作者：郭泉   

编辑：冯仍 校对：冯仍 翻译：周敏

  川普总统表示：“对于左媒内外的人，他们以为会在中期选举前夕引入新冠2.0（汉坦病毒）局面，大概是为了重燃邮寄投票骗局，这次不会得逞。放弃吧！”

川普总统还下令恢复8000名“良知战士”的军籍，旨在纠正拜登政府时期疫苗强制令造成的不公待遇，为拒绝接种疫苗而被强制逐出军队的“良知军人”平反。

哈德逊研究所：

“郭教授，早上好！汉坦病毒来了！一些特定国家又要封控封城了，但川普总统会让美国社会‘带疫运行’。您在攻读博士、博士后之前，曾是南京大学社会学系应用社会学（法学）硕士，导师张彦、宋林飞、周晓虹、童星都是社会公共政策专家。我想听听您对川普总统‘带疫运行’公共政策的社会学分析。”

兰德研究院：

“太好了，一个是哈佛大学公共政策学博士，一个是南京大学社会学与哲学博士。‘带疫运行’是否与‘带癌生存’类似呢？很期待你们的对话！”

我说：

封城防控，其实源于14世纪威尼斯共和国首创的隔离制度。虽然在当时发挥过重大积极作用，但七个世纪后的今天，社会高度全球化，经济衰退与失业饥饿造成的社会危害，有时甚至比疫情本身更大，也更容易快速引发社会崩溃。

有关特定国家的疫情封控，我们今天“莫谈国事”，只讨论美国社会的“带疫运行”。

所谓“带疫运行”，可以被定义为一种适应性危机管理政策，其核心在于平衡疫情防控与经济社会的持续运转。

这一政策通过分阶段调控、资源动态配置和精准干预，在保障公共卫生安全的同时，最大程度维持社会基本功能。

一、政策特点与积极意义

1. 弹性防控框架

美国采取“三级重启模式”（监测期、恢复期、稳定期），允许各州依据本地疫情数据灵活调整管控强度。

例如疫情较轻州份优先复工，重灾区则强化医疗资源配置，体现了分层响应机制的科学性。

2. 技术创新应用

美国推广“免下车检测站”（Drive-through Testing），大幅提升筛查效率，单日检测量达到百万级，同时降低交叉感染风险。

此外，还依托私营医疗体系快速扩容ICU病床，并调用国民警卫队建设方舱医院，以增强医疗系统韧性。

3. 经济托底保障

美国通过《CARES法案》注入2.2万亿美元，包括：

向居民直接发放现金补助（成人1200美元、儿童500美元）

为中小企业提供3770亿美元薪资保护贷款

扩大失业保险至零工经济从业者

这些措施有效缓冲了失业潮冲击。2020年第二季度，美国居民可支配收入甚至逆势增长6.2%。

二、政策理论基础

这一模式被政治学界归纳为“适应性治理”（Adaptive Governance）的实践：

1. 制度弹性

联邦与州政府分权协作，例如联邦储备物资与州级应急行动中心联动。

2. 动态学习

依据实时疫情数据不断调整防控策略。在早期检测失误后，美国迅速放开商业机构检测权限。

3. 社会参与

通过公私合作机制，如药企加速疫苗研发、零售企业提供检测场地，以激活市场力量。

三、成效与挑战

“带疫运行”在短期内避免了医疗系统全面崩溃。2020年第三季度，美国GDP环比反弹33.1%。

但这一政策也受制于联邦制固有矛盾。各州资源调配效率差异较大，导致“带疫运行”效果并不均衡。

此次汉坦病毒尚处于大规模流行前夜，美国政府仍需未雨绸缪，持续优化检测追踪技术与跨州协调机制，以提升“带疫运行”的长期适应能力。

约翰斯·霍普金斯大学评估指出，此类政策的关键，在于如何在不确定性中建立动态响应能力。其经验，为全球公共卫生事件治理提供了重要参考。

兰德说：

“你们南京大学与约翰斯·霍普金斯大学共建的中美研究中心，我去过。今年还会再去，到时一定拜访郭教授。”

我说：

“好的。‘金陵闲客自逍遥，笑看秦淮水月迢；身外浮名何足系，春风醉卧百花桥。’南京话里，我这种人叫‘无事佬’。你随时来，我随时陪你逛秦淮。”

哈德逊说：

“太好了。我最后还想请郭教授从政治、经济、文化等多维度，客观分析川普总统‘带疫运行’政策的背景与影响。”

我说：

先从政治角度看，川普政府强调经济稳定与个人自由，认为严格封控会削弱政府权威与民众信心。

其政策逻辑建立在“小政府”理念之上，主张减少行政干预，维护市场自主运行。这反映出美国保守派政治哲学对政府权力的警惕，以及对个人选择权的重视。

从经济角度看，“带疫运行”旨在避免大规模失业与企业倒闭，防止经济陷入深度衰退。美国经济高度依赖消费与服务业，长期停摆可能引发连锁反应。

政府通过财政刺激与货币政策维持流动性，试图在公共卫生危机中维持经济韧性。

从哲学角度看，该政策体现了实用主义与自由意志主义的结合。一方面强调现实效果，认为适度管控比全面封锁更符合实际需求；另一方面强调个体责任与自由，反对强制隔离等过度限制人身自由的措施。

从医学与公共卫生角度看，科学界对病毒传播规律长期存在不同判断。特朗普政府依据部分医学观点，认为自然免疫与群体免疫具有可行性，因此主张通过分级防控保护高风险人群，而非全面封锁。

当然，这一策略也面临医疗资源挤兑与长期健康风险的争议。

最后，从社会学角度看，美国社会高度多元，不同群体对风险的认知与应对方式差异显著。政策需要兼顾不同阶层利益，避免社会进一步撕裂。

部分民众担忧长期封控会导致心理健康恶化、教育中断以及社会孤立，因此支持有限度开放。

我的结论是：

川普政府的“带疫运行”政策，是基于特定政治理念、经济现实与科学认知的综合决策。

其本质，是美国在极端危机下进行的一场特殊治理实验。其核心逻辑在于：通过分权决策、科技赋能与经济干预，在死亡风险可控的前提下，最大程度保障公民的生存权与发展权。

尽管这一政策存在争议，但相关数据表明，它在一定程度上守住了民众生计底线，也为全球公共卫生治理提供了不同于封控模式的另一种参考路径。

泉史公作《水城旧事鉴》

昔欧罗巴有巨邑曰威尼斯，舟楫如云，商贾辐辏。

元末之时，黑死病横行欧陆，十室九空。

水城执政者夙夜忧叹，遂于港口设木栅，勒令远来舟船停泊外岛，凡四十日无恙者，方准入城。

此“四十日之限”（Quarantino），实为后世封城隔离制度之滥觞。

此法一行，疫气稍遏，商旅渐安，列邦争相效仿，诚为护佑生民之良策。

然时移世易，今非昔比。

观今世诸邦，产业全球化、供应链交错，万民依赖百工协作与商路流通而存续。若遇大疫仍拘泥古法，严锁城垣、断绝往来，其弊有三：

一曰：百业凋敝，民失所依

今之世界，产业链横跨万里。封锁一久，则工厂停摆、商贸断裂、百姓失业。

当是时也，疫病未必先杀人，饥饿与贫困却可能更快摧毁社会。

二曰：财用枯竭，邦本动摇

现代国家财政高度依赖经济循环。长期封禁，必致税收锐减、债务高筑。

财力一旦枯竭，则赈济无以为继，民怨沸腾，社会动荡之速，或甚于疫病蔓延。

三曰：人心溃散，道义难继

现代社会信息流通迅疾，人们长期困守，亲友隔绝，前途无望，则焦虑与绝望蔓延。

此种精神创伤，非药石可医，实乃国家长远之隐忧。

泉史公曰：

威尼斯之制，诚为应急之智；然若不察时代变迁，机械套用于今日，恐成抱薪救火之举。

医者医病，圣手医国。

防疫之道，在于权衡：既要防疫气流毒，更须保民生、护元气。

若因噎废食，使百业倾颓、万家冻馁，则纵暂避疫锋，终陷社会崩坏之渊。

后世执政者，当审时度势，兼顾民生与秩序，方为经国之大道。

Operating Amidst an Epidemic

Author: Guo Quan

Editor: Feng Reng Proofreader: Feng Reng Translator: Shen Meihua

President Trump stated: “For the people inside and outside the left-wing media, they thought they would introduce a COVID 2.0 (Hantavirus) situation on the eve of the midterm elections, probably to reignite the mail-in voting scam. This time it won’t succeed. Give it up!”

