What Would China Be Like Today if Chiang Kai-shek Had Not Failed?
Author: Wang Xiaofei Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min
Historical development is often full of contingency and complexity. In the mid-20th century, China underwent profound political and social transformations, and the outcome of the Chinese Civil War altered the direction of China’s development. If history had yielded a different result—supposing the Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kai-shek had achieved victory in the Civil War—then today’s China might present a developmental path completely different from reality. By comparing the political systems, economic policies, and international environments of that time, a certain degree of analysis can be applied to this historical hypothesis.
First, regarding the political system, if the Chiang Kai-shek government had continued to rule in Mainland China, China might have gradually formed a political model transitioning from an authoritarian system toward constitutional democracy. During the Chiang Kai-shek era, the Nationalist Government had nominally formulated the Constitution of the Republic of China and proposed the goal of gradually realizing constitutionalism. Although this system was not truly implemented under the environment of war and political struggle, looking at the subsequent development of the Taiwan region, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime did indeed complete a transition from authoritarian rule to a democratic system under specific historical conditions. Therefore, some historians believe that if the Nationalist Government had continued to rule the Mainland, China might have experienced a political development path similar to that of South Korea or Taiwan—namely, a strong government first driving economic development, followed by the gradual opening of the political system.
Second, regarding economic development, China might have integrated into the global market economy system much earlier. The economic policies during the Nationalist Government period generally leaned toward the development of a market economy and private enterprise. If these policies had continued, China might have gradually established an industrial system dominated by the private economy in the second half of the 20th century and attracted more international capital into the Chinese market. Considering China’s massive population and abundant labor resources, it is possible that China, like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, could have achieved rapid economic growth through export-oriented industrialization. Such a developmental path might have allowed China to become an important global manufacturing and trade center much sooner.
Third, regarding social structure, Chinese society might have displayed different changes. The land policies of the Nationalist Government period differed from the later model of Land Reform; if the Nationalist Government had continued to rule, the rural land system might have been adjusted through gradual reform rather than through large-scale political movements to achieve redistribution. This approach might have reduced social upheaval, but it also might have resulted in a slower pace of rural reform. Consequently, changes in China’s urban-rural structure might have been more incremental.
Furthermore, regarding international relations, if the Chiang Kai-shek government had continued to rule China, it is highly likely that China would have become an important ally of the Western bloc during the Cold War. The United States and its allies might have provided China with more economic and military support, thereby driving China’s economic and industrial development. Under these circumstances, China might have participated in international organizations and the global trade system much earlier and played a major role in the Asia-Pacific region.
Of course, this historical hypothesis also contains many uncertain factors. China has a vast territory and a large population; even under the same system, the developmental paths of different regions might have had huge discrepancies. At the same time, factors such as issues left over from the war, social inequality, and the structure of political power could all have influenced the direction of China’s future development. Therefore, there is no single possible outcome in history.
Overall, if the Chiang Kai-shek government had not failed in the Civil War, China might have advanced along another developmental road: politically, it might have experienced a gradual transition from authoritarianism to democracy; economically, it would have integrated into the global market system earlier; and in international relations, it would have been closer to the Western bloc. However, all of this remains merely speculation at the level of historiography. History has already happened, and the actual path of development has shaped today’s China. Reflecting on this hypothesis is meaningful primarily in helping people understand how historical choices influence a nation’s future.
Reflections of a Chinese Scholar on Political Systems, Power, and the Future
Author: Guo Quan Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min
From a Student of the “Class of ’89” to a Long-term Thinker on Political Systems
If one were to summarize Guo Quan’s life trajectory in a single sentence, it might be: a person’s continuous reflection on systems for over thirty years.
Over the past decades, his identity has constantly shifted—university student, worker within the “system” (government/state enterprise), scholar, university teacher, and later, a public figure continuously expressing political views.
Yet, behind these changing identities, his thoughts have always revolved around a single question: How should China’s political system operate?
From the university campus of 1989 to subsequent academic research and later public expression, this question has run through his entire life.
1989: A Generation’s Political Memory
In 1987, Guo Quan entered university. Two years later, the 1989 student movement broke out in China.
Although he was not in Tiananmen Square in Beijing at the time, but was instead participating in local activities elsewhere, that period of history became an important starting point for the formation of his political consciousness. Recalling that time, he says: “The university students of our generation have all, to some extent, experienced that history.”
On the university campuses of that era, political discussion was not rare. Many students were exposed for the first time to discussions regarding democracy, systems, and national governance. For many, it was an intellectual enlightenment. Guo Quan believes that this enlightenment does not end upon graduation.
When students enter society, these reflections often re-emerge in new ways.
Entering Society: Systemic Issues in Reality
After graduating from university in 1990, Guo Quan entered enterprises and the government system to work. Real society was completely different from campus life.
Through grassroots work, he began to encounter various specific issues—administrative decision-making, social contradictions, and public affairs. Through these practical experiences, he gradually formed a judgment: many problems are not merely management issues, but systemic issues. “If they are not solved through democratic means, many problems simply cannot be resolved,” he says. In his view, an autocratic system can indeed improve efficiency in certain situations, such as in resource concentration and administrative decision-making. However, in the long run, a power structure lacking institutional checks and balances easily generates new contradictions.
These reflections prompted him to return to academic research.
The Academic Path: Searching for Systemic Answers
In 1993, Guo Quan was admitted to Nanjing University to pursue a Master’s degree in Sociology. Sociological research provided him with new analytical tools.
In sociological theory, a system is not just a political arrangement, but also a way for society to operate. Systems determine how society coordinates interests, resolves conflicts, and forms public rules. “A democratic system is actually a social operation mechanism,” he says.
After completing his Master’s degree, he entered the Nanjing Municipal Court to work. Judicial practice became another window for him to understand social issues.
During his time at the court, he handled a large number of cases and social disputes. Many cases appeared to be legal issues on the surface, but at a deeper level, they reflected contradictions within the systemic structure. This experience led him to gradually form the view that many social conflicts can ultimately be traced back to systemic problems. While working at the court, Guo Quan continued to pursue a PhD in Philosophy. From 1996 to 1999, three years of philosophical research became an important stage in the formation of his thought. Philosophical training allowed him to begin thinking about political issues from a more macro perspective. In his view, politics is not just a matter of institutional design, but also a matter of values and ideological systems.
“Politics and philosophy are inseparable,” he says. Without reflection at the philosophical level, politics can easily move toward extremes.
During this period, he gradually formed political ideas centered on freedom and democracy and began to systematically study the developmental history of modern democratic systems.
The Formation of a Concept: Multi-Party Elections
In his early research and writing, Guo Quan—like many researchers of political theory—often used concepts such as “democracy,” “freedom,” “constitutionalism,” and the “rule of law” to discuss political systems. But as his research deepened, he gradually developed a new reflection on these terms.
In real-world politics, these concepts often possess significant room for interpretation. Different political systems and different political traditions all use these terms to describe their own institutional arrangements. Even in some highly centralized power structures, one can still see expressions like “democracy” and “rule of law.”
In Guo Quan’s view, this conceptual ambiguity causes many political discussions to remain at an abstract level. Therefore, in the large number of articles he published later, he began to gradually use a more specific and more easily identifiable concept to express his political stance—
Multi-party elections.
