠道。他们的沉默，正在被政权解读为可以无限收紧的绿灯。
因此，当我们讨论中国民主政治的现实路径时，不应仅仅停留在抽象的制度理想，而应正视这样一个问题：如何利用有限的空间，保护并壮大中产阶级与市场经济的力量，使之成为推动中国走向民主与法治的基础力量。
一、中产阶级与民营企业：现代民主的经济支柱
现代政治社会学的多国经验表明：经济多元化推动形成相对独立的社会阶层，由此产生法治诉求与权利意识，再由法治化的中产阶级形成民主制度的重要推动者。在现代化的进程中，中产阶级通常被视为社会稳定与民主化的双重保障。经济学家巴林顿·摩尔的名言——“没有资产阶级，就没有民主”——并非绝对真理，但放在中国的语境下却格外贴切。
民营企业家，不仅是财富创造者，也是中产阶级的重要来源。他们雇佣工人，推动创新，刺激消费，缴纳税收，并在社会中形成一个相对独立于国家机器的经济力量。这种经济力量，一旦获得法治保障与政治权利，就可能成为制衡权力、推动改革的重要支柱。回顾中国改革开放以来，民营经济的成长历程可谓是曲折中崛起：
•1980年代：个体户、乡镇企业萌芽，经济上虽仍处于边缘地位，但其已经注定将焕发出蓬勃生机；
•1990年代—2000年代初：民营经济快速扩张，市场机制初步确立，中产阶级规模显著扩大；
•胡温时期：尽管政治改革停滞，但经济自由度相对较高，民营企业家迎来“黄金十年”；
•习近平时期：从“防风险”到“共同富裕”的旗号，实质是国有资本全面渗透民营领域，“国进民退”成为新常态。
在中国语境下，民营企业家及其雇员、上下游供应商和依赖其收入的家庭，构成了中产阶级的主体之一。按2023年中国统计局与民间机构综合估算：
•民营企业贡献60%以上GDP；
•创造80%以上的城镇就业；
•提供70%以上的技术创新成果；
•占全部企业数量90%以上。
这些数据不仅是经济数字，也是社会结构的映射。民营经济的衰退，意味着中产阶级的萎缩；而中产阶级的萎缩，将直接削弱中国社会走向民主与法治的内在动力。
二、市场经济、法治与民主化的内在逻辑
经济与政治之间并非一条单向因果链，但现代史证明：一个相对自由的市场经济，能够孕育公民社会，而公民社会则是民主制度的温床。市场经济的健康运行离不开对私有财产的保障、契约精神的维护以及司法的独立。台湾在1980年代末期的民主化，离不开其经济高度市场化与中产阶级壮大的背景；韩国、智利等国的经验也表明，经济结构的多元化与中产阶级的自信，是民主化浪潮的重要推手。市场经济不是民主的充分条件，但它是民主化的重要前提之一。原因在于：
1.产权保障需求：市场经济离不开明确、稳定的产权制度，而产权保障必须依赖独立司法和透明立法。
2.契约精神：商业活动培养了基于规则的合作与竞争文化，这与民主的政治文化相契合。
3.多元利益格局：市场经济会打破单一的权力垄断，使社会形成多中心、多利益群体结构。
亚洲国家民主制度的发展比较也可以佐证这一点：
•台湾：1980年代中期经济高度市场化，中产阶级壮大，最终推动政治开放；
•韩国：民营工业巨头与工会、学生运动共同构成民主化的社会基础，并推动了韩国民主政治的发展；
•智利：经济自由化之后，中产阶级在民选制度下扮演稳定器角色，经济发展促进了智利中产阶级的发展，反之亦然。
在中国，改革开放40年形成的“半市场经济”虽不完整，却已经部分打破了计划经济对社会的全面控制。民营企业和中产阶级的出现，为未来的政治多元化埋下了种子。这一结构的存在，本是通往政治现代化的潜在阶梯。
遗憾的是，这一萌芽在习近平时代遭遇了全面扼杀。市场经济被国企垄断、被行政命令凌驾，法治被党纪替代，产权保护沦为纸面承诺。这不仅摧毁了经济活力，也正在切断通往政治现代化的可能路径。
三、习近平时代的“国进民退”与结构性倒退
“国进民退”并非始于习近平，但在他的任内，被推到了极致。“国进民退”不仅是经济策略，更是习近平的政治需求，并带上了强烈的政治控制色彩。
动机：
1.权力安全优先：中共担心民营经济过大削弱党的控制力；
2.财政依赖：国企可以成为政治工具和财政输血管道；
3.意识形态回潮：强调“党领导一切”，上管天，下管地，中间管空气，东西南北中，都归党管！将经济资源重新收归国有。
表现：
•金融领域：整肃蚂蚁金服、限制互联网巨头融资。中小企业或民营企业，到银行贷款难，银行大量向国企投放低利息贷款；
•实体经济：房地产行业断供式调控，教培行业“一刀切”禁令，互联网平台的严厉封控等等，通过国资委、地方国企、央企集团收购或控股优质民企，实现政治性资源回收；
•制度层面：强化国企垄断地位，限制民企准入。实行司法压制，以反腐、金融安全等名义，绕过正常司法程序，直接介入企业运营与所有权。
后果：
•投资信心崩塌，资本外流加速；
•创新能力下降，高科技产业受制于外部制裁；
•大规模裁员与失业，社会焦虑上升。
这些现象不仅是经济衰退的预兆，更是民主化土壤被人为掏空的警讯。这种倒退不仅是经济上的自残，更是政治上的战略自杀——它削弱了中国社会中最有可能推动制度进步的力量。
四、民营企业家的政治困境与心理危机
中国民营企业家的政治困境，主要包括缺乏明确的政治身份认定、政治保护伞不足、面对高压监管和政策不确定性、难以通过政治途径维护自身利益等等。主要表现在政治上的孤立无援：
•无代表：在人大、政协等政治机构中，他们只是装饰品。
•无保护：产权得不到真正保障，随时可能被以“反腐”“安全”之名剥夺资产甚至自由。
•高压司法：纪检与司法体系失去制衡，法律程序形同虚设。
这导致企业家群体普遍心理高度紧张，部分人被迫转移资产、移民甚至放弃事业。跳楼、自杀、被捕——这些不是个案，而是压抑到极点的群体现象。在这样的环境下，民营企业家承受着巨大的压力，他们的沉默，不是因为认同现状，而是因为缺乏安全发声的渠道。汪林朋的坠楼，是这种无声恐惧的一个冰冷符号。