President Trump also ordered the reinstatement of 8,000 “warriors of conscience” to military status, aiming to correct the unjust treatment caused by the vaccine mandates during the Biden administration, and to rehabilitate the “soldiers of conscience” who were forced out of the military for refusing to be vaccinated.

Hudson Institute:

“Good morning, Professor Guo! Hantavirus has arrived! Some specific countries are going to impose lockdowns and close cities again, but President Trump will let American society ‘operate amidst the epidemic.’ Before pursuing your PhD and post-doctoral studies, you were a Master of Applied Sociology (Law) in the Department of Sociology at Nanjing University. Your advisors Zhang Yan, Song Linfei, Zhou Xiaohong, and Tong Xing are all experts in social public policy. I would like to hear your sociological analysis of President Trump’s public policy of ‘operating amidst the epidemic.'”

RAND Corporation:

“Wonderful, one is a PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University, and the other is a PhD in Sociology and Philosophy from Nanjing University. Is ‘operating amidst an epidemic’ similar to ‘living with cancer’? Looking forward to your dialogue!”

I said:

Lockdown and epidemic control actually originated from the quarantine system first created by the Republic of Venice in the 14th century. Although it played a major positive role at that time, today, seven centuries later, society is highly globalized. The social harm caused by economic recession, unemployment, and hunger is sometimes even greater than the epidemic itself, and it is also easier to quickly trigger a social collapse.

Regarding the epidemic lockdowns in specific countries, today we shall “not discuss state affairs” and only discuss the American society’s “operating amidst the epidemic.”

The so-called “operating amidst the epidemic” can be defined as an adaptive crisis management policy. Its core lies in balancing epidemic prevention and control with the continuous functioning of the economy and society.

Through phased regulation, dynamic resource allocation, and precise intervention, this policy maximizes the maintenance of basic social functions while ensuring public health and safety.

I. Policy Characteristics and Positive Significance

1. Flexible Control Framework

The United States adopted a “three-stage reopening model” (monitoring phase, recovery phase, stabilization phase), allowing each state to flexibly adjust control intensity based on local epidemic data.

For example, states with milder epidemics were given priority to resume work, while hard-hit areas strengthened the allocation of medical resources, reflecting the scientific nature of the layered response mechanism.

2. Application of Technological Innovation

The United States promoted “drive-through testing stations,” greatly improving screening efficiency, reaching a daily testing volume of millions, while reducing the risk of cross-infection.

In addition, it relied on the private medical system to quickly expand ICU beds, and called upon the National Guard to build mobile cabin hospitals to enhance the resilience of the medical system.

3. Economic Bottom-Line Protection

The United States injected $2.2 trillion through the CARES Act, including:

Direct cash subsidies to residents ($1,200 per adult, $500 per child)

$377 billion in Paycheck Protection Program loans for small and medium-sized enterprises

Expanding unemployment insurance to gig economy workers

These measures effectively cushioned the impact of the unemployment wave. In the second quarter of 2020, the disposable income of U.S. residents even grew counter-trend by 6.2%.

II. Theoretical Basis of the Policy

This model is summarized by the political science community as the practice of “Adaptive Governance”:

1. Institutional Flexibility

The federal and state governments decentralized and collaborated; for example, federal reserve supplies were linked with state-level emergency operation centers.

2. Dynamic Learning

Prevention and control strategies were continuously adjusted based on real-time epidemic data. After early testing errors, the United States quickly opened up testing authority to commercial institutions.

3. Social Participation

Through public-private partnership mechanisms, such as pharmaceutical companies accelerating vaccine research and development, and retail enterprises providing testing venues, market forces were activated.

III. Achievements and Challenges

“Operating amidst the epidemic” prevented a total collapse of the medical system in the short term. In the third quarter of 2020, U.S. GDP rebounded by 33.1% quarter-on-quarter.

However, this policy was also constrained by the inherent contradictions of the federal system. The efficiency of resource allocation varied greatly among states, leading to an uneven effect of “operating amidst the epidemic.”

The current Hantavirus is still on the eve of a large-scale epidemic. The U.S. government still needs to take precautions, continuously optimize testing and tracking technologies, and cross-state coordination mechanisms to improve the long-term adaptation capability of “operating amidst the epidemic.”

An assessment by Johns Hopkins University pointed out that the key to such policies lies in how to establish a dynamic response capability amidst uncertainty. Its experience provides an important reference for global public health event governance.

RAND said:

“I have been to the Center for Chinese and American Studies jointly established by your Nanjing University and Johns Hopkins University. I will go there again this year, and I will definitely visit Professor Guo then.”

I said:

“Great. ‘The idle guest of Jinling enjoys freedom and leisure, watching the Huai River water and the moon from afar with a smile; why should one be bound by worldly fame, drunk in the spring breeze, lying on the Hundred Flowers Bridge.’ In the Nanjing dialect, a person like me is called a ‘Wushi-lao’ (a person with nothing to do). Come anytime, and I will accompany you to stroll along the Qinhuai River anytime.”

Hudson said:

“Wonderful. Lastly, I would also like to ask Professor Guo to objectively analyze the background and impact of President Trump’s ‘operating amidst the epidemic’ policy from multiple dimensions such as politics, economy, and culture.”

I said:

First, looking from a political perspective, the Trump administration emphasized economic stability and individual freedom, believing that strict lockdowns would weaken government authority and public confidence.

Its policy logic was built upon the philosophy of “small government,” advocating for the reduction of administrative intervention and maintaining the independent operation of the market. This reflects the vigilance of American conservative political philosophy toward government power, as well as the emphasis on individual right to choose.

From an economic perspective, “operating amidst the epidemic” aimed to avoid mass unemployment and business closures, preventing the economy from falling into a deep recession. The U.S. economy is highly dependent on consumption and the service industry; long-term shutdowns could trigger a chain reaction.

The government attempted to maintain liquidity through fiscal stimulus and monetary policy, trying to sustain economic resilience during a public health crisis.

From a philosophical perspective, this policy embodied a combination of pragmatism and libertarianism. On one hand, it emphasized realistic effects, believing that moderate control was more in line with practical needs than a total lockdown; on the other hand, it emphasized individual responsibility and freedom, opposing excessive restrictions on personal freedom such as mandatory isolation.

From a medical and public health perspective, the scientific community has long held different judgments on the patterns of virus transmission. The Trump administration, based on certain medical viewpoints, believed that natural immunity and herd immunity were feasible, and therefore advocated protecting high-risk populations through tiered prevention and control, rather than a comprehensive lockdown.

Of course, this strategy also faced controversies regarding the strain on medical resources and long-term health risks.

Finally, from a sociological perspective, American society is highly diverse, and different groups have significantly different perceptions of and responses to risks. Policies need to balance the interests of different social strata to avoid further tearing the society apart.

Some citizens worried that long-term lockdowns would lead to worsening mental health, educational disruption, and social isolation, and therefore supported limited reopening.

My conclusion is:

The Trump administration’s policy of “operating amidst the epidemic” was a comprehensive decision based on specific political concepts, economic realities, and scientific cognitions.

Its essence was a special governance experiment conducted by the United States under an extreme crisis. Its core logic lay in: maximizing the protection of citizens’ rights to survival and development under the premise of controllable death risks, through decentralized decision-making, technological empowerment, and economic intervention.

Although this policy remains controversial, relevant data indicate that it guarded the baseline of public livelihood to a certain extent, and also provided another reference path for global public health governance that is different from the lockdown model.

Quan Shicong’s Composition: The Mirror of Past Events in the Water City

In ancient times, there was a great city in Europe called Venice, where boats gathered like clouds and merchants converged.

During the late Yuan Dynasty, the Black Death raged across the European continent, leaving ten houses out of ten empty.

The rulers of the Water City sighed and worried night and day. Consequently, they set up wooden barricades at the port and ordered ships arriving from afar to anchor at outer islands; only those who remained without illness for forty days were permitted to enter the city.

