作者：萧钦元
編輯：gloria wang 责任编辑：刘芳 校对：熊辩 翻译：刘芳

壮士策马行，扬鞭志未宁。
胸怀君王事，南渡跨长陵。
赤地尽纵横，铁蹄遍青冥。
挥戈扫八荒，剑气动四邻。
旌旗映日辉，战鼓震天鸣。
百战何所惧，豪气贯凌云。
黄沙掩不尽，平生自常青。
大梦历寒暑，天地共长行。

To Youth

Author: Xiao Qin-Yuan
Editor: Gloria Wang Executive Editor: Liu Fang Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Liu Fang

The valiant rider urges his steed onward, his restless will unrestrained.
With royal duty in his heart, he crosses the southern plains and distant ridges.
Across scorched and endless lands, his iron hooves thunder beneath the vast sky.
With a sweeping blade he clears the wilds, his sword-aura stirring all around.
Banners blaze beneath the sun, and war drums roar up to the heavens.
A hundred battles hold no fear; his bold spirit pierces the clouds.
Though yellow sands may cover all, his life remains evergreen.
Through seasons cold and warm he pursues his great dream, journeying long with heaven and earth.

作者：陀先润
编辑：李堃 责任编辑：刘芳 校对：林小龙 翻译：彭小梅

又到了读公报、聊公报的时间。十天前，有人信誓旦旦地说，四中全会将有大变，习近平要下台。我笑而不语。如今尘埃落定，他依然稳坐其位，全党全军依旧紧紧围绕在“以习近平为核心”的周围。转播画面里，所有人都正襟危坐，唯有张又侠低头翻阅报告，神色淡然。有人说他是反习的老大，这种说法可笑。只有被信任到骨子里的人，才敢在群臣如履薄冰时随意翻页。

很多人讨厌共产党，不愿意读公报，觉得那是空话、套话、假话。错了。越是假话的时代，真话就越藏在行间。这次的公报最值得注意的，是那几个被重新启用的词汇。

第一个是“经济自给自足”。这四个字，几十年没在中央文件中出现过。过去只说“粮食安全”，现在直接讲经济自给自足。这不是口号，而是判断，是对未来局势的预判。北京已经意识到，在未来五年乃至更长的时间里，中国将被长期制裁与封锁。自给自足不是主动闭关，而是被迫闭关的预演。一个外贸驱动的国家，突然要自给自足，意味着从原料、市场到金融体系都要重组。从重建供销社，到区域粮食安全，再到成品油和化工体系，本是“只做不说”的底层动作，如今被写进公报，说明他们已不再掩饰。中国在为“被切断”做准备。未来五年，海外情报系统的任务将从偷技术转向建渠道——走私物资、秘密结算、规避制裁。这将是一场悄无声息的“伊朗化”转型。

第二个是“边斗争、边备战、边建设”。很多人说是首次出现，其实不是。这个词最早出现在1962年的《解放军报》。那时的中国，也正经历饥荒与内斗。这次不同的是，它第一次出现在中央全会公报中，意味着这不再是军内密语，而是全党共识。斗争，是内部的；备战，是外部的；建设，是苦撑的。这三个方向，正是六十年代老路的翻版。当一个政权在文件里公开使用这样的语言，说明它已经进入长期备战状态——政治斗争长期化，军事备战常态化，经济困难结构化。

第三个是“推动国家统一”。以前的说法是“促进”“推进”，这次改为“推动”。措辞的变化，就是立场的转变。“和平统一”四个字，彻底消失。能和平统就和平统，不能和平统，也要统。台湾问题不再是外交话题，而是军事议程。

与此同时，军队清洗仍在继续。火箭军上将被一锅端，中央委员成批被开除。很多人还在幻想军中反习，但他们忘了，中国的政治逻辑是：被破格提拔的人，死得最快。因为他们没有派系，只有一个靠山——那个提拔他们的人。当靠山不再需要他们，清除起来毫不手软。有人说这是宫斗，错，这不是宫斗，而是体制的自我防御机制。它靠不断清洗维持忠诚，靠持续斗争延续统治。

现在的中共，正在重走1960年代的路线——经济上自我封闭，政治上自我净化，军队上自我恐惧。“十五五”规划的关键词已经摆在台面上：经济自给自足，边斗争、边备战、边建设，推动国家统一。这三个方向加在一起，就是一个字——紧。国家要紧，社会要紧，思想要紧，生活也要紧。空气越来越稀薄，言语越来越危险。

我们能做什么？也许，只能思考如何在“紧”的时代活下去。不是躲避风暴，而是活得比别人久一点，清醒一点。因为当一个国家开始谈“自给自足”，开始强调“备战与斗争”，那意味着它已经不再相信世界，也不再相信人民。它只相信管控，只相信收紧。

时代的齿轮正在倒转。有人还在幻想变革，有人还在为套话鼓掌。历史早已告诉我们，最危险的不是狂热，而是沉默。

所以，四中全会没有新消息，只有旧路重来。只是这一次，连伪装都省了。

The New Language of the Fourth Plenary Session: Self-Reliance, Preparing for War While Building — The Era Is Tightening

Author: Tuo Xianrun
Edited : Li Kun Managing Editor: Liu Fang Proofread: Lin Xiaolong Translated : Xiaomei Peng

Abstract:By examining the subtle shifts in wording within the CCP’s communiqué from the Fourth Plenary Session, this article interprets the emerging direction of China’s political, economic, and military landscape. The changes reveal an increasingly closed, defensive, and tense regime preparing for long-term confrontation with the outside world.