五、民主运动的战略契机：对接中产阶级
在当前高科技信息时代，要让一个武装到牙齿的中共下台，不能依赖空洞的革命口号，而要利用其政策的软肋，削弱其独裁根基，扩大民主力量的生存空间。面对全方位武装的专制政权，单纯的街头政治或网络口号，无法直接改变政权结构。真正的突破口，在于充分利用中共的政策，扩大民主力量的经济与社会基础。
中产阶级与民营企业家，正是这个软肋的核心——他们的经济利益与政治安全高度依赖法治与制度稳定。一旦他们意识到自身命运与民主法治息息相关，就可能成为民主运动的天然盟友。为什么中产阶级是关键？
•他们有稳定收入与资产，需要法治保护
•他们具备一定教育水平，更能理解制度的重要性
•他们经济独立，不完全依赖政府救济
中国民主党应如何介入？
1.成为代言人和舆论代表：在国际舆论场公开且持续关注、揭露中产阶级及民营企业家的困境，塑造“民主=经济安全”的认知；
2.建立信息网络：通过海外商业与学术网络，搭建信息与资源桥梁，形成海外与国内企业家的安全沟通渠道。特别需要为中国中产阶级造势和政治宣传；
3.提供援助：国内外建立理论阵营为中国中产阶级鼓与呼，在中国民营企业家遭遇打压时，提供法律、媒体、经济上的援手。
4.政策倡议：制定保护产权、鼓励创新、减少行政干预、限制国企垄断的政策蓝图。
5.尝试扩大建立中国民主党外围组织，比如中国民营企业家互助会、中国知识分子互助会、中国中产阶级神性启迪会（引导企业家信神信灵魂信因果等等）、中国企业家行善互助会等类似互助组织，多渠道拓展其联合与互助，扩大其社会生存空间。
这样做，不仅是对一个群体的保护，更是在为未来的民主经济基础积蓄力量。其战略意义在于：保护民营企业家，就是保护民主的经济命脉。
六、结语：在废墟完全成型之前，抓住时代的脉搏
汪林朋的死亡，不应只是新闻档案中的一个数字，而应成为我们重新思考中国政治与经济关系的契机；汪林朋的坠楼，不仅是个人悲剧，更是历史的一声警钟。
中国四十年改革开放的经济成果，正在被“国进民退”的倒车碾压殆尽。如果民营经济的基石被彻底摧毁，中国社会将失去最有可能推动民主化的阶层基础。
中国民主党的使命，不仅是反对独裁，还要主动保护和扩大这一阶层的生存空间，保护并壮大那些能够支撑未来民主制度的经济与社会力量，因为抓住他们，就是抓住了中国走向民主与法治的经济基础；抓住他们，就是抓住了中国未来的制度希望。忽视他们，就是放弃了最现实的变革路径
历史从不等待犹豫者。中共的倒车正在摧毁四十年来积累的经济与社会成果，现在正是决定性的时间窗口——在废墟完全成型之前，我们应把握住时代的脉搏，让中产阶级的利益与民主运动的方向结合，让他们的呼吸与民主的脉搏同频，让中产阶级的声音与民主运动的心跳同步。
The Political Predicament of China’s Private Entrepreneurs and the Historical Opportunity for Democratic Transformation
— Strategic Reflections on Democracy in the CCP’s Era of “State Advances, Private Retreats”
Author: Li Baotan
Editor: Xing Wenjuan Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Liu Fang
Abstract: This article offers an in-depth analysis of the political-economic context of Xi Jinping’s era of “state advances, private retreats,” arguing that private entrepreneurs—an essential pillar of the middle class—now face systemic repression and a deep psychological dilemma. It calls on the pro-democracy movement to actively connect with the middle class and mobilize it as a decisive force for China’s democratization.
A fully fledged market economy and the growth of the middle class form the economic foundation for China’s transition to democracy and the rule of law. As Aristotle observed, “The best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class… If the middle class is numerous and stronger than the other classes, the state is usually well governed.” In today’s high-tech era, to force a CCP armed to the teeth to step down or undertake genuine