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《阶级叙事的牢笼~谈中国的文学意识形态》

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作者:刘畅

       新文化运动中鲁迅有一篇知名的著作叫《狂人日记》,日记中第一篇就说,翻开四书五经,通篇就两个字“吃人”,这里的人是指人性。这个观点也太极端化,在作者看来,中国的传统文学用一个字概括“礼”,等级分明,各守其道,如果偏要用西方平等思想来看,确实是压抑了人性。

       当代中国的文学呢,大体上(不绝对)也可以用两个字概括:“阶级”,阶级情感和阶级斗争。

      大凡获奖作品一定离不开这两个符号。一位长辈曾告诉我,一句口号中如果有炮火和血腥味,一定来自《某选》。翻越茅盾文学奖奖获奖作品,《平凡的世界》讲阶级感情,歌颂苦难,歌颂无产阶级的自力更生;《白鹿原》讲阶级斗争,田小娥要求女权,黑娃最终还是革了封建地主的命;《尘埃落定》讲了藏族农奴的斗争;其余的《李自成》《将军吟》更不用说了,莫言的《蛙》又反传统礼数。以阶级标准来规范,创作者要在社会主义土地上活下去,要么歌颂底层人民,要么书写与阶级敌人斗争的勇气(官僚主义,帝国主义,封建主义,资本主义),要么在历史题材中重现“阶级”斗争史。斗吧!结果斗来斗去,连阶级情感都斗没了。翻开各类视频号,一会炮轰这个帝国主义国家,一会炮轰那个强权国家,老百姓也逐渐清晰,炮轰了帝国主义不说,又把炮筒瞄准贪官污吏,还有多余的精力呢,就对准自己的同胞吧!

       有的家庭,平时看似井水不犯河水,关系平平,一旦家里出了个什么事,内向的人突然变外向了,胆小的也大胆了,颓废的也变得精神抖擞,纷纷起来炮轰,仿佛“斗争”就是个鸦片,有了他,才存在活着的意义。但当代中国,没有那么多阶级斗争,大多数时间都是平平淡淡,怎么找到鸡血呢?到处找假想敌,攀比,对比,家庭外找不到,就在家庭内找,敌人才是存在的最大意义。十年浩劫也是如此,国外的敌人动不了,就动内部敌人吧!

       中国人爱斗,一走出国门,一副天朝子民的派头,稍有不满,就认为是歧视,一出手一出口,立马成为国际新闻头条,根本还是在于“斗争”的惯性。汤姆大哥分享了一个故事,一个从大陆来的女子,刚刚坐上他的出租车,他就问,你来自哪里?那个女子说来自日本,汤姆立马切换成日语模式“日本人ですか?(Nihonjin desu ka)你是日本人吗?)”女子听不懂,一来一去,才知道来自大陆。中间聊得还不错,但一下车,汤姆直接收获差评一个。在国外,还有另一个现象,一个亚裔如果遇到什么狗血的麻烦,不管三七二十一,只要冒充中国人,也许能躲过一劫,这既是让中国人帮他们背黑锅,也是让中国这个标签破罐子破摔。

       翻开西方文学名著,《悲惨世界》《复活》《安娜卡列尼娜》《茶花女》等,里面一定能读得出上帝,上帝需要救赎,上帝的道需要遵循,尤其是《安娜卡列尼娜》明明控诉的安娜违背了婚姻的神圣导致家破人亡,中国人却解读为封建主义压抑了女性,安娜是女权主义者,简直是荒谬绝伦之极。《悲惨世界》明明是冉阿让自我的救赎,却被扣上封建主义对基层人民的压迫。同一个故事,用不同视角解读,结论是千差万别。

       一个社会,一群人何时能从“阶级叙事”中释放出来?如何从“阶级斗争”彻底解脱出来呢?与天斗不如与己斗,与地斗不如在仁爱中身心和谐。守天道,尊天命,戒掉自身恶习,保留人性的真善美,活出天道喜悦的样子,何尝不也是一种斗争和解放呢?唯一的差别是,后者是为了最终的和谐,前者的斗争是冤冤相报,没有终点!

作者简介

巴银:刘畅,四川广安人,中国前致公党党员,旅居美国洛杉矶,诗歌《忆勐腊》《嘉陵江》《流浪》《豆瓣酱》等曾发表于西南商报副刊。

微信:491712361851

编辑:Gloria Wang 校对:王滨 翻译:沈美花

The Cage of Class Narrative: On Chinese Literary Ideology

Author: Liu Chang

Abstract: Beginning with the concept of “cannibalism” in Lu Xun’s A Madman’s Diary, this article reflects on the value orientation of modern and contemporary Chinese literature and social narratives. The author posits that while traditional Chinese literature can be summarized by the concept of Li (propriety/social order), modern and contemporary literature has long revolved around “class.” Class sentiments and class struggle have become key themes in literary works and social discourse, shaping how people view the world and conduct interpersonal relationships, ultimately forming a mindset centered on “struggle.” Furthermore, comparing Chinese and Western literature, the author argues that Western classics focus more on religion, redemption, and the individual soul, whereas Chinese literature emphasizes social contradictions and class narratives. Finally, the author proposes transcending endless opposition and struggle by returning to benevolence, self-cultivation, and the spirit of the Heavenly Way (Tiandao), replacing external conflict with inner growth to achieve true spiritual liberation through harmony.

In the New Culture Movement, Lu Xun authored a famous work titled A Madman’s Diary. In the very first entry, the protagonist claims that upon opening the Four Books and Five Classics, the entire text boiled down to just two words: “eating people”—where “people” refers to human nature. In my view, this perspective is overly extreme. Traditional Chinese literature can broadly be summarized by a single word: Li (propriety/order)—marked by clear hierarchies where everyone abides by their prescribed role. If judged strictly through the Western lens of equality, it indeed appears to suppress human nature.

As for contemporary Chinese literature, it can generally (though not absolutely) be summarized by two words: “class”—specifically, class sentiment and class struggle.

Virtually all award-winning works are inseparable from these two symbols. An elder once told me that if a slogan carries the scent of gunpowder and blood, it undoubtedly comes from the Selected Works [of Mou]. Browsing through the winners of the Mao Dun Literature Prize: Ordinary World speaks of class sentiment, praising suffering and celebrating the self-reliance of the proletariat; White Deer Plain addresses class struggle, where Tian Xiao’e demands women’s rights and Heiwa ultimately overthrows the feudal landlord; Red Poppies (The Dust Settles) depicts the struggle of Tibetan serfs; not to mention works like Li Zicheng and Song of the General. Mo Yan’s Frog, on the other hand, rebels against traditional norms and propriety.

Regulated by class standards, if creators wish to survive on socialist soil, they must either praise the common people, depict the courage of struggling against class enemies (bureaucracy, imperialism, feudalism, and capitalism), or re-create the history of “class struggle” in historical themes. Struggle on! Yet, after all this incessant struggling, even class sentiment itself has been struggled away. Turn on various video platforms, and one moment they are blasting this imperialist nation, and the next, that powerful state. The public has also grown increasingly clear-headed: after bombarding foreign imperialists, they aim their cannons at corrupt officials; and if they still have energy left over, they direct it at their own fellow countrymen!

Take certain families, for instance. Normally, they seem to mind their own business and maintain unremarkable relationships. But the moment something happens at home, the introverted suddenly become extroverted, the fearful become bold, and the listless become energized, rising up one after another to launch attacks. It is as if “struggle” were an opium—only through it do they find a reason to live. Yet in contemporary China, there isn’t actually that much class struggle; most days pass in mundane tranquility. So how do people get their adrenaline rush? By hunting for imaginary enemies everywhere, engaging in comparisons and rivalries. If they cannot find an enemy outside the home, they look for one within. Enemies become the ultimate purpose of existence. The same was true during the Ten Years of Catastrophe [Cultural Revolution]—unable to touch enemies abroad, they turned on internal enemies instead!

The Chinese love to struggle. Once they step abroad, they carry the haughty aura of subjects from the Celestial Empire. At the slightest dissatisfaction, they perceive it as discrimination; the moment they act or speak out, they immediately make international headlines. At its root, this stems from the inertia of “struggle.” Brother Tom shared a story: a woman from Mainland China had just gotten into his taxi when he asked, “Where are you from?” The woman replied that she came from Japan. Tom immediately switched to Japanese: “Nihonjin desu ka?” (“Are you Japanese?”). The woman didn’t understand, and after a brief back-and-forth, he realized she was actually from Mainland China. They had a pleasant conversation along the way, yet as soon as she got out of the car, Tom received a one-star review.

Abroad, there is another phenomenon: if an Asian person encounters some absurd trouble, regardless of the facts, as long as they pretend to be Chinese, they might escape unscathed. This not only makes the Chinese a scapegoat for others, but also lets the “Chinese” label sink into self-abandonment.

Opening Western literary classics—such as Les Misérables, Resurrection, Anna Karenina, and La Dame aux Camélias—one can always discern God, the need for God’s redemption, and the requirement to abide by God’s path. In particular, while Anna Karenina clearly denounces Anna’s violation of the sanctity of marriage which led to her family’s ruin and her own death, Chinese critics interpret it as feudalism repressing women, portraying Anna as a feminist—a reading that is utterly absurd. Les Misérables is fundamentally Jean Valjean’s personal redemption, yet it was labeled in China as the oppression of the lower classes by feudalism. The exact same story, viewed from different perspectives, yields vastly different conclusions.

When can a society and a people finally be released from the “class narrative”? How can they thoroughly liberate themselves from “class struggle”? Rather than struggling against Heaven, it is better to struggle against oneself; rather than struggling against Earth, it is better to seek harmony of body and mind in benevolence and love. Abiding by the Heavenly Way, respecting destiny, shedding one’s bad habits, preserving the truth, goodness, and beauty of human nature, and living out the joy of the Heavenly Way—is this not also a form of struggle and liberation? The only difference is that the latter is aimed at ultimate harmony, whereas the former’s struggle is a vicious cycle of vengeance with no end in sight!