It’s that time again—reading and dissecting the Party communiqué.Ten days ago, some confidently predicted that the Fourth Plenary Session would bring a major upheaval—that Xi Jinping would step down. I merely smiled. Now that the dust has settled, Xi remains firmly in power, and the Party and the army continue to “unite closely around the core.” In the televised footage, everyone sat stiffly at attention—except Zhang Youxia, who calmly flipped through the report. Some called him the “anti-Xi commander,” but that’s absurd. Only those trusted to the bone dare to appear relaxed when everyone else walks on eggshells.

Many people dislike the Communist Party so much that they refuse to read its communiqués, dismissing them as hollow slogans and clichés. That’s a mistake. The emptier the era, the more truth hides between the lines. In this communiqué, several words and phrases—quietly reintroduced after decades—reveal much about China’s direction.

“Economic Self-Reliance” These four words have not appeared in central government documents for decades. In the past, officials spoke only of “food security.” Now, they speak plainly of economic self-reliance. This is not propaganda—it is a forecast. Beijing has realized that in the next five years, or longer, China will face sustained sanctions and isolation. Self-reliance is not a voluntary retreat—it’s a rehearsal for forced seclusion. For a country dependent on exports, shifting to self-reliance means restructuring everything—from raw materials and supply chains to financial systems. The revival of supply cooperatives, regional grain security plans, and domestic energy systems—once quiet bureaucratic operations—are now written into official policy. This is an open admission that China is preparing for “being cut off.”In the coming years, the focus of China’s overseas intelligence work will shift—from stealing technology to building covert logistics networks: smuggling materials, bypassing sanctions, and conducting secret settlements. Quietly, China is entering an “Iranization” phase of transformation.

“Fighting, Preparing for War, and Building Simultaneously “Many claim this phrase is new—it isn’t. It first appeared in PLA Daily in 1962, when China was also reeling from famine and internal purges. What is new is its appearance in a central plenary communiqué, elevating it from a military slogan to a Party-wide consensus. “Fighting” refers to internal struggle; “Preparing for war” refers to external confrontation; “Building” refers to holding the line economically. Together, they revive the logic of the 1960s: political struggle institutionalized, military readiness normalized, economic hardship entrenched.

When a regime begins to use this kind of language in its formal documents, it signals the start of a permanent wartime posture—both politically and psychologically.

“Advancing National Unification” Previously, the term used was “promoting” or “facilitating” unification. Now it has shifted to “advancing.” This subtle change marks a major turn in attitude. The phrase “peaceful reunification” has disappeared entirely. The message is clear: “If unification can be achieved peacefully, so be it; if not, it will still be achieved. “The Taiwan issue is no longer a diplomatic topic—it has been moved to the military agenda.

Meanwhile, purges within the military continue. Entire branches, like the Rocket Force, have been wiped out; dozens of Central Committee members expelled. Some still fantasize about a “pro-anti-Xi” faction within the army—but they misunderstand China’s political DNA. In this system, those promoted beyond normal rank die the fastest. They have no faction—only one patron, the man who promoted them. And when that patron no longer needs them, their fall is swift and merciless. This is not palace intrigue—it’s the regime’s self-defense mechanism. It survives through constant purges and perpetual internal struggle.

Today’s CCP is retracing the path of the 1960s: Economic self-isolation, political purification, and military fear. The next Five-Year Plan—“The 15th Plan”—already defines its priorities: economic self-reliance，simultaneous struggle, mobilization, construction，advancing national unification. Together, these form a single word: tight. The state tightens; society tightens; thought tightens; and daily life tightens. The air grows thinner, speech more dangerous.

What Can We Do? Perhaps nothing—except to think about how to live in an age of tightening. Not to flee the storm, but to survive a little longer, and stay a little clearer. Because when a country begins to talk about “self-reliance,” and emphasizes “struggle and preparation for war,” it means it no longer trusts the world—or its own people. It trusts only control.

The gears of history are turning backward. Some still dream of reform; others still applaud slogans. But history has already spoken: The greatest danger is not fanaticism—it is silence.

So no, the Fourth Plenary Session brought no “new message”. Only the return of an old path—this time, without the disguise.

