会 议 提 案

一、案由

中国人民政治协商会议（政协）设立之初，其核心宗旨在于将各党派、各界别、各民族、各团体的代表纳入政治协商框架，实现“长期共存、互相监督、肝胆相照、荣辱与共”的政治协商原则。然而，当前政协的实际运作已严重偏离这一初衷，真正的反对派政党和持不同政见者被全面排斥在外，政治协商名存实亡。本提案旨在呼吁恢复政协作为政治协商机构的正常功能，切实落实《中国人民政治协商会议章程》的相关规定，向包括反对派政党、异议人士在内的各界人士开放政协席位，使政治协商制度回归真实、多元、包容的本来面目。

二、历史依据与现实背景

（一）政协的历史初衷。1949 年第一届中国人民政治协商会议召开时，共有各党派、各界别、各团体代表共 662 人出席，其中包括中国国民党革命委员会、中国民主同盟、中国民主建国会、中国致公党、九三学社、台湾民主自治同盟等多个党派和无党派民主人士。这一制度的设计初衷，是在新中国建立之初统一各方力量、共商国是。彼时的政协具有实质性的政治协商功能，各方可以自由发表不同意见。

（二）1957 年后的转折。反右运动后，政协的政治协商功能逐渐弱化。民主党派中大量敢于直言的人士被打成“右派”，从此以后，政协逐渐从政治协商机构异化为形式上的“统一战线组织”，反对意见被视为禁区，真正的政治协商名存实亡。

（三）当前政协的结构性缺陷。现今政协的委员构成中，各“民主党派”均自认“接受中国共产党领导”，不存在任何真正意义上的反对派或独立声音。异议人士、独立知识分子、民间组织代表、不同政治观点持有者均无法进入政协平台。这使得政协失去了其作为“政治协商”机构的核心意义。

三、提案内容与具体建议

基于上述历史依据与现实分析，本党郑重提出以下建议：

1. 开放政协席位给真正的反对派政党。允许包括中国民主党在内的未注册政党及独立政治团体派出代表参与政协会议，使政协席位真正体现“各党派”的多元性。

2. 邀请异议人士、独立知识分子参加政协。为长期关注公共事务、人权事业、法治建设的独立人士提供政协委员席位，包括但不限于维权律师、公共知识分子、独立媒体人、民间社会组织代表等。

3. 保障政协委员的言论自由与谏正质询权。任何政协委员在政协会议期间的发言、提案、质询不得作为政治追诉的依据，确立政协委员谏正免责权。

4. 建立政协提案的强制回复机制。政府部门对政协委员的提案必须在规定时限内作出书面回复，并向社会公开，接受全体政协委员的质询和监督。

5. 改革政协委员选拔机制。政协委员应通过其所代表界别的民主协商或选举产生，而非单纯由上级指定，以增强政协委员的代表性和合法性。

6. 公开政协会议过程。政协全体会议、小组讨论及提案审议应向媒体和公众开放，实现政治协商的透明化，接受全社会的监督。

四、提案理由

（一）实现《宪法》赋予公民的政治权利。《中华人民共和国宪法》第三十五条规定，公民有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行、示威的自由。将持不同政见者排斥在政治协商体制之外，违背了宪法精神。

（二）增强国家治理的合法性与有效性。当所有政治参与者均持相同立场时，政治协商失去意义。引入真正的反对派和不同声音，能形成有效的政策辩论和监督，提升决策质量，增强国家治理的合法性。

（三）回应社会多元化的现实需求。当今中国社会已高度多元化，不同的利益群体、价值观念、政治诉求广泛存在。政协作为“最广泛的爱国统一战线组织”，应当真正容纳和反映这种多元性，而非将其压制和消弭。

（四）展现制度自信。一个真正自信的政治制度，不应害怕不同声音，而应当通过包容和对话来展现其优越性。开放政协平台给反对派，正是制度自信的体现。

五、结语

政治协商的前提是多元与包容。没有反对派的参与，政治协商便无从谈起。中国民主党作为一个追求宪政民主的政党，愿意在政协的框架内，以和平、理性、建设性的方式参与国家治理，为中国的政治文明进步贡献力量。

我们期望政协能够回归其历史使命，成为真正的多党派政治协商平台，而非形式主义的橡皮图章。这不仅是对政协创立者的告慰，更是对十四亿中国人民政治权利的尊重。

提案人：中国民主党：朱虞夫、郑存柱2026 年3 月4 日

Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

Conference Proposal

Title of Proposal:	Restoring the Proper Function of the CPPCC: Inviting Opposition Parties and Dissidents to Participate in the Political Consultative Conference
Proposers:	China Democracy Party: Zhu Yufu, Zheng Cunzhu
Date of Submission:	March 4, 2026
Category:	Political System Reform

I. Rationale

When the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was first established, its core purpose was to incorporate representatives from various political parties, sectors of society, ethnic groups, and organizations into the framework of political consultation, thereby realizing the principles of “long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, frank and open communication, and sharing both honor and disgrace.” However, the CPPCC’s current operations have severely deviated from this original intent. Genuine opposition parties and dissidents have been completely excluded, rendering the political consultation system a mere formality. This proposal aims to call for the restoration of the CPPCC’s normal functions as a political consultation body, to effectively implement the relevant provisions of the Charter of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and to open CPPCC seats to representatives from all sectors of society—including opposition parties and dissidents—so that the political consultation system may return to its true, diverse, and inclusive nature.

II. Historical Basis and Current Context

(1) The Original Intent of the CPPCC. When the First Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was convened in 1949, a total of 662 representatives from various political parties, sectors, and organizations attended, including members of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, the China Democratic League, the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the China Zhi Gong Party, the Jiusan Society, the Taiwan Democratic Autonomous League, and other political parties, as well as non-partisan democratic figures. The original design of this system was to unify all forces and jointly deliberate on state affairs at the dawn of the People’s Republic of China. At that time, the CPPCC possessed substantive political consultation functions, and all parties could freely express differing opinions.

(2) The Turning Point After 1957. Following the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the CPPCC’s political consultative function gradually weakened. A large number of outspoken figures within the democratic parties were labeled as “rightists.” From then on, the CPPCC gradually transformed from a political consultative body into a nominal “united front organization.” Dissenting opinions were treated as off-limits, and genuine political consultation became a mere formality.

(3) Structural Deficiencies of the Current CPPCC. In the current composition of CPPCC members, all “democratic parties” acknowledge that they “accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China,” and there are no opposition parties or independent voices in any meaningful sense. Dissenters, independent intellectuals, representatives of civil society organizations, and those holding differing political views are unable to gain access to the CPPCC platform. This has caused the CPPCC to lose its core significance as an institution for “political consultation.”

III. Proposal Content and Specific Recommendations

Based on the historical context and current analysis outlined above, our Party solemnly proposes the following recommendations:

1. Open CPPCC seats to genuine opposition parties. Allow unregistered political parties, including the China Democratic Party, and independent political groups to send representatives to participate in CPPCC sessions, ensuring that CPPCC seats truly reflect the diversity of “all political parties.”

2. Invite dissidents and independent intellectuals to participate in the CPPCC. Provide CPPCC member seats to independent individuals who have long been concerned with public affairs, human rights, and the rule of law, including but not limited to rights defense lawyers, public intellectuals, independent media professionals, and representatives of civil society organizations.

3. Guarantee CPPCC members’ freedom of speech and their right to offer advice and raise inquiries. No remarks, proposals, or inquiries made by any CPPCC member during CPPCC sessions shall be used as grounds for political prosecution; establish immunity for CPPCC members regarding their right to offer advice and criticism.