Author Profile

Ba Yin: Liu Chang, native of Guang’an, Sichuan; former member of the China Zhi Gong Party; currently residing in Los Angeles, USA. Poems such as Remembering Mengla, Jialing River, Wandering, and Bean Paste have been published in the supplement of Southwest Business Daily.

WeChat: 491712361851

Editor: Gloria Wang

Proofreader: Wang Bin

Translator: Shen Meihua

极权主义之六——丝绸缠树

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作者:张兴贵

为什么极权国家在对外交往中特别喜欢“摆排场”?从纳粹德国的盛大阅兵,到苏联的宏伟国事访问,再到当代某些国家的豪华接待和军事展示,这一幕幕场景反复上演。外交成为“剧场政治”的舞台:通过视觉震撼、仪式秩序和象征符号,制造“强大统一”的幻象。这种表演性并非偶然,而是源于极权政权深刻的内在不安全感——它必须不断证明自身的“必然胜利”和“历史正当性”,因为其合法性并非源于民众同意,而是源于神话构建。

第一,摆排场是投射力量、制造威慑的工具。 极权政权往往内部存在结构性脆弱:经济可能低效、民生压力巨大、社会不满潜伏。它们无法通过透明治理赢得认可,于是转向外部“秀肌肉”。一场盛大的阅兵或国宾仪式,能瞬间营造“国家强大、领袖英明”的形象。这些排场不是浪费,而是战略投资:通过视觉震撼,弥补硬实力不足或掩盖内部问题。民主国家外交更注重实质谈判和互惠,而极权外交则把“形式”本身变成武器——让对手感受到压力,让潜在盟友看到“靠山”。

第二,摆排场服务于宣传机器。极权体制的核心是意识形态垄断和群众动员。这种政权需要不断制造“神话”来维持民众的狂热或顺从。对外排场被精心包装,通过国家媒体向国内传播:外国领导人鞠躬、盛大欢迎仪式、礼物交换,都被解读为“世界认可我们的伟大成就”。这能转移国内矛盾,强化“举国一致”的幻觉。它制造一种“外部肯定内部稳定”的循环:排场越隆重,国内忠诚度越高;忠诚度越高,越能支撑更多排场。这种表演性政治,正是极权主义“剧场国家”的特征——一切皆为演出,一切演出皆为统治。

第三,摆排场是寻求国际承认的手段。极权国家常面临“合法性赤字”。它们缺乏选举授权,无法靠民意支撑,于是依赖“绩效合法性”和“程序合法性”(仪式)。当绩效不足时,仪式就成为替代品。极权主义不满足于统治人民,它试图重塑人民感知的世界。盛大排场正是这一企图的国际版:通过仪式秩序,暗示“混乱的外部世界”最终会臣服于“有序的极权模式”。

从更宏大视角看,这一现象反映了“景观社会”理论在极权语境下的极端化。权力不再满足于隐藏,它需要被观看、被崇拜。极权排场是将政治彻底审美化、戏剧化的结果:群众成为观众,领袖成为主角,历史成为导演。这暴露了极权主义的内在矛盾——它声称代表“历史必然”,却必须不断通过人为表演来证明。

极权外交的“摆排场”不是孤立文化现象,而是体制逻辑、权力心理与宣传机制的系统产物。真正的国家力量,源于治理效能、民众福祉与普世价值,而非舞台上的灯光与队列。唯有摒弃表演性政治,拥抱理性对话,世界才能走向持久和平与繁荣。

编辑:Geoffrey 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

Totalitarianism Part VI: Silk Wrapped Around Trees

By Zhang Xinggui

Why are totalitarian states so particularly fond of “putting on grand spectacles” in their foreign interactions? From Nazi Germany’s lavish military parades to the Soviet Union’s grand state visits, to the luxurious receptions and military displays of certain contemporary states, these scenes are performed over and over again. Diplomacy becomes a stage for “theater politics”: through visual shock, ritual order, and symbolic signs, a illusion of “power and unity” is manufactured. This performative nature is by no means accidental; rather, it stems from a profound inner insecurity inherent in totalitarian regimes—they must constantly prove their own “inevitable victory” and “historical legitimacy,” because their legitimacy originates not from the consent of the governed, but from the construction of myth.

First, putting on grand spectacles is a tool for projecting power and manufacturing deterrence. Totalitarian regimes often harbour internal structural vulnerabilities: their economies may be inefficient, livelihood pressures immense, and social discontent latent. Unable to win recognition through transparent governance, they turn outward to “flex their muscles.” A grand military parade or state guest ceremony can instantly construct an image of a “mighty nation and wise leader.” These grand spectacles are not mere waste, but strategic investments: through visual shock, they make up for deficiencies in hard power or conceal internal problems. While diplomacy in democratic countries places greater emphasis on substantive negotiations and reciprocity, totalitarian diplomacy turns “form” itself into a weapon—making adversaries feel pressure and enabling potential allies to see a “backer.”

Second, putting on grand spectacles serves the propaganda machine. The core of a totalitarian system is ideology monopoly and mass mobilization. Such regimes need to continuously manufacture “myths” to maintain the fervor or compliance of the populace. External spectacles are meticulously packaged and broadcast domestically through state media: foreign leaders bowing, grand welcoming ceremonies, and exchange of gifts are all interpreted as “world recognition of our great achievements.” This diverts domestic contradictions and reinforces the illusion of “nationwide unity.” It creates a cycle where “external validation reinforces internal stability”: the more luxurious the spectacle, the higher the domestic loyalty; the higher the loyalty, the more it can sustain further spectacles. This performative politics is precisely the defining characteristic of the totalitarian “theater state”—everything is a performance, and every performance serves the rule.

Third, putting on grand spectacles is a means of seeking international recognition. Totalitarian states often face a “legitimacy deficit.” Lacking electoral authorization, they cannot rely on popular mandate for support, and thus depend on “performance legitimacy” and “procedural legitimacy” (rituals). When performance falls short, rituals become the substitute. Totalitarianism is not content with merely ruling over the people; it attempts to reshape the world as perceived by the people. Grand spectacles are precisely the international version of this attempt: through ritualized order, they imply that the “chaotic outside world” will ultimately submit to the “ordered totalitarian model.”

From a broader perspective, this phenomenon reflects the extreme application of the theory of the “Society of the Spectacle” within a totalitarian context. Power is no longer content with remaining hidden; it demands to be watched and worshipped. Totalitarian spectacles are the result of the complete aestheticization and dramatization of politics: the masses become the audience, the leader becomes the protagonist, and history becomes the director. This exposes the inherent contradiction of totalitarianism—while claiming to represent “historical inevitability,” it must constantly rely on artificial performances to prove it.

The “grand spectacles” of totalitarian diplomacy are not an isolated cultural phenomenon, but a systemic product of institutional logic, power psychology, and propaganda mechanisms. True national strength stems from governance efficacy, public well-being, and universal values, rather than stage lights and marching formations on a stage. Only by abandoning performative politics and embracing rational dialogue can the world move toward lasting peace and prosperity.

Editor: Geoffrey Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

我们真的理解刘晓波说的“我没有敌人,我没有仇恨”吗?

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作者:关永杰

在7月12日北加州纪念刘晓波逝世九周年海祭活动前,我邀请一位朋友参加。他却回答:“我不去,我不认可刘晓波,因为他说过‘我没有敌人,我没有仇恨’。共产党这个独裁专制的政权,难道不是我们的敌人吗?”

他的这个回答,让我再次陷入思考。

其实,我曾经也对这句话感到疑惑。我读过刘晓波的《末日幸存者的忏悔》,书中记录了他在狱中、获释后的挣扎与反思。他不是一个天生的英雄,而是一个有血有肉、会恐惧、会软弱的普通人。后来,他获得诺贝尔和平奖,也有人批评他过于温和,对他的理念及认罪词提出质疑。

所以过去我一直认为,“我没有敌人,我没有仇恨”,只是刘晓波选择了和平、理性、非暴力抗争的这种温和对抗方式的一种个人表达。

直到最近,我与中国民主党旧金山党部副主席、历史研究者张俊杰先生一起讨论相关话题时,在张的指引下,才终于理解了这句话更深层的含义。

刘晓波并不是没有反抗,也不是向专制妥协。他反对的是剥夺人民自由与尊严的专制体制,而不是把那些持不同立场的人都视为必须消灭的敌人。

这一思想,与甘地、梭罗、马丁·路德·金等人的非暴力理念一脉相承。他们都深知,暴力往往只会制造新的暴力,仇恨也只会孕育新的仇恨。如果革命最终继承了专制“敌我斗争”的逻辑,那么旧的暴政倒下之后,新的暴政仍可能诞生。

真正伟大的非暴力抗争,不是放弃抗争,而是拒绝继承暴政的逻辑;不是消灭敌人,而是唤醒良知,瓦解专制的合法性,为未来留下一个能够包容不同意见、尊重人权、依靠法治与公平竞争解决政治分歧的民主社会。

刘晓波相信,只有反抗暴政,而不成为另一个暴政;追求正义,而不被仇恨吞噬,未来的中国才有可能建立一个自由、民主、法治、尊重人权的现代文明国家。

九年前刘晓波抱憾离世,他留下的不只是一个名字,当我们真正理解了“我没有敌人,我没有仇恨”,才真正理解了刘晓波,也理解了他留给中国民主事业最珍贵的思想遗产。

以下是北加州纪念刘晓波逝世九周年海祭活动现场的图片,摄影:关永杰

我们真的理解刘晓波说的“我没有敌人,我没有仇恨”吗?

刘晓波逝世九周年海祭活动,在北加州的一处海滨举行,活动号召人:中国民主党旧金山党部主席方政

活动发起人兼主持人、中国民主党员刘静涛(左一)、高应芬(左二)

活动参与者手持白花,拉起横幅——“纪念刘晓波 捍卫自由”

李凯朗诵吴祚来先生作的纪念诗《祭晓波九周年》

周云龙发言

刘忱忱发言

黄晓敏发言

郭志军发言

胡帅背着两月大的孩子前来参与悼念活动并发表感言

卢占强朗诵《我没有敌人——我的最后陈述》节选

方政向刘晓波先生画像敬献上白花

胡丕政献花

袁强献花

李树青献花

纪念刘晓波逝世九周年海祭活动参与者合照

编辑:钟然

校对:周敏

翻译:戈冰

Do We Truly Understand Liu Xiaobo’s “I Have No Enemies, and No Hatred”?