This “forty-day limit” (Quarantino) was truly the origin of the lockdown and isolation systems of later generations.

Once this law was implemented, the pestilence was slightly contained, merchants and travelers gradually found peace, and various nations rushed to emulate it. It was truly an excellent strategy to protect and nurture the people.

However, times have changed, and the present is nothing like the past.

Observing the nations of the world today, industries are globalized and supply chains are intertwined. Millions of people rely on the cooperation of various trades and the circulation of trade routes to survive. If one encounters a great epidemic yet still rigidly adheres to ancient methods, strictly locking city walls and severing interactions, there are three harms:

First: All industries wither, and the people have nothing to rely on

In today’s world, supply chains span tens of thousands of miles. Once a lockdown is prolonged, factories halt, commerce fractures, and ordinary people lose their jobs.

At such a time, the epidemic may not kill people first, but hunger and poverty may destroy society faster.

Second: Financial resources drain dry, and the foundation of the state shakes

Modern state finances are highly dependent on the economic cycle. Long-term blockades will inevitably lead to sharp decreases in tax revenues and high accumulation of debts.

Once financial capacity is exhausted, relief efforts cannot be sustained, public grievances will boil over, and the speed of social turmoil may be faster than the spread of the disease.

Third: People’s hearts scatter, and moral resolve is hard to maintain

In modern society, information flows rapidly. When people are trapped and confined for a long time, separated from relatives and friends, and hopeless about the future, anxiety and despair will spread.

This kind of spiritual trauma cannot be cured by medicine, and it constitutes a long-term hidden worry for the nation.

Quan Shicong says:

The system of Venice was truly the wisdom of emergency response; however, if one does not examine the changes of the era and mechanically applies it to today, it is feared it will become an act of carrying firewood to put out a fire.

Physicians treat illnesses, but master hands heal the state.

The way of epidemic prevention lies in balance: one must both prevent the spread and poisoning of the epidemic air, and even more so, protect public livelihood and safeguard the vital energy.

If one gives up eating for fear of choking, causing all industries to collapse and tens of thousands of households to freeze and starve, then even if the edge of the epidemic is temporarily avoided, the nation will ultimately sink into the abyss of social collapse.

Rulers of future generations should judge the hour and size up the situation, balancing both livelihood and order, for that is the great way of governing a country.

 作者：金米

 朋友圈里的母亲节上周就开始了。 

各类商家带头出来，呼吁关爱妈妈，鲜花、红包、转账、祝福长文，这样一年一场集体性的表演，我看了很多年。

人们在今天高喊“母亲伟大”，可到了明天，又默认一个女人就该回到厨房、婚姻和忍耐里。 

我始终不太喜欢“母亲节快乐”这句话，我只是祝愿过少数几个活出女性姿态的女性。在我这里，她们对孩子无私，但仍保有自我，这才是我欣赏的母亲。我认为首先懂得爱自己的母亲才有能力和精力去爱孩子。 

所以，那些铺天盖地的节日祝福，在我这里就像一种奖章。奖励她们又一年没有崩溃，没有逃走，没有停止奉献。 

不得不承认，至少我看到的中国社会直到今天，骨子里依然默认女性是“附属品”。年轻时是谁的女儿，结婚后是谁的妻子，老了是谁的母亲。 

唯独很少有人问，她自己是谁。

很多女性从小被教育要懂事、顾家、情绪稳定。她们被允许温柔，却不被允许自私；被要求牺牲，却不能喊累。社会一边歌颂“伟大的母亲”，一边又默认家务、育儿、照顾老人，本来就该是她的责任。 

最荒唐的是，人们竟把这种消耗叫作女性应该具备的美德，如果没有，那就是不道德的事。 

可一个人如果长期不能做自己，再体面的生活，也只是缓慢的窒息。 

比起节日里的歌颂，我更希望她们能真正自由一点。可以不贤惠，可以不伟大，可以不永远把别人放在前面。 

真正的爱，从来不是在今天集体喊一句“母亲节快乐”。而是在每一个普通日子里，都允许她首先成为她自己。

 我很少会刻意在今天说一句“母亲节快乐”。因为我对妈妈的爱，不是集中在某个被提醒的日子里，而是藏在一年四季无数个寻常时刻。 

比起“节日快乐”，我更希望妈妈们这一生，能够真正做自己。不只是某个人的母亲、妻子、女儿，也依然是那个有热爱、有情绪、有梦想的人。 

愿妈妈们不用永远坚强，不用总把别人放在前面。 

愿她们自由、松弛、平安，活得肆意热烈，不论何时何地何把年纪，也依旧对世界怀有温柔与好奇。 

孩子爱妈妈，从来不需要靠一个节日来证明。

编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

 

Reflections on Mother’s Day

Author: Jin Mi

Abstract: Behind the bustle of Mother’s Day, many women are still expected by default to bear sacrifice and devotion. Compared to the praise during the festival, what is more important is to allow them, in their daily lives, to truly possess the freedom and dignity to be themselves.

Mother’s Day in the Friends Circle (Moments) started as early as last week.

Various merchants took the lead to come out, calling for care for mothers—flowers, red envelopes, money transfers, long text blessings. This kind of annual, collective performance is something I have watched for many years.

Today, people loudly shout “Mothers are great,” but by tomorrow, they default to the idea that a woman should return to the kitchen, marriage, and endurance.

I have always disliked the phrase “Happy Mother’s Day” somewhat; I only wish it to a few women who live out a true feminine stance. In my view, they are selfless toward their children but still retain themselves—this is the kind of mother I admire. I believe that only a mother who first knows how to love herself has the capacity and energy to love her child.

Therefore, those overwhelming festival blessings feel to me like a medal. Rewarding them for another year of not breaking down, not running away, and not stopping their devotion.

It must be admitted that, at least in the Chinese society I see even today, people still default in their bones to the idea that women are “appendages.” A daughter to someone when young, a wife to someone after marriage, and a mother to someone when old.

Yet, rarely does anyone ask who she herself is.

Many women are educated from childhood to be sensible, family-oriented, and emotionally stable. They are permitted to be gentle, but not permitted to be selfish; they are required to sacrifice, but cannot complain about being tired. Society praises “great mothers” on one hand, while defaulting to the idea that housework, childcare, and caring for the elderly are naturally her responsibilities on the other.

The most absurd part is that people actually call this consumption a virtue that women ought to possess; if they do not have it, it is deemed an immoral thing.

But if a person cannot be themselves for a long time, no matter how decent life looks, it is just a slow suffocation.

Compared to the praise during festivals, I prefer that they could be truly a bit more free. It is okay not to be virtuous, okay not to be great, and okay not to always put others first.

True love is never about collectively shouting “Happy Mother’s Day” today. Rather, it is about allowing her, in every ordinary day, to first become herself.

I rarely deliberately say “Happy Mother’s Day” today. Because my love for my mother is not concentrated on a certain reminded day, but is hidden in countless ordinary moments throughout the four seasons of the year.

Compared to “Happy Festival,” I prefer that mothers, in this lifetime, can truly be themselves. Not just someone’s mother, wife, or daughter, but still that person who has passions, emotions, and dreams.

May mothers not have to be strong forever, and not always have to put others first.

May they be free, relaxed, and safe, living willfully and passionately, retaining gentleness and curiosity toward the world no matter when, where, or at what age.

A child’s love for their mother never needs a festival to be proven.