4. Establish a mandatory response mechanism for CPPCC proposals. Government departments must provide written responses to CPPCC members’ proposals within the prescribed timeframe, make these responses public, and be subject to inquiry and oversight by all CPPCC members.

5. Reform the selection mechanism for CPPCC members. CPPCC members should be selected through democratic consultation or election within the sectors they represent, rather than simply being appointed by higher authorities, to enhance their representativeness and legitimacy.

6. Make the proceedings of CPPCC meetings public. Plenary sessions, group discussions, and proposal deliberations of the CPPCC should be open to the media and the public to ensure the transparency of political consultation and to accept oversight from society as a whole.

IV. Rationale for the Proposal

(1) Realizing the political rights granted to citizens by the Constitution. Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that citizens have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration. Excluding dissidents from the political consultation system runs counter to the spirit of the Constitution.

(2) Enhancing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of National Governance. When all political participants hold identical positions, political consultation loses its meaning. Introducing genuine opposition and dissenting voices can foster effective policy debate and oversight, improve the quality of decision-making, and strengthen the legitimacy of national governance.

(3) Responding to the Real-World Demands of a Diverse Society. Contemporary Chinese society is highly diverse, with a wide range of interest groups, value systems, and political demands. As the “broadest patriotic united front organization,” the CPPCC should genuinely accommodate and reflect this diversity, rather than suppressing or eliminating it.

(4) Demonstrating institutional confidence. A truly confident political system should not fear dissenting voices but should demonstrate its superiority through inclusiveness and dialogue. Opening the CPPCC platform to the opposition is precisely a manifestation of such institutional confidence.

V. Conclusion

The prerequisites for political consultation are pluralism and inclusiveness. Without the participation of the opposition, political consultation is impossible. As a political party committed to constitutional democracy, the China Democratic Party is willing to participate in national governance within the framework of the CPPCC in a peaceful, rational, and constructive manner, contributing to the advancement of China’s political civilization.

We hope that the CPPCC will return to its historical mission and become a genuine multi-party political consultation platform, rather than a rubber-stamp body mired in formalism. This would not only honor the memory of the CPPCC’s founders but also demonstrate respect for the political rights of China’s 1.4 billion people.

Proposers: China Democratic Party: Zhu Yufu, Zheng Cunzhu

March 4, 2026

2026年政府工作报告宣布，城乡居民基础养老金再次提高20元。这个数字被包装为“民生改善”，被当作国家关怀农村老人的证明。然而，当我们把这20元放进真实的生活语境中，就会发现，这更像是一种制度性的敷衍，甚至是一种对底层群体长期忽视后的象征性安抚。

一个最简单的问题是：20元能改变什么？当一碗面接近20元，一次普通就医远超其数额，这种调整几乎不具备实际意义。农村老人每月两三百元的养老金，本就无法覆盖基本生活，更不用说医疗、护理与意外支出。当国家以如此微小的幅度调整养老金，却将其宣传为重大民生进步时，问题就不再只是经济问题，而是政治问题。

真正的矛盾在于，中国的发展模式长期建立在对农民的制度性牺牲之上。土地制度、户籍制度、社会保障制度，都在不同程度上把农民排除在现代福利体系之外。数亿农民在工业化与城市化进程中提供了廉价劳动力，承担了通货膨胀与公共服务不足的风险，却在年老之后只能领取象征性的养老金。这不是偶然的政策失误，而是体制逻辑的必然结果。

更值得警惕的是，在缺乏民主监督与权力制衡的环境下，公共财政的使用优先级往往由少数决策者决定，而非通过社会讨论形成共识。农民既没有真正意义上的政治代表，也缺乏独立组织表达利益诉求的空间。他们的养老困境很难转化为制度压力，只能被动等待自上而下的“施舍式改革”。当权力无需为选票负责时，最弱势群体的利益自然最容易被忽视。

与此同时，大量资源被投入到维稳体系、形象工程以及各种宏大叙事中，而基础民生保障却长期停留在低水平微调。养老金每年象征性上涨几十元，不仅无法解决问题，反而可能强化一种危险的信号：只要社会缺乏反抗能力，再不合理的待遇也可以被合理化。这种“温水煮青蛙式”的政策调整，让不公平逐渐常态化，让底层群体习惯于低预期生存。

有人将这种政策称为“德政”，因为毕竟是增加了。但真正的德政，应当是保障人的尊严，而不是维持最低限度的生存。一个国家如果在拥有巨大财政与发展成就的同时，仍让农村老人依靠两三百元度过晚年，那么问题显然不在于有没有能力，而在于有没有意愿。

因此，农民养老金只涨20元，并不是简单的财政选择，而是一面镜子。它映照出一个高度集权体制在面对底层民生问题时的真实态度：可以缓慢调整，但不愿触动结构；可以象征改善，但避免制度重构。只要权力缺乏来自社会的有效约束，这种局面就很难根本改变。

对于普通人而言，真正值得思考的，不是这20元是否太少，而是为什么在一个强调“人民至上”的政治叙事中，最需要保障的人却始终站在福利体系的边缘。真正的民生改善，应当以人的尊严为尺度，而非以最低生存为底线。当一个社会无法保障最基础的养老尊严，其发展成就也将失去根基。

作者：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰

2026.3.15

Peasants’ Pensions Rise by Only 20 Yuan

Abstract: With peasants’ pensions increasing by a mere 20 yuan, it is difficult to improve their actual living conditions, reflecting systemic neglect and welfare imbalances. In the absence of oversight and representative mechanisms, marginalized groups have long been sidelined, and symbolic adjustments mask structural problems.

The 2026 Government Work Report announced that the basic pension for urban and rural residents would be raised by another 20 yuan. This figure has been packaged as an “improvement in people’s livelihoods” and presented as proof of the state’s care for rural seniors. However, when we place these 20 yuan within the context of real life, we find that it resembles more of a systemic evasion—or even a symbolic appeasement following long-term neglect of the underprivileged.

The simplest question is: What can 20 yuan really change? When a bowl of noodles costs nearly 20 yuan and a routine medical visit far exceeds that amount, such an adjustment is virtually meaningless. The monthly pension of two or three hundred yuan for rural seniors is already insufficient to cover basic living expenses, let alone medical care, nursing, and unexpected costs. When the state adjusts pensions by such a minuscule amount yet promotes it as a major advancement in people’s livelihoods, the issue ceases to be merely an economic one and becomes a political one.

The real contradiction lies in the fact that China’s development model has long been built upon the institutional sacrifice of peasants. Land systems, household registration systems, and social security systems all exclude peasants from modern welfare systems to varying degrees. Hundreds of millions of peasants have provided cheap labor during the processes of industrialization and urbanization, shouldering the risks of inflation and inadequate public services, yet in their old age, they can only receive symbolic pensions. This is not an accidental policy blunder, but the inevitable result of the system’s logic.

What is even more alarming is that, in an environment lacking democratic oversight and checks on power, the priorities for public finance are often determined by a handful of decision-makers rather than through social discussion leading to consensus. Peasants have neither genuine political representation nor the space to organize independently to articulate their interests. Their pension predicament is unlikely to translate into institutional pressure; they can only passively await top-down “charity-style reforms.” When those in power are not accountable to the electorate, the interests of the most vulnerable groups are naturally the easiest to overlook.

Meanwhile, vast resources are poured into stability maintenance systems, vanity projects, and various grand narratives, while basic livelihood protections remain stuck at a low level, subject only to minor adjustments. Annual symbolic pension increases of a few dozen yuan not only fail to solve the problem but may reinforce a dangerous signal: as long as society lacks the capacity to resist, even the most unreasonable treatment can be rationalized. This “the boiling frog phenomenon” approach to policy adjustment gradually normalizes inequality and conditions the underprivileged to survive with low expectations.