reform, one must strategically use its own policies to weaken its authoritarian reactionism and maximize the living space for democracy and the rule of law. Therefore, exposing Xi Jinping’s backward turn, helping to push Xi out, and striving for reformers to take office is the most urgent, realistic, and consequential task for China’s democratic movement today. The movement should seize the pulse of the times, focus on the power of China’s middle class and the fate of private entrepreneurs, and think deeply about their political needs so as to find the best opening and opportunity for China’s democratic development.
Introduction: Wang Linpeng’s Fall and a Silent Class
On July 27, 2025, a terse news item rippled through business circles, the media, and social networks: Wang Linpeng, chairman of Easyhome, fell to his death from a Beijing high-rise while under judicial investigation. The official notice was “concise” as usual—vague cause, missing details. For the private sector, this was not a random accident but the latest footnote to a larger trend.
Since Xi Jinping took power, at least dozens of well-known private entrepreneurs—from real estate and the internet to manufacturing—have been forced overseas, arrested and sentenced, or have “died unexpectedly” while under investigation or restrictions on personal liberty: Xiao Jianhua, Xu Jiayin, Wu Xiaohui, Guo Wengui, Jia Yueting, Sun Dawu, Wang Jian, Duan Weihong, Bao Fan, Lin Shengbin, among others. Since April alone this year, four prominent entrepreneurs have leapt to their deaths (see table). Behind these cases lies a deeper reality: the private economy is under the harshest political and institutional pressure it has faced since the start of reform and opening.
Table1. Prominent Private Entrepreneurs Who Died by Suicide in the Past Three Months
Such a strikingly similar list reveals a pattern: in the institutional atmosphere of “state advances, private retreats,” private entrepreneurs’ sense of security and presence is being stripped away step by step.
Even more dangerous is this: China’s middle class and private entrepreneurs—the society’s central stratum—lack political representation and protection. They cannot safeguard themselves within the system, nor do they have channels to speak outside it. Their silence is being read by the regime as a green light for endless tightening.