作者：宇宙大觀　
編輯：鍾然 責任編輯：劉芳 校對：程筱筱 翻译：彭小梅

村山富市，日本前首相，出身平民，是戰後日本少有的平民政治家。他為人溫和謙遜，作風誠懇，重視多元意見和民主討論。村山富市最大的政治遺產就是他在首相任上發表的《村山談話》，反省日本在二戰中的＂植民地支配＂和＂侵略＂的歷史錯誤，對岸中共政權則表示“歡迎”，至今要求日本政府“奉守”云云。在我看來，村山大愛的純徹明朗，恰恰映襯出中共邪惡之陰黑骯髒。

《村山談話》反映了日本人對二戰的反省思考，在民主多元環境下，只是其中的一元，村山先生必須面對各種不同意見的質疑和反對。從當年新手議員高市早苗到大學生，多有當面對話辯論，村山先生溫文尔雅平和待人等優質人格溢於言表。更重要的是作為出身平民回歸平民的政治家，沒有任何對權益的執著依戀，他的居家依然是一直以來的平民小屋，我每每陪中國人造訪這位日本前首相之家，無人不感慨這連中國一個村長都不如⋯⋯我與村山先生的交往，除了感受到老人家對中國人的友善，就是內心無欲之純靜。這對我是最重要的感染所在，得以用來維護自己的獨立人格。

但與村山先生一樣，許多強調“日中友好”的日本人，注重於自己的歷史內省和良好願望，缺乏或不願對對岸中共政權邪惡本質作更多了解，以為“以心傳心”，傳達善意即可，這樣很容易落入中共的陷阱，被邪惡利用。

中共的邪惡是深不見底的，它們利用日本侵華偽裝抗日壯大自己，翅膀一硬叛亂奪權：它們高宣民主蛊惑人民一旦奪權便將人民權利剝奪殆盡，任意打殺搶掠；它們自稱“無產階級革命”、“為人民服務”，個個把自己搞成超級資產階級腐敗分子再用金錢腐化他人；它們從“謝日”到“反日”要求日本不忘歷史而它們自己殘害中國人的罪行則一律掩蓋抵賴；它們所有的承諾都是陰謀詭計，唯用不受任何制約的“超限戰”來對付它認為的障礙；由於它挾持廣大國土和龐大人口加上軍力，外部無奈它何，連對全世界發動生化戰爭的罪責也無法追究⋯⋯

我曾向村山富市先生推薦王康們的“浩氣長流”，表示中華民國才是日中戰爭時的中方，請他為“浩氣長流”畫冊題了辭；我也曾向村山先生贈送過陳破空的書籍，請他對中共多作了解；後來我也向他贈送了我的《中國人權英雄畫傳》一書，由於老先生早就了解了我的父親早年被共匪害死的事情，對我的反共表示了一定的理解⋯⋯

《村山談話》的最後一段“必須推廣和平的理念和民主主義”，中共是加以無視的，因為它們獨裁上瘾，崇尚暴力和陰謀詭計，越來越黨軍國主義，在邪惡的黑道上越發加速，進而與其它獨裁邪惡勢力狼狽為奸，成為當今文明世界的最大威脅。

《村山談話》作為一個日本官宣文件自有其歷史地位，但中共的無盡邪惡被不斷暴露，促使日本民意向反中共國的方向變動，也是民主政治的自主優化之必然。

Murayama’s Goodwill and the CCP’s Evil

Author: Yu Zhou Da Guan
Edited:Zhong Ran Managing Editor: Liu Fang Proofread: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translated: Xiaomei Peng

Abstract:Using the Murayama Statement as a point of reflection, this essay praises former Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama for his courage and moral integrity in acknowledging Japan’s wartime aggression. At the same time, it condemns the hypocrisy and malice of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which manipulates history for its own political agenda. The author calls on Japan to remain alert to the CCP’s true nature and to uphold the principles of democracy and peace.

Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama was one of the few postwar Japanese leaders who truly rose from among the people. Mild in temperament, humble in manner, and sincere in conduct, Murayama valued open discussion and democratic diversity. His greatest political legacy was the Murayama Statement, in which he publicly acknowledged and apologized for Japan’s “colonial rule and aggression” during World War II. The CCP government across the sea claimed to “welcome” the statement and continues to demand that Japan “adhere” to it. Yet to me, Murayama’s sincere moral courage and his transparent compassion only serve to highlight the CCP’s darkness and deceit.

The Murayama Statement reflects Japan’s pluralistic self-examination of its wartime past within a democratic society. Murayama faced questions and criticism from all sides—from new Diet members such as Sanae Takaichi to outspoken university students—and he always responded with calmness and grace. His gentlemanly demeanor and moral integrity were unmistakable.