By Guan Yongjie

Abstract: Departing from a renewed understanding of “I have no enemies, and no hatred,” this article emphasizes that opposing autocracy is not equivalent to creating enemies. Only by adhering to nonviolence and showing respect for human rights and the rule of law can a genuinely democratic society be achieved.

Prior to the sea memorial event in Northern California on July 12 commemorating the ninth anniversary of Liu Xiaobo’s passing, I invited a friend to attend. However, he replied: “I am not going. I do not agree with Liu Xiaobo, because he once said, ‘I have no enemies, and no hatred.’ Isn’t this autocratic and dictatorial regime of the Communist Party our enemy?”

His answer plunged me once again into deep reflection.

In fact, I too was once puzzled by this sentence. I had read Liu Xiaobo’s Confessions of a Doomsday Survivor, which documented his struggles and reflections while in prison and after his release. He was not a born hero, but a ordinary human being of flesh and blood who experienced fear and weakness. Later, when he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, some criticized him for being too moderate, questioning his philosophy and his guilty plea statement.

Therefore, in the past, I had always believed that “I have no enemies, and no hatred” was merely a personal expression of Liu Xiaobo’s choice of a peaceful, rational, and nonviolent form of moderate resistance.

It was not until recently, during a discussion on related topics with Mr. Zhang Junjie—Vice Chair of the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party and a historian—that, guided by Zhang, I finally understood the deeper meaning behind this statement.

Liu Xiaobo was not foregoing resistance, nor was he compromising with autocracy. What he opposed was the autocratic system that deprives people of their freedom and dignity, rather than viewing individuals holding different positions as enemies who must be eradicated.

This line of thought is directly continuous with the nonviolent philosophies of Mahatma Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau, and Martin Luther King Jr. They all deeply understood that violence often only generates new violence, and hatred only breeds new hatred. If a revolution ultimately inherits the autocratic logic of “enemy-versus-us struggle,” then after the old tyranny falls, a new tyranny may well be born.

Truly great nonviolent resistance does not mean relinquishing resistance, but refusing to inherit the logic of tyranny; it does not mean eradicating the enemy, but awakening conscience, dismantling the legitimacy of autocracy, and leaving behind for the future a democratic society capable of accommodating differing opinions, respecting human rights, and resolving political disagreements through the rule of law and fair competition.

Liu Xiaobo believed that only by resisting tyranny without becoming another tyranny, and by pursuing justice without being consumed by hatred, could a future China possibly establish a modern civilized nation characterized by freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.

Nine years ago, Liu Xiaobo passed away with regret, leaving behind much more than just a name. Only when we truly understand “I have no enemies, and no hatred” do we truly understand Liu Xiaobo, as well as the most precious intellectual legacy he left to the cause of Chinese democracy.

Below are photos from the site of the sea memorial event in Northern California commemorating the ninth anniversary of Liu Xiaobo’s passing. Photography: Guan Yongjie

我们真的理解刘晓波说的“我没有敌人,我没有仇恨”吗?

The sea memorial event commemorating the ninth anniversary of Liu Xiaobo’s passing was held at a waterfront location in Northern California. The event convener: Fang Zheng, Chair of the San Francisco Branch of the China Democracy Party.

Event organizers and hosts, members of the China Democracy Party: Liu Jingtao (first from left), Gao Yingfen (second from left).

Event participants holding white flowers and holding up a banner reading: “In Memory of Liu Xiaobo — Defend Freedom.”

Li Kai reciting the commemorative poem “In Memory of Xiaobo’s Ninth Anniversary” written by Mr. Wu Zuolai.

Zhou Yunlong delivering a speech.

Liu Chenchen delivering a speech.

Huang Xiaomin delivering a speech.

Guo Zhijun delivering a speech.

Hu Shuai attending the memorial event carrying his two-month-old child and sharing his thoughts.

Lu Zhanqiang reciting excerpts from “I Have No Enemies: My Final Statement.”

Fang Zheng offering white flowers before the portrait of Mr. Liu Xiaobo.

Hu Pizheng offering flowers.

Yuan Qiang offering flowers.

Li Shuqing offering flowers.

Group photo of participants at the sea memorial event commemorating the ninth anniversary of Liu Xiaobo’s passing.

Editor: Zhong Ran

Proofreader: Zhou Min

Translator: Ge Bing

洛杉矶 7月25日 中共党卫军的非法本质研讨会

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洛杉矶 7月25日 中共党卫军的非法本质研讨会

【八一召集令】

军队国家化,拒做党卫军!

2026年8月1日,建军节不是沉默的纪念,而是我们点燃希望的战场。我们觉醒,我们挺身而出,我们拒绝接受“党指挥枪”的枷锁。军队不是一党的私器,它应是国家和人民的忠诚卫士,守护每一个中国人的自由与尊严!

我们呼吁所有热爱自由、追求民主的海内外华人同胞,以及支持中国民主化的国际朋友,加入我们的抗议行动!

我们为何而聚?

•因为“人民军队”不应沦为一党一人的工具

•因为枪口不该对准手无寸铁的同胞

•因为沉默的军人,将在历史上留下耻辱的一笔

•因为退役军人不该被遗忘、抛弃八一不是中共的庆典,八一是人民的宣示!

请大家积极转发、踊跃参加,

带上横幅、口号牌、一起发出我们的声音!

八一,是良知的召唤。 历史终将记住今天我们站在哪一边。

活动时间:2026年7月25日 6:30-10:00 pm

地点:El Monte 中国民主党特别支部

发起人:丁海峰

主持人:谢志诚

策划人:李贤兵、唐伟锋

联系人:李金杉6268162266 谢燊权9495723210

海报制作人:张致君

国有器官

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作者:鲁慧文

占据中国人口绝大多数的底层人,似乎正在一点一点地失去对自己身体的所有权。

近日,一名十七岁的少年完成了器官捐献志愿登记。当地官员、警察和工作人员登门表彰,镜头里,鲜花鲜艳,笑容灿烂。少年和家人站在一起,大概以为自己做了一件光荣的事。他们也许相信,自己只是提前表达了一份善意;政府给予肯定,社会给予掌声,这便是一种荣耀。

然而评论区里并没有多少掌声。

许多人首先想到的,不是这个少年将来能够救多少人,而是这个少年以后是否安全,毕竟不久前一个在郑州学校体检当中摔倒被保安急切问是否安好的孩子很快就丢失了器官死去了。

这实在是一件很奇怪的事。

在一个正常的社会里,器官捐献本应令人想到善意、医学和生命延续;可在这里,人们看到这样的新闻,却先想到失踪、意外、医院和权力。

这究竟是公众太多疑,还是中共政府早已透支了自己的信用?

宣传者并不回答。

他们只负责把鲜花递到少年手里,把镜头对准那一家人的笑脸,再配上一段温暖的音乐。至于人们为什么恐惧,捐献流程是否透明,未成年人是否真正充分知情,儿童和青少年为啥会无故消失死去并缺少器官,谁来监督器官分配,谁来保证医疗决定不受利益干扰,这些问题通常是不适合出现在镜头里的。

镜头是用来制造感动的,不是用来回答问题的。

我最近还看到两则新闻。一则是日本对涉嫌违法寻求器官移植的人进行追责,另一则是新加坡对违规器官交易采取惩罚措施。评论区里,有人赞美这些政府真正把生命平等和人权平等当回事。

因为在那里,一个有钱人的命,并不天然比穷人的命更值钱;一个有权者的身体需要,也不能自动变成另一个弱者必须承担的代价。

而在我们这里,最常听到的词却是“奉献”。

孩子要奉献,青年要奉献,病人要奉献,穷人更应当奉献。

他们活着的时候奉献劳动,失业的时候奉献忍耐,生病的时候奉献积蓄,死后最好连身体也一并奉献。

至于谁在接受这些奉献,通常是不必问的。

问,就是不善良。

怀疑,就是没有爱心。

要求公开,就是“抹黑”。

于是,一个人的器官,仿佛并不是由他自己支配的,而是暂时寄存在身体里,等到某一天,再由某种更大的需要来接管。

所谓“自愿”,也变得值得推敲。

自愿的背后,是中国大地上无数个丢失孩子的寻亲家庭和很多死去在河水里发现的却少了器官的孩子的身体。

一个成年人,在没有任何压力的情况下,经过充分了解,决定死后捐献器官,这当然值得尊重。但一个十七岁的少年,在官方宣传、学校教育、家庭期待和荣誉表彰之中作出的决定,究竟有多少是真正独立的选择?

当一种选择受到鲜花和掌声的奖励,而另一种选择被暗示为自私和冷漠时,这种“自愿”还剩下多少自由?

真正的自愿,应该包括随时拒绝的权利。真正的安全,是不会因为被大数据匹配就突然消失并失去生命。

一个人不仅有捐献器官的权利,也有不捐献的权利;不仅有帮助陌生人的权利,也有首先保护自己的权利。

如果一个社会只宣传奉献,却不认真保护拒绝,那么它所需要的可能不是志愿者,而是顺从者。如果一个社会,孩子可以随时丢失,活人可以随时在大街上被绑走,每一个底层人就如同羊圈里的“手指羊”一样随时被挑选宰杀,那这不是国家,这是地狱。

中国如果真的想要建立并不断扩大器官捐献登记体系,这本可以是一件推动医学进步的事情。但任何涉及人体、死亡和巨大医疗利益的制度,都不能只依靠道德口号运行。

它需要公开的数据,需要清晰的法律,需要独立的监督,需要可追溯的分配程序,还需要让每一个普通人相信:无论他有没有钱、有没有权、有没有关系,他的生命都不会因为别人的“需要”而被轻视。

遗憾的是,人们看到的往往是宣传和突然的少年消失,却很少看到完整透明的解释。

每年究竟有多少未成年人失踪?