Some label such policies as “benevolent governance” simply because they represent an increase. But true benevolent governance should safeguard human dignity, not merely sustain the bare minimum of survival. If a nation, despite possessing immense fiscal resources and development achievements, still leaves rural elders to rely on two or three hundred yuan to get through their twilight years, then the problem clearly lies not in a lack of capability, but in a lack of will.

Therefore, the 20-yuan increase in peasants’ pensions is not merely a fiscal choice, but a mirror. It reflects the true attitude of a highly centralized system when confronting the livelihood issues of the underprivileged: it is willing to make gradual adjustments, but unwilling to touch the underlying structure; it may offer symbolic improvements, but avoids systemic restructuring. As long as power lacks effective constraints from society, this situation will be difficult to fundamentally change.

For ordinary people, what truly merits reflection is not whether 20 yuan is too little, but why, within a political narrative that emphasizes “the people first,” those most in need of protection remain perpetually on the margins of the welfare system. True improvement in people’s livelihoods should be measured by human dignity, not by the bare minimum required for survival. When a society fails to guarantee the most basic dignity in old age, its developmental achievements will also lose their foundation.

Author: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

March 15, 2026

（一）

索求赔偿、恢复律师执业

        赔偿：按照上海市相应年份的律师平均收入的标准赔偿自2020年4月1日起至恢复本人律师执业之日止的收入损失（含两年半期间限制人身自由的损失）。

上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正，你们好！

        记得，上次给上海市委、市政府写公开信是四年前上海封城期间，要求当时的书记李强和龚正你鼓气勇气，勇于承担历史责任解封上海。

       我是2021年1月29日在李强任中共市委书记、市长龚正、局长陆卫东期间被“合法”注销律师执业证的中国公民彭永和

      之所以是合法，那是因为上海是要脸且会“用法“的地方————注销的事实依据是“无律所聘用”。

      然，事实是，前后我签订了三家律师事务所。

       2020年3月30日签订的第一家在我办完手续离开原所不到十分种就来电了，说：“听律师说你有政治倾向问题，我不能拿律所去赌”。为此，我特意写信给上海市司法局和上海市人民政府还做了一个视频，问：什么样的政治倾向在上海是可以做律师的？什么样的政治倾向在上海是不可以做律师的？强调：本人接受普世价值，坚决反对专政、反对独裁——如果这属于政治倾向。

        ——你们两位是不是跟我有同样上述的“政治倾向”？我赌你陈吉宁一定是！理由：你在英国的书没有白读！

        2020年7月14日第三家律所的主任中午请我吃了午饭，饭后让我帮他完善修改聘用合同条款，下午离开律所一个半小时左右，这家律所主任就打电话过来说：“司法局说你不能转到浦东来，我没想到你情况这么严重（签合同前我对他大致讲了我的情况）。为此，我又做了一个视频说：“在上海有一股神秘的力量在阻止本人律师执业，找律所签合同的事情没有告诉任何人，手续也还没有提交到司法局，怎么就被知道了呢，难道是我被跟踪了或是通信被监控了，这跟踪监控的活司法局能干吗？

       后，“厕所革命”领导人季孝龙出狱期间国保来我这“深刻交代”时说………——二位猜猜他们说了什么？

       律师证被注销大概就两三天后，国保跟我说，该信访信访，该诉讼诉讼。我回复说：“我是白痴吗？我去向把我律师证干掉的人申冤，我脑子坏掉了”？

      向对自己做局的人寻求救济维权，是不是脑子坏掉——书记、市长你们说是不是？

       全国的公民、访民你们说是不是？

       律师证被合法注销后，我就被24小时，两班倒，每班2人，看守了两年半！

      疫情上海封城期间借“         ”公开信，委托李强书记帮我问问龚正你——上海市民会允许你们这样糟踏他们纳税的钱吗？

————借此机会，我要再问一下全体上海市民——你们同意他们这么做吗？

     文述到此，请问：书记陈吉宁、市长龚正，我彭永和的律师证是不是被中共上海市委、市政府领导下的某些“滥用职权”的腐败份子搞掉的？我彭永和有没有权利要求赔偿？我彭永和的律师证该不该恢复？

       

       另外，本人制定的《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则草案》已经发给律协和司法局，规则的制定和促进颁布是我对上海全体律师作出的承诺。麻烦二位帮我一个忙、帮上海全体律师一个忙——要求上海市司法局限期上海市律师协会制定颁布《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则》——书记陈吉宁、市长龚正，可以吗？

         就以上问题的处理，我期待你们两位的作为。同时，我邀请全体中国公民，尤其是上海的市民和律师跟我一起做这个见证。

 

        最后，2026年1月1日我被11人安全从北京带回上海，带回上海前两天的12月30日晚上在北京发生的我跟上海公安一起“锻炼健身”的故事，哪天兴趣来了我跟你们讲讲。

        结尾，看到此文的中国公民、外国友人如果你知道或判断是谁非法阻止我在上海律师执业，麻烦联系我或者有关部门，陈吉宁书记、龚正市长公务繁忙就不要打扰他们了，以便后续本人维权、党和政府打击腐败。

      本人微信电话13816353773，住上海市浦东新区航头镇沈庄村15组52号。

     

                                                       公民：彭永和

                                                       2026年3月1日

An Open Letter from Former Shanghai Lawyer Peng Yonghe to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government

(I)

Seeking Compensation and Restoration of Law Practice

Compensation: Compensation for loss of income from April 1, 2020, until the date my law practice is restored, based on the standard average income for lawyers in Shanghai for the corresponding years (including compensation for the loss of personal freedom during the two-and-a-half-year period).

Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng, Hello!

I remember the last time I wrote an open letter to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government was four years ago during the Shanghai lockdown. I requested the then-Secretary Li Qiang and you, Gong Zheng, to summon your courage and dare to take historical responsibility to lift the lockdown on Shanghai.

I am Peng Yonghe, a Chinese citizen whose lawyer’s practicing certificate was “legally” revoked on January 29, 2021, during the tenure of Li Qiang as Secretary of the CPC Municipal Committee, Gong Zheng as Mayor, and Lu Weidong as Bureau Director.

The reason it was “legal” is that Shanghai is a place that cares about its “face” and knows how to “use the law”—the factual basis for the revocation was “no law firm employment.”

However, the fact is that I had signed contracts with three law firms one after another.

On March 30, 2020, less than ten minutes after I finished the procedures to leave my original firm, the first firm I signed with called and said: “I heard from other lawyers that you have political orientation issues; I cannot gamble with my law firm.” To this end, I specifically wrote a letter to the Shanghai Municipal Justice Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government and made a video, asking: What kind of political orientation allows one to be a lawyer in Shanghai? What kind of political orientation prohibits one from being a lawyer in Shanghai? I emphasized: I accept universal values and resolutely oppose dictatorship and autocracy—if that counts as a political orientation.

—Do you two share the same “political orientation” as mentioned above? I bet you, Chen Jining, definitely do! The reason: Your time studying in the UK was not in vain!

On July 14, 2020, the director of a third law firm treated me to lunch. After the meal, he asked me to help him refine and modify the terms of the employment contract. About an hour and a half after I left the firm that afternoon, the director called and said: “The Justice Bureau said you cannot transfer to Pudong. I didn’t realize your situation was so serious” (I had given him a general overview of my situation before signing the contract). For this, I made another video saying: “There is a mysterious force in Shanghai preventing me from practicing law. I didn’t tell anyone about finding a firm to sign a contract, and the procedures hadn’t even been submitted to the Justice Bureau yet—how did they find out? Could it be that I am being followed or my communications are being monitored? Is following and monitoring something the Justice Bureau can do?”