Therefore, when discussing realistic pathways to democracy, we must move beyond abstract institutional ideals and face a concrete question: How can limited space be used to protect and expand the strength of the middle class and the market economy so they become the foundational force for democracy and the rule of law?
I. Middle Class and Private Enterprise: Economic Pillars of Modern Democracy
Comparative experiences in political sociology show that economic diversification fosters relatively independent social strata; this in turn generates demands for the rule of law and rights, from which a law-abiding middle class emerges as a key driver of democratic institutions. In modernization processes, the middle class is often both the guarantor of stability and a catalyst for democratization. Barrington Moore’s dictum—“No bourgeoisie, no democracy”—is not an absolute truth, but it fits China’s context with particular force.
Private entrepreneurs are not only wealth creators but also a major source of middle-class formation. They employ workers, drive innovation, stimulate consumption, pay taxes, and constitute economic power relatively independent of the state apparatus. Once this economic power gains legal protection and political rights, it can check arbitrary authority and support reform.
The private economy’s rise since reform and opening has been a story of arduous ascent:
1980s: individual businesses and township-and-village enterprises sprouted—marginal yet brimming with vitality;
1990s–early 2000s: rapid expansion of the private sector, initial entrenchment of market mechanisms, marked growth of the middle class;
Hu–Wen period: despite stalled political reform, economic freedom was relatively high, yielding a “golden decade” for entrepreneurs;
Xi era: under banners such as “risk prevention” and “common prosperity,” state capital permeated private domains; “state advances, private retreats” became the new normal.
In China’s context, private entrepreneurs—together with their employees, upstream and downstream partners, and dependent households—constitute a core of the middle class. According to combined estimates by the National Bureau of Statistics and independent institutions for 2023:
Private enterprises contribute over 60% of GDP;
Create over 80% of urban employment;
Provide over 70% of technological innovation;
Account for over 90% of all registered firms.
These figures map the social structure, not just the economy. A retreat of the private economy means a shrinking middle class; a shrinking middle class weakens the endogenous momentum for democracy and the rule of law.
II. The Internal Logic Linking Market Economy, Rule of Law, and Democratization
The economy and politics are not connected by a single cause-and-effect line, but modern history shows that a relatively free market economy nurtures civil society, and civil society is the seedbed of democracy. A healthy market requires protection of private property, respect for contracts, and an independent judiciary. Taiwan’s democratization in the late 1980s owed much to high marketization and a growing middle class; South Korea and Chile likewise demonstrate how diversified economic structures and a confident middle class propel democratic waves. Marketization is not sufficient for democracy, but it is an important precondition, because:
Property-rights security: markets require clear, stable property rights backed by independent courts and transparent legislation.
Contractual ethos: commerce fosters rule-based cooperation and fair competition—cultures that align with democratic politics.
Plural interests: market economies break up monopolies of power and create multi-centered, multi-interest social structures.
In China, forty years of reform produced an incomplete “half-market economy,” yet it partially broke the total control of the planned economy. Private firms and the middle class planted seeds for future political pluralism. This structure could have been a stairway to political modernization.
Regrettably, in the Xi era the sprout has been crushed. State monopolies reassert dominance; administrative orders override markets; party discipline displaces the law; and property protection remains paper-thin. This not only stifles economic vitality but also severs the path toward political modernization.
III. “State Advances, Private Retreats” and Structural Regression under Xi Jinping
“State advances, private retreats” did not originate with Xi, but it has been pushed to an extreme under his rule. It is more than an economic tactic; it is a political imperative, saturated with control.
Motivations
Primacy of regime security: fear that a large private sector dilutes Party control;
Fiscal dependence: SOEs serve as political instruments and fiscal conduits;
Ideological resurgence: “Party leadership over everything”—from heaven above to earth below, from east to west and north to south, everything belongs to the Party—re-nationalizing economic resources.
Manifestations
Finance: rectification of Ant Group; curbs on tech-giant financing; SMEs face lending drought while SOEs get cheap credit;
Real economy: abrupt real-estate tightening, the one-size-fits-all ban on private tutoring, and heavy controls on internet platforms; state capital acquires or takes stakes in quality private firms via SASAC, central and local SOE groups;
Institutional level: reinforced SOE monopolies and restricted private entry; judicial pressure that bypasses due process under banners like anti-corruption and financial security, directly intervening in operations and ownership.