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

作者：鄭偉

      摘要 ：致敬在中共高壓下堅持抗爭的女性與母親，讚揚她們在迫害與監控中守護真相、法治與自由的不屈勇氣。 

        在這個溫柔的節日，我們將目光投向那些在風暴中依然堅持、堅守、溫暖的女性。

        她們是母親。但她們的“母親”身份，在暴政下被賦予了更為沉重，也更為悲壯的含義。

        我們致敬“天安門母親”。她們是一群被惡魔奪走孩子的母親，在長達三十七年的漫長黑夜裡，她們用孱弱的身體築起真相的長城。她們拒絕遺忘，拒絕沉默，在嚴密的監控和年歲的蠶食下，依然堅持著那一聲對正義的追問。她們是中國當代最堅韌的良心。

        我們致敬維權母親。如丁家喜的妻子羅勝春，高智晟的妻子耿和，余文生的妻子許艷，王全璋的妻子李文足，維權媽媽何方美、可可……她們原本或許只是想做一個平靜生活的妻子、媽媽，但當暴政奪走了丈夫、孩子的自由和健康，她們在恐懼中起身，從一位普通女性轉變為在法院門口，在國際舞台上疾呼的人權捍衛者。她們用柔弱的雙肩，扛起了營救家人和追求法治的雙重重擔。

        我們更要致敬那些自己身陷囹圄、不斷抗爭的女性代表。是張展用絕食的身軀展現的道德高度，是黃雪琴用筆寫下的女性尊嚴，是王宇在酷刑前不屈的法律人風骨，是王荔蕻在弱勢群體前的抗爭，是熱依拉·達吾提對民族文化血脈的堅守。還有“白紙運動”中那些年輕的面孔，她們用青春的勇氣打破了沉默，證明了正義的火種未曾在年輕一代中熄滅。

        在中共的強權下，她們面臨的是全方位的迫害：非法的拘禁，獄中的酷刑，剝奪通訊，醫療權的虐待、對家人的監控與威脅。暴政企圖通過摧毀她們的身體、割裂她們的家庭關係來讓她們屈服。

        然而，她們沒有屈服。

        她們的抗爭，超越了個人的不幸。她們在為孩子追求一個免於恐懼的未來，她們在為社會追求一個有法治、有真相的明天。

       暴政可以囚禁她們的身體，卻無法囚禁她們的意志；可以切斷她們與外界的聯繫，卻無法切斷她們與正義的共鳴。

       在這個母親節，讓我們記住這些名字：丁子霖、張先玲、張展、王宇、黃雪琴、曹芷馨……她們是女兒、是妻子、是母親，更是鋼鐵般的公民。

        她們的堅韌，如同寒冬後的春暉，雖然微弱，卻在無情地消融著暴政的冰雪。

        致敬她們的勇氣！祈願她們的自由！

        祝福所有偉大的女性，母親節快樂！

編輯：胡麗莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

Steel Spring Radiance: Dedicated to All Women Resisting Under CCP Tyranny

Author: Zheng Wei

Abstract: A tribute to the women and mothers who persist in resistance under high pressure from the CCP, praising their unyielding courage in guarding truth, the rule of law, and freedom amidst persecution and surveillance.

On this gentle holiday, we turn our gaze toward those women who still persist, hold fast, and remain warm amidst the storm.

They are mothers. But their identity as “mothers,” under tyranny, has been endowed with a heavier and more tragic meaning.

We pay tribute to the “Tiananmen Mothers.” They are a group of mothers whose children were snatched away by demons. In the long night spanning thirty-seven years, they have used their frail bodies to build a Great Wall of truth. They refuse to forget, refuse to remain silent; under strict surveillance and the erosion of age, they still persist in that one inquiry for justice. They are the most resilient conscience of contemporary China.

We pay tribute to the rights-defense mothers. Such as Luo Shengchun, wife of Ding Jiaxi; Geng He, wife of Gao Zhisheng; Xu Yan, wife of Yu Wensheng; Li Wenzu, wife of Wang Quanzhang; and rights-defense mothers He Fangmei, Keke… They might have originally just wanted to be wives and mothers living a peaceful life, but when tyranny took away the freedom and health of their husbands and children, they stood up amidst fear, transforming from ordinary women into human rights defenders shouting at court gates and on international stages. With their delicate shoulders, they have carried the double burden of rescuing their families and pursuing the rule of law.

We must pay even greater tribute to those female representatives who are themselves imprisoned and constantly resisting. It is the moral height shown by Zhang Zhan with her hunger-striking body; it is the female dignity written by Huang Xueqin with her pen; it is the unyielding integrity of a legal professional shown by Wang Yu in the face of torture; it is the struggle of Wang Lihong before vulnerable groups; it is Rahile Dawut’s persistence in guarding the cultural lifeblood of her nation. There are also those young faces in the “White Paper Movement”; they used the courage of youth to break the silence, proving that the sparks of justice have never been extinguished among the younger generation.

Under the power of the CCP, they face all-around persecution: illegal detention, torture in prison, deprivation of communication, abuse of medical rights, and surveillance and threats against their families. Tyranny attempts to make them yield by destroying their bodies and severing their family relationships.

However, they have not yielded.

Their struggle transcends personal misfortune. They are pursuing a future free from fear for their children; they are pursuing a tomorrow with the rule of law and truth for society.

Tyranny can imprison their bodies, but it cannot imprison their will; it can cut off their connection with the outside world, but it cannot cut off their resonance with justice.

On this Mother’s Day, let us remember these names: Ding Zilin, Zhang Xianling, Zhang Zhan, Wang Yu, Huang Xueqin, Cao Zhixin… They are daughters, wives, mothers, and even more so, citizens of steel.

Their resilience is like the spring radiance after a cold winter; though faint, it is relentlessly melting the ice and snow of tyranny.

Salute their courage! Pray for their freedom! Blessings to all great women, Happy Mother’s Day!

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

作者：周小星  

1989年6月4日，北京。

一群渴望自由、反腐败、追求民主与法治的学生和市民，最终等来的不是对话，而是坦克、子弹和镇压。

那一年，来自全国各地的大学生走上街头，他们并非暴徒，也不是所谓“动乱分子”。很多人只是单纯地希望国家变得更好，希望结束腐败，希望拥有更多言论自由，希望中国能够走向更加开放和文明的未来。

他们聚集在天安门广场，静坐、绝食、演讲，用和平方式表达诉求。广场上有年轻人的理想，也有普通市民对未来的期待。

但中共最终选择了最残酷的方式回应。

军队开进北京，坦克驶入街道，枪口对准自己的人民。长安街上的枪声、履带声和哭喊声，成为那个时代最沉重的记忆。许多年轻生命永远停留在1989年的夏天，很多家庭从此支离破碎。

真正令人愤怒和悲哀的，不仅仅是那一夜发生的流血事件，更是37年来中共对这段历史持续不断的封锁和掩盖。

在中国，“六·四”成了禁词，相关书籍被删除，网络内容被屏蔽，讨论被压制。无数年轻人甚至从未听说过这段历史。一个政权如果真的问心无愧，就不会如此恐惧人民记住过去。

中共害怕的从来不是纪念本身，而是真相被更多人知道。

因为一旦人们开始了解历史，就会明白：当一个政权把维稳置于人民生命之上，把不同声音视为威胁，把遗忘当作统治工具，它最惧怕的永远是独立思考和自由意志。

37年过去，很多事情已经改变，但有些伤口仍未愈合。

纪念“六·四”，不是为了沉浸在仇恨中，而是拒绝遗忘，拒绝让谎言改写历史。

历史不会因为删帖、封号和沉默而消失。

那些逝去的生命，值得被记住；那段被掩盖的历史，值得被讲述。

铭记1989，勿忘“六·四”。

自由从来不是免费的。

编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

History Will Not Vanish Through Silence

Author: Zhou Xiaoxing

Abstract: During the June 4th Incident in 1989, students and citizens pursuing democracy and freedom were met with military suppression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For 37 years, the authorities have continuously blocked the truth of history, but history and the deceased should not be forgotten.

June 4, 1989, Beijing. A group of students and citizens longing for freedom, opposing corruption, and pursuing democracy and the rule of law ultimately did not receive dialogue, but rather tanks, bullets, and suppression.

That year, university students from all over the country took to the streets. They were not thugs, nor were they so-called “rioters.” Many simply hoped for the country to become better, hoped for an end to corruption, hoped for more freedom of speech, and hoped that China could move toward a more open and civilized future.

They gathered in Tiananmen Square—sitting in, fasting, and giving speeches—expressing their demands through peaceful means. In the square, there were the ideals of the youth and the expectations of ordinary citizens for the future.

However, the CCP ultimately chose the most brutal way to respond. The military marched into Beijing, tanks drove into the streets, and muzzles were aimed at their own people. The sound of gunfire, the roar of treads, and the cries on Chang’an Avenue became the heaviest memories of that era. Many young lives remained forever in the summer of 1989, and many families were shattered from that moment on.

What is truly infuriating and sorrowful is not only the bloodshed that occurred that night, but also the continuous blockade and cover-up of this history by the CCP for 37 years.