Later, when Ji Xiaolong, the leader of the “Toilet Revolution,” was released from prison, the domestic security officers (Guobao) came to me for a “profound confession” and said… —Can you two guess what they said?

About two or three days after my lawyer’s certificate was revoked, the domestic security told me I could file petitions (Xinfan) or lawsuits as I saw fit. I replied: “Am I an idiot? Am I out of my mind, going to seek redress from the very people who destroyed my lawyer’s certificate?”

Seeking relief and rights protection from the people who set you up—isn’t that being out of one’s mind? Secretary, Mayor, what do you say?

Citizens and petitioners across the country, what do you say?

After my lawyer’s certificate was “legally” revoked, I was watched 24 hours a day, in two shifts with two people per shift, for two and a half years!

During the Shanghai lockdown, I used a “_____” open letter to entrust Secretary Li Qiang to ask you, Gong Zheng—would the citizens of Shanghai allow you to squander their tax money like this?

—Taking this opportunity, I want to ask all Shanghai citizens again—do you agree to them doing this?

Having written to this point, I ask: Secretary Chen Jining, Mayor Gong Zheng, was my lawyer’s certificate destroyed by certain corrupt elements “abusing their power” under the leadership of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee and Municipal Government? Do I, Peng Yonghe, have the right to demand compensation? Should my lawyer’s certificate be restored?

Additionally, the “Draft Rules for the Election and Recall of the Shanghai Bar Association” that I formulated has already been sent to the Bar Association and the Justice Bureau. The formulation and promotion of the promulgation of these rules is my promise to all lawyers in Shanghai. I trouble you two to do me a favor, and do all lawyers in Shanghai a favor—require the Shanghai Municipal Justice Bureau to set a deadline for the Shanghai Bar Association to formulate and promulgate the “Rules for the Election and Recall of the Shanghai Bar Association”—Secretary Chen Jining, Mayor Gong Zheng, is that possible?

Regarding the handling of the above issues, I look forward to your actions. At the same time, I invite all Chinese citizens, especially the citizens and lawyers of Shanghai, to join me as witnesses.

Finally, on January 1, 2026, I was safely brought back to Shanghai from Beijing by 11 people. Regarding the story of me “exercising and keeping fit” together with the Shanghai public security in Beijing on the night of December 30, two days before I was brought back—I will tell you about it when I feel like it.

In closing, to any Chinese citizen or foreign friend seeing this: if you know or can judge who illegally prevented me from practicing law in Shanghai, please contact me or the relevant departments. Since Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng are busy with official duties, do not disturb them, so that I may proceed with protecting my rights and the Party and government can crack down on corruption.

My WeChat and phone number is 13816353773. I live at No. 52, Group 15, Shenzhuang Village, Hangtou Town, Pudong New Area, Shanghai.

Citizen: Peng Yonghe

March 1, 2026

朱虞夫先生：

您好！

近日拜读您与郑存柱先生联名提出的《中国人民政治协商会议提案——恢复政协的正常功能：邀请反对派政党、异议人士参加政治协商会议》。通篇阅读之后，我对您长期以来为中国民主事业所付出的勇气与坚持，依然深怀敬意。您在提案中提出，希望恢复政协设立之初的政治协商精神，让包括反对派政党、异议人士在内的不同政治力量进入协商体系，从而推动中国政治制度向更加开放、多元、包容的方向发展。这种以和平、理性方式推动政治进步的愿望，本身体现了一种建设性的政治理想。

然而，在认真思考之后，我仍有一些不同的看法，愿以坦诚而尊重的方式向您提出讨论。

从历史经验来看，中国共产党执政七十余年以来，其政治结构、权力运行方式以及对社会的控制机制，已经形成了高度封闭且自我保护的体系。在这样的体系之中，真正意义上的政治协商空间极为有限。虽然在某些历史时期曾出现过短暂的“政治协商”的表面景象，但很快便以严厉的政治运动作为收场。1957年的反右运动，正是一个深刻而沉痛的历史例证。许多原本被邀请“帮助共产党整风”的知识分子和民主人士，最终却被打成“右派”，其后数十年的人生命运因此彻底改变。

这一历史事实，使人不得不对“体制内部改良”的可能性产生深刻怀疑。

表面上看，中国人民政治协商会议在制度设计上，本应成为多党派参与公共事务的重要平台。但在现实运作中，所谓“民主党派”早已成为体制内的附属组织，它们在政治上公开承认并接受中国共产党的领导，缺乏真正独立的政治立场与监督能力。在这样的结构下，政协更多呈现为一种象征性的政治仪式，而非真实意义上的政策辩论与制度监督平台。

因此，尽管您提出邀请反对派政党与异议人士进入政协，是一种试图恢复制度本意的努力，但这一设想依然建立在一个前提之上：即中国共产党愿意主动开放权力结构，并允许真正的政治竞争与监督存在。

而这一前提，在现实政治逻辑中却显得极其脆弱，不现实的。

纵观近几十年的政治发展，特别是习上台之后，中国共产党不仅没有逐渐放松对社会与政治空间的控制，反而在多个领域呈现出更加集中化和收紧化的趋势。独立媒体空间不断缩小，民间组织受到严格限制，言论环境日趋紧张。在这样的背景下，邀请真正的反对派进入政协，恐怕不仅难以实现，甚至在现行政治环境中几乎没有现实可能。

更进一步说，中国社会之所以不断出现要求改革的声音，恰恰说明现行体制已经积累了大量深层矛盾。如果一个制度在几十年时间里始终拒绝建立真正的权力制衡机制，拒绝允许社会力量参与政治监督，那么这种制度本身就很难通过局部修补来完成自我更新。

正因如此，我个人逐渐形成一种较为悲观却也更加现实的判断：单纯寄希望于体制内部的改良，是不可能解决中国政治结构中长期积累的问题的。

历史上许多国家的经验表明，当权力长期缺乏监督与制衡时，制度内部往往难以自我纠正。真正的政治转型，往往来自社会力量、历史环境以及制度压力的综合作用，而不是仅仅依靠执政集团的自觉改变。

因此，在我看来，与其期待一个已经高度固化的权力体系主动开放，不如更加清醒地认识历史发展的规律。任何政权，无论其力量多么强大，只要长期背离社会公义与人民权利，终究无法逃避历史的审判。历史长河中曾经不可一世的统治集团，最终大多都成为时代的过客。

当然，这并不意味着我们应当放弃理性、和平与文明的原则。恰恰相反，在面对复杂而漫长的历史进程时，更需要保持理性的思考与道义的坚持。对于过去历史中发生的种种政治迫害与制度性伤害，也终究需要在未来某个阶段通过公开、透明、法治化的方式进行历史清算与责任追究。这既是对受害者的尊重，也是一个国家实现真正和解与重建所必须经历的过程。

先生长期以来以诗人与行动者的身份参与中国民主运动，您的经历本身已经成为中国当代历史的一部分。正因如此，我也十分希望未来中国的政治讨论能够更加坦诚、多元，而不同路径之间也能够彼此理解、相互讨论。

对于中国未来的道路，我们或许有不同的判断与策略。但所有追求自由、法治与尊严的人们，最终的目标应当是一致的——那就是建立一个真正尊重公民权利、拥有制度制衡、能够保障人性尊严的现代国家。

谨以此信表达个人的一点思考，若有不当之处，尚祈海涵。

顺颂

安好。

中国民主党旧金山宣传部副部长 

《北京之春》《在野党》旧金山记者站站长 缪青

2026年3月6日

朱虞夫回复缪青：

缪青先生的信写得非常好 ！我完全赞同。中共的本质难道还有人比我更清楚吗？王某的信与我没有任何关系，难道我还不知道其醉翁之意吗？有人对苍蝇说，我给你消消毒，苍蝇不会答应，因为它的本质必须是脏的。但是可以通过苍蝇的讳疾忌医让大家更看清中共是什么货色。我发此文到群里的时候给张致君说，用意一，给中共添堵；用意二，给国内民主党朋友打气。与其空喊口号，不如大家都来为“两会”献计献策。

An Open Letter to Mr. Zhu Yufu

Mr. Zhu Yufu:

Hello!