In Guo Quan’s view, multi-party elections are the most direct hallmark distinguishing a democratic system from an autocratic one. He wrote in an article:
“The simplest way to judge whether a country truly implements a democratic system is to see whether genuine multi-party elections exist.”
In his view, if political power can be generated through publicly contested elections, and if different political forces can participate in the competition, then power has the possibility of being constrained by the system.
Conversely, if political competition is institutionally restricted, then even if terms like “democracy,” “freedom,” and “constitutionalism” appear in institutional texts, it is very difficult to form a genuine political competition mechanism.
In another article, Guo Quan further explained this viewpoint. He believes that in modern political systems, the core of democracy is not just the election itself, but whether power can be replaced through institutionalized competition.
“A true democratic system is, in essence, a system of competition for power.”
In his view, the significance of multi-party elections lies precisely here. It is not just a method of election, but a systemic arrangement that ensures political power must face social choice.
Therefore, Guo Quan repeatedly emphasizes a judgment: if a real political competition mechanism is lacking, then concepts like democracy, freedom, and constitutionalism may be given different interpretations by different power structures.
It was precisely on the basis of this reflection that “multi-party elections” gradually became the core keyword in his political discourse.
Suggestions for Young People: The Power of Writing and Expression
During the interview, Guo Quan mentioned the importance of writing many times.
He says that starting from 2007, he maintained a habit of writing nearly one article every day. Except for the period he spent serving a prison sentence, this habit basically never ceased. In his view, writing is not only a form of personal record-keeping but also a way to participate in public affairs.
“If thoughts are not expressed, they cannot enter public discussion,” he says.
He once wrote in an article: “The progress of a society often begins with the expression of ideas.”
When talking about young people, Guo Quan believes that expression itself is an important form of public participation. If a society lacks ideological exchange and public discussion, it is very difficult to form true consensus and progress.
Therefore, he encourages young people to think more, write more, and express their own views more. Whether through articles, research, or public discussion, letting thoughts enter the social field of vision is, in itself, a way to promote social progress.
At the same time, however, he also reminds that expression does not necessarily mean fierce confrontation. In a realistic environment, rational, restrained, and continuous expression is often more powerful.
“Expressing a viewpoint does not necessarily require using a forceful manner,” he says. “The important thing is to express continuously, while also learning how to protect oneself.”
In his view, the intellectual space of a society is often formed slowly through long-term, unceasing expression. For an individual, maintaining independent thought and expressing it in an appropriate manner is, in itself, a way of participating in the process of history.
Conclusion: A Question Still Continuing
Thirty-plus years ago, Guo Quan was still a student who had just entered a university campus.
Thirty-plus years later, he is still thinking about the same question—political systems and the future of society.
During this time, Chinese society has undergone tremendous changes. Economic development, urban expansion, and technological progress have all profoundly changed the face of this country. But in Guo Quan’s view, a deeper question has always existed: how a nation’s system shapes its future.
As the interview concluded, he mentioned that for those who care about public affairs, expression and reflection themselves possess meaning.
“Changes in a society often start from thoughts,” he says.
Perhaps, for many people, discussions regarding systems, politics, and the future remain full of controversy. But historical experience also constantly reminds people that a country’s path of development is never decided all at once; rather, it is gradually formed through continuous discussion, experimentation, and choice. In this process, different voices and different reflections will all become part of the social memory.
Guo Quan’s story is perhaps just one of those ways of expression.
As for the question of China’s future path, it remains a matter for time, history, and the many more people who are still thinking.
Bay Area Rally Supports “Hong Kong Parliament” ——Paying Attention to the Jimmy Lai Case and the 100th Day of the Wang Fuk Court Great Fire
Author: Guan Yongjie Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Zhou Min
On March 8 local time, as part of a multi-city coordinated action overseas, members of the San Francisco Bay Area China Democracy and Human Rights Alliance and citizens concerned with Hong Kong affairs held a rally to support the “Hong Kong Parliament” being organized by those in exile overseas. The cities participating in this coordination included London, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, and Las Vegas. In their speeches, participants spoke about the changes in Hong Kong’s political and social environment in recent years and paid attention to issues such as the case of media person Jimmy Lai and the 100th day of the Wang Fuk Court fire. The event was hosted by Li Haifeng.
Li Congling stated in her speech that since the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020, Hong Kong’s original political space and social environment have undergone huge changes, and many pro-democracy figures have been arrested or forced into exile overseas. Against this background, some exiled Hong Kongers are promoting the establishment of a “Hong Kong Parliament,” hoping to build a platform for Hong Kong people scattered overseas to express opinions and discuss public affairs, so that the voice of Hong Kong people continues to be heard in the international community.
Yang Kun spoke about the social changes in Hong Kong in recent years. He stated that Hong Kong was long famous for its openness, rule of law, and internationalization, but with Beijing’s comprehensive takeover of Hong Kong, the social atmosphere has tightened significantly, and the environment for speech has also undergone great changes. He believes that this transformation not only affects local Hong Kong residents but also causes many overseas Chinese who have long followed Hong Kong’s development to feel worried.
He Dongling mentioned the case of Hong Kong media person Jimmy Lai in her speech. She stated that Jimmy Lai founded Apple Daily and long supported press freedom and democratic values, but after the implementation of the National Security Law, he was charged with multiple crimes and heavily sentenced; this case has caused widespread concern in the international community. She called on the outside world to continue paying attention to Jimmy Lai and other Hong Kong political cases, and to support the Hong Kong people who are still speaking out for freedom.
Li Shuqing, in his speech, mentioned the 100th day of the Wang Fuk Court fire. He stated that he himself worked in the construction engineering industry in Mainland China for more than ten years and has a relatively good understanding of the “black curtain” (shady dealings) of the relevant industry. In his view, it is difficult to see this fire, which caused major casualties, as a simple ordinary accident; it may involve industry corruption and lack of supervision. Against the background of changes in Hong Kong’s overall political environment, some people also worry that the transparency and social supervision mechanisms in Hong Kong’s past system are being gradually weakened.
Host Li Haifeng stated in his concluding remarks that Hong Kong was once an international city famous for freedom, the rule of law, and prosperity, but in recent years these qualities have faced a serious impact. He pointed out that supporting the overseas promotion of the establishment of the “Hong Kong Parliament” is not only to allow exiled Hong Kongers to continue participating in the discussion of public affairs but also to remind the international community to maintain continuous attention on Hong Kong’s situation.
In the subsequent free discussion session, participants also exchanged views on Hong Kong’s social changes, the Chinese government’s United Front strategies, and the views of Taiwan society on related issues. Some participants stated that the changes occurring in Hong Kong in recent years have a certain warning significance for Taiwan society, hoping that the people of Taiwan can be more vigilant against political influence from Beijing and not easily believe the CCP’s United Front narrative.
At the end of the activity, the scene continued the previously launched “One Person, One Dollar to Support Mainland Prisoners of Conscience” fundraising action. At the same time, participants also expressed support through donations for the mother of Niu Tengyu, the party involved in China’s “Esu Wiki Case,” and displayed some of the paintings she created at the scene. According to the introduction, these paintings are currently an important source of livelihood for Niu Tengyu’s mother. Because purchasing relevant works within China may face police harassment, some paintings were sent to the United States, kept with the assistance of Li Haifeng, and support was expressed through voluntary donations.