More importantly, Murayama was a man who came from ordinary people and returned to them. He never sought privilege or wealth; his modest home remained unchanged even after serving as prime minister. Every time I accompanied Chinese visitors to his residence, they were deeply moved—many remarked that even a village chief in China lived far more lavishly.In all my interactions with Murayama, I sensed only his goodwill toward Chinese people and his inner peace born of detachment from personal gain. That purity deeply influenced me and strengthened my own sense of moral independence.

However, like Murayama, many Japanese who emphasize “Sino-Japanese friendship” focus mainly on their own historical reflection and goodwill, while neglecting—or refusing—to recognize the evil nature of the CCP. Believing that “heart-to-heart understanding” can bridge political divides, they often fall into the CCP’s trap and become instruments of its manipulation.

The CCP’s evil is unfathomable. It exploited Japan’s invasion of China to masquerade as a resistance force, then betrayed its allies and seized power through violence. It once shouted slogans of “democracy” to deceive the masses, only to strip the people of all rights once in control. It called itself “the proletarian revolution” and claimed to “serve the people,” yet its leaders became the most corrupt elite, using money to corrupt others. From “gratitude to Japan” to “anti-Japanese nationalism,” it has cynically demanded that Japan “never forget history,” while covering up its own atrocities against the Chinese people. Every promise it makes conceals a conspiracy. It practices unrestricted warfare against anything it sees as an obstacle—without moral or legal restraint.Backed by vast land, population, and military power, it faces little accountability from the outside world—not even for unleashing a global biological catastrophe.

I once recommended to Mr. Murayama the historical art collection The Flow of Heroic Spirit by Wang Kang, emphasizing that the Republic of China (Taiwan), not the CCP, was the legitimate Chinese government during the war. He kindly wrote an inscription for it. I also gifted him books by Chen Pokong to help him understand the CCP’s true nature, as well as my own work Portraits of China’s Human Rights Heroes. Knowing that my father had been killed by the communists in his youth, Mr. Murayama expressed genuine sympathy and understanding for my anti-communist position.

The closing line of the Murayama Statement— “We must spread the ideals of peace and democracy”—has been completely ignored by the CCP. Addicted to dictatorship, it glorifies violence and conspiracy, marching ever deeper into militarism and tyranny. It now conspires with other authoritarian regimes, forming an unholy alliance that threatens the civilized world.

While the Murayama Statement retains its historical value as an official declaration of Japan, the CCP’s ever-exposed crimes have gradually shifted Japanese public opinion toward rejecting the communist regime. This evolution represents the natural self-correction of a healthy democracy.

作者：陀先润
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：罗志飞 校对：林小龙 翻译：彭小梅

随着中共20届四中全会的临近，各种传闻和谣言如潮水般涌来。从所谓“元老PK”到“政变在即”，这些故事在海外自媒体和社交平台上流传甚广。然而，我认为这些传闻大多缺乏事实基础，甚至违背基本的政治逻辑。本文旨在剖析这些谣言的荒谬之处，并揭示中共体制的深层问题——不是某个领导人的个人作风，而是整个政党的本质缺陷。

四中全会原定于去年召开，却被推迟至今年。这本是中共一贯的“宁缺毋滥”作风：如果党内共识未成，或领导层感到形势不稳，便宁可不开。回顾历史，毛泽东时代曾数年不开党代会；习近平去年也以此拖延。早在7月30日，新华社就发布了会议消息，内容与当前基本一致，这表明早在7月前，党内各派已达成相对平衡。会议定于10月20日至23日举行，主要议题未变，何来“剧变”一说？

然而，谣言却将此描绘成一场“黑手党式”对决：元老们与习近平在会上“投票拉锯”，开会前各方拉拢势力、比拼票数，甚至有人“犹豫不决”。这完全是西方式民主幻想的投射，与中共的运作模式格格不入。中央委员的投票并非随意，每一票背后牵扯利益网络和权力平衡。这种“拍桌子瞪眼”的场景，更像是意大利黑帮电影，而非北京中南海的现实。

更耸人听闻的是“政变”谣言。传闻称汪洋或胡春华将上位，借助军方力量：张又侠“反水”，刘源“回归”，掌控军队，将习近平软禁。四中全会仅剩“宣布喜讯”——习近平只剩国家主席虚衔，至明年结束。

这些说法忽略了政变的本质：在任期未满时推翻总书记、军委主席和国家元首，在任何体制下均属政变。中共历史上确有先例：1976年逮捕“四人帮”、胡耀邦下台、赵紫阳事件。但每次政变均为控制当事人后立即宣布，并召开特别会议确认合法性。拖延数月至十月再宣？这是“夜长梦多”的自杀行为，历史上鲜有成功案例。