Recently, I read the “Proposal for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—Restoring the Normal Functions of the CPPCC: Inviting Opposition Parties and Dissidents to Participate in the Political Consultative Conference,” jointly proposed by you and Mr. Zheng Cunzhu. After reading it in its entirety, I still harbor deep respect for the courage and persistence you have long dedicated to China’s democratic cause. In your proposal, you suggest restoring the spirit of political consultation as it existed at the founding of the CPPCC, allowing different political forces—including opposition parties and dissidents—to enter the consultative system, thereby promoting the development of China’s political system toward a more open, pluralistic, and inclusive direction. This desire to advance political progress through peaceful and rational means itself embodies a constructive political ideal.

However, after careful reflection, I still hold some differing views and wish to present them for discussion in a candid and respectful manner.

From the perspective of historical experience, in the seventy-plus years since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power, its political structure, the way power operates, and its mechanisms for social control have formed a highly closed and self-protective system. Within such a system, the space for political consultation in any true sense is extremely limited. Although brief “political consultation” facades appeared during certain historical periods, they were quickly concluded with severe political movements. The Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 is a profound and painful historical example. Many intellectuals and democratic figures who were originally invited to “help the Communist Party rectify its style” were ultimately labeled as “Rightists,” and their fates for the following decades were completely transformed as a result.

This historical fact forces one to harbor deep doubts about the possibility of “internal reform within the system.”

On the surface, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was originally intended in its institutional design to be an important platform for multi-party participation in public affairs. But in reality, the so-called “democratic parties” have long since become subordinate organizations within the system; they publicly acknowledge and accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party politically, lacking truly independent political stances and supervisory capabilities. Under such a structure, the CPPCC functions more as a symbolic political ritual than a platform for genuine policy debate and institutional oversight.

Therefore, although your proposal to invite opposition parties and dissidents into the CPPCC is an effort to restore the original intent of the institution, this vision is still built upon a premise: that the Chinese Communist Party is willing to actively open its power structure and allow for the existence of true political competition and supervision.

And this premise, in the logic of real-world politics, appears extremely fragile and unrealistic.

Looking at the political developments of recent decades, particularly since Xi took office, the Chinese Communist Party has not only failed to gradually relax its control over social and political spaces but has instead shown a trend toward greater centralization and tightening in multiple fields. The space for independent media continues to shrink, civil organizations are strictly restricted, and the environment for speech is becoming increasingly tense. In this context, inviting true opposition into the CPPCC is likely not only difficult to achieve but almost a physical impossibility in the current political environment.

Furthermore, the fact that calls for reform continue to emerge in Chinese society precisely proves that the current system has accumulated a large number of deep-seated contradictions. If a system has consistently refused to establish true mechanisms for checks and balances and refused to allow social forces to participate in political supervision over several decades, then it is very difficult for such a system to complete self-renewal through partial repairs.

Because of this, I have personally gradually formed a relatively pessimistic yet more realistic judgment: simply pinning hopes on reform from within the system is incapable of solving the problems long accumulated in China’s political structure.

The experiences of many countries in history show that when power lacks supervision and checks and balances for a long time, the interior of the system often finds it difficult to correct itself. True political transition often comes from the combined effects of social forces, the historical environment, and institutional pressure, rather than relying solely on the conscious change of the ruling group.

Therefore, in my view, rather than expecting a highly solidified power system to open up voluntarily, it is better to have a clearer understanding of the laws of historical development. Any regime, no matter how powerful its strength, will ultimately be unable to escape the judgment of history as long as it deviates from social justice and the rights of the people for a long time. Most of the ruling groups that were once insufferably arrogant in the long river of history eventually became mere passersby of the era.

Of course, this does not mean we should abandon the principles of rationality, peace, and civilization. On the contrary, when facing a complex and long historical process, it is even more necessary to maintain rational thinking and moral persistence. Regarding the various political persecutions and institutional injuries that occurred in the past, historical accountability and the pursuit of responsibility through open, transparent, and legalized means will eventually be required at some future stage. This is both a sign of respect for the victims and a process that a country must undergo to achieve true reconciliation and reconstruction.

You have long participated in the Chinese democracy movement as both a poet and an activist; your experience has itself become a part of contemporary Chinese history. Because of this, I also very much hope that China’s future political discussions can be more candid and pluralistic, and that different paths can understand and discuss one another.

Regarding China’s future path, we may have different judgments and strategies. But the ultimate goal of all people who pursue freedom, the rule of law, and dignity should be consistent—that is, to establish a modern country that truly respects civil rights, possesses institutional checks and balances, and can guarantee human dignity.

I offer this letter to express a few of my personal thoughts. If there are any improprieties, I pray for your indulgence.

Wishing you well.

Miao Qing Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the China Democracy Party, San Francisco Station Chief of the San Francisco Press Station for “Beijing Spring” and “The Opposition Party”

March 6, 2026

Zhu Yufu’s Reply to Miao Qing:

Mr. Miao Qing’s letter is written very well! I completely agree. Is there anyone who understands the essence of the CCP better than I do? That letter by a certain Mr. Wang has nothing to do with me; do I not already know his “ulterior motives” (literally: the drunkard’s heart is not in the wine)? If someone says to a fly, “I’ll disinfect you,” the fly won’t agree, because its essence must be dirty. However, through the fly’s “refusal to face its illness,” we can let everyone see more clearly what kind of “goods” the CCP really is. When I sent this text to the group, I told Zhang Zhijun: Intent one, to cause trouble for the CCP; Intent two, to boost the morale of Democracy Party friends inside the country. Instead of shouting empty slogans, it is better for everyone to come and offer “advice and suggestions” for the “Two Sessions.”

作者：朱晓娜
编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩

2025年2月17日，李延贺一案在上海市第一中级人民法院一审宣判。官方通报称，其因“煽动分裂国家罪”被判处有期徒刑三年，剥夺政治权利一年，并处没收个人财产人民币五万元。通报还表示，当事人当庭表示认罪服法，在法定上诉期内未提起上诉，判决已经生效。

李延贺是台湾出版机构八旗文化的出版人，多年来出版了大量涉及中国历史、政治以及社会问题的书籍。2023年，他在上海探亲期间被有关部门带走调查。此案在很长时间里缺乏公开信息，直到判决公布，外界才逐渐了解案件结果。

作为一名曾经生活在中国大陆、如今身在海外的华人，我看到这样的新闻感到十分沉重。因为我非常清楚，在中国表达不同意见可能带来的后果。我曾经因为在社交媒体上发表个人经历以及对社会问题的看法，被当地警方上门要求删除相关内容。当时的经历让我深刻意识到，在中国，普通公民的表达空间是十分有限的。

那次事件之后，我开始更加关注中国的言论环境以及公民权利问题。我逐渐意识到，很多社会问题之所以长期存在，很大程度上是因为缺乏公开讨论和自由表达的空间。当不同意见无法被表达时，社会也就失去了自我修正的能力。

后来我来到美国，在这里接触到了更多关于民主制度、公民权利以及言论自由的理念。生活在一个可以公开表达意见的社会里，让我第一次真正体会到自由表达的重要性。正是在这样的环境下，我加入了中国民主党，并开始参与海外华人的民主活动。