The organizers stated that they hope, through continuously holding similar activities, to let more people pay attention to the human rights situation in Hong Kong and China and provide what support they can to relevant individuals.
Abstract:On the occasion of International Women’s Day, the author pays tribute to women in China and Hong Kong who have been persecuted for defending rights and speaking out. Their suffering and courage, the author argues, must not be concealed beneath the atmosphere of celebration, and their sacrifices for truth and dignity must be remembered.
International Women’s Day has come again. In a normal country, this should be a day to respect women, thank women, and fight for women’s equal rights. But for someone like me—a Chinese person who escaped from China and now lives in exile in the United States—what comes to mind on this day is not flowers, greetings, or festivity. What I think of are the women in mainland China and Hong Kong who have been repressed and persecuted for telling the truth, defending rights, participating in public affairs, commemorating history, and demanding the truth.
Among these women are journalists, lawyers, mothers, scholars, and ordinary citizens. They did not commit any monstrous crime. Many of them merely wanted to speak one honest sentence, seek one measure of justice, and hold on to the most basic conscience that a person should have. Yet for this, they were arrested, sentenced, detained for long periods, humiliated, and monitored. Some even lost their health, their families, and their freedom. Such a reality weighs heavily on the heart.
I, too, am a Chinese exile. When I was still in China, because of the Chinese Communist Party’s long-term information blockade, the Great Firewall, and its tight control over speech, there were many things we simply did not know, or only knew very little about. At that time, like many Chinese people, I could only live in a world that had been filtered and distorted. It was only after I arrived in the United States that I gradually learned how many Chinese women had endured such enormous suffering in the darkness over these years. They spoke the truth for this nation, and they bore suffering that should never have fallen upon them.
Over the years, many public cases have become visible. Zhang Zhan was sentenced by the CCP for independently reporting the truth about the pandemic in Wuhan. Huang Xueqin, who had long followed feminist issues and public affairs, was sentenced to five years. Li Qiaochu, for her continued public speech, was sentenced on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.” He Fangmei, who fought for families of children harmed by vaccines, was also heavily sentenced in the end. There are also earlier figures such as Cao Shunli, Ni Yulan, and Gao Yu. Their experiences all point to one fact: under CCP rule, as long as a woman refuses to be silent and dares to step forward and speak differently, she can at any moment become a target of repression.
The situation in Hong Kong is the same. In the past, many people believed Hong Kong still had room for freedom, still had rule of law, still had freedom of expression. But over the past few years, everyone has seen clearly what has happened. After the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, many Hong Kong women also became victims of political persecution. Chow Hang-tung was imprisoned for persisting in commemorating June Fourth and continuing to speak out. Gwyneth Ho was convicted for participating in the democratic primary. Agnes Chow and Claudia Mo, among others, have also paid a heavy price for peacefully participating in public affairs. There are also Hong Kong women activists in exile overseas who remain wanted, threatened, and even see their families implicated. Such a regime is no longer merely suppressing dissent. It treats all those who do not obey, do not cooperate, and do not remain silent as enemies.
What pains me especially is that the CCP’s persecution of women is often not merely political repression in a general sense. It carries something colder and crueler. It seeks not only to deprive you of freedom, but to humiliate you, break you, and isolate you, making you pay a higher price in your body, your spirit, your family, and your children. For women, this persecution often goes deeper, hurts more, and more clearly reveals the evil of this system. A truly confident and truly civilized country would not regard women who tell the truth as threats. Only a deeply fragile and deeply fearful authoritarian regime would be afraid even of a journalist, a mother, or an ordinary rights defender.
As a man, as a husband, and also as a father, I find it difficult to remain calm whenever I think about these things. Because I know that women are not an abstract word. Women are our mothers, wives, and daughters. They are often the ones in a family who are most enduring, most responsible, and most likely to suffer in silence. If a society cannot even protect its own women, but instead oppresses, humiliates, and destroys them, then what civilization can it still claim to have? If a regime constantly speaks of women’s liberation and gender equality yet sends outspoken women to prison and labels women who insist on pursuing truth as threats to national security, then this propaganda is nothing but a shameless political performance.
Today I am in the United States, already some distance away from China. Yet precisely because I have left that environment, I can see even more clearly that the women most worthy of respect in China are often not those who stand on propaganda stages, but those who, under pressure, still refuse to abandon conscience and refuse to stop telling the truth. They may have no titles, no applause, and perhaps very few people even know their names, but their persistence itself is the most powerful exposure of lies.
I often think that without these women, Chinese society would be even darker. Because it was they who stepped forward at the most dangerous moments; who spoke when others dared not speak; who insisted on remembering when history was being buried; who still refused to bow completely when the entire society was pressed down by fear. Through their suffering, they illuminated the true face of this system. Through the price they paid, they let the world see what the CCP’s so-called “stability,” “harmony,” and “women’s liberation” are built upon.
So on this so-called International Women’s Day, I would rather dedicate my tribute to these truly suffering and truly courageous Chinese women. They are not symbols in holiday propaganda, not embellishments in slogans, and not “women’s representatives” used by officials to decorate their image. They are witnesses to China’s painful reality, people who did not bow under power, and proof that this nation has not yet become completely numb.
I write this short essay simply to express one very basic thought: to commemorate Chinese women today, we cannot speak only of flowers and praise. We cannot speak only of success and glamour. We certainly cannot pretend, in the festive atmosphere created by the CCP, that everything is fine. What truly deserves remembrance are the women persecuted for upholding conscience; the women in prisons, detention centers, under surveillance, and on the road of exile, who still have not given up their dignity.
Their suffering must not be covered by a holiday.Their names must not be swallowed by silence.Their courage must not remain only in the memory of a few.
May the day come when Women’s Day in China is no longer burdened with repression and tears, when no more women are imprisoned for speaking the truth, punished for pursuing justice, or have their lives destroyed for defending dignity. Only then will Chinese women truly have a holiday that belongs to them.
Abstract:Quoting historian Yu Ying-shih’s observation that “nostalgia is the uprooting of culture,” this essay explores the spiritual condition and cultural memory of political exiles living abroad. Through recollections of the author’s hometown Chongqing and stories of historical exiles, the author reflects on the responsibility and perseverance of those in exile, arguing that true nostalgia is not merely longing for land, but a vigilant commitment to freedom, culture, and the future of the nation.
“Nostalgia is not the memory of homeland, but the uprooting of culture.” These words by historian Yu Yingshi strike like a heavy iron nail driven deep into the hearts of countless political exiles. Without elaborate rhetoric, they reveal a harsh and truthful reality: what political exiles lose is not merely land, but the spiritual roots connected to that land.
They are banished by institutions, marginalized by history, persecuted by reality, and neglected by language.Over time, they seem to become wandering spirits suspended between spirit and culture—walking through foreign nights while carrying a faint yet stubborn spark.
That spark is called nostalgia.
I. Nostalgia: From Geographic Pain to Cultural Loss
“Alone in a foreign land as a stranger,every festival makes me miss my family even more.”
For centuries, this line from Wang Wei has been the classic Chinese expression of homesickness. Yet for political exiles, nostalgia has long surpassed the sentimental longing of holidays. It resembles a slow and enduring pain—a rupture that cannot easily be healed.
My hometown is Chongqing, a city of mountains and rivers with a long history.In my memories there are elderly women selling liangfen at alley entrances, the fragrance drifting from old teahouses on street corners, banana leaves swaying under summer eaves, and bougainvillea blooming across the hills.