近期，何卫东、苗华等9名上将被开除党籍军籍，涉嫌严重职务犯罪。谣言称这是“清洗异己”，暗示军队反叛。但若真如此，习近平早被捕、“喜讯”早已公布。事实是，这些动作说明他仍掌控大局，继续巩固权力。刘源虽出身显赫，但军队基础薄弱——半路转任，反腐得罪诸多将领，难以掌控。张又侠或许尚有影响力，但刘源难成气候。

我理解这些谣言的流行：自媒体为流量编造“爽文”，迎合海外华人的不满情绪。许多人长期憋屈，便寄希望于“万一成真”，明知虚假仍愿倾听。但这无济于事。更扎心的是：在特朗普政策间接助益中共、习近平和普京的国际环境下，谁愿接手这个“烂摊子”？

有人幻想胡春华或汪洋上台，即可“改弦更张”：对美妥协、结束贸易战、重返全球化。这是中产阶层的美梦。他们首先是中共成员，首要目标是维护党的存续。全面认输？短期或缓和经济，但将摧毁党的基本盘——民族主义者和“小粉红”难以接受，“独立自主”原则荡然无存。谁如此行事，谁将面临亡党危机。更何况，中美冲突已渐行渐远，非一时之争，而是意识形态和地缘政治的深层对立。

四中全会即将召开，习近平去留自有分晓。但我明确表态：期待四天内他下台、交出实权、仅剩虚衔？此景不会出现。我们不妨打赌，静观其变。

此类幻想常源于“换人即变天”的错觉：踹掉习近平，来个“明君”，中国就新生。回顾中共党史和历次政治运动，便知并非如此。这不是个体问题，而是中共本质缺陷。该党不变革，换多少领导亦徒劳。习近平并非“开倒车”，而是踩油门加速原有路径，并拉开车窗帘，让乘客看清冲向悬崖的方向。过去虽缓慢前行，却遮蔽视线，大家在车厢里高唱《一条大河》，喊着“没有共产党就没有新中国，党带领我们吃上肉了。

今日之言或许消极，但事实如此。若不愿面对，可选择官方新闻联播，沉浸正能量幻觉；或浏览某些海外节目，如大纪元、希望之声，幻想明天习近平下台，后天中国美好。想自欺欺人？此类内容可暂缓情绪。但若真心求索，我唯有实言：中共不亡，中国难变。这不是悲观，而是对历史的清醒认知。《在野党》杂志作为独立声音的平台，应继续揭露这些真相，推动海外华人反思。

Rumors Around the Fourth Plenary Session: The Illusion of Xi’s Downfall and the Unchanging Nature of the CCP

Author: Tuo Xianrun
Edited: Zhou Zhigang Managing Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofread: Lin Xiaolong Translated: Xiaomei Peng

Abstract:This article examines the widespread rumors surrounding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee—claims such as “Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua will take power with military backing,” “Zhang Youxia has defected,” or “Liu Yuan will return and place Xi under house arrest.” The author argues that these stories are baseless and politically illogical. Even if Xi were to step down, the CCP’s fundamental nature would remain unchanged.

As the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th CCP Central Committee approaches, a flood of rumors has emerged. From supposed “power struggles among party elders” to “an imminent coup,” such tales have spread widely across overseas media and social platforms. Yet most lack factual foundation and contradict the basic logic of how the CCP operates. This essay dissects the absurdity of these rumors and reveals the deeper truth: the real problem lies not in any one leader’s personality, but in the structural corruption and nature of the Party itself.

Originally scheduled for last year, the session was postponed—consistent with the CCP’s habitual “better none than instability” approach. When internal consensus falters or political tension rises, it simply delays meetings. Historically, Mao Zedong went years without holding Party congresses; Xi Jinping did the same last year.By July 30, Xinhua News Agency had already announced the conference and its themes, suggesting that by mid-summer the factions had reached equilibrium. The meeting, set for October 20–23, retains its original agenda—hardly a sign of upheaval.

Yet rumormongers describe it as a “mafia-style showdown” in Zhongnanhai: elders confronting Xi in a vote, factions bargaining for influence, and delegates wavering in their loyalties. Such stories are pure fantasy—a Western projection of democratic politics onto an authoritarian machine. In the CCP, a vote is never free; every ballot reflects complex networks of patronage and power balance. The imagined scene of people shouting and slamming tables belongs more to The Godfather than to Beijing’s political reality.

Even more sensational are the coup narratives: claims that Wang Yang or Hu Chunhua will take over with the army’s support; that General Zhang Youxia has turned against Xi; that Liu Yuan is returning to command the military and will place Xi under house arrest. Supposedly, the Plenary Session will “announce the good news”—Xi demoted to a ceremonial presidency by year’s end.

These scenarios ignore the essence of a coup: forcibly removing the General Secretary, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Head of State before term’s end. The CCP has seen power struggles before—the arrest of the Gang of Four (1976), Hu Yaobang’s ouster, Zhao Ziyang’s purge—but in each case, the operation was swift, announced immediately, and followed by an emergency meeting to legitimize it. To delay months until October would be political suicide.