过去两年中，我多次参与与中国人权和民主议题有关的公开活动，包括纪念历史事件的集会、声援政治案件的抗议活动，以及呼吁关注中国人权问题的公共活动。据不完全统计，我参与的相关活动已经超过80场。在这些活动中，我不仅参与集会，还举牌发言，表达自己对中国政治现状的看法。许多活动都有媒体报道，也留下了照片和视频记录。

对我来说，这些活动不仅仅是政治表达，更是一种责任。我相信，一个社会只有允许不同声音存在，允许历史与现实被不断讨论，才有可能真正进步。出版、写作以及公共讨论，本来就是推动社会发展的重要力量。

李延贺案再次提醒我们，在当今世界，思想与信息早已跨越国界传播，但制度之间的差异仍然深刻影响着个人命运。同样的观点、同样的书籍，在不同制度之下可能会被赋予完全不同的意义。

也正因为如此，像我这样身在海外的人，才更加珍惜表达的权利。虽然离开了中国，但我仍然关注中国社会的发展，也希望未来有一天，中国的普通公民能够在不必担心风险的情况下讨论历史、表达观点、参与公共事务。

对于很多海外华人来说，表达本身或许是一件很小的事情，但在某些环境下，它却意味着勇气。正因为经历过压抑与限制，我们才更加明白自由表达的价值。

Reflections on the Value of Freedom of Speech Through the Case of Li Yanhe

Author: Zhu XiaonaEditor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:Li Yanhe was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of “inciting separatism,” drawing attention to China’s environment for free expression. Reflecting on personal experiences, the author discusses the limitations on freedom of speech and emphasizes the importance of open expression and public discussion.

On February 17, 2025, the case of Li Yanhe was sentenced in the first instance at the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. According to the official announcement, he was convicted of the crime of “inciting separatism” and sentenced to three years in prison, one year of deprivation of political rights, and a fine of 50,000 RMB in confiscated personal assets. The announcement also stated that Li Yanhe accepted the verdict in court and did not file an appeal within the statutory appeal period, meaning the judgment has taken legal effect. Li Yanhe is the publisher of Gusa Press, a Taiwanese publishing house that has released numerous books concerning Chinese history, politics, and social issues. In 2023, he was taken away by authorities for investigation while visiting family in Shanghai. For a long time, the case lacked publicly available information, and it was not until the verdict was announced that the outside world gradually learned of the outcome.

As someone who once lived in mainland China and now resides overseas, I felt deeply saddened when I read this news. I understand very clearly the consequences that can arise from expressing different opinions in China. I once posted about my personal experiences and views on social issues on social media. As a result, local police visited my home and demanded that I delete the content. That experience made me realize how limited the space for expression is for ordinary citizens in China.

After that incident, I began paying closer attention to the environment for free speech and civil rights in China. Gradually, I came to realize that many social problems persist largely because there is no open space for discussion and free expression. When differing opinions cannot be voiced, society loses the ability to correct itself.

Later, I came to the United States, where I encountered more ideas about democratic institutions, civil rights, and freedom of speech. Living in a society where people can openly express their views allowed me, for the first time, to truly appreciate the importance of free expression. In such an environment, I joined the Chinese Democracy Party and began participating in democratic activities among overseas Chinese communities.

Over the past two years, I have taken part in numerous public events related to human rights and democracy in China, including commemorative gatherings for historical events, protests in support of political prisoners, and public activities calling attention to human rights issues in China. According to incomplete statistics, I have participated in more than 80 such events. In these activities, I have not only attended rallies but also held signs and spoken publicly about my views on China’s political situation. Many of these events have been covered by the media and documented through photos and videos.

For me, these activities are not merely political expressions—they represent a sense of responsibility. I believe that a society can truly progress only when it allows different voices to exist, when history and present realities can be openly discussed. Publishing, writing, and public debate are essential forces that drive social development.

The case of Li Yanhe once again reminds us that in today’s world, ideas and information easily cross-national borders, yet differences in political systems continue to profoundly shape individual destinies. The same ideas and the same books may be interpreted in completely different ways under different political systems.

It is precisely for this reason that people like me, living overseas, cherish the right to express ourselves even more. Although I have left China, I still care deeply about its future and hope that one day ordinary Chinese citizens will be able to discuss history, express opinions, and participate in public affairs without fear of punishment.

For many overseas Chinese, expression may seem like a small act. Yet in certain environments, it requires great courage. And precisely because we have experienced repression and restriction, we understand even more deeply the true value of freedom of expression.

⸺兼论现代普世⼈权与威权治理逻辑的根本冲突

作者：Cooper Guan/《在野党》采访部记者
编辑：李晶 翻译：彭小梅

⼀､ ⼀场被重新定义的“新闻审判”

黎智英案并⾮普通的刑事案件 它更像是⼀场具有象征意义的政治审判｡

案件的核⼼争议，不仅是个⼈⾏为是否触法，⽽是新闻活动本身是否被定义为国家安全威胁｡在现代法治国家，新闻⾃由是权⼒监督的重要机制，⽽在威权政治结构中信息控制则被用作维持统治合法性的核⼼⼯具｡

黎智英的审判实际上反映了⼀个问题：当权⼒将自由⾔论视为⻛险时，法律是否仍然是法律，还是仅成为政治⼯具。

⼆､ 新闻⾃由的国际法基准与现实背离

国际社会对于新闻⾃由与表达⾃由有明确规范：

世界⼈权宣⾔ 第19条，明确保障思想､ 良⼼与表达⾃由 包括传播信息的权利｡

公⺠权利和政治权利国际公约 ICCPR，将新闻与⾔论⾃由列为核⼼基本权利｡

联合国⼈权理事会多次强调，国家安全不得成为压制媒体的模糊性理由｡

黎智英案所引发的争议，恰恰集中在以下⼏点：

首先，国家安全概念的⽆限扩张。新闻评论､ 国际交流被纳⼊“危害国家安全”的范畴｡

其次，法律的模糊性与追溯性适⽤，使⾏为⼈在事前难以判断合法边界｡

第三，本案程序公正的国际质疑。包括陪审制度变化､ 审理透明度下降等｡

当法律不再提供清晰预期时，新闻⼯作者⾯对的将不再是法律⻛险，⽽是制度性危险｡

三､ 威权信息治理，从内容管理到思想控制

黎智英案并不是孤⽴事件 ⽽是更⼤信息管控体系的⼀部分｡这⼀体系具有典型特征：

特征一，从“内容审查”升级为“意图审查”

不再仅关注具体信息真假 ⽽是追究观点⽴场与其产生的潜在影响｡

特征二，从“违规处罚”转向“刑事化表达”

⾏政监管逐步升级为刑事指控 形成寒蝉效应｡

特征三，从“媒体管理”延伸⾄个⼈表达

普通公⺠的社交媒体⾔论也被纳⼊管控范围｡

这种模式的结果是： 新闻机构趋于⾃我审查；公共讨论空间急剧收缩；社会共识形成机制被削弱。最终，社会失去真实信息与理性讨论能⼒｡

四､ 新闻伦理的悖论，当追求真相成为⻛险

新闻职业伦理要求：独⽴调查、权⼒监督、公开讨论。但在被⾼度控制的信息环境中，这些职业要求反⽽可能成为⻛险来源｡

这产生⼀种结构性悖论，越专业､ 越独⽴的新闻⾏为，越可能被视为威胁｡⻓期来看，这影响将从传媒行业扩张至整个社会。使学术研究受限，创作表达萎缩，让公共政策失去反馈机制，最终损害国家治理本身的理性基础｡