There are also countless unnamed old streets and alleys. They do not appear on maps, yet they remain vividly alive in memory.
But I have also witnessed another Chongqing. During the years of urban demolition, familiar stone-paved streets disappeared overnight, replaced by cold glass facades. It felt like a violent project of collective amnesia suddenly stripping the city of its layers of time and robbing people of their coordinates of memory.
Over the past two decades, many Chinese cities have rapidly become strange and surreal. The disappearance of culture and the erosion of institutions do not occur overnight. Yet once they become a tide, they resemble a breached dam unstoppable.
While living and working in Beijing, each time I returned home I felt that the streets I once knew had become unfamiliar. Nostalgia was no longer something that a plane ticket could resolve. It had become a wound deep within the soul, one that refuses to heal.
II. Political Exiles: The Most Devoted Patriots
Many people cannot understand why Chinese dissidents and democracy activists overseas constantly criticize China.
In truth, we have never criticized China.What we criticize is the Chinese Communist regime, not the nation itself.
They accuse us of “insulting China” and “being unpatriotic.”But true patriotism has never meant hiding problems. It means daring to confront them. It means not remaining silent when the country is suffering but speaking out when it is in pain.
Silence can also be a form of betrayal.
In today’s China under Communist rule, speaking about problems often requires courage.Raising questions is frequently labeled as “smearing the nation,” yet refusing to raise them means abandoning the most basic dignity of the people.
If a country truly wishes to become better, it must learn to face the truth.Freedom and fairness should not be gifts bestowed by the state—they are rights inherent to the people.
For this reason, I have always believed that political exiles are not enemies of their country. They are, in fact, its most devoted patriots.
We did not abandon our homeland—our homeland abandoned us.What we left was a regime, not a culture.What we criticize is the evil of a system, not the roots of the Chinese nation.
III. Exiles in History
Nostalgia is not unique to modern times.Throughout human history, exile has often accompanied civilization itself.
During the An Lushan Rebellion, the Tang poet Du Fu wandered for half his life, drifting from Chang’an to the thatched cottage in Chengdu. Amid the ruins of a collapsing empire, he wrote:
“Though the nation is shattered, the mountains and rivers remain;in the spring city, grass and trees grow deep.” Eight simple characters express both personal grief and national tragedy.
Lin Yutang spent much of his life abroad. He once said:“I left China not because I did not love it. It was precisely because I loved it that I left.” In the English-speaking world he wrote warmly about Chinese culture, yet always with an unspoken sadness.
The Russian poet Anna Akhmatova, whose husband was executed and whose son imprisoned, wrote Requiem in those years of terror.She never left her homeland, yet lived under surveillance and fear heavier than exile itself. “I would rather keep watch for the people,” she wrote,“than flatter the tyrant.”
When the Nazis came to power, Thomas Mann left Germany. He once told a friend:“Germany is dead, yet I am still alive.”
In exile he wrote The Magic Mountain and Buddenbrooks, building for himself a spiritual homeland.
Looking back at history, one notices a remarkable pattern:very often, the flame of civilization has been preserved by exiles.
They are not failures.They are night watchmen.
IV. Yu Ying-shih: Rebuilding China in Exile
Among many exiles, Yu Ying-shih perhaps offers the greatest spiritual encouragement.
He never held political office, yet he became one of the most important voices in modern Chinese intellectual history. He neither depended on power nor sought political advantage, but consistently stood on the side of freedom.
He revived the Confucian ideal of the scholar-gentleman, expressing it through the phrase:
“Establish the heart of Heaven and Earth, secure the destiny of the people.”
He once said something deeply meaningful: “Wherever I am, China is there.”
This statement is his most profound answer to the condition of exile. Even when a person lives in a foreign land, as long as Chinese culture and the ideals of freedom remain alive in his heart, China itself does not truly disappear.
Sometimes I fall into long periods of quiet reflection.The loneliness of exile is a quiet and enduring loneliness.
Yet it is precisely in such solitude that people begin to ask again: Who are we? For whom do we continue this struggle?
Yu Yingshi’s perseverance reminds us that even in the free world, one can still preserve a sanctuary of thought for China.
V. My Nostalgia
My nostalgia is not only the streets of Chongqing, the bougainvillea, or the banana leaves under summer eaves. Nor is it merely the taste of hot pot or the sound of footsteps on stone roads.
My nostalgia is the accent in my parents’ voices.
It is the letters left by my grandfather, Su Gengsheng, a graduate of the tenth class of the Whampoa Military Academy and a major general whose life endured many hardships.It is the hymns I once sang in an underground house church.
My nostalgia is also the knife-like pain each time I hear that a dissident has been secretly arrested, a rights lawyer has disappeared, or a journalist has been silenced.
At the same time, it carries a heavy sense of shame:they continue to struggle at great risk, while I remain fortunate enough to live freely.
I once stood for a long time along the shoreline of San Francisco, staring out at the Pacific wind. Yet in my mind appeared the evening glow along the Jialing River in Chongqing.
When I read scripture in an American church, I remember the morning when I was baptized at St. Love Church in Chongqing.
When I shout “freedom of speech” at democratic gatherings, I recall Liu Xiaobo’s final courtroom statement in 2010:
“I have no enemies and no hatred…I hope to transcend my personal suffering to face the future of the nation and express my longing for a free China.”
At that moment I gradually understood something:
Nostalgia is not a geographical coordinate—it is a projection of the spirit.
As long as we do not abandon faith, reason, freedom, and justice, we have not truly left China.
Yu Ying-shi once said, “Wherever I am, China is there.” This is not arrogance. It is responsibility.
The nostalgia of political exiles is the pain of carrying ideals.It exhausts us, confuses us, yet also makes us more sober and determined.
Living in the free world overseas, we must not forget those compatriots who remain imprisoned, monitored, and silenced.
Therefore, we remind ourselves through this nostalgia:
Do not give up.Do not remain silent.Do not betray.
We are exiles, but we are not rootless.We are people without a country, yet we have not forgotten our country.
As long as we preserve the roots of culture and the faith in values, even in foreign lands we can still become sparks of Chinese civilization.
Our very existence is another form of China.
Thus I often think:every exile is a small but stubborn lighthouse.
With quiet voices we remind the world:
China is not yet free,and the Chinese people are still living in darkness.
At the same time we remind ourselves:
Do not stop.Do not surrender.
Perhaps one day, when China finally becomes free, people will look back on this period of history. They may discover that in the darkest years there were always faint voices that refused to fall silent; that in the loneliest years of exile there were still people guarding language, faith, and memory.
History is often like this:empires disappear, regimes change, but humanity’s longing for freedom never ends.
If one day China truly moves toward freedom and constitutional government, perhaps no one will remember the names of those of us in exile.
But that does not matter.
What matters is that in the coldest moments of history, we did not allow the flame in our hands to go out.
As long as that flame continues to burn, China’s night will not be eternal.
Miao QingReporter, The Opposition PartyEssay written in exile in the United StatesMarch 9, 2026
From Iran’s “Decapitation Strike” to Asymmetric Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait
Author: Miao Qing, Reporter of The Opposition PartyEditor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei
I. A Convergence of History: The Memory of February 28 and a Shock in the Middle East
On February 28, 2026, history produced a meaningful convergence across different parts of the world.