Recent purges of nine senior generals—including He Weidong and Miao Hua—were interpreted by rumor mills as “cleansing rivals.” If true, Xi would have already fallen, and the “good news” proclaimed. Instead, the opposite is true: such purges show Xi still consolidates control. Liu Yuan, though well connected, lacks a solid military base—his anti-corruption crusade alienated key officers. Zhang Youxia retains influence, but Liu Yuan is unlikely to mount any real challenge.

The popularity of these rumors is understandable. Overseas Chinese, long frustrated with China’s authoritarian system, yearn for “what if” stories that offer emotional relief. Many self-media creators exploit this sentiment for traffic, crafting “feel-good fiction” that fuels fleeting hope. Yet none of this changes reality.

Some imagine that if Hu Chunhua or Wang Yang took power, China would “change course”—reconcile with the U.S., end trade wars, and return to globalization. Such dreams belong to the urban middle class. But these figures are first and foremost Party members; their priority is the CCP’s survival. To “surrender” to the West might temporarily ease economic pain but would alienate nationalists and Party loyalists—triggering a legitimacy crisis and even collapse.Moreover, the U.S.–China confrontation is no longer about tariffs or tactics; it is a deep ideological and geopolitical divide.

As the plenary session begins, Xi’s political fate will become clearer—but expecting him to lose real power within four days is naïve. If anyone wishes to wager otherwise, let’s wait and see.

Such fantasies stem from the illusion that “changing the leader means changing China.” History proves otherwise. The CCP’s crises are systemic, not personal. Replacing one leader with other changes nothing. Xi is not “driving in reverse”—he’s flooring the accelerator on the same old road, only pulling back the curtain so passengers can finally see the cliff ahead. In the past, the car moved slower, and people sang songs of praise, believing “Without the Party, there would be no New China.”

This may sound pessimistic, but it is reality. Those who prefer denial can turn to state propaganda for “positive energy,” or watch certain exile channels promising that “Xi will fall tomorrow, and China will be free the day after.” Such illusions may offer emotional comfort—but for those who truly seek understanding, there is only one sober truth: China will not change until the CCP collapses.

That is not despair—it is clarity.As an independent platform for free thought, In Opposition must continue exposing these truths and urging overseas Chinese to think critically, beyond rumor and fantasy.

作者：陈西
编辑：邢文娟 责任编辑：钟然 校对：林小龙 翻译：刘芳

每个中国人都梦想着把中国建设成为一个和谐包容、富强民主的现代文明国家，然而在二十一世纪的今天，我在贵州省又遇到了“红卫兵小将”。这再次说明，“文革”幽灵仍然在游荡，依然笼罩着中华大地。

我亲眼见过“文革”时期的“红卫兵”小将目无法纪，肆意残害他人。他们眼里没有法律，在他们的人生字典里，根本没有人权、宪政或者包容性的概念，他们被教育为了保证红色江山万年长，疯狂地打倒一切，铲除所谓的“封资修、地富反坏右”等等大毒草与社会有识之士。

如此，我陈西便被“红小将”们视为大坏蛋，大毒草，成了必须被实施无产阶级专政的对象。于是，从7月13日起，小将们决定对我及我的手机实行专政N多天。

尽管中华人民共和国虽有《宪法》，并且《宪法》第三十三条明确写到：国家尊重和保障人权。但是，“红小将”们并不把《宪法》放在眼里，也不把普世观价值放在眼里，他们只把领导指示当做最高的行动纲领，而非法律。把不服从领导安排的人当作敌人对待。防止精神污染而非普世观放在眼里。小将们的浅薄和无知阻碍了他们认识真理，用药理学来说：常识之一是无毒的草药无药效，只有有毒的草药才能入药，他们不知道毒草就是名贵药草，有毒的才可入药。他们不识自然，不能理解一个充满活力的世界是一个五毒俱全，牛鬼蛇神存在的世界。

地球上不存在“红色保险箱”那种极端的地方，也不存在完全无菌无污染的区域。社会政治学家曾指出：人类世界是一个多元多样结构的世界，不是一元化“祖国山河一片红”的世界，人不必为一元化忧虑什么。令人忧虑的不是多元化，而是将“一元化”当成理想的执念。

中国古人有句古话是这么说的：“人心惟危，道心惟微”，这个世界又复杂又奇妙。我们求知求学“为学日益”；但如果有人妄图改变世界，违背道理自然规律，则是“为道日损，损之又损”，最终会落得个达到“以至于无为”的认知境地，那么，人交的学费太多，损失太大了。我们何必非要交了高昂学费才识真理呢！何必非要付出巨大损失后才知道“道与无为”的关系呢！以至才晓得“上无为而民自化”自主自治重要性的道理呢。所以有中共领导提出：“一个都不能少”，提倡“个人主义”，其目的是尊重个体，把中国建成一个“上无为而民自化”的民本包容性国家。“民为邦之本，本固则邦宁。”社稷为个人设，个人过上幸福生活才决非是为国家存在的目的。