多少人被找回?多少人的尸体在水里被发现?

这些孩子后来去了哪里?

公众需要的不是一句“不要传谣”,而是一套能够经得起核查的答案。

公众需要的是生命的基本权利,是孩子可以安全地上学回家,而不是会突然被匹配,被取器官,被消失,整个底层社会陷入一种巨大的恐惧之中不可自拔。

医院同样如此。

医学原本是救人的,但医院一旦同时成为资本、行政权力和稀缺资源交汇的地方,人们自然会担心:医生面对的究竟是病人,还是指标?手术面对的究竟是生命,还是收益?

器官移植比普通手术更加特殊。它的一端是等待生存的人,另一端却必然连接着死亡。这样的医疗行为,必须拥有比普通手术更高的透明度,而不是更深的神秘。

器官从哪里来?

死亡如何判定?

若这些问题不能被普通公众清楚地了解,那么再多的宣传片,也无法换来真正的信任,反而增加更多更深的恐惧。

有人说,不相信医院和政府,是民众的悲哀。

这话只说对了一半。

民众不信任制度,当然是悲哀;但一个制度若从不努力让自己值得信任,反而责怪民众多疑,那便不只是悲哀,而是傲慢。

一个真正尊重生命的国家,不会急着让孩子宣誓捐献器官,而会先让孩子知道:你的身体属于你自己。

它不会只教孩子如何奉献,也会教孩子如何拒绝;不会只告诉孩子死后可以帮助别人,也会告诉孩子活着的时候,任何人都无权伤害你、支配你、利用你,更不会让太多的孩子突然消失并死去。

国家可以管理医院,可以制定法律,可以建立器官捐献体系,却不能因此成为人体的主人。

否则,中国底层的每一个人,便不过是一具暂时活着的国家资产。

工作时,是劳动力。

缴费时,是纳税人。

生病时,是医疗消费者。

被匹配后,则是可利用的器官资源。

一个人从出生到死亡,仿佛都被登记、编号、分类和使用。只有他自己,反而最没有发言权。

这便是“国有器官”最可怕的地方。

它不一定真的写在法律里,也不一定有人公开宣布。它可能只是藏在一次次宣传、一次次表彰、一次次道德劝说之中,使人渐渐相信:个人的身体并不完全属于个人,必要的时候,个人应当服从更大的安排。

而所谓“更大的安排”,通常从来不需要向个人解释。

我并不反对器官捐献。

我反对的是,在缺乏透明和信任的环境里,将捐献包装成一种必须赞美的道德正确;我反对的是,让尚未成年的孩子站到镜头前,成为制度宣传的样板;我反对的是,普通人的生命问题被要求无条件相信,而有权者却不必接受同等程度的监督;我反对的是,底层中国人的孩子可以随时消失,随时被匹配,随时被拿走作为别人的器官资源。

器官若不再首先属于个人,那么所谓生命权,永远不会在中国这片土地上产生并被尊重。

那位十七岁的少年仍在笑。

鲜花捧在手中,官员站在身旁,镜头记录着一场被命名为“光荣”的仪式。

我只希望,在很多年以后,他依然平安地活着。

而不是让今天的这张照片,成为人们日后不敢回看的东西。

编辑:胡丽莉  校对:周敏 翻译:沈美花

State-Owned Organs

Author: Lu Huiwen

Abstract: Questioning the promotion of organ donation propaganda in an environment lacking transparency and trust, appealing to safeguard individual bodily autonomy, and calling for the establishment of an open, independent, and verifiable organ donation system.

The vast majority of China’s populace—the people at the bottom layer of society—seem to be losing ownership of their own bodies, bit by bit.

Recently, a seventeen-year-old youth completed the volunteer registration for organ donation. Local officials, police officers, and staff members visited his home to commend him. In the camera frame, the flowers were vivid and the smiles were bright. The youth stood alongside his family, presumably believing he had performed a glorious deed. They perhaps believed they were simply expressing an act of goodwill in advance; with the government offering validation and society offering applause, this felt like an honor.

Yet, in the comment sections, there was little applause to be found.

What many people first thought of was not how many lives this youth might save in the future, but whether he would remain safe hereafter. After all, not long ago, a child in Zhengzhou who fell during a school physical exam and was anxiously asked by a security guard if he was alright soon lost his organs and died.

This is truly a very strange thing.

In a normal society, organ donation ought to evoke thoughts of goodwill, medicine, and the continuation of life; yet here, when people see such news, their immediate thoughts turn to disappearances, accidents, hospitals, and power.

Is this because the public is overly paranoid, or is it that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government has long since exhausted its own credit?

The propagators do not answer.

They are only responsible for placing the flowers into the youth’s hands, pointing the camera at the family’s smiling faces, and adding a piece of heartwarming background music. As for why people feel fear, whether the donation process is transparent, whether minors are truly fully informed, why children and teenagers vanish without cause and die missing organs, who oversees organ allocation, and who ensures medical decisions are free from financial and political interference—these questions are generally deemed unsuitable to appear in front of the lens.

The lens is used to manufacture emotional touching, not to answer questions.

I also recently saw two news items. One was about Japan holding people legally accountable for suspected unlawful attempts to seek organ transplants; the other was about Singapore implementing punitive measures against illegal organ transactions. In the comment sections, some praised these governments for genuinely taking equality of life and equality of human rights seriously.

Because there, a rich person’s life is not naturally more valuable than a poor person’s life; nor can a powerful person’s bodily needs automatically become a cost that a weaker individual must bear.

Whereas here with us, the word heard most frequently is “dedication” and “self-sacrifice.”

Children must sacrifice; youth must sacrifice; the sick must sacrifice; and the poor, even more so, ought to sacrifice.

They dedicate their labor while alive, dedicate their endurance when unemployed, dedicate their savings when sick, and upon death, it is best if they dedicate their bodies as well.

As for who is receiving these sacrifices, that is generally something one ought not to ask.

To ask is to be unkind.

To doubt is to lack compassion.

To demand openness is to “slander and smear.”

Thus, an individual’s organs seem not to be at their own disposal, but are merely temporarily deposited inside their body, waiting for a certain day when a greater need comes to take them over.

So-called “voluntariness” also becomes something worthy of scrutiny.

Behind this “voluntariness” lie the countless families across the land of China searching for missing children, and the bodies of many dead children recovered from rivers missing their internal organs.

When an adult, under no pressure whatsoever and after becoming fully informed, decides to donate organs after death, that is of course worthy of respect. But when a seventeen-year-old youth makes a decision amidst official propaganda, school education, family expectations, and honorary commendations, how much of it is truly an independent choice?

When one choice is rewarded with flowers and applause, while the other choice is implied to be selfish and indifferent, how much freedom remains in this “voluntariness”?

Genuine voluntariness must include the right to refuse at any time. Genuine safety means one will not suddenly disappear and lose their life simply because of a big data match.

A person has not only the right to donate organs, but also the right not to donate; not only the right to help strangers, but also the right to protect themselves first.

If a society only preaches sacrifice while failing to earnestly protect the right to refuse, then what it requires may not be volunteers, but obedient subjects. If, in a society, children can go missing at any time, living human beings can be snatched from the streets at any moment, and every person at the bottom layer of society is like a “finger sheep” in a pen—picked out and slaughtered at any time—then this is not a country; this is hell.

If China truly wants to establish and continually expand an organ donation registration system, this could originally have been an undertaking that drives medical progress. However, any system involving the human body, death, and vast medical interests cannot function solely on moral slogans.

It requires public data, clear laws, independent supervision, a traceable allocation procedure, and it needs to reassure every ordinary person: regardless of whether they have money, power, or connections, their life will not be treated lightly simply due to someone else’s “need.”

Regrettably, what people often see is propaganda and sudden disappearances of youths, but rarely a complete and transparent explanation.

How many minors actually go missing every year?

How many are recovered? How many of their bodies are discovered in water?

Where did these children go in the end?

What the public needs is not a single line saying “do not spread rumors,” but a set of answers that can stand up to verification.

What the public needs are basic rights to life—that children can safely go to school and return home, rather than being suddenly matched, harvested of their organs, and made to disappear, leaving the entire lower strata of society trapped in an inescapable sense of deep terror.

The same applies to hospitals.

Medicine was originally meant to save lives; but once a hospital simultaneously becomes a place where capital, administrative power, and scarce resources intersect, people naturally worry: is the doctor facing a patient, or a quota performance metric? Is the surgery facing a human life, or a financial yield?

Organ transplantation is far more unique than ordinary surgery. One end connects to people waiting to survive, while the other end inevitably connects to death. Medical practices of this nature must possess a higher level of transparency than ordinary surgeries, rather than deeper secrecy.

Where do the organs come from?

How is death determined?

If these questions cannot be clearly understood by the general public, then no amount of propaganda films will earn true trust; instead, they will only fuel deeper and broader fear.

Some say that it is a tragedy for the populace to disbelieve the hospitals and the government.

This statement is only half right.

It is indeed a tragedy when the public distrusts the system; but if a system never strives to make itself trustworthy and instead blames the public for being overly suspicious, then that is not merely a tragedy, but sheer arrogance.

A nation that truly respects life would not be in a hurry to have children swear oaths to donate organs; rather, it would first let the child know: your body belongs to you.

It would not merely teach children how to dedicate themselves, but also teach children how to say no; it would not merely tell children that they can help others after death, but also tell children that while they are alive, no one has the right to harm you, control you, or exploit you—and certainly, it would not allow so many children to suddenly disappear and die.

The state can manage hospitals, enact laws, and establish organ donation systems, but it cannot thereby become the master of the human body.

Otherwise, every person at the bottom layer of China is nothing more than a temporarily living state asset.

When working, they are labor power.

When paying fees, they are taxpayers.

When sick, they are medical consumers.

Once matched, they become usable organ resources.

From birth to death, a person seems to be registered, numbered, categorized, and utilized. Only they themselves have the least say.

This is precisely the most terrifying aspect of “state-owned organs.”