On that day, Taiwanese society continued commemorating the February 28 Incident of 1947. That bloody suppression not only reshaped Taiwan’s social structure but also became a historical trauma that cannot be ignored in Taiwan’s path toward democratization.
Yet on the very same day, a dramatic event shook the political landscape of the Middle East. A joint U.S.–Israel military operation, code-named Operation Epic Fury, carried out a targeted strike against Iran’s supreme leader, bringing an end to his thirty-seven-year rule.
The symbolic meaning of this operation quickly transcended the Middle East itself. It was not merely a military strike; it became a landmark event reflecting the transformation of warfare in the 21st century.
For Taiwan, this day has acquired a dual historical meaning:it is both a memorial of past authoritarian violence and a moment witnessing how modern “decapitation strikes” can end long-standing authoritarian rule.
II. The Transformation of War Logic: From Total War to “Decapitation Warfare”
From the perspective of military strategy, the operation represents a transformation in the logic of warfare.
During the two world wars of the 20th century and throughout the Cold War, war largely followed the logic of total war. Competition between nations depended heavily on resource reserves, industrial capacity, and troop numbers. Whoever possessed more tanks, more aircraft, and more soldiers was more likely to prevail.
However, Operation Epic Fury demonstrated a completely different form of warfare.
When Iran’s supreme leader could still be precisely eliminated despite operating within an extremely tight security system, it suggested that the deterrence logic of modern warfare is changing. The decisive factor is no longer merely the quantity of weapons but whether one possesses the capability to strike the decision-making core of the enemy with precision.
The key to victory is shifting from attrition on the battlefield to targeting the command center.
This transformation means that the cost of war is no longer an abstract national loss; it increasingly falls directly on specific decision-makers.
III. The Iranian Case: The Reality of Technological Gaps in Modern Warfare
Before the collapse of Ali Khamenei’s rule, Iran had long claimed to possess a vast missile arsenal and advanced air-defense systems.
In official propaganda, these weapons were portrayed as a defensive shield capable of crippling regional adversaries.
However, many of these systems had never been tested in a real high-intensity electronic warfare environment.
When U.S. and Israeli forces launched a cross-generation military campaign, stealth technology, electronic warfare systems, and real-time intelligence networks formed an overwhelming technological advantage. Iran’s once-proud air-defense network quickly revealed fatal weaknesses: insufficient detection capability, slow response times, and chaotic command structures.
The defensive system once portrayed as impenetrable proved almost incapable of functioning on the real battlefield.
This outcome once again demonstrates that in modern warfare, technological gaps often outweigh numerical superiority.
IV. Beijing’s Military Narrative and Its Real Risks
For years, Beijing has attempted to shape a strategic image of overwhelming power through large-scale military parades, displaying missile forces and stealth aircraft.
The purpose of such displays is to create psychological deterrence through sheer scale.
Yet the Iranian case reminds observers that in an era of highly informationized warfare, relying solely on the number of weapons does not guarantee military superiority.
If a military has never been tested in genuine high-intensity conflict, its massive arsenal may amount to little more than a visual spectacle. When confronted with advanced electronic warfare and stealth penetration capabilities, these weapons may even become precise targets themselves.
In other words, in 21st-century warfare, numerical advantage is increasingly being redefined by technological superiority.
V. Taiwan’s Strategic Choice: Asymmetric Deterrence
For Taiwan, this event provides an important strategic lesson.
Taiwan cannot compete with mainland China in terms of military spending, population size, or industrial capacity. If Taiwan were to fall into the traditional logic of attritional warfare, it would always remain at a disadvantage.
Therefore, Taiwan’s security strategy must be built upon asymmetric deterrence.
The essence of this deterrence is not to destroy large numbers of enemy troops but to ensure that decision-makers must confront personal risks when issuing the order to wage war.
When the cost of war shifts from national losses to direct threats to the personal safety of decision-makers, the psychological effect of deterrence becomes greatly amplified.
VI. The Structural Weakness of Authoritarian Systems
One defining characteristic of authoritarian regimes is the high concentration of power.
In traditional warfare, such concentration can increase efficiency in command execution. However, in the era of decapitation strikes, it may become a fatal vulnerability.
When state power is concentrated in the hands of a small number of individuals—or even a single leader—the entire political system relies on an extremely fragile command chain.
Once this chain is severed, the entire state apparatus may quickly fall into chaos.
In contrast, democratic systems usually possess more distributed decision-making structures. Even if individual leaders face risks, the state can continue to function.
Therefore, decapitation deterrence poses a far greater strategic shock to authoritarian regimes than to democratic states.
VII. From Military Deterrence to Psychological Deterrence
If Taiwan can deepen intelligence and technological cooperation with allies such as the United States and Japan, and develop long-range precision strike capabilities, the security landscape of the Taiwan Strait could fundamentally change.
When potential aggressors calculate the cost of war, they would no longer consider only equipment losses but also personal security risks.
Under such conditions, the decision to start a war becomes far more difficult.
The essence of this deterrence is not merely military—it is psychological.
Once the cost of war shifts from abstract national losses to the concrete life-and-death risks of individuals, even the strongest expansionist impulses must reconsider the risks involved.
VIII. The Institutional Contest Between Democracy and Dictatorship
Ultimately, the Taiwan Strait issue is not only a military contest but also a competition between political systems.
The strength of democratic systems lies in the resilience and legitimacy of their power structures.
Authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, often depend on personal authority to maintain control. Once the core of power is threatened, the entire system may rapidly destabilize.
Thus, under modern warfare conditions, authoritarian regimes may in fact be more fragile than democratic states.
If Taiwan’s security strategy can be built upon this institutional difference, Taiwan may possess a stronger strategic foundation for defending democracy and freedom.
Conclusion: The Real Trump Card of Peace
Peace across the Taiwan Strait does not depend solely on the number of weapons or the scale of military spending.
What ultimately determines war or peace is how decision-makers calculate risk.
If one day Beijing’s leaders realize that launching a war will not merely cost soldiers’ lives but could directly threaten the stability of their own rule, then the option of war may be shelved at the very source of decision-making.
Only then will peace possess a truly reliable strategic trump card.
To study the political structure of human society, one must first have a correct understanding of human nature. Political structures are fundamentally centered on human beings as their subjects. Governments are established either to manage people or to serve them, and governments themselves are composed of people. Therefore, only by fully understanding the weaknesses of human nature can appropriate institutional measures be taken to prevent these weaknesses from manifesting in governmental behavior.
(1) Common Characteristics of Human Nature
Human beings are animals. Although the human way of life has become vastly different from that of other animals—humans no longer need to hunt prey or gather fruit for survival—the fundamental nature of humans as animals has not disappeared. Many human instincts remain identical to those of other animals.
These basic instinctive needs include eating and drinking, protection from heat and cold, reproduction, personal safety, rest, and recreation. Nearly all human activities ultimately aim to satisfy these instinctive needs.
In modern society, although machines and specialized production have greatly changed the form of human labor, people often perform tasks that are not directly related to satisfying these instincts. However, the ultimate purpose remains the same: the rewards obtained from such labor can be exchanged for food, drink, clothing, and shelter that fulfill basic needs. Without such exchanges, few people would naturally enjoy operating monotonous machines at fixed hours every day, transporting goods that hold no personal interest, or enduring muscular fatigue.