In China, “June 4th” has become a forbidden term. Relevant books are deleted, internet content is blocked, and discussions are suppressed. Countless young people have never even heard of this history. If a regime truly had a clear conscience, it would not fear the people remembering the past so much.

What the CCP fears has never been the act of commemoration itself, but rather the truth being known by more people. Because once people begin to understand history, they will realize: when a regime places “stability maintenance” above human life, regards different voices as threats, and uses forgetting as a tool of governance, what it fears most will always be independent thinking and free will.

Thirty-seven years have passed, and many things have changed, but some wounds have yet to heal. To commemorate “June 4th” is not to immerse oneself in hatred, but to refuse to forget and to refuse to let lies rewrite history.

History will not vanish because of deleted posts, banned accounts, or silence. Those lost lives deserve to be remembered; that covered-up history deserves to be told.

Remember 1989; do not forget “June 4th.” Freedom is never free.

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

——中国银行管控的系统性不对称

作者：周敏

编辑：胡丽莉 校对：王滨 翻译：戈冰

银行，在世人常识中是储户资金最安全的去处。存入，取出，天经地义。但是你发现没有？近年来，一个奇异的景象在中国银行体系中反复上演：骗子和内部人员能以惊人的效率将储户的钱转走，而储户自己要取回这笔钱，却要面对预约、盘问、证明、审查，乃至被拒之门外。

而这番景象，究根结底，是1949年后中国一切为党服务的制度设计之必然结果。

一、两个场景，两种速度

2025年10月，吉林省扶余市。储户陈冰将1000万元企业备用金存入扶余惠民村镇银行，业务由该行员工赵某丽经办。同月，另一储户王女士也将800万元积蓄存入同一银行，同样由赵某丽负责。赵某丽此前以完成存款指标为由，向储户承诺高于公开利率的回报，多次准时兑付，储户逐渐放松警惕。

2025年12月，陈冰发现手机银行无法登录，前往营业厅查询，被告知银行卡已挂失，账户内仅余一万余元——1000万元几近转空。王女士的800万元同样不翼而飞，银行拒绝提供资金流水凭证，隐瞒资金去向。事后查明，赵某丽通过伪造签名、冒名挂失补办银行卡等手段，将两人合计1800万元非法转走。赵某丽事发后服药轻生，被救回后已被批捕。

两笔共计1800万元的资金，从存入到被转空，整个过程银行系统没有触发任何有效预警，没有任何人主动通知储户。

现在再把镜头切换到另一个场景。

2024年，邢台，一名女子因丈夫病重急需现金支付医疗费用，前往银行取款。她被柜员以”大额取现”为由长时间盘查，反复追问资金用途，取款受阻。同年，沈阳一女子欲取5000元，被要求其丈夫必须到场。青岛一男子因无法当场提供”资金来源证明”，无法取出自己账户里的钱。吉林省某银行更一度要求取款超过2万元，须持辖区派出所出具的证明。

同一金融系统，同类账户里的钱。内部人员转走1800万，无声无息；储户自己取几万，困难重重。

二、管控的方向

要理解这种不对称，就得先理解这套管控机制究竟是为谁设计的。

中国银行体系在名义上服务储户，在结构上却是向上负责——对党政体系、监管机构、中共维稳负责。储户在法律意义上对银行拥有债权，而非对自己资金的直接所有权。这个区别在正常时期几乎感知不到，在危机时刻则暴露无遗。

大额现金管理制度要求5万元以上取现须提前预约，取款时须说明用途。这套机制的官方理由是反洗钱和反电信诈骗，但其实际功能远不止于此：这是让国家实时掌握大额资金流向，防范资本外逃，监控政治敏感资金异动。换言之，它首先是一套资本管控工具，其次才是反诈工具，保护储户则排在更后面。

柜员层面还存在一个自我加强的机制：若柜员放行了一笔事后被认定为涉诈的资金，将被个人处罚扣薪。这意味着柜员的理性选择必然是尽可能设置障碍，因为柜员清楚地看到，误伤普通储户的代价，远远低于放行涉诈资金的代价。于是每一个急需用钱的病人家属，每一个临时周转的商户，都成了这套风控机制的潜在嫌疑人。

与此形成鲜明对比的是，内部人员作案时走的则是监控之外的路径。系统级权限、职务便利、伪造票证——这些手段绕过柜台风控流程与前端审查。看见了吗？监控最严密的地方，恰恰是普通人取自己钱的窗口；漏洞最多的地方，恰恰是内部人员施展空间的后台。

三、爆雷之后的维权困境

内部人员作案尚属个案，但是，当机构本身成为掠夺者，这套不对称就会以更大的规模呈现。

2022年，河南四家村镇银行毫无预警地同时关闭线上取款渠道，约40万储户发现自己的存款无法提取。事后查明，银行股东以河南新财富集团为核心，通过内外勾结，将储户资金系统性转移，涉案金额据估计逾百亿元人民币。在这里，作恶的是谁？正是银行本身。

储户前往郑州维权，健康码被莫名赋红，无法进入郑州。大规模抗议现场出现身份不明的白衣人强行驱散人群，部分储户遭到殴打。随后，当局以”先垫付5万元以下”的方式分化维权队伍——拿到钱的人不再闹，剩下大额储户人数越来越少，声音越来越小。时至今日，仍有逾千名储户未获任何赔偿。

这套处置方式表明了一件事：当储户利益与维稳目标发生冲突，优先被保护的并不是储户利益。

四、制度性不对称的本质

上述案例放在一起通盘观察，可以看见一个清晰的脉络：

这套系统对资金流动的管控方向是倒置的。它对内部人员盗转、股东掏空几乎无效，对普通储户取回自己的钱反倒层层设防、令人崩溃。反洗钱反电诈的说法，为机构失职提供了合规掩护，同时还把监控资本流动的成本，以审查程序的名义转嫁给了储户。

工行南宁分行原高管梁建红，以伪造存单、替换票证的方式，历时数月转走11名储户约2.5亿元存款，银行系统全程未能有效识别。判决后，银行的第一个动作就是把责任归咎于员工个人行为；储户的民事赔偿诉求则被要求”先刑后民”，等待刑事追赃程序走完——而那个程序，可以漫长得以年来计算。

当储户被要求向银行证明自己有权取回自己的钱，这个关系已经不是存款关系，而是实质上的管控关系。银行不是服务方，而是施压方、管理方、控制方。

在一个法治健全的金融体系里，举证责任天然地落在银行一侧：银行须证明有法定理由才能拒绝支付。而在今天的中国，这个举证责任已经悄然倒置。储户不再是委托人，而更像是需要持续自证清白的被审查者。

面对这样的结构，储户究竟还能做什么来保护自己？这个问题，恐怕没有在现行体制内寻找答案的空间。

The People’s Money, the Party’s Decision

—Systemic Asymmetry in China’s Banking Oversight

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: In many regions, banks have failed to issue timely warnings when internal staff embezzle funds, while depositors face strict scrutiny and restrictions when attempting to withdraw their money. This article highlights the asymmetry within the financial system regarding the treatment of ordinary depositors versus internal risk management.

In the common understanding, banks are the safest place for depositors’ funds. Depositing and withdrawing money is a matter of course. But have you noticed? In recent years, a bizarre phenomenon has repeatedly unfolded within China’s banking system: fraudsters and insiders can transfer depositors’ money away with astonishing efficiency, while depositors themselves face appointments, interrogations, proof requirements, and scrutiny—and are even turned away—when trying to retrieve their own funds.

Ultimately, this phenomenon is the inevitable result of China’s post-1949 institutional design, which prioritizes serving the Party above all else.

I. Two Scenarios, Two Speeds

October 2025, Fuyu City, Jilin Province. Depositor Chen Bing deposited 10 million yuan in corporate contingency funds into Fuyu Huimin Rural Commercial Bank, with the transaction handled by bank employee Zhao Mouli. That same month, another depositor, Ms. Wang, also deposited 8 million yuan in savings into the same bank, again under Zhao Mouli’s supervision. Zhao Mouli had previously promised depositors returns higher than the published interest rates, citing the need to meet deposit quotas, and made timely payments on multiple occasions, causing the depositors to gradually let down their guard.