It may not necessarily be written explicitly into law, nor does anyone need to announce it publicly. It may simply lurk behind repeated propaganda, repeated commendations, and repeated moral persuasions, gradually inducing people to believe that an individual’s body does not belong entirely to the individual, and that when necessary, the individual ought to submit to the “greater arrangement.”

And the so-called “greater arrangement” usually never needs to explain itself to the individual.

I am not opposed to organ donation.

What I oppose is wrapping donation into a mandatory moral correctness that must be praised, within an environment lacking transparency and trust; what I oppose is putting underage children in front of the camera to serve as propaganda models for the system; what I oppose is demanding that ordinary people unconditionally trust life-and-death matters, while those in power do not have to undergo an equivalent level of supervision; what I oppose is that the children of ordinary Chinese people at the bottom of society can vanish at any time, be matched at any time, and be taken away at any time to serve as someone else’s organ resource.

If organs no longer belong first and foremost to the individual, then the so-called right to life will never emerge or be respected upon this land of China.

That seventeen-year-old youth is still smiling.

Holding flowers in his hands, with officials standing beside him, the camera records a ceremony named “glory.”

I only hope that many years from now, he will still be alive and well.

Rather than letting today’s photograph become something people dare not look back upon in the future.

Editor: Hu Lili

Proofreader: Zhou Min

Translator: Shen Meihua

中国民主党的政协提案决不是投降

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——以九八组党、台湾民进党的民主实践为例

作者:郑存柱

“背叛”“投降”,这样的帽子扣下来,声音很响,分量很轻。指责中国民主党的政协提案就是投降的人,其实从没把自己的逻辑想清楚。照他们的说法,凡是踏进对方设定的场子、用对方的规矩说话,就等于承认对方、就等于缴械。可这套逻辑一旦当真,第一个被它判成“叛徒”的,恰恰是中国民主党自己——而且要从它出生的那一天算起。

1998年,中国民主党在浙江公开成立。那年6月25日,王有才、王东海、林辉几个人做了一件当时惊天动地的事:他们没有转入地下,没有搞秘密串联,而是堂堂正正地拿着材料,走进浙江省民政厅,按照中华人民共和国的《社会团体登记管理条例》,申请注册成立一个反对党。朱虞夫,就是那批人组党人士之一。请问,照“投降论”的算法,这算什么?向民政厅递交注册申请,不就等于承认了中华人民共和国政府的合法性、承认了它那套登记制度吗?那么中国民主党从娘胎里就是“投降派”,这话说得出口吗?

中国民主党的政协提案决不是投降

荒唐。谁都看得明白,1998年那一纸注册申请,不是磕头,是逼宫。它把一个尖锐的问题顶到共产党鼻子底下:你的宪法白纸黑字写着结社自由,你的法律写着社团可以登记,那你到底认不认自己的法?允许,就等于承认反对党合法;不允许,就等于当众撕毁自己的宪法和法律。正因为这一招打在要害上,当局才那样惊慌,才把王有才、徐文立、秦永敏一个个重判入狱,一判就是十一年、十二年、十三年。用现有的合法渠道去斗争,从来不是软弱,恰恰是最叫专制难堪的锋利。为这条路坐过牢的人,后来者没有谁有资格对他们骂一句“投降”。

把眼光投向海峡对岸,同一个道理更是活生生地摆在那里。民进党的党纲白纸黑字写着“建立主权独立自主的台湾共和国”——这就是台独。“中华民国”这个国号、这部宪法,本就是台独要否定、要取代的东西。可民进党是怎么做的?它派人去参加中华民国从村里长到总统的各级选举。陈水扁、蔡英文、赖清德,一个个举起右手,宣誓效忠《中华民国宪法》,然后坐进他们纲领上明明要废掉的那个国家的总统府。有谁跳出来骂民进党“背叛台独”“向国民党投降”?没有。因为凡是有点政治常识的人都懂:参选,是借现成的合法平台去争民心、扩地盘、一寸一寸地改造这个体制,而不是在选票上盖个章、承认现状万岁。民进党正是靠这条“体制内”的路,从戒严令下被追捕的地下党,一路走到执政。当年它若因为“参选中华民国就是承认中华民国”而拒绝参选,到今天也不过还是街头一群喊口号的人,永远进不了那个能拍板的房间。

从1998年走进民政厅,到今天的政协提案,中国民主党走的是同一条路,认的是同一个理:走上对方的舞台,绝不等于认同对方的剧本。要求进入政协,不是承认现在这个政协合格——恰恰相反,这份提案通篇都在骂它“名存实亡”“橡皮图章”,要求把席位交给真正的反对派,要求委员言论免责,要求会议开门见光。这不是下跪,是把民运所追求的目标直接拍在对方桌上。

说到底,投降是放弃目标,不是更换手段。真投降,是承认对方对、把自己的诉求咽回肚子里。可这份提案从头到尾死咬宪政民主、死咬多元监督,一个字都没让。它“退”的,只是“斗争非得在体制外、非得摆出对抗的架势才算数”这一种执念。把手段的灵活骂成立场的背叛,是把民运的成败押在姿态够不够悲壮上,而不是押在到底能不能撬动这块铁板上。曼德拉既坐过牢,也走上过谈判桌;东欧的反对派既印过地下刊物,也坐上过圆桌。哪一次从专制到民主的转身,是单靠体制外死磕就一步到位的?关键时刻,总得有人肯坐到桌前,把口号变成能落地的条款。

当然,走进体制是有风险的——会被利用,会被收编,会被拿去当“民主”的花瓶。这些警惕都对,都必要。但“提防风险”和“张口就骂投降”,是两码事。中国民主党的政协提案是不是背叛,标尺只有一根:它让你离目标更近,还是更远?它替不同的声音撬开了一道缝,还是替专制补上了裂痕?

1998年那一纸注册申请,没有换来一个合法政党,却把共产党“违宪违法”四个字钉在了历史的耻辱柱上。今天提出共产党不可能接受的政协提案,又一次把这个政权逼到“认不认自己的法”的墙角。这从来不是缴枪,而是换一个战场,接着打同一场仗。

编辑:冯仍 校对:冯仍 翻译:戈冰

The CPPCC Proposals of the China Democracy Party Are by No Means a Surrender

——Taking the 1998 Party Formation and the Democratic Practice of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party as Examples

By Zheng Cunzhu

Labels like “betrayal” and “surrender” are slapped on with a resounding roar, yet their actual weight is incredibly light. Those who accuse the China Democracy Party’s CPPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) proposals of being a surrender have, in fact, never thought through their own logic. According to their line of reasoning, anyone who steps into a venue set up by the opponent and speaks according to the opponent’s rules is equivalent to recognizing the opponent and laying down their arms. However, once this logic is taken seriously, the very first to be judged as a “traitor” by it would be none other than the China Democracy Party itself—and that would have to be counted from the very day it was born.

In 1998, the China Democracy Party was openly established in Zhejiang. On June 25 of that year, Wang Youcai, Wang Donghai, and Lin Hui did something that was earth-shattering at the time: they did not go underground, nor did they engage in clandestine networking; instead, they uprightly and honorably took their materials, walked into the Zhejiang Provincial Department of Civil Affairs, and applied to register and establish an opposition party in accordance with the “Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Social Organizations” of the People’s Republic of China. Zhu Yufu was precisely one of the party organizers among that group of people. May I ask, according to the calculation of the “surrender theory,” what does this count as? Submitting a registration application to the Department of Civil Affairs—does that not equal recognizing the legitimacy of the government of the People’s Republic of China and recognizing its system of registration? If so, then the China Democracy Party has been a “surrenderist faction” straight from its mother’s womb—could anyone actually bring themselves to say such words?

中国民主党的政协提案决不是投降

Absurd. Anyone can see clearly that the single sheet of registration application in 1998 was not a kowtow, but a forced abdication. It thrust a sharp question right under the Communist Party’s nose: Your constitution writes in black and white the freedom of association, and your laws state that social organizations can be registered, so do you ultimately recognize your own laws or not? To allow it would equal recognizing the legitimacy of the opposition party; to disallow it would equal tearing up its own constitution and laws in public. It was precisely because this move struck at the vital point that the authorities panicked so severely, sentencing Wang Youcai, Xu Wenli, and Qin Yongmin to heavy prison terms one by one, handing down sentences of eleven, twelve, and thirteen years. Utilizing existing legal channels to wage a struggle has never been weakness; on the contrary, it is the very sharpness that causes autocracy the greatest embarrassment. For those who have gone to prison for this path, no successor possesses the qualifications to hurl a single curse of “surrender” at them.

Turning one’s gaze to the opposite side of the strait, the exact same principle is placed there in a vivid and concrete manner. The party platform of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) states in black and white: “establish a sovereign, independent, and autonomous Republic of Taiwan”—this is Taiwan independence. The national title “Republic of China” and this constitution were originally the very things that Taiwan independence sought to negate and replace. Yet, what did the DPP do? It dispatched people to participate in the Republic of China’s elections at all levels, from village chiefs to the president. Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen, and Lai Ching-te, one after another, raised their right hands, swore allegiance to the “Constitution of the Republic of China,” and then sat inside the presidential office of that very country which their platform explicitly aimed to abolish. Did anyone leap out to curse the DPP for “betraying Taiwan independence” or “surrendering to the Kuomintang”? No. Because anyone with a modicum of political common sense understands: participating in elections is borrowing a ready-made legal platform to vie for the hearts of the people, expand one’s territory, and transform this system inch by inch, rather than stamping a seal on a ballot and declaring “long live the status quo.” It was precisely by relying on this “within-the-system” path that the DPP walked all the way from being an underground party hunted under martial law to becoming the ruling party. Back then, if it had refused to run because “participating in the elections of the Republic of China means recognizing the Republic of China,” it would still be nothing more than a crowd of people shouting slogans on the street today, never able to enter that room where final decisions are made.