Secondly, human beings are highly intelligent animals. In a crowded world, when conflicts of interest arise, humans recognize the benefits of cooperation. By forming groups with relatives, friends, or tribes, individuals gain greater security through collective strength. Consequently, individuals may sometimes sacrifice personal interests for the benefit of the group.
Within these groups, in order to maintain order and prevent chaos, people recognize the necessity of shared agreements and the restraint of personal desires. This gives rise to the social characteristics of human beings.
The key distinction between humans and other animals lies in humans’ enormous capacity for memory. The invention of writing and printing further expanded human memory almost without limit. The accumulation and dissemination of knowledge and experience have enabled humanity to transform the entire planet and fundamentally change its way of life. Yet it can be argued that the purpose of most human inventions is essentially the same: to obtain greater returns with less labor.
The tendency to prefer comfort and avoid labor is part of human nature. People generally do not enjoy physical labor.
Humanity has long studied its own nature. For those who are curious, this question remains fascinating. Some believe that “human nature is inherently good,” and that individuals become morally corrupted only later in life. Marxist theory, however, argues that the root cause of human evil lies in private property. According to this view, the desire to possess property creates conflicts between individuals and gives rise to oppression and exploitation.
Under this theory, the abolition of private property and the establishment of public ownership would permanently solve these problems. If all property belonged collectively to society, every individual would become an owner of all property. Each person would then be working for themselves, generating tremendous enthusiasm for labor. Since property would belong to everyone, the incentive to accumulate personal wealth would disappear, eliminating selfishness. In such a society, individuals working for themselves would simultaneously work for others, producing an atmosphere of mutual cooperation—“everyone for one, and one for everyone”—thus creating a perfect and superior social order.
However, historical practice has shown that this well-intentioned theory did not succeed. The reason is simple: human selfishness does not disappear simply because private property is abolished. When individuals expend effort performing tedious labor and endure physical discomfort, yet find that the rewards they receive are not proportional to their effort—while countless others share the fruits of their labor—the rational calculation becomes clear.
If one reduces effort, the shared benefits may not decrease significantly. After an initial period of enthusiasm, the dominant characteristic of people in such systems becomes inertia rather than productivity. Few individuals remain willing to work tirelessly to create wealth that will be shared by countless others. Social progress stagnates, and a “society of equal prosperity” often becomes a “society of equal poverty.”
Human beings are fundamentally self-centered animals; selfishness is an inherent aspect of human nature. This is particularly evident in infants. Careful observation shows that infants are extremely self-centered. They attempt to possess anything they perceive as useful, driven purely by their own needs and desires. The only difference between adults and infants is that adults learn to restrain their desires and recognize the benefits of cooperation and patience. Yet when opportunities arise, these infantile characteristics often reappear.
Human selfishness is not easily erased. Individuals naturally consider issues first from their own perspective. This tendency does not disappear simply because property ownership systems change, nor does it vanish when individuals change social status.
Anthropological studies also show that humans are group-oriented animals centered around family structures. Although modern societies differ greatly from primitive lifestyles, people still care more about relatives and friends than about strangers. Human relationships resemble the layered structure of an onion—ranging from close relationships to distant ones. Individuals are generally reluctant to sacrifice their own interests for strangers.
Human beings also possess other common weaknesses: arrogance, stubbornness, competitiveness, hypocrisy, laziness, and greed. Human nature is somewhat flexible, much like a rubber band. External forces can temporarily alter its shape, but once those forces disappear, it quickly returns to its original form. Similarly, external constraints may temporarily modify human behavior, but once those constraints are removed, inherent weaknesses tend to reappear.
Human nature is far from perfect and contains many weaknesses. Government officials are no different from ordinary people in this regard. Therefore, when studying political systems, designing governmental structures, and selecting leaders, these characteristics of human nature must never be ignored.
Ruling elites, however, often prefer that the public not perceive them as possessing such weaknesses. They attempt to persuade citizens that they are selfless, humble, knowledgeable, and always correct. The purpose is simple: to encourage people to accept their rule so that their privileges can be maintained effortlessly.
If a well-intentioned social system is built upon incorrect assumptions about human nature—overestimating the impact of property ownership on behavior, overestimating individuals’ sense of responsibility and altruism toward the collective, while ignoring human weaknesses and failing to establish safeguards—such a system will inevitably deviate from its original goals. Ultimately it may become distorted and bring disastrous consequences to society.
In any political society, the government is the most powerful organization. No other civil association can rival its authority. Governments are exclusive institutions—each country can have only one government. Once individuals obtain power and experience its benefits, they rarely relinquish it voluntarily. Consequently, once a political system is established, reforming it becomes extremely difficult and rarely achievable in the short term.
Where there is government, there are government officials. The authority of government must be exercised through these officials. In terms of human nature, they are no different from ordinary individuals. Yet they possess enormous power and can directly influence the lives of citizens in many ways.
In systems of public ownership, officials effectively become the administrators of all social property. They thus acquire immense power over citizens’ livelihoods—even control over life and death. Like all humans, however, they also desire comfort and convenience. When they discover that power can easily be exchanged for material benefits, they may gradually form privileged groups corresponding to their level of authority. Over time this can evolve into a large bureaucratic ruling class.
If power clearly provides significant personal benefits, individuals will pursue official positions with great determination, cultivate political networks, seek lifetime tenure, and even attempt to pass positions to their descendants. If bureaucrats possess absolute authority over citizens without constraints, they may become arrogant and domineering. Driven by laziness or stubbornness, they may become indifferent and inflexible. When faced with resistance, they may resort to repression and violence, demanding absolute obedience and compelling citizens to serve their interests.
Ultimately, the relationship between administrators and the public may deteriorate into one of oppression and exploitation.
A famous psychological experiment illustrates this phenomenon. A group of volunteer students was randomly divided into two groups: prisoners and guards. They were asked to simulate prison life. After only two weeks, researchers were forced to terminate the experiment. Participants had fully internalized their roles. The “guards” began abusing and humiliating the “prisoners,” while the “prisoners” became resentful and desperate.
This experiment reveals an important aspect of human nature: when one group gains unrestricted power over another group that lacks effective resistance, social relationships can quickly deteriorate.
Thus, wherever government exists and officials possess power, the tendency to abuse that power will always exist. Even if an old government is overthrown and replaced by leaders drawn from the people, their interests may gradually diverge from those of ordinary citizens. They may eventually form a new bureaucratic class, repeating historical cycles seen throughout many societies.
Therefore, when individuals possess authority over others without constraints, they tend to use that power to serve their own interests. This tendency must always be remembered in the study of politics.
Although societies around the world differ in many respects, there is no significant difference in intelligence among different races or nations. Differences arise primarily from climate, environment, customs, economic development, and education. Human weaknesses are universal across societies. Therefore, successful political systems and governance experiences from one country can be adopted by others.
Political science, like natural science, is not limited by national borders. Just as scientific innovations can be applied worldwide, effective political institutions that improve people’s lives will eventually gain universal recognition.
However, some local interest groups resist such innovations. Without understanding their merits, they claim that foreign ideas are incompatible with local traditions. In reality, such resistance often serves only to protect the privileges of a small minority at the expense of the broader population.
(2) Individual Differences Among Humans
Although humans share many common characteristics, significant individual differences also exist. People differ not only in physical appearance but also in knowledge, experience, personality, diligence, and intelligence.