In December 2025, Chen Bing discovered he could not log into the mobile banking app. Upon visiting the branch to inquire, he was informed that his bank card had been reported lost, and only about 10,000 yuan remained in his account—the 10 million yuan had nearly vanished. Ms. Wang’s 8 million yuan had also disappeared without a trace, and the bank refused to provide transaction records, concealing the funds’ whereabouts. Subsequent investigations revealed that Zhao Mouli had illegally transferred a total of 18 million yuan from the two women by forging signatures and fraudulently reporting their cards lost to obtain replacements. After the incident, Zhao attempted suicide by overdosing on medication; she was rescued and has since been arrested.

Throughout the entire process—from the deposit of the two sums totaling 18 million yuan to their complete depletion—the bank’s system failed to trigger any effective alerts, and no one proactively notified the depositors.

Now let’s shift our focus to another scenario.

In 2024, in Xingtai, a woman went to a bank to withdraw cash urgently needed to cover her husband’s medical expenses. She was subjected to a lengthy interrogation by a teller on the grounds of a “large cash withdrawal,” repeatedly questioned about the funds’ intended use, and ultimately prevented from withdrawing the money. That same year, in Shenyang, a woman attempting to withdraw 5,000 yuan was told her husband must be present. In Qingdao, a man was unable to withdraw money from his own account because he could not provide “proof of funds” on the spot. A bank in Jilin Province even went so far as to require a certificate issued by the local police station for withdrawals exceeding 20,000 yuan.

The same financial system, money in similar accounts. When an insider transfers 18 million yuan, it goes unnoticed; when a depositor tries to withdraw a few tens of thousands, they face immense difficulties.

II. The Direction of Control

To understand this asymmetry, one must first understand for whom this control mechanism was actually designed.

China’s banking system nominally serves depositors, but structurally, it is accountable upward—to the Party and government system, regulatory bodies, and the CCP’s stability maintenance apparatus. Legally speaking, depositors hold claims against the bank, rather than direct ownership of their funds. This distinction is barely perceptible in normal times but becomes glaringly obvious in times of crisis.

The large-cash management system requires advance reservations for cash withdrawals exceeding 50,000 yuan, with the purpose of the withdrawal to be stated at the time of withdrawal. The official justification for this mechanism is anti-money laundering and anti-telecom fraud, but its actual functions go far beyond that: it allows the state to track the flow of large sums of money in real time, prevent capital flight, and monitor politically sensitive financial movements. In other words, it is first and foremost a tool for capital control, secondarily an anti-fraud tool, with the protection of depositors ranking even lower on the list of priorities.

At the teller level, there is a self-reinforcing mechanism: if a teller approves a transaction that is later identified as fraud-related, they face personal penalties, including salary deductions. This means that the rational choice for a teller is inevitably to create as many obstacles as possible, because they clearly see that the cost of mistakenly inconveniencing ordinary depositors is far lower than the cost of allowing fraud-related funds to pass through. Consequently, every family member of a patient in urgent need of funds and every merchant seeking temporary liquidity becomes a potential suspect under this risk control mechanism.

In stark contrast, when internal personnel commit fraud, they take paths outside the scope of surveillance. System-level permissions, the convenience of their positions, and forged documents—these methods bypass counter-level risk control processes and front-end reviews. Do you see? The most heavily monitored areas are precisely the windows where ordinary people withdraw their own money; the areas with the most vulnerabilities are precisely the back offices where internal personnel have room to operate.

III. The Dilemma of Seeking Redress After a Financial Scandal

While insider fraud is typically an isolated incident, when the institution itself becomes the predator, this asymmetry manifests on a much larger scale.

In 2022, four village banks in Henan simultaneously shut down their online withdrawal channels without warning, leaving approximately 400,000 depositors unable to access their funds. Subsequent investigations revealed that bank shareholders, led by the Henan New Fortune Group, had systematically diverted depositors’ funds through collusion with both internal and external parties, with the total amount involved estimated to exceed 10 billion yuan. Who was responsible for this wrongdoing? It was the banks themselves.

When depositors traveled to Zhengzhou to demand their rights, their health codes were inexplicably marked red, preventing them from entering the city. At the site of large-scale protests, unidentified individuals in white clothing forcibly dispersed the crowd, and some depositors were beaten. Subsequently, the authorities sought to divide the protest group by offering “advance payments of up to 50,000 yuan”—those who received the money stopped protesting, while the number of depositors with larger balances dwindled, and their voices grew fainter. To this day, over a thousand depositors have yet to receive any compensation.

This approach reveals one thing: when the interests of depositors conflict with the goal of maintaining social stability, it is not the depositors’ interests that are prioritized.

IV. The Essence of Institutional Asymmetry

When viewed holistically, the cases described above reveal a clear pattern:

This system’s approach to controlling capital flows is inverted. It is virtually ineffective against embezzlement by insiders or asset stripping by shareholders, yet it erects layer upon layer of barriers—often to the point of frustration—to prevent ordinary depositors from retrieving their own money. The rhetoric of anti-money laundering and anti-telecom fraud provides a compliance cover for institutional dereliction of duty, while simultaneously shifting the cost of monitoring capital flows onto depositors under the guise of review procedures.

Liang Jianhong, a former senior executive at the Nanning Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), embezzled approximately 250 million yuan in deposits from 11 depositors over several months by forging deposit certificates and swapping physical documents—a scheme the banking system failed to detect throughout the entire process. Following the verdict, the bank’s first move was to attribute the blame to the employee’s individual actions; meanwhile, depositors’ civil compensation claims were met with the requirement to “pursue civil claims after criminal proceedings,” forcing them to wait for the criminal asset recovery process to conclude—a process that can take years.

When depositors are required to prove to the bank that they have the right to retrieve their own money, this relationship is no longer one of depository banking but has effectively become one of control. The bank is not a service provider but rather an entity that exerts pressure, manages, and controls.

In a financial system governed by the rule of law, the burden of proof naturally falls on the bank: the bank must demonstrate that it has legal grounds to refuse payment. In today’s China, however, this burden of proof has quietly been reversed. Depositors are no longer clients but rather subjects under scrutiny who must constantly prove their own innocence.

Faced with such a structure, what can depositors actually do to protect themselves? It seems there is little room to find an answer to this question within the current system.

致：中国共产党总书记习近平

申请人：彭永和，中国公民（前上海律师），76年生，江西籍，无固定住所地。

本人彭永和，希望能像前总理朱镕基那样，怀着“不管前面是地雷阵还是万丈深渊，我都将一往无前，义无反顾，鞠躬尽瘁，死而后已”的为人民服务” 的历史责任感和使命感而申请加入中国共产党。

同时，我正式邀请习近平你作为本人的入党介绍人。

我深知，以我现在可疑的政治立场，上海方面不可能接受我的入党申请，其它省份的又根本不了解我，所以，目光只能投向你！至于理由：“你懂的”！

本人申请加入中国共产党的动机和目的：

1，消除误会：

在长达九年的被维稳过程中，说本人有政治倾向问题；说本人虽然嘴上不说，可心里和所作的事情就是要推翻中国共产党的领导！

为此，前几年我特意给上海市司法局和市政府写了一封公开信，信中说“本人坚决反对专政、反对独裁、接受普世价值”——如果这是政治倾向的话———这可不是我彭永和首先提出来的，早在抗战及国共内战时期，“新华社”就向全体国人公开发表过类似的表态；毛泽东也曾在1945 年的《论联合政府》中提到，中国应实现林肯的“民有、民治、民享”原则和罗斯福的“四大自由”——这能是政治倾向有问题？这能是要推翻中国共产党的领导的意思？

之后，记得还曾经两次给上海市长龚正写公开信明确表示希望“消除误会”然，从未得到回应。

2, 害怕打击报复：

他们曾跟我说：“你我是敌对关系，…….”。

3, 可以自由去北京看升国旗、敬礼：

今年1月底，我到北京的当天就被上海的国宝带到了北京的一个派出所说:“你在公安部的黑名单里，你不能待在北京……….”。北京的那个国宝也对我说:“我是不可能让你待在北京的……”。

4, 恢复律师证：

因涉及政治倾向问题，2021年1月份我的律师证就被上海市司法局注销了，注销前的申辩书的标题是“给中共中央总书记国家主席习近平的公开信”，具体内容你去看看，国保那有。