From walking into the Department of Civil Affairs in 1998 to today’s CPPCC proposals, the China Democracy Party has walked the same path and recognized the same principle: stepping onto the opponent’s stage by no means equals identifying with the opponent’s script. Demanding entry into the CPPCC is not recognizing the current CPPCC as qualified—on the contrary, the entirety of this proposal is cursing it as “existing in name only” and a “rubber stamp,” demanding that seats be handed over to the real opposition, demanding immunity for committee members’ speeches, and demanding that meetings be opened to the light of day. This is not kneeling; it is slapping the goals pursued by the democracy movement directly onto the opponent’s table.

In the final analysis, surrender means giving up the goal, not changing the means. A true surrender is admitting that the opponent is right and swallowing one’s own demands back into the stomach. Yet, from beginning to end, this proposal tightly grips constitutional democracy and clings fiercely to pluralistic oversight, without yielding a single word. What it “retreats” from is merely the obsession that “struggle must be outside the system and must strike a confrontational posture to count.” Cursing the flexibility of means as a betrayal of stance is staking the success or failure of the democracy movement on whether the posture is tragic and heroic enough, rather than on whether it can actually pry open this slab of iron. Mandela not only went to prison but also walked to the negotiation table; the opposition in Eastern Europe not only printed underground publications but also sat at the round table. Which turn from autocracy to democracy has ever been achieved in a single step solely by fighting to the bitter end outside the system? At the critical moment, someone must always be willing to sit at the table and turn slogans into clauses that can hit the ground.

Of course, stepping into the system carries risks—being utilized, being co-opted, and being used as a vase for “democracy.” These warnings are all correct and all necessary. However, “being vigilant against risks” and “opening one’s mouth just to shout ‘surrender'” are two entirely different matters. As to whether the CPPCC proposal of the China Democracy Party is a betrayal, there is only one yardstick: does it bring you closer to the goal, or further away? Has it pried open a crack for different voices, or has it mended a fissure for the autocracy?

That single sheet of registration application in 1998 did not win a legal political party, but it nailed the words “violating the constitution and breaking the law” regarding the Communist Party onto the pillar of historical shame. Proposing a CPPCC proposal today that the Communist Party cannot possibly accept forces this regime into the corner of “whether or not it recognizes its own laws” once again. This has never been laying down arms, but rather changing to another battlefield to continue fighting the exact same war.

Editor: Feng Reng Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Ge Bing

专访徐光:四年绝食、三十余年坚持——“我爱的是这个国家,不是某一个政党”

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采访记者:贾嘉 王海霞 沈美花
采访地点:在野党杂志社

人物简介

徐光,浙江杭州人,中国民主党浙江委员会创始成员之一,1989年杭州学生民主运动参与者。1989年北京学生运动期间,他在杭州武林广场参加了声援北京学生的绝食行动。此后三十余年来,他持续关注民主、法治及公民权利议题,多次因参与相关活动受到拘留、监视和判刑。

1999年,徐光由于参与组建中国民主党,被以“颠覆国家政权罪”判刑五年。

2022年,徐光因纪念“六四”被指控犯有“寻衅滋事罪”判处四年有期徒刑。自被捕即音讯全无,至亲也无法知道他的任何下落。服刑期间,他长期以绝食方式表达抗议。据亲友介绍,他曾长期依靠鼻饲维持生命,身体一度极度消瘦。2026年5月19日刑满出狱时,体重仅约90斤,出狱照片在海外广泛传播,引发众多朋友和关注者的关切,从而使拍摄者毛庆祥被抓并拘留半个月,徐光本人也被警方带走,失踪至“六四”以后回家。

经过短暂休养,目前徐光体重已恢复至115斤左右,精神状态明显改善。近日,《在野党》记者贾嘉通过视频连线,对徐光进行了出狱后的首次深度专访。

“看到他的第一眼,我们终于松了一口气”

距离徐光出狱,已经过去两个多月。

出狱当天流传出来的一张照片,让很多关心他的人久久不能平静。

照片中的他,脸颊深陷,身体瘦得几乎脱形,站立时甚至需要依靠支撑。很多熟悉他的朋友第一眼甚至没有认出来。

为徐光的安全,我们没有第一时间联系采访,而是希望他先把身体养好。

直到这一天,视频终于接通。

屏幕里的徐光穿着一件深色上衣,虽然依然清瘦,但气色比出狱时好了许多,讲话声音平稳,精神状态也恢复不少。

寒暄之后,我们问出了大家最关心的问题。

记者贾嘉:

“徐老师,您好。我们一直都很牵挂您的身体,看到您刚出狱时的照片,很多海外朋友都非常揪心。这段时间恢复得怎么样?”

徐光笑了笑。

“刚出来的时候只有90斤,现在恢复到115、116斤左右了。”

听到这个数字,我们终于放下了心。

他说,恢复得快,很重要的原因是自己的心态一直比较平静。

“出来以后,睡得着,吃得下,所以恢复得比较快。”

1989年,一次绝食改变了一生

很多人知道徐光,是因为他几十年来始终坚持自己的理念。

但他说,年轻时的自己,并不是一个热衷政治的人。

“我本来就是一个比较喜欢自由生活的人,喜欢过自己的小日子。国家那么大,我觉得一个普通人能做什么?”

1989年,北京学生运动爆发。

全国各地纷纷响应。

杭州武林广场,也聚集了许多声援北京的学生。

每天,北京学生绝食、被送往医院抢救的消息不断传来。

他说,那些画面深深触动了自己。

“他们为了国家、为了民族,可以把自己的生命放在那里。我如果还只想着自己过得舒服一点,心里真的过意不去。”

于是,他来到武林广场,也加入了绝食。

他说,当时的想法其实很简单。

“就是爱这个国家,希望它越来越好。”

在他看来,那不仅仅是一次社会运动。

也是自己人生方向的开始。

那场对学生和市民的大屠杀深深震撼了徐光,“从那以后,为国家、为民族、为自由、为民主,这些理念就在我心里扎下了根。”

四年绝食,真正支撑我的不是意志,而是信念

谈到狱中的四年绝食,很多人都想知道,他究竟靠什么坚持下来,记者问:“做出一个决定已经不容易,坚持四年,更难。到底是什么支撑着您?”

徐光沉默片刻。

随后缓缓说道:

“首先,我认为,我不是为了我自己。”

他说,自己所做的一切,都不是为了个人利益,也不是为了家庭,而是为了国家、为了民族。

“如果我是为了我自己,我早就不会坚持了。”

他说,每当身体因为长期绝食而承受巨大痛苦的时候,他都会不断提醒自己:

“我是为了国家、为了民族在承受这些苦难。”

“当我这样想的时候,我反而感觉不到那么痛苦了。”

他说,真正能够支撑自己坚持下来的,是信念,而不是单纯的意志力。

“最难的时候,我总会想起1989年的年轻人”

采访中,徐光讲述了一段令我们印象深刻的话。

他说,每当自己觉得身体和精神都快支撑不住的时候,脑海里总会浮现1989年那些年轻人的身影。

“他们很多人才二十岁左右。”

“没有经历过人生,没有家庭,没有孩子,没有未来。”

而自己已经结婚、生子,也经历过人生。

他说:“跟他们相比,我已经很幸运了。”

每次想到这里,他都会告诉自己:

“他们都能够付出生命,我还有什么苦不能吃?”

他说,很多次,自己就是这样挺过来的。

“国家,不是某一个政党的国家”

采访中,我们问了一个很多人都会思考的问题。

长期遭受打压,会不会怀疑自己的坚持?

徐光认真地回答:

“国家,不是某一个政党的国家。”

他说,在自己的理解中:

国家属于人民。

不是属于政府。

更不是属于某一个领导人。

“我爱的,是这个国家,是中国人民,是养育我的这片土地。”

他说,这一点,几十年来从未改变。

“所以,我从来没有怀疑过自己的初心。”

⸻⸻⸻

采访尾声

采访进行了一个多小时。

就在我们准备继续聊下去的时候,电话那头传来了家人的声音。

徐光笑着说:

“我太太叫我了,下次再聊吧。”

我们相约改日继续采访。

屏幕关闭后,我久久没有离开电脑。

采访中,徐光谈得最多的,并不是自己在监狱里遭遇了什么,而是1989年、国家、人民、自由、民主,以及支撑他一路走来的信念。

无论人们如何评价他的选择,对他而言,这些信念构成了他人生的重要部分。

附录|徐光狱中诗作

据了解,服刑期间,徐光坚持阅读、思考,并创作了多首诗歌。以下两首诗创作于2024年,是他狱中作品的一部分。

《为国为民争民主》
作于2024年9月9日

为国为民争民主
飘零半世心不空
西子湖头有三忠
为国为民呕心血
慷慨就义赴从容
仁爱博爱皆大爱
自由民主普世同
奋斗百年误歧路
正本清源终成功

《一寸自由一寸血》
作于2024年9月14日

一寸自由一寸血
敬天保民根自泥
砥砺前行心不迷
自强不息五千载
厚德载物三万里
弃德报怨应巨变
误入歧途俄为师
一寸自由一寸血
誓争民主志不移

(采访记者:贾嘉、王海霞、沈美花与民主前辈徐光视频采访中)

编辑:赵杰 校对:周敏 翻译:戈冰

Exclusive Interview with Xu Guang: Four Years of Hunger Strike, Over Thirty Years of Persistence — “What I love is this country, not a particular political party”

Interviewers: Jia Jia, Wang Haixia, Shen Meihua
Interview Location: The Opposition Party Magazine Office

Profile

Xu Guang, a native of Hangzhou, Zhejiang, is one of the founding members of the Zhejiang Committee of the China Democracy Party and a participant in the 1989 Hangzhou Student Democracy Movement. During the 1989 Beijing student movement, he participated in a hunger strike in Hangzhou’s Wulin Square to voice solidarity with the students in Beijing. Over the subsequent thirty-plus years, he has continuously focused on issues of democracy, the rule of law, and civil rights, and has been repeatedly detained, placed under surveillance, and sentenced for participating in related activities. In 1999, due to his involvement in organizing the China Democracy Party, Xu Guang was sentenced to five years in prison on the charge of “subverting state power.”