If a social theory attempts to enforce absolute equality of income while ignoring these differences, it effectively punishes the hardworking, rewards the lazy, suppresses capable individuals, and encourages mediocrity. Such a society may appear equal, but it is not truly fair. Genuine equality would only exist when everyone becomes equally mediocre and unproductive.
Human abilities vary due to both innate traits and environmental influences.
For society to progress rapidly, effective organization and management are essential. Not everyone possesses the ability to perform these roles successfully. Only a small number of exceptionally capable individuals can perform them effectively.
Some may argue that intelligent individuals can become more dangerous if they misuse power. This is indeed possible. However, if a society allows officials to abuse authority without punishment, both incompetent and brilliant leaders can cause harm. The key is to establish strong institutional constraints that prevent abuse of power.
A healthy society should be managed by its most capable individuals—whether in government, business, research institutions, or social organizations. By allowing the most talented and creative individuals to lead, society ensures continuous progress.
A fundamental question for any political system is how to identify and select the most capable individuals. Talented people do not always seek power, and they may remain unnoticed unless effective mechanisms exist to discover them.
Public elections are one such mechanism. Citizens are capable of recognizing competent individuals and selecting leaders who serve their interests. Public trust can enhance a leader’s sense of responsibility and commitment.
At the same time, compensation should correspond to contributions. Individuals who create greater value for society should receive appropriate rewards. Adequate compensation also reduces incentives for corruption.
Political equality and economic equality are different concepts. They are not inherently linked. Economic inequality does not necessarily prevent political equality. Political equality refers to equal opportunities for individuals to exercise their rights.
The relationship between political and economic systems can be summarized as follows:
A society should not promote absolute economic equality but should encourage and reward individuals who contribute to progress and innovation. Proper incentives can transform individual creativity into collective advancement.
However, excessive inequality should also be avoided. Governments may use taxation and social programs to support disadvantaged groups and ensure fair opportunities, particularly through education and anti-monopoly policies.
In most societies, both the richest and the poorest individuals represent only a small portion of the population. The majority belong to a middle group capable of maintaining a decent standard of living. In a healthy democracy, the majority’s will determines laws and policies.
Ultimately, the direction of political and economic policies depends on the collective choices of citizens. Public opinion is capable of balancing the interests of different social groups.
Editor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Zhou Min
Abstract: In China, religious belief is strictly incorporated into the administrative control system. House gatherings outside of official churches are often regarded as “illegal,” and even reading scriptures or praying may face interference, reflecting the sharp conflict between freedom of belief and power regulation.
In many countries, religious belief is a completely ordinary matter. Some people go to churches to pray, some go to temples to burn incense, and some quietly read scriptures or sing hymns; these are all personal, free choices. But if one places the same things in China, they sometimes become very “complicated.”
In China, if you want to be a Christian, there is actually a “standard route”—that is, to go to a government-approved “Three-Self Church.” There, everything is orderly: churches must be registered, sermons must be filed for the record, activities must be approved, and even religious affairs must accept administrative management. In other words, here, belief is best when it is “organized, planned, and supervised.”
The problem is that not all Christians believe that faith requires this method of management. Consequently, some people choose to read scriptures and pray at home or in small gathering spots; three or five people singing hymns or sharing their faith—these are known as “house churches.” According to common sense, this is just a group of people gathering at home, but in some places, this is defined as “illegal religious activity.”
Thus, a rather ironic scene emerges: a few people reading the Bible in a living room may be treated as objects requiring “rectification”; a prayer meeting may sometimes be met with “on-site guidance” from the police; a common religious book may also be treated as an “item” that needs to be confiscated. Even more interesting is that many house churches do not engage in public propaganda, nor do they hold large-scale events; they simply gather together to pray and read scriptures. Yet, in some places, such gatherings will still be registered, questioned, or even banned. It is as if the act of belief itself appears exceptionally “dangerous” if it has not undergone administrative approval.
This leads to the question: If prayer must be approved, is belief still belief? If reading scriptures requires filing for the record, is the conscience still free? Many members of house churches actually do not have any grand goals; they only hope to express their faith without interference. However, reality often tells them one thing: in certain places, even the quietest prayer can become a matter that “needs to be explained.”
Whether a society is truly open is not only reflected in its economic development or city scale, but in whether people can freely think, express, and believe. Faith should belong to the heart, not to an approval process.
Perhaps one day, people will no longer need to pull the curtains in their living rooms to pray, will no longer worry about their gatherings being interrupted, and will no longer need to explain why they are reading a religious book. At that time, faith will have truly returned to where it was originally meant to exist—within the conscience and freedom of human beings.
Representation Regarding the “Reply to Administrative Reconsideration”
Abstract: This article is the author’s response to the “Reply to Administrative Reconsideration,” exposing the truth regarding the China social security department’s handling of his pension insurance contribution years and retirement benefits. The social security department lacks sufficient legal basis and violates the principles of fairness, honesty, and human rights.
To: The People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou (Administrative Reconsideration Bureau):
The Petitioner, Chen Shuqing, is the applicant for administrative reconsideration in Case No. [2006] 67 of the Gongshu District Government (hereinafter referred to as “the Petitioner”).
On the afternoon of March 2, 2026, in accordance with the provisions of Article 47 of the Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Petitioner went to the Administrative Reconsideration Bureau of Gongshu District, Hangzhou, to consult and copy the “Reply to Administrative Reconsideration” and other relevant materials submitted by the Respondent, the Human Resources and Social Security Bureau of Gongshu District, Hangzhou.
Prior to receiving the aforementioned “Reply” and related materials, the Petitioner had never received such detailed written reasons and bases regarding the Respondent’s performance of duties during previous dealings. At the same time, it was discovered that regarding the claims of unreasonable and illegal administrative acts raised in the “Application for Administrative Reconsideration” of this case, the “Reply” neither acknowledges nor refutes or denies them. The Petitioner now provides necessary factual supplementary explanations and targeted representations regarding the “Reply.”
I. Regarding the Petitioner’s dismissal and the issue of deemed contribution years. The “Reply to Administrative Reconsideration” states: “In July 1995, the Petitioner was processed for dismissal; therefore, the Respondent determined his deemed contribution years to be 0 years and 0 months. The Petitioner’s continuous length of service should be calculated from April 1992, the date he began participating in the old-age insurance.”
First, the Approval Regarding the Dismissal of Chen Shuqing by the Gongshu District Banshan Commercial Integrated Company dismissed the Petitioner on the grounds of “leaving the post from July 1, 1995, to the present,” and this dismissal decision was made hastily within that very month. If the deducted deemed contribution period were from the so-called “absence” on July 1, 1995, until the decision was made, it would certainly be justifiable. However, is it appropriate to deduct the four-month period from December 1991 to March 1992, during which I worked at the unit without any fault?