五､ 法治的核⼼不是法律⽂本，⽽是权⼒边界

真正的法治，不取决于律的数量，⽽是看法律是否限制权⼒，法律是否保障少数派与异⻅者，法律是否具有可预期性。如果法律主要⽤于规范⾔论、定义思想、惩罚批评，那么它更接近“统治技术” ，⽽⾮现代意义上的法治｡

黎智英案引发的国际关注，本质上并⾮针对个案，⽽是对法律⼯具化趋势的系统性担忧｡

六､ 社会舆论的⻓远影响：信任结构的瓦解

新闻⾃由不仅是媒体⼈的权利 更是社会的公共资产｡

当公众意识到媒体⽆法独⽴报道、信息存在系统性过滤、表达可能带来⻛险，社会将出现三种长期不良后果：一是信任断裂，官⽅信息与⺠间认知脱节｡二是谣⾔⽣态化，真实信息缺失反⽽滋⽣谣⾔｡三是公共讨论极端化，中间理性空间消失｡这对任何社会的稳定与发展都是⻓期隐患｡

七､ 新闻⾃由不是特权，⽽是⽂明社会的基础设施

黎智英案，不仅关乎⼀个⼈的命运。当新闻成为罪名，社会失去的不只是记者，⽽是对现实的共同理解能⼒｡

现代社会的稳定，不来⾃沉默，⽽来⾃开放的信息流通、多元的意⻅表达、独⽴的监督机制。真正的强⼤，不是没有批评，⽽是能够容纳批评｡

新闻⾃由､ ⾔论⾃由与法治原则，并⾮⻄⽅或东⽅的专属价值，⽽是现代⽂明运⾏的基本条件｡当这些原则被侵蚀时，受损的不仅是媒体行业，更是整个社会的未来｡

When Journalism Becomes a Crime

The Systemic Collapse of Press Freedom and Rule of Law under Authoritarianism — Reflections from the Jimmy Lai Case

And the Fundamental Conflict Between Universal Human Rights and Authoritarian Governance

Author: Cooper Guan, Reporter, Interview Department, The Opposition PartyEditor: Li Jing Translator: Peng Xiaomei

I. A “Journalistic Trial” That Has Been Redefined

The Jimmy Lai case is not an ordinary criminal case. It more closely resembles a political trial with symbolic significance.

The central controversy of the case is not simply whether an individual’s actions violated the law. Rather, it concerns whether journalistic activity itself is being defined as a national security threat.

In modern rule-of-law societies, press freedom functions as an essential mechanism for checking power. In authoritarian political structures, however, information control becomes a core tool for maintaining the legitimacy of rule.

The trial of Jimmy Lai ultimately raises a deeper question:When those in power regard freedom of speech as a risk, does the law still remain law—or does it become merely a political instrument?

II. International Legal Standards on Press Freedom and Their Divergence from Reality

The international community has established clear norms regarding press freedom and freedom of expression.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and expression, including the right to disseminate information.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) identifies press and speech freedoms as fundamental rights.

The United Nations Human Rights Council has repeatedly emphasized that national security must not become a vague justification for suppressing the media.

The controversies surrounding the Jimmy Lai case focus on several key issues:

First, the unlimited expansion of the concept of national security.Journalistic commentary and international communication have been placed within the category of “endangering national security.”

Second, the ambiguity and retroactive application of legal provisions, making it difficult for individuals to determine the legal boundaries of their actions in advance.

Third, international concerns regarding procedural fairness, including changes to the jury system and reduced transparency in court proceedings.

When the law no longer provides clear expectations, journalists face not merely legal risk, but systemic institutional danger.

III. Authoritarian Information Governance: From Content Management to Thought Control

The Jimmy Lai case is not an isolated incident. It forms part of a broader system of information control.This system exhibits several defining characteristics:

Feature One: From “content censorship” to “intent censorship.”Authorities are no longer concerned only with whether information is true or false; they now scrutinize viewpoints and the potential influence of those viewpoints.

Feature Two: From “administrative penalties” to the criminalization of expression.Regulatory measures gradually escalate into criminal charges, producing a powerful chilling effect.

Feature Three: From “media regulation” to the control of individual expression.Even ordinary citizens’ speech on social media becomes subject to oversight.

The consequences of this model are profound:News organizations increasingly engage in self-censorship；Spaces for public discussion shrink rapidly；The mechanisms through which social consensus forms gradually weaken. Ultimately, society loses the ability to access reliable information and to conduct rational debate.

IV. The Ethical Paradox of Journalism: When Seeking Truth Becomes Risky

Professional journalistic ethics demand independent investigation, oversight of power, and open public discussion.Yet in a highly controlled information environment, these professional standards themselves may become sources of risk.

This creates a structural paradox: the more professional and independent journalistic activity becomes, the more likely it is to be perceived as a threat.Over time, the consequences extend beyond the media industry and spread across society as a whole.Academic research becomes constrained.Creative expression diminishes.Public policymaking loses its feedback mechanisms.Ultimately, this erodes the rational foundations of governance itself.

V. The Core of Rule of Law Is Not Legal Texts but the Limits of Power

True rule of law is not determined by the number of laws on the books. Instead, it depends on several fundamental questions:Do laws limit power?Do laws protect minorities and dissenters?Do laws provide predictability and clarity?If laws are primarily used to regulate speech, define thought, and punish criticism, then they resemble techniques of rule, rather than rule of law in the modern sense.The international concern surrounding the Jimmy Lai case is therefore not merely about a single individual. It reflects a broader anxiety about the systematic instrumentalization of law.

VI. The Long-Term Social Consequences: The Collapse of Trust Structures

Press freedom is not only the right of journalists—it is a public asset of society.When people realize that the media cannot report independently, that information is systematically filtered, and that expression itself may carry risks, several long-term consequences emerge:First, a breakdown of trust. Official narratives diverge sharply from public perceptions.Second, the ecology of rumors. When reliable information is scarce, misinformation spreads more easily.Third, the polarization of public debate. The space for rational, moderate discussion gradually disappears.All of these outcomes represent long-term threats to the stability and development of any society.

VII. Press Freedom Is Not a Privilege but the Infrastructure of Civilized Society

The Jimmy Lai case is not only about the fate of one individual.When journalism itself becomes a crime, society loses not only journalists but also its shared capacity to understand reality.

The stability of modern societies does not arise from silence. It arises from open flows of information, pluralistic expression of opinions, and independent oversight mechanisms.True strength does not mean the absence of criticism. It means the ability to tolerate criticism.

Press freedom, freedom of speech, and the rule of law are not values belonging exclusively to the West or the East. They are the basic conditions for the functioning of modern civilization. When these principles erode, the damage is not limited to the media industry—it affects the future of society as a whole.