Consequences
Investor confidence collapses; capital flight accelerates;
Innovation declines; high-tech industries buckle under external sanctions;
Large-scale layoffs and rising unemployment fuel social anxiety.
These are not just harbingers of recession; they are warnings that the soil for democratization is being hollowed out. The regression is economic self-harm and political self-sabotage—weakening the very forces most likely to drive institutional progress.
IV. Private Entrepreneurs’ Political Predicament and Psychological Crisis
Private entrepreneurs lack a clear political status, institutional protection, and workable avenues to defend interests under high-pressure regulation and policy uncertainty. Politically, they are isolated:
No representation: in the NPC and CPPCC, they are mere window dressing;
No protection: property rights are insecure; assets and liberty can be taken under the pretexts of “anti-corruption” or “security”;
High-pressure law enforcement: disciplinary bodies override courts; due process is hollow.
The result is chronic fear across the entrepreneurial class. Some transfer assets abroad, emigrate, or abandon their ventures. Suicides, arrests, and disappearances are not outliers but manifestations of collective despair. Their silence does not mean consent; it reflects a lack of safe channels to speak. Wang Linpeng’s fall is a cold emblem of this silent terror.
V. A Strategic Opening for the Democracy Movement: Engaging the Middle Class
In today’s high-tech information age, a militarized dictatorship will not be toppled by empty slogans. The path is to exploit the regime’s soft underbelly—policies that depend on the very economic forces it suppresses—thus weakening authoritarian roots and expanding democratic breathing room. Street politics or online chants alone cannot change power structures; the real breakthrough is to enlarge democracy’s economic and social base by leveraging the CCP’s own policy contradictions.
The middle class and private entrepreneurs are central to this soft spot: their economic interests and personal security hinge on the rule of law and institutional stability. Once they recognize that their fate is bound up with democratic legality, they can become natural allies of the movement. Why are they pivotal?
They have stable income and assets requiring legal protection;
Their education helps them grasp the importance of institutions;
They are economically independent and not wholly reliant on state relief.
What should the Chinese Democratic Party (CDP) do?
Be a spokesperson: consistently spotlight the plight of the middle class and private entrepreneurs in international discourse, shaping the perception that “democracy = economic security.”
Build information networks: create safe bridges, via overseas business and academic channels, between domestic and overseas entrepreneurs; proactively campaign to raise the political profile of China’s middle class.
Provide assistance: assemble legal, media, and economic support when entrepreneurs are persecuted; build intellectual and advocacy coalitions at home and abroad.
Policy advocacy: propose blueprints to protect property rights, encourage innovation, reduce administrative interference, and limit SOE monopolies.
Expand affiliated civic bodies of the CDP: e.g., a Private Entrepreneurs’ Mutual Aid Association, Intellectuals’ Solidarity Association, Middle-Class Spiritual Enlightenment Society (encouraging belief in conscience, soul, and moral causality), Entrepreneurs for Philanthropy Alliance, and similar mutual-aid organizations—broadening channels for association, assistance, and social space.
This is not only about protecting a group; it is banking the economic capital of a future democracy. To protect private entrepreneurs is to protect democracy’s economic lifeline.
VI. Conclusion: Seize the Pulse Before the Ruins Set
Wang Linpeng’s death must not become just another statistic; it should prompt a re-examination of China’s political-economic nexus. His fall is not only a personal tragedy; it is a historical alarm bell.
Forty years of reform-era gains are being crushed under the rollback of “state advances, private retreats.” If the foundation of the private economy collapses, China will lose its most promising social base for democratization.
The CDP’s mission is not only to oppose dictatorship but to proactively protect and expand the living space of the very strata capable of sustaining a future democratic order. To grasp them is to grasp the economic basis of China’s democratic and legal future—and the hope of its institutional renewal. To ignore them is to abandon the most realistic path to change.
History does not wait for the hesitant. As the CCP’s reversal destroys the economic and social gains of four decades, this is the decisive window. Before the ruins are fully set, we must seize the pulse of the age: align the interests of the middle class with the direction of the democracy movement, let their breathing keep time with democracy’s heartbeat, and let their voices resonate with its rhythm.