In 2022, Xu Guang was sentenced to four years in prison on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for commemorating “June Fourth.” Following his arrest, all news of him vanished completely, and even his closest relatives were unable to obtain any information regarding his whereabouts. During his imprisonment, he conducted a long-term hunger strike as a form of protest. According to his relatives and friends, he relied on nasogastric tube feeding for a prolonged period to sustain his life, and his body once became extremely emaciated. When he completed his sentence and was released on May 19, 2026, his weight was only about 90 jin (approx. 45 kg). A photograph of him taken upon his release circulated widely overseas, sparking deep concern among many friends and observers; consequently, Mao Qingxiang, the person who took the photograph, was arrested and detained for half a month, while Xu Guang himself was also taken away by the police, remaining missing until returning home after “June Fourth.”

After a brief period of recuperation, Xu Guang’s weight has currently recovered to around 115 jin (approx. 57.5 kg), and his mental and physical state has noticeably improved. Recently, The Opposition Party reporter Jia Jia conducted the first in-depth exclusive interview with Xu Guang after his release via video link.

“Seeing him for the first time, we finally breathed a sigh of relief”

More than two months have passed since Xu Guang was released from prison.

A photograph that circulated on the day of his release made many people who care about him unable to find peace of mind for a long time.

In the photograph, his cheeks are deeply sunken, his body is so thin that it is nearly deformed, and he even requires support to stand. Many friends who are familiar with him could not even recognize him at first glance.

For Xu Guang’s safety, we did not reach out for an interview immediately, wishing instead for him to first restore his health.

Until this day, the video call was finally connected.

On the screen, Xu Guang was wearing a dark-colored top. Although he was still thin, his complexion was much better than when he was released from prison; his speaking voice was steady, and his mental and physical state had recovered a great deal.

After exchanging pleasantries, we asked the question that everyone cared about the most.

Reporter Jia Jia:

“Hello, Teacher Xu. We have always been very concerned about your health. Seeing the photograph of you when you were just released, many friends overseas felt deeply anxious and pained. How has your recovery been during this period of time?”

Xu Guang smiled slightly.

“When I just came out, I was only 90 jin(approx. 45 kg), but now I have recovered to around 115 or 116 jin(approx. 57.5 kg).”

Hearing this number, we finally set our minds at ease.

He said that a very important reason for his rapid recovery was that his mindset had always remained relatively peaceful.

“Since coming out, I can sleep well and eat well, so the recovery has been relatively fast.”

1989: A Hunger Strike That Changed a Lifetime

Many people know of Xu Guang because he has consistently adhered to his ideals for decades.

Yet, he said that when he was young, he was not someone keen on politics.

“Originally, I was just someone who preferred a free life, liking to live my own small daily life. The country is so big; I felt, what could an ordinary person do?”

In 1989, the Beijing student movement erupted.

Responses echoed all across the country.

In Hangzhou’s Wulin Square, many students also gathered to voice solidarity with Beijing.

Every day, news kept arriving that Beijing students were on hunger strikes and being rushed to hospitals for emergency treatment.

He said those scenes deeply touched him.

“For the country and for the nation, they could lay down their lives right there. If I still only thought about living a bit more comfortably myself, I would truly feel terribly uneasy in my heart.”

Consequently, he went to Wulin Square and joined the hunger strike as well.

He said his thoughts at the time were actually very simple.

“It was just loving this country and hoping that it would become better and better.”

In his view, that was not merely a social movement.

It was also the beginning of his life’s direction.

That massacre of students and citizens deeply shocked Xu Guang. “Since then, concepts such as working for the country, for the nation, for freedom, and for democracy have taken root in my heart.”

Four Years of Hunger Strike: What Truly Supported Me Was Not Willpower, But Belief

Speaking of his four-year hunger strike in prison, many people want to know what exactly he relied on to persevere. The reporter asked: “Making a decision is already not easy; persevering for four years is even harder. What on earth supported you?”

Xu Guang fell silent for a moment. Then he spoke slowly:

“First of all, I believe that I was not doing it for myself.”

He said that everything he did was not for personal interest, nor was it for his family, but for the country and for the nation.

“If I were doing it for myself, I would have stopped persevering long ago.”

He said that whenever his body endured immense suffering due to the long-term hunger strike, he would constantly remind himself:

“I am enduring these hardships for the country and for the nation.”

“When I think this way, I instead do not feel as much pain.”

He said that what could truly support him to persevere was belief, rather than pure willpower.

“During the hardest times, I would always think of the young people of 1989”

During the interview, Xu Guang recounted a passage that left a deep impression on us.

He said that whenever he felt his body and mind were about to become unsustainable, the figures of those young people from 1989 would always emerge in his mind.

“Many of them were only around twenty years old.”

“They had not experienced life, had no families, no children, and no future.”

In contrast, he had already married, had a child, and had experienced life.

He said: “Compared to them, I am already very fortunate.”

Every time he thought of this, he would tell himself:

“They could all give up their lives; what hardships can I not endure?”

He said that on many occasions, this was exactly how he made it through.

“The country does not belong to a particular political party”

During the interview, we asked a question that many people ponder.

Having suffered suppression for a long time, does he ever doubt his persistence?

Xu Guang answered earnestly:

“The country does not belong to a particular political party.”

He said that in his own understanding:

The country belongs to the people.

It does not belong to the government.

And it certainly does not belong to a particular leader.

“What I love is this country, the Chinese people, and this land that raised me.”

He said that this point has never changed over the decades.

“Therefore, I have never doubted my original aspiration.”

———

Epilogue of the Interview

The interview proceeded for over an hour.

Just as we were preparing to continue chatting, a family member’s voice came from the other end of the phone.

Xu Guang said with a smile:

“My wife is calling me; let’s chat next time.”

We agreed to continue the interview another day.

After the screen turned off, I did not leave the computer for a long time.

Throughout the interview, what Xu Guang spoke about the most was not what he had encountered in prison, but rather 1989, the country, the people, freedom, democracy, and the belief that supported him all along the way.

No matter how people evaluate his choices, to him, these beliefs constitute an essential part of his life.

Appendix | Xu Guang’s Poetry Written in Prison

It is understood that during his sentence, Xu Guang persisted in reading and reflecting, and composed multiple poems. The following two poems were written in September 2024 and constitute part of his prison works.

Striving for Democracy for the Country and the People

Composed on September 9, 2024

Striving for democracy for the country and the people, Drifting through half a lifetime, yet the heart is not empty. At the banks of the West Lake, there are the Three Loyals, Exerting life’s blood for the country and the people. Righteously facing martyrdom with calm composure, Benevolence and philanthropy are both the greatest forms of love, Freedom and democracy are universal to all. Struggling for a century, yet misled down a mistaken path, Dispelling falsehoods to return to the source, success will ultimately be achieved.

An Inch of Freedom, An Inch of Blood

Composed on September 14, 2024

An inch of freedom, an inch of blood,
Revering heaven and protecting the people, the roots originate from the mud.
Forging ahead through trials, the heart does not wander,
Constantly striving for self-improvement for five thousand years,
With great virtue sustaining all things across thirty thousand li. Abandoning virtue to repay resentment invites momentous change, Going astray by taking Russia as the tutor. An inch of freedom, an inch of blood, Vowing to fight for democracy, the resolve shall never shift.

(Interviewers: Jia Jia, Wang Haixia, Shen Meihua in a video interview with democratic elder Xu Guang)

Editor: Zhao Jie Proofreader: Zhou Min Translator: Ge Bing

洛杉矶 7月19日 《全球觉醒》第八十期 强烈谴责中共借《民族团结法》实施跨国迫

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洛杉矶 7月19日 《全球觉醒》第八十期 强烈谴责中共借《民族团结法》实施跨国迫害!

洛杉矶 7月19日 《全球觉醒》第八十期 强烈谴责中共借《民族团结法》实施跨国迫

《全球覺醒》第八十期

自由之鐘 時時敲響 全球覺醒 民主聯盟 消滅獨裁 推翻暴政

活動主題:跨國暴力猖獗,惡法長臂引路:強烈譴責中共借《民族團結法》實施跨國迫害

就在今年七月六日,卑鄙的暴力恐嚇直接降臨在了自由台灣的土地上。直言抗共、支持民主的知名評論家矢板明夫先生,在台中遭遇暴徒惡意尾隨並遭到野蠻的肢體襲擊。警方逮捕的行凶者,竟然是一名受境外黑手僱用、犯案後企圖立刻搭乘逃亡的港籍男子。這絕不是一起普通的治安事件,而是一起精心策劃、具有卑鄙政治目的的跨國僱傭傷害案件,更是這部惡法落地後實施跨國暴力鎮壓的第一槍!

這場瘋狂暴力的背後,是一場精心預謀的法制化深淵。就在案發前的七月一日,中共剛剛強行實施了所謂的《民族團結進步促進法》。這部惡法最無恥的地方,就在於其第63條公然宣稱具有域外追責效力。這無異於將流氓的長臂管轄直接寫入法律,給跨國鎮壓穿上了合法的遮羞布。惡法落地僅第六天,台灣就發生了針對反共學者的僱傭攻擊。從國內的數位化天網,到跨國的肉體恐嚇,中共正在企圖為全球每個華人的大腦和身體套上無形鎖鏈。

今天我們在海外站在這裡,不僅是為了聲援遭遇暴行的矢板明夫先生,更是要代所有深受跨國鎮壓威脅的同胞,徹底撕碎極權妄圖恐嚇世界的幻覺。自由世界的安全底線容不得流氓踐踏,本周美國國會緊急起草反跨國鎮壓法案,正義的反擊戰已經全面打響!我們絕不妥協,也絕不因恐懼而保持沉默。跨國黑手終將被正義斬斷,這個血債累累的體制,必將迎來最徹底的清算!

✊ 我們的口號:

✊ 強烈譴責跨國暴力!抗議中共恐怖統治!

✊ 惡法豈能長臂管轄!誓死捍衛言論自由!

✊ 嚴厲打擊跨境迫害!獨裁體制必迎審判!

✊ 結束一黨專政鐵幕!自由必勝,獨裁必敗!