The description in the July 1995 Approval Regarding the Dismissal of Chen Shuqing, stating “the person has left the post since July 1, 1995, to date,” is fabricated and inconsistent with the agreement between the company and me. The actual situation was that the unit itself suffered from long-term poor management (old state-owned commercial units were impacted by a large number of professional markets, comprehensive markets, and individual vendors). Wages had already been suspended more than a year prior. Subsequently, I proposed to contract business, but because the conditions necessary for me to generate income for the unit were not provided (the business premises I sought were rented to others), it was agreed to allow the Petitioner, Chen Shuqing, to seek his own livelihood. The personnel relationship continued to be attached to the unit, which would pay social security on my behalf, though all actual costs were provided by Chen Shuqing himself (refer to the Hangzhou Industrial and Commercial Enterprise Unified Collection Receipt No. 0077295 for social security fees paid by Chen Shuqing to the unit, which was only found after rummaging through boxes at home a few days ago and is attached as an annex to this Representation). Under these circumstances, there is naturally no issue of so-called “leaving the post” or “being at the post.” Before being notified of the “dismissal,” I was not informed of the reasons for the impending dismissal or the channels for protecting my rights. At that time, I merely treated it as a unilateral termination of the contract by the unit and did not seriously understand or distinguish the actual meaning and consequences between “dismissal,” discharge, and resignation.
Although this “dismissal” reflects, to some extent, the vulnerability of individual citizens due to a lack of legal awareness—especially rights-protection awareness—under a deficient social rule of law, the Petitioner’s ignorance of his rights as an employee and failure to seek protection after the “dismissal,” combined with the fact that the deducted deemed contribution period was only four months, led to the request in this case to process the pension audit based on 24 years and 4 months of contribution, which did not include these four months. Since the Respondent raised this issue in the “Reply to Administrative Reconsideration,” the Petitioner might as well provide supplementary explanations and evidence sufficient to overturn the facts of the “dismissal.” It would be best if a fair solution could be reached during the reconsideration process. However, if it is ignored or if the Respondent’s determination regarding the “dismissal” and the zeroing out of the four-month deemed contribution continues to be formally accepted, the Petitioner is willing to adopt the stance of “if the other party no longer mentions it, we will no longer pursue it,” as it does not affect the overall situation of this case.
II. The “Reply” remains silent on the issue of the Respondent “failing to keep its word” and damaging the principle of protecting the interests of trust in government actions.
At the time of payment, the Respondent did not inform payers, including the Petitioner, of the so-called issue of “irregular participation in basic old-age insurance during imprisonment.” It feigned ignorance of “irregular fee collection” and, as a government action, accepted all social security contributions without refusal. Now, when required to fulfill statutory social insurance responsibilities, it suddenly changes its tune, claiming “irregularity” because of the “irregular payments” by the payer. Today, the Respondent, as a professional entity (which should have known), is suspected of intentional or clearly negligent “failure to inform of regulations” and “collecting fees in violation of regulations,” yet it does not bear the responsibility for the “violation.” Instead, it forces the layperson and active contract-fulfilling social security beneficiary—the Petitioner, Chen Shuqing—to bear the loss of contract breach under the name of “irregularity.” Furthermore, so-called “irregularity” can by no means be equated with “illegality.” No law in the People’s Republic of China clearly stipulates that “one shall not participate in social insurance during imprisonment” or that social insurance institutions “may cancel and refuse to bear insurance responsibilities for participation during imprisonment.” The Respondent’s behavior, in any civilized era or place that values reason and the rule of law, would be seen as the arbitrary and absurd exercise of dominant power, seriously damaging the government’s social credibility!
III. When the Petitioner went to the Respondent’s window to handle retirement procedures, he repeatedly (verbally) requested the Respondent to consider the human rights conventions that China has signed and, in some cases, ratified. These include provisions prohibiting forced unpaid labor and universal social insurance for everyone. At that time, a section-level staff member laughingly replied, “You’re wandering too far off!” I treated it as ignorance or a joke. Now, the Petitioner has formally detailed the relevant articles and contents of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in the “Application for Administrative Reconsideration.” However, the “Reply” continues to ignore the principle that administrative acts (including specific and abstract acts) must not conflict with the law, and ignores the international conventions that the state has signed, ratified, and put into effect.
International conventions signed and especially ratified by the state are public commitments to the whole world, including the Chinese people. Any disregard for these conventions when applying the law to specific cases not only harms the realization of the rule of law domestically but will also inevitably damage the country’s international reputation and image. We are more than twenty years into the twenty-first century. If state personnel or organs continue to ignore the role and effectiveness of international conventions signed and ratified by their own country when exercising power, can their knowledge, ability, and perspective be called qualified?
IV. The “Reply” ignores the widespread illegal use of labor dispatch workers by organs and institutions for “fake employment” (where actual labor is inconsistent with nominal employment, including social security registration) and serious violations of the legal requirement for “equal pay for equal work,” yet only determines the Petitioner’s social security contributions during imprisonment as “irregular.” This is essentially the same “social security agency payment.” This double standard not only violates the basic principle of a rule-of-law society—that “government action is forbidden unless authorized by law, while citizen action is free unless prohibited by law”—but also, how does it differ from the arbitrary power of ancient feudal despotism where “the officials are allowed to set fires, but the commoners are forbidden to light lamps”?
V. Undoubtedly, forced unpaid labor in prisons—which violates the UN Charter, the two UN human rights covenants, and universal values of civilization—must undergo fundamental changes or even be abolished as our country continues to reform and open up or further expand its opening. This is precisely why spokespersons for the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly (and cover-up-ly) emphasize that “there is no forced labor in Xinjiang” and “there is no forced labor in China.” While in prison, the Petitioner and fellow inmates watched the CCTV News Bulletin every night as required. Every time we saw or heard these claims of “no forced labor,” we would laugh as a group. “No forced labor in China? Wherever there is a prison, there is forced labor; at least the Qiaosi Prison where we were has always had forced labor.” Besides the “methods” of forced labor I personally saw and heard, if necessary, I might as well let “everyone tell their stories” about their personal experiences in prison (including forced unpaid labor), and let economic scholars discuss the impact of “prison forced unpaid labor” on fair market competition, social employment, and labor rights, as well as the role and influence of prison labor products on Chinese commodity exports. To avoid being too “off-topic” and due to space constraints, I will stop here and not expand into more specific and full discussions for now.
If we start with the individual case of Chen Shuqing, it is hoped that it can gradually lead to a universal recognition that social security contributions during past imprisonment are valid, or even allow the vast number of imprisoned persons to pay back deficient years of social security after release. This would allow those released from prison to truly enjoy a fair old-age life like other citizens, which is conducive not only to the peaceful reform of prisoners but also to the resettlement and return of released persons to normal social life, avoiding the possibility of some people taking risks out of desperation. This establishes a reasonable buffer and transition period between the current penal system and its execution and the future abolition of forced unpaid labor in prisons.
In summary, the Petitioner earnestly requests the People’s Government of Gongshu District, Hangzhou (Administrative Reconsideration Bureau), when reviewing this case, to pay necessary attention to the fact that the Respondent neither acknowledged nor refuted the issues and reasons raised by the Petitioner in the “Application for Administrative Reconsideration.” This refusal to answer the focus of legal application disputes: if it is because they cannot, it shows that the legality and rationality of their administrative act cannot withstand scrutiny; if it is out of disdain, it is the arrogance of power, which should be even more prevented.
I look forward to a final administrative reconsideration decision that is legal, fair, and comprehensive.
Respectfully,
Petitioner: Chen Shuqing
March 3, 2026
Attachments: 1.One copy of this Representation Regarding the “Reply to Administrative Reconsideration” 2.Two copies of the Hangzhou Industrial and Commercial Enterprise Unified Collection Receipt No. 0077295
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