多元包容性国家不选择不预先设定人的好坏优劣而存在，这也是法理和法律的中立性要求是这个理。法律只关注个人，不关心集体主义；只保障个人的权利，不保障集体的利益；法理认为，即使是集体福祉，也是从个人点滴功夫积小成大而得。哪怕是集体福祉，也应建立在保障个体权利与尊严的基础之上。公共利益不应以牺牲个人为代价。细节决定成败。如果法律仅服务于集体主义，法治国家的基础将难以建立，多元包容的社会也将无从谈起。

也有中共官员曾经提出，不要只盯着《宪法》33条，也要看《宪法》第五十一条。我说：《宪法》第五十一条不是倡导集体主义，而是指”不得损害国家的、社会的、集体的利益”；国家、社会、集体是被动语，不是主语，是由一个个的个体组成的，个体公民的利益得到保障，集体、社会和国家的利益才能得到保障。才是主体与主题；“不得损害”只是提示句，不是主题句，其轻重缓急表现在它们的排序上。排序在前的是目的，排序靠后的是辅助；“保护个人主义”是目的，这个要求还含有可行性，和可操作性专业技术上的诉求，是从细节出发的选择。换句话说，不损害国家、社会和集体的利益，最终目的也是为了让人民过上富足的生活，这一点来看，岂不是应该从一开始就尊重个体自由，保障个体利益吗？

可是，我看到的贵州“红小将”无法无天，行事没有底线，依俨然是五十年前“文革”时期的那套思维模式。，他们行事没有底线，没有法治思维，更没有细节意识；他们任意侵犯公民的基本权利，并蔑视中华传统中“亲亲之隐”的美德，还把传统文化中的“株连九族”的文化糟粕发扬到极致 ，美其名曰：“分清敌我”“划清界线”，简直是刷新了人性恶的底线。19日，小将们又把陈西的内人传唤到派出所，要求陈西的内人把好做手机实名制责任人责任，并恐吓陈西内人说：一旦有事，只追究手机实名制责任人的责任。小将们这一招何其歹毒，哪里有半点常人该有的恻隐之心。然而，他们却是在用美好词汇“为你好”去释放人性灵魂深处的恶心，让人们把本不该做的事堂堂正正做出来。法律尚且认同“亲亲之隐”，承认亲人之间有隐私权，包庇不为罪，而浅薄的“小将”们利用手中的权力，胁迫家人做不利于受害者的事情，这在任何一个民主国家都是不可能发生的事，在党国却堂而皇之地进行着。他们是不懂法律精神的。他们的肤浅里没有”恻隐之心“，更没有“细节论”；即便有，那也是令人恶心，让人愤慨的细节，而“细节论”的细节是让人舒心，是体贴人性脆弱的细节。

《宪法》一旦不被尊重，就如同一张废纸，每个人都可能生活在危险当中。 “文革”时期父子反目、邻里相互揭发、学生批斗老师的人伦惨剧历历在目，我不想看到悲剧重演，不想我们的国家再次进入失序的浩劫。每天都在上演，小将们也不识专政与“国家尊重和保障人权”不可同日而语的选择；一旦同日而语，国家；因为，专政行人制，保障人权行法治。小将们的浅薄使他们既不识毒草的功用，也蔑视传统美德。当年，小将们就做出了许多令人恶心之事，如：逼迫人六亲不认，强迫亲人反目，老师、学生、同事之间相互检举揭发批判。像胡适先生留在大陆的儿子被逼公开断绝了父子关系，而小将们仍没有放过他，硬要“痛打落水狗”；胡三痛恨自己为什么姓“胡”，最后，他不得不上吊自杀，以结束“胡”姓生命来恶心革命党人。留在大陆胡适先生所有学生或朋友都被小将们迫来批判他们曾经的先生或好友，唯有他的学生，前北京市副市长吴晗“至死没有佛头抹粪”，而导致吴晗被批斗致死的原因，正是吴晗与老师胡适的私人通信被革命党人发现，并被视为罪证①。

因正能量制造的恶行使一个国家的生存环境变得十分恶劣；最后，正能量也变质为造恶的罪证。

在这里，我要提醒人们，警惕“文革”和它的“红小将”们死灰复燃！

注：①《南渡北归》岳南著 第三部离别 第二章短兵相接 第三章胜利的牺牲品

被封数月，老号被废之前，写这一文。不知你们能收到否，此文能用否；想念离乡背景，漂泊万里之外的你们；望同仁们在外多多保重！

你们的同道： 陈西 于贵州贵阳被囹之家中

2025年10月18日

Encountering the “Red Guard Youths” Again

Author: Chen Xi
Editor: Xing Wenjuan Executive Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Lin Xiaolong Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract：The author, Chen Xi, recounts meeting “Red Guard youths” again in Guizhou and laments that the mentality of the Cultural Revolution has not vanished. He condemns their lawlessness, violations of human rights, and contempt for constitutionalism and the rule of law. The essay calls for respect for individual rights, warns against the extremism of collectivism, and cautions society to remain vigilant against the revival of the Cultural Revolution’s ghost.