当新闻成为⻛险⸺以黎智英案为镜鉴的个⼈与时代观察

作者：Cooper Guan

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

⼀､ ⼀个曾在体制媒体⼯作的⼈的观察

我曾在中国体制内党群⼝从事宣传⼯作，同时为多家体制媒体撰稿与通讯｡ 在那个阶段，我接受的职业训练强调舆论导向､ 宣传纪律与信息控制｡

后来，我创办⽂化传播机构，专注创意视频制作，并逐渐转向以真实表达与创作⾃由为核⼼的职业路径｡

新闻与创作让我相信：真实是职业的基础，表达是社会进步的动⼒。

然⽽，中共治下的中国现实的政治环境，使这⼀信念不断受到冲击｡

黎智英案，使我不得不重新思考⼀个问题：当新闻被视为威胁时，媒体⼈还如何存在？

⼆､ 从制度内部到表达受限，个⼈经历与公共现象

在中国⽣活期间，我通过⽹络逐渐接触到更多历史､ 政治､ 时事信息｡出于对公共事务的关注，我曾在社交平台纪念＂六·四＂等历史事件，分享公共议题观点，呼吁法治､ ⾃由与⼈权。结果，不仅内容被删除，账号被限制，最终在⼀次全国性的⽹络整治⾏动中被永久封禁。这些经历让我意识到，表达本身可能已成为⻛险｡ 这种现象并⾮个案，⽽是信息治理体系的⼀部分｡

三､ 黎智英案 新闻活动如何被重新定义

黎智英案的核⼼问题，并不仅仅是某些具体⾏为是否合法，⽽是新闻评论是否被视为政治威胁，国际交流是否被解释为安全⻛险，媒体⻆⾊是否被重新定义。

在现代法治社会，新闻通常被视为监督机制，⽽在⾼度控制的政治结构中，新闻可能被视为潜在⻛险源｡ 这种转变，不仅影响个别记者，也改变整个媒体⽣态｡

四､ 从国内经历到海外媒体参与，表达空间的对⽐

来到海外后，我开始参与华⼈⺠主媒体的采访与志愿⼯作｡ 我第⼀次感受到可以公开提问、可以讨论敏感议题，可以表达不同观点｡

这种对⽐使我更加清楚地认识到，⾃由表达并不是抽象⼝号，⽽是每天可以实践的现实｡

同时，我也意识到，海外华⼈社区中仍存在⾃我审查与沉默⽂化｡ 不愿公开表达政治观点，在社交媒体避免讨论敏感议题，对媒体采访保持警惕｡ 这不仅是个⼈选择，更是⻓期制度环境塑造的⼼理结构与⻓期的信息控制环境和中共⼴泛的海外⻓臂监控密切相关｡

当新闻活动被刑事化，所产⽣的寒蝉效应不仅局限在某个地区，它将通过社群⽹络扩散到全球华⼈社会｡

五､ 新闻⾃由的意义，不仅属于记者

没有独⽴媒体的社会，往往出现信息来源单⼀、谣⾔传播加剧、公共监督缺失等常见现象。因为新闻⾃由并不是媒体⼈的特权，⽽是公众获取真实信息的保障｡ 黎智英案之所以引发国际关注，正是因为它触及现代社会如何平衡权⼒与表达｡

六､ 个⼈⽴场声明

基于个⼈经历与⻓期观察 我逐渐形成明确⽴场：

第一，坚决⽀持新闻⾃由与⾔论⾃由；第二、坚定⽀持法治与⼈权原则；第三，强烈反对以模糊安全概念限制表达。这些⽴场源于我个人曾经在体制内的媒体相关⼯作经验，也来自我自身多年创作⾏业经历，尤其是遭受被封号与表达受限，⾔论审查和警察调查，甚至让⼈恐惧⼈身安全的亲身经历，以及当前参与海外⺠主媒体的实践，我的写作与采访，记录和表达正是这种⽴场的延续｡

七､ 记录仍然是抵抗遗忘的⽅式

黎智英案提醒我，历史不会因为沉默⽽停⽌，真实也不会因为恐惧⽽消失｡

对我⽽⾔，继续写作与采访，不只是职业选择，更是对真实与⾃由的坚持｡

在任何社会中，允许不同声⾳存在，才是真正稳定与成熟的标志｡

From State Propaganda to Overseas Democratic Media

When Journalism Becomes a Risk — Personal and Historical Reflections Inspired by the Jimmy Lai Case

Author: Cooper GuanEditor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:From working in China’s propaganda system to practicing journalism in overseas democratic media, the author reflects on the risks surrounding press freedom and freedom of expression through the lens of the Jimmy Lai case, emphasizing the importance of rule of law and truth.

I. Observations from Someone Who Once Worked in the State Media System

I once worked in the propaganda system within China’s party-affiliated institutions, while also writing and reporting for several state-controlled media outlets. During that period, my professional training emphasized guidance of public opinion, propaganda discipline, and information control.

Later, I founded a cultural communications agency focused on creative video production and gradually shifted toward a professional path centered on truthful expression and creative freedom.

Journalism and creative work led me to believe that truth is the foundation of the profession, and expression is the driving force of social progress.however, the political reality in China under Communist Party rule has repeatedly challenged this belief. The Jimmy Lai case forced me to reconsider a difficult question: When journalism itself is treated as a threat, how can journalists continue to exist?

II. From Within the System to Restricted Expression: Personal Experience and a Broader Public Phenomenon

While living in China, I gradually gained access through the internet to more historical, political, and current affairs information.Out of concern for public affairs, I once commemorated historical events such as June Fourth on social media, shared views on public issues, and called for rule of law, freedom, and human rights. The result was that not only were my posts deleted, but my account was restricted and eventually permanently banned during a nationwide internet “rectification campaign.” These experiences made me realize that expression itself can become a risk. This phenomenon is not an isolated case; it is part of a broader system of information governance.

The Jimmy Lai Case: How Journalism Is Being Redefined

The core issue of the Jimmy Lai case is not merely whether certain actions are legal. Rather, it raises deeper questions: Can journalistic commentary be interpreted as a political threat?Can international communication be redefined as a national security risk?Is the role of the media itself being fundamentally redefined?

In modern societies governed by the rule of law, journalism is typically regarded as a mechanism of oversight.But within highly controlled political structures, journalism may instead be treated as a potential source of danger. This transformation affects not only individual journalists but also reshapes the entire media ecosystem.

IV. From Domestic Experience to Overseas Media Participation: A Contrast in Freedom of Expression

After coming overseas, I began participating in interviews and volunteer work with Chinese-language democratic media outlets. For the first time, I experienced the ability to ask questions openly, discuss sensitive topics, and express differing viewpoints. This contrast made me realize more clearly that freedom of expression is not an abstract slogan—it is a reality that can be practiced daily.

At the same time, I also noticed that within overseas Chinese communities there still exists a culture of self-censorship and silence.Many people avoid openly expressing political opinions, refrain from discussing sensitive issues on social media, and remain cautious toward media interviews.This is not merely a personal choice. It is a psychological structure shaped by long-term institutional environments, deeply connected to decades of information control and the Chinese Communist Party’s extensive long-arm surveillance overseas.

When journalistic activity becomes criminalized, the resulting chilling effect does not remain confined to a single region; it spreads through social networks to Chinese communities around the world.

The Meaning of Press Freedom Belongs Not Only to Journalists

In societies without independent media, several familiar problems often emerge:limited sources of information,the spread of rumors,the absence of public oversight.Press freedom is not a privilege for journalists. It is a guarantee for the public to obtain truthful information.The Jimmy Lai case has drawn international attention precisely because it touches upon a fundamental question of modern societies:How should power be balanced with freedom of expression?

VI. A Personal Statement of Position

Based on my personal experiences and long-term observations, I have gradually formed a clear position:

First, I firmly support freedom of the press and freedom of speech.Second, I firmly support the principles of rule of law and human rights.Third, I strongly oppose the use of vague security concepts to restrict expression.

These positions come from my earlier experience working within China’s state media system. They also arise from my years working in creative industries, particularly from my own experiences of account bans, restricted expression, censorship, police questioning, and even fear for personal safety. Today, through my participation in overseas democratic media, my writing and interviews are a continuation of this position.

VII. Recording Is Still a Way to Resist Forgetting

The Jimmy Lai case reminds me that history will not stop because of silence, and truth will not disappear because of fear.

For me, continuing to write and conduct interviews is not only a professional choice—it is also a commitment to truth and freedom.

In any society, allowing different voices to exist is the true sign of stability and maturity.