2026年7月19日(星期日)3:30PM (下午)

地點:中共駐洛杉磯總領館

地址:443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020

活動召集人:廖军/劉廣賢

活動規劃: 孫曄/王喆

活動主持:易勇

組織者:王磊 6262354824/丁秀峰 6266325844羅旭6265656930/劉錦亮6264933382陳健 6266178615 /绍亚峰 6264744967

活動義工:于海龍 /張建勇/楊光/黃思博

攝影:Ji Luo /朱明昌

主辦單位:中國民主黨聯合總部美西黨部

中國民主黨聯合總部美南黨部

自由鐘民主基金會

洛杉矶 7月18日 第799次茉莉花行动 声援张展与牛腾宇

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洛杉矶 7月18日 第799次茉莉花行动 声援张展与牛腾宇

第799次茉莉花行动

绝不妥协的良知 呼唤自由的曙光

——声援张展与牛腾宇

时间: 2026年7月18日(周六) 15:30

地址: 洛杉矶中领馆(443 Shatto Place, Los Angeles, CA 90020)

近日,因报道真相而入狱的公民记者张展荣获“刘晓波奖”。然而,这位坚守信仰与良知的女性,至今依然身陷囹圄。与此同时,因“恶俗维基案”遭受重判的青年牛腾宇,仍在狱中承受着极其残酷的折磨与迫害。张展为疫区求真,牛腾宇为真相蒙冤。他们仅仅因为拒绝谎言、坚守常识,便遭遇了残酷的国家机器打压。 一个把说真话视为犯罪的政权,其内心充满恐惧;但高墙关得住追求自由的身体,却永远锁不住向往光明的灵魂。

在此,我们郑重呼吁并强烈要求:

第一,立即释放张展、牛腾宇! 无条件释放所有因言获罪、被非法拘押的良心犯、政治犯,确保他们的生命健康与基本人权;

第二,停止酷刑与政治迫害! 彻底调查针对牛腾宇等良心犯的刑讯逼供行为,并公开追究滥用职权的执法人员责任;

第三,捍卫言论与新闻自由! 停止一切“以言定罪”的独裁行径,把真相的知情权与发声的自由还给每一位中国公民。

今天,我们为狱中的勇士呐喊。 当良知被审判,沉默就不再是中立;当勇敢者在狱中坚守,我们在海外绝不退缩。拒绝遗忘,拒绝恐惧。 释放张展!释放牛腾宇!自由属于人民!

主办: 中国民主党洛杉矶委员会

刘晓波九周年:时间长河中擦亮自由灯塔

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作者:卢超

在人类追求自由民主的漫长光谱中,2010年奥斯陆那把空着的蓝色椅子,成为了一个定格的历史符号。它不仅凝聚了刘晓波个人的苦难与荣耀,更像是一面巨大的棱镜,将中国本土的民主抗争折射到了全球的聚光灯下。转眼间,历史的指针已走到了刘晓波先生逝世九周年。年复一年,海内外在不同角落点燃的烛光,不仅是在追思一位先行者的献身,更是在拉长的时间线里,重新审视并擦亮他留下的政治遗产——尤其是他如何将中国的命运,真正编织进全球自由与人权的共同体之中。

刘晓波九周年:时间长河中擦亮自由灯塔

在很长一段时间里,本土的维权抗争常被孤立地视为一国内部的“异见”表达。然而,刘晓波的实践与最终获得诺贝尔和平奖,彻底打破了这种地域性的局限。他用自己的文字和肉身向世界证明:中国普通公民对基本人权的争取,绝非西方价值的简单移植,而是人类普世价值在东亚大陆上最自然、最顽强的生长。这一遗产确立了一个清晰的逻辑——中国的人权状况,从来都不是“内政”,而是关乎全球自由指数与和平秩序的晴雨表。

在这样的脉络下,海外民运及各界力量每年坚持不懈地举办纪念活动,其意义早已超越了单纯的仪式性怀念。

首先,这种年复一年的坚守,是在对抗极权体制最擅长的“历史遗忘症”。 垄断权力的统治者总是试图通过封锁信息与抹除记忆,让一代代人陷入历史的虚无。海外的持续纪念,就像是在坚硬的高墙上凿开的一道道透光孔。它通过文字、集会和跨世代的对话,将刘晓波的思想、他的《零八宪章》、以及他直至生命最后一刻的坚守,转化为一种活着的、可传递的共同记忆。这种记忆的留存,为海内外所有拒绝犬儒、心存自由的人,提供了一个精神的锚点。

其次,每年的纪念活动是海外民主力量凝聚共识、连接全球自由阵营的重要枢纽。 在今天世界正经历民主退潮与数字极权崛起的双重挑战下,海外民运的纪念不再是孤立的抱团取暖,而是演变成了一个与全球公民社会、各国政要及人权组织深度对接的平台。通过这个平台,中国的民主抗争得以融入当下全球抵抗威权主义蔓延的巨浪中,向世界清晰地传递一个信号:中国的民主化不再是一个孤立的、等待外部救援的“特例”,而是全球自由阵营不可或缺的关键一环。

从刘晓波的遗产出发,这种内外共振的全球视野,也要求我们重新定义“人权外交”的内涵。过去,国际社会对华的人权关切,往往依附于经贸谈判或地缘政治的博弈。而刘晓波留给世界的启示在于,人权必须是外交的核心原则本身。每年的纪念,正是向国际社会公开重申这一原则的契机。我们要促使国际社会明白,在一个互联互通的时代,对一个庞大帝国人权退步的绥靖,终将反噬全球的民主根基。

刘晓波在《我没有敌人》中展现的那种人类命运共同体的悲悯与宽容,在今天依然有其现实的操作性。他让高墙内的抗争者知道自己并不孤单,也让高墙外的世界无法闭目塞听。在九周年的今天,世界格局在变,抗争的手段在变,但刘晓波当年用生命撑起的那个国际维度依然坚固。那把空椅子不应该只是历史的遗憾,它更是一个持久的召唤,提醒着后来者:自由的浪潮,终需四海交汇,方能奔流不息。

编辑:周志刚 校对:程筱筱 翻译:沈美花

Liu Xiaobo’s 9th Anniversary: Polishing the Beacon of Freedom in the Long River of Time

Author: Lu Chao

In the long spectrum of humanity’s pursuit of freedom and democracy, the empty blue chair in Oslo in 2010 has become a frozen historical symbol. It not only condensed Liu Xiaobo’s personal suffering and glory, but also acted like a massive prism, refracting the domestic democratic struggle within China into the global spotlight. In the blink of an eye, the pointer of history has moved to the ninth anniversary of Mr. Liu Xiaobo’s passing. Year after year, the candlelights lit in different corners at home and abroad are not only in memory of a pioneer’s dedication, but also an effort to re-examine and polish the political legacy he left behind along the elongated timeline—especially how he genuinely wove China’s destiny into the global community of freedom and human rights.

刘晓波九周年:时间长河中擦亮自由灯塔

For a long time, the domestic rights defense movement (Weiquan) was often isolated and viewed as an internal expression of “dissent” within a single country. However, Liu Xiaobo’s practice and his ultimate receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize completely broke this regional limitation. He used his own writings and flesh to prove to the world that ordinary Chinese citizens’ struggle for basic human rights is by no means a simple transplantation of Western values, but rather the most natural and resilient growth of universal human values on the East Asian continent. This legacy established a clear logic—that China’s human rights situation has never been an “internal affair,” but is a barometer concerning the global freedom index and peace order.

Under such a context, the unremitting efforts of overseas pro-democracy movements and various sectors to hold commemorative activities every year have long surpassed pure ritualistic remembrance.

First, this year-after-year perseverance is a fight against the “historical amnesia” that the totalitarian system excels at. Rulers who monopolize power always attempt to trap generations into historical nihilism by blocking information and erasing memories. Continuous commemorations overseas are like light-transmitting holes chiseled one by one into the hard, high walls. Through text, rallies, and cross-generational dialogues, they transform Liu Xiaobo’s thoughts, his Charter 08, and his perseverance up to the very last moment of his life into a living, transmissible collective memory. The preservation of this memory provides a spiritual anchor for all people at home and abroad who refuse cynicism and harbor freedom in their hearts.

Second, the annual commemorative activities serve as a crucial hub for overseas democratic forces to build consensus and connect with the global camp of freedom. In today’s world, which is experiencing the dual challenges of a democratic recession and the rise of digital totalitarianism, the commemorations by the overseas pro-democracy movement are no longer an isolated act of huddling together for warmth, but have evolved into a platform for deep integration with global civil society, international dignitaries, and human rights organizations. Through this platform, China’s democratic struggle is integrated into the current massive wave of global resistance against the spread of authoritarianism, sending a clear signal to the world: China’s democratization is no longer an isolated “special case” waiting for external rescue, but an indispensable and critical link in the global camp of freedom.

Starting from Liu Xiaobo’s legacy, this global vision of internal-external resonance also requires us to redefine the connotation of “human rights diplomacy.” In the past, the international community’s concern over China’s human rights was often attached to economic and trade negotiations or geopolitical maneuvering. The revelation Liu Xiaobo left to the world is that human rights must be the core principle of diplomacy itself.

The annual commemoration is precisely an opportunity to publicly reaffirm this principle to the international community. We must make the international community understand that in an interconnected era, appeasing the regression of human rights in a massive empire will ultimately erode the democratic foundations of the entire globe.

The compassion and tolerance for a community with a shared future for mankind that Liu Xiaobo demonstrated in I Have No Enemies still retain practical operability today. He let the resisters inside the high walls know that they are not alone, and he made it impossible for the world outside the high walls to shut its eyes and ears. Today, on the ninth anniversary, the world landscape is changing and the methods of struggle are changing, but the international dimension that Liu Xiaobo held up with his life remains solid. That empty chair should not just be a regret of history; it is a lasting summation and call, reminding those who follow: the tide of freedom must eventually converge from the four seas in order to surge forward endlessly.

Editor: Zhou Zhigang | Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxia | Translator: Shen Meihua