5, 兑现对上海全体律师的承诺博取名声：

我说过要努力促成《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则》的尽早颁布，2022年本人就制定了此规则草案发给了上海市律师协会和司法局，就在今年的3月份在给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信（二）中还提及了此事，甚至在总理李强当上海市委书记的时候借助疫情的公开信寻求过他的帮助。

6, 获得巨额赔偿：

在今年3月份给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信（一）中公开进行索赔，我估算了一下大概一百五十万元左右。

你想，如果我入了党，我们之间的关系就是同志了对吧，也就说明之前确实是个误会阿，既然是误会，那么这么多年的不能律师执业的损失就应该赔偿给我对吧？

7,被养老金分配状况刺激、担心自己十年后:

如今，公务员、事业单位退休每月平均六七千，农民和城市居民平均二百多点。而，2025年世界银行修订，联合国统计司 (UNSD)发布的国际绝对贫困标准线是“日均生活消费3美元”。折合人民币约每月630元，也就是说还不到国际贫困线的一半！

如果我今年入了党，那么，我一定会同你一道还有其他同志一起想办法把农民和城市居民的养老金到明年提高到每月一千元，后年继续提高，直至跟公务员和企业职工相当的水平。

哎！要是李克强总理还活着，我想，他一定会全力支持我们的！

8, 被医疗保障制度所刺激，担心自己和孩子看不起病：

网友总结为：不是没有免费医疗，而是免费医疗的名单里没有你！

如果我今年入党了，我就跟你一起不论前面是地雷阵还是万丈深渊，将一往无前，义无反顾，鞠躬尽瘁，死而后已”，目标是在三年内实现全民“平等基础保障的免费医疗”。

9，被（2026）沪7101行初309号行政裁定书所刺激：

一审法院裁定书表述如下：………..实际系对市司法局是否履行了对上海律协的监督管理职责的异议，明显不属于《条例》所调整的范畴，被诉告知对原告的权利义务不产生实际影响，……..故原告的起诉不符合法定起诉条件。

如果真如法院认为的那样，本人为何不去控告、投诉或者以行政不作为为由提起诉讼？又或者如给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信（二）中那样明确要求对上海市司法局相关涉案人员渎职的行为进行调查处理？反而是申请信息公开律师协会的财务审计报告和材料———到底是法院脑残还是本人脑残？

另，法院不开庭，就可以避免查明：本人立案时提交的律师执业证证据上面记载的时间和本人的实际执业年份在所申请的上海律师协会第十、十一届期间，从而关系到本人的财产权、知情权、监督权。如此，就可以装糊涂用对原告的权利义务不产生实际影响结案，从而避免上海律协每年“亿”元会费的实际支出情况被公开的可能性，从而影响到上海几万名律师的心情和律师行业的稳定！

10, 被于凯等言论自由权案件的刺激：

我的朋友于凯律师，因在司法部门前举牌反映“律协自治、会费、黑名单等问题被涉嫌寻衅滋事犯罪。

黑名单问题，我是亲历者，被明确告知上了上海市司法局黑名单。

外交部发言人反复说中国公民有言论自由权，没有任何一个公民会“因言获罪”。 我入党之后，我将更有力量与你一起和其他同志促使《新闻法》在一年之内制定和颁布。届时，将明确言论自由权的边界，避免类似如我朋友于凯案的再次发生。

我初步的设想的言论自由的边界是：非因故意制作、编造、发表或明知是虚假旨在攻击、诋毁政府及工作人员履行公职行为或现状的言论、信息而传播的，不得为罪。

前款因故意除已然造成社会功能上的停止或丧失，或已然处于紧迫状态政府不得不通过武力对公共场所和秩序所进行干预、预防和布置外的，也不得为罪。

11,对阳光法案的期盼和被巨额财产来源不明罪金额上调至300万的刺激：

《公职人员财产公示法》已然是被绝大多数国家已验证的最好的反腐败方法之一，只要该法颁布，巨额财产来源不明罪金额根本无需上调，反而可以下调甚至废除此罪。如，新加坡。如有巨额财产来源不明一律按“贪污处理”。

我入党之后，将与你并肩作战，二年内颁布《公职人员财产公示法》，如你曾说的“扎紧制度的篱笆”，自己亲自为自己带上“枷锁”、拴上锁链、筑起笼子。

12,我的兄弟丁家喜和朋友张展案件的刺激：

我的兄弟丁家喜，这次又被判刑12年；朋友张展这次又是4年。

我知道，那些办理他们案件的公检法人员也知道，他们的追求和目标其实跟你跟党是一模一样———民主、宪政、法治中国。

这激起了我强烈的对隐藏在党内的腐败份子清除欲望。届时，你我将并肩作战，对腐败份子0容忍。

13,…….

太多了，待续。

以上，或许有人会说——彭永和，你动机不纯，贪名贪财阿，你这种人怎么能入党呢？

这个问题问得非常好！

我的答复是：我是血肉之身，不是特殊材料制作的，所以，我必须直视人性尊重人性，一切从人性出发，不叫口号，事实求是，不隐瞒不欺骗组织。我想，只有这样才具备申请加入中国共产党的资格吧。你说是吧？

最后，我要说明一下为什么要以公开信的方式。原因就是：既然我决心要为人民服务，那么，本申请书涉及的信息和“服务事项”就自然应当公开接受全民的核实检验和监督，如果在本申请书中你发现或经举报核实有任何故意捏造的事实，本人将永远不再申请加入中国共产党。

习近平主席、 全体中国公民、全体中国共产党员、其他八个党派党员、川普总统、内塔尼亚胡总理、泽联斯基总统、安东尼奥·古特雷斯,联合国秘书长等所有文明的境外势力和追求文明的人们，如果你认为我彭永和更有可能真的会履行共产党的宗旨、践行共产党对十四亿中国人的承诺“全心全意为人民服务”，请支持我加入中国共产党。谢谢！

今日去北京！ 此入党申请书公开前，该不会又被上海或北京的公安控制了吧！

申请人：彭永和

电话微信：13816353773

邮箱：[email protected]

[email protected]

2026年5月10日

2026年5月11日临近中午火车到北京西站，刚走出车厢即被北京警方控制，当天晚上被上海警方带回上海。

Open Letter of Application for Party Membership by Peng Yonghe, a Chinese Citizen (Former Shanghai Lawyer)

To: Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China

Applicant: Peng Yonghe, a Chinese citizen (former Shanghai lawyer), born in 1976, native of Jiangxi Province, with no fixed residence.

I, Peng Yonghe, wish to apply for membership in the Communist Party of China with the same historical sense of responsibility and mission to serve the people as former Premier Zhu Rongji, who declared: “Whether I face a minefield or a bottomless abyss, I will press forward without hesitation, devote myself wholeheartedly, and serve until my dying breath.”

At the same time, I formally invite you, Xi Jinping, to serve as my sponsor for Party membership.

I am well aware that, given my current questionable political stance, the authorities in Shanghai will not accept my application for Party membership, and those in other provinces simply do not know me. Therefore, I have no choice but to turn to you! As for the reason: “You know why!”

My motives and objectives for applying to join the Communist Party of China:

1. To clear up misunderstandings:

During the nine-year-long process of being “maintained for stability,” it was claimed that I had political leanings; that although I did not speak of it openly, my heart and my actions were aimed at overthrowing the leadership of the Communist Party of China!

To address this, a few years ago I specifically wrote an open letter to the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice and the Municipal Government, stating: “I firmly oppose dictatorship and autocracy, and embrace universal values”—if this constitutes a political orientation—this is not something I, Peng Yonghe, first proposed. As early as the War of Resistance and the Chinese Civil War, Xinhua News Agency had publicly issued similar statements to all Chinese citizens; Mao Zedong also mentioned in his 1945 essay “On the United Government” that China should realize Lincoln’s principle of “government of the people, by the people, for the people” and Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms”—how could this be considered a problematic political stance? How could this be interpreted as an intent to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of China?

Afterward, I recall writing two open letters to Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng, explicitly expressing my hope to “clear up the misunderstanding,” yet I never received a response.

2. Fear of Retaliation:

They once told me, “We are enemies, ……”.

3. Freedom to go to Beijing to watch the flag-raising ceremony and salute:

In late January of this year, on the very day I arrived in Beijing, I was taken by a Shanghai police officer to a Beijing police station, where I was told: “You’re on the Ministry of Public Security’s blacklist; you cannot stay in Beijing…” The Beijing police officer also told me: “There’s no way I’m going to let you stay in Beijing…”

4. Restoration of my lawyer’s license:

Due to issues involving political leanings, my lawyer’s license was revoked by the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice in January 2021. The title of my defense statement submitted before the revocation was “Open Letter to Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the People’s Republic of China.” You can review the specific contents—they are on file with the State Security Bureau.

5. Fulfilling a promise to all Shanghai lawyers to gain a reputation:

I have stated that I would strive to facilitate the early promulgation of the “Shanghai Bar Association Rules on Election and Recall.” In 2022, I drafted these rules and submitted them to the Shanghai Bar Association and the Bureau of Justice. As recently as March of this year, I mentioned this matter in my “Open Letter (II) to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng.” I even sought assistance from Premier Li Qiang via an open letter during the pandemic when he was serving as Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary.

6. Securing Substantial Compensation:

In my first open letter to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng this past March, I publicly demanded compensation. I estimate the amount to be approximately 1.5 million yuan.

Just think: if I were to join the Party, our relationship would be that of comrades, right? That would mean what happened before was indeed a misunderstanding. And since it was a misunderstanding, shouldn’t I be compensated for the losses incurred over all these years during which I was unable to practice law?

7. Alarmed by the current state of pension distribution and worried about my situation ten years from now:

Today, retired civil servants and public institution employees receive an average monthly pension of 6,000 to 7,000 yuan, while farmers and urban residents receive an average of just over 200 yuan. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank’s 2025 revision and the international absolute poverty line published by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the threshold is “an average daily living expense of $3.” Converted to RMB, this amounts to approximately 630 yuan per month—meaning it is less than half the international poverty line!

If I join the Party this year, I will certainly work with you and other comrades to find ways to raise the pensions for farmers and urban residents to 1,000 yuan per month by next year, and continue to increase them the year after, until they reach a level comparable to that of civil servants and enterprise employees.

Ah! If Premier Li Keqiang were still alive, I believe he would wholeheartedly support us!

8. Provoked by the healthcare system and worried about being unable to afford medical treatment for myself and my children:

Netizens have summed it up as: “It’s not that there is no free healthcare—it’s just that you aren’t on the list for free healthcare!”

If I join the Party this year, I will stand with you, and no matter whether we face a minefield or a bottomless abyss ahead, we will press forward undaunted, without hesitation, dedicating ourselves wholeheartedly until our dying breath. Our goal is to achieve “free healthcare with equal basic coverage for all” within three years.

9. Provoked by Administrative Ruling No. (2026) Hu 7101 Xing Chu 309:

The first-instance court’s ruling states as follows: ……….. This is in fact an objection to whether the Municipal Bureau of Justice has fulfilled its supervisory and management duties over the Shanghai Bar Association, which clearly falls outside the scope of the Regulations. The contested notice has no actual impact on the plaintiff’s rights and obligations,…. …Therefore, the plaintiff’s lawsuit does not meet the statutory conditions for filing a lawsuit.

If the situation is truly as the court claims, why did I not file a criminal complaint, lodge a formal complaint, or initiate a lawsuit on the grounds of administrative inaction? Or, as explicitly requested in my Open Letter (II) to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng, why did I not demand an investigation and disciplinary action against the relevant personnel at the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice for their dereliction of duty? Instead, I applied for the disclosure of the Bar Association’s financial audit reports and materials—is it the court that is brain-dead, or am I?

Furthermore, by refusing to hold a hearing, the court can avoid ascertaining that the date recorded on the attorney’s license I submitted upon filing the case corresponds to my actual years of practice during the 10th and 11th terms of the Shanghai Bar Association, which directly relates to my property rights, right to know, and right to oversight. In this way, they can feign ignorance and dismiss the case on the grounds that it has no practical impact on the plaintiff’s rights and obligations, thereby preventing the disclosure of the Shanghai Bar Association’s actual annual expenditure of “hundreds of millions” in membership fees—which would affect the morale of tens of thousands of lawyers in Shanghai and the stability of the legal profession!

10. Stimulated by the case involving Yu Kai and others regarding the right to freedom of speech:

My friend, Attorney Yu Kai, was suspected of committing the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for holding up a sign in front of the judicial authorities to protest issues such as “bar association autonomy, membership fees, and blacklists.”

Regarding the blacklist issue, I am a firsthand witness; I was explicitly informed that I had been placed on the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice’s blacklist.

The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly stated that Chinese citizens have the right to freedom of speech, and that no citizen will be “punished for their words.” After I join the Party, I will have greater strength to work with you and other comrades to ensure that the “Press Law” is drafted and enacted within one year. At that time, the boundaries of the right to freedom of speech will be clearly defined, preventing the recurrence of cases similar to that of my friend Yu Kai.

My preliminary conception of the boundaries of freedom of speech is as follows: it shall not constitute a crime to produce, fabricate, publish, or disseminate speech or information that is not intentionally created, or that is knowingly false, with the intent to attack or defame the government or government officials in the performance of their official duties or regarding the current state of affairs.

Furthermore, the acts described in the preceding paragraph shall not constitute a crime if they are committed intentionally, unless they have already caused a functional halt or loss of social order, or unless the government is already in a state of emergency and is compelled to intervene, prevent, or deploy forces in public spaces and to maintain public order.

11. Expectations for the Sunshine Act and the stimulus of raising the threshold for the crime of unexplained wealth to 3 million:

The “Public Officials’ Asset Disclosure Act” is already one of the best anti-corruption methods proven effective by the vast majority of countries. Once this law is enacted, there will be no need to raise the threshold for the crime of unexplained wealth; on the contrary, it can be lowered or even abolished. For example, in Singapore, any case of unexplained wealth is uniformly treated as “corruption.”

Once I join the Party, I will fight alongside you to enact the “Public Officials’ Asset Disclosure Law” within two years. As you once said, we must “tighten the institutional fence”—personally placing “shackles” on ourselves, fastening chains, and building a cage.

12. The Impact of the Cases Involving My Brother Ding Jiaxi and My Friend Zhang Zhan:

My brother, Ding Jiaxi, has once again been sentenced to 12 years in prison; my friend, Zhang Zhan, has been sentenced to another 4 years.

I know—and the officials from the public security, procuratorial, and judicial authorities handling their cases know as well—that their aspirations and goals are actually identical to yours and those of the Party: democracy, constitutional government, and the rule of law in China.

This has sparked in me a strong desire to root out the corrupt elements hiding within the Party. When that time comes, you and I will fight side by side, with zero tolerance for corrupt officials.

13,…….

There is too much to say; to be continued.

Regarding the above, some might say—Peng Yonghe, your motives are impure; you crave fame and wealth. How could someone like you ever join the Party?

That is an excellent question!

My response is: I am made of flesh and blood, not some special material. Therefore, I must face human nature head-on and respect it. I must approach everything from the perspective of human nature, avoid empty slogans, seek truth from facts, and never conceal or deceive the organization. I believe that only in this way do I qualify to apply for membership in the Communist Party of China. Don’t you agree?

Finally, I would like to explain why I am submitting this as an open letter. The reason is this: since I am determined to serve the people, the information and “matters of service” contained in this application should naturally be made public to be verified, examined, and supervised by the entire nation. If you discover, or if it is verified through a report, that there are any intentionally fabricated facts in this application, I will never again apply to join the Communist Party of China.

President Xi Jinping, all Chinese citizens, all members of the Communist Party of China, members of the other eight political parties, President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Zelenskyy, António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and all civilized foreign forces and people who pursue civilization—if you believe that I, Peng Yonghe, am more likely to truly uphold the Communist Party’s principles and fulfill the Party’s commitment to 1.4 billion Chinese people to “serve the people wholeheartedly,” please support my application to join the Communist Party of China. Thank you!

Heading to Beijing today! Before this application for Party membership is made public, I hope I won’t be detained by the Shanghai or Beijing police again!

Applicant: Peng Yonghe

Phone/WeChat: 13816353773

Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

May 10, 2026

On May 11, 2026, shortly before noon, my train arrived at Beijing West Station. As soon as I stepped out of the carriage, I was detained by Beijing police and taken back to Shanghai by Shanghai police that same evening.