Every Chinese dream of building the nation into a harmonious, inclusive, prosperous, and democratic modern civilization. Yet here in the twenty-first century, in Guizhou Province, I once again encountered “Red Guard youths.” This proves that the specter of the Cultural Revolution still wanders over the land of China, casting its long, chilling shadow.

I have seen with my own eyes how, during the Cultural Revolution, those “Red Guard youths” acted with utter disregard for law and conscience, arbitrarily persecuting others. In their eyes, there was no law; in their personal lexicon, there were no concepts of human rights, constitutionalism, or tolerance. They had been taught that to preserve the “red regime for ten thousand years,” they must mercilessly attack everything and uproot all the so-called “poisonous weeds” — the feudalists, capitalists, revisionists, landlords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, and rightists — as well as all the people of independent mind.

Thus, I, Chen Xi, was deemed a great “poisonous weed,” a sworn enemy of the proletariat, a target for their dictatorship. Beginning on July 13, these “little Red Guards” decided to exercise their dictatorship over me and my mobile phone for many days.

Though the People’s Republic of China has a Constitution, and Article 33 clearly states that “the State respects and guarantees human rights,” the “Red Guard youths” hold the Constitution in no regard. Nor do they respect universal values. For them, the leader’s instructions are the supreme code of action— not law. Those who disobey official arrangements are treated as enemies. They guard against “spiritual pollution” rather than uphold universal human values.

Their shallowness and ignorance prevent them from recognizing truth. To borrow from pharmacology: a harmless herb has no curative power; only poisonous plants can become medicine. They do not understand that “poisonous weeds” can be precious herbs—that what is toxic can also heal. Failing to understand nature, they cannot comprehend that a vibrant world is one where all kinds of creatures exist, where both “ox-ghosts and snake-spirits” have their place.

There is no such thing on Earth as a “red safety box,” an absolutely pure, unpolluted zone. Political theorists have long pointed out that humanity lives in a pluralistic, diverse world, not in a monolithic one where “the whole country is red.” We need not fear diversity; what is truly dangerous is the obsession with uniformity—treating “one color” as the ideal.

An ancient Chinese saying goes, “The human heart is perilous; the Way is subtle.” The world is indeed complex and wondrous. In learning, one should “gain daily,” but in following the Way, one must “diminish daily.” Those who attempt to reshape the world against natural law end up learning through loss upon loss until they reach “non-action”—wu wei. Yet such tuition is too costly. Why must we always pay such a high price before recognizing truth? Why must we suffer great loss before understanding that the Way and Non-Action are one, and that “when the ruler is inactive, the people govern themselves”?

That is why some within the CCP leadership once said, “Not a single person should be left behind,” and even promoted “individualism”—meaning respect for the individual, so that China might become a people-centered, inclusive nation in which “when the ruler does not interfere, the people self-transform.” As the ancients said, “The people are the foundation of the state; when the foundation is firm, the nation is at peace.” The state exists for the individual, not the individual for the state. Only when each person lives a happy life can the nation truly be strong.

A pluralistic and inclusive nation does not pre-classify people as good or bad; this is also what legal neutrality demands. Law concerns itself with individuals, not collectivism. It protects personal rights, not collective interests. Jurisprudence holds that even collective welfare arises from the accumulation of countless individual efforts. Thus collective good must rest upon the protection of individual rights and dignity. Public interest must never come at the expense of the individual. Details determine success or failure: if law serves only collectivism, the foundations of a rule-of-law state will crumble, and a pluralistic, tolerant society will become impossible.

Some Party officials have said, “Do not just look at Article 33; also read Article 51 of the Constitution.” I respond: Article 51 does not advocate collectivism; it merely cautions that “citizens, in exercising their freedoms and rights, shall not infringe upon the interests of the state, society, or the collective.” The state, society, and collective are objects, not subjects—they are composed of individuals. Only when individual citizens’ rights are secured can the interests of the state, society, and collective be secured. “Shall not infringe” is a reminder clause, not the main theme. In order and weight, what comes first—the individual—is the purpose; what follows is auxiliary. Protecting individualism is the goal, and it is also the only technically feasible path, one that begins with concrete details. In other words, the ultimate aim of “not harming the state, society, or collective” is to ensure people live prosperous lives. From this perspective, should we not begin by respecting individual freedom and safeguarding personal interests?

Yet the “Red Guard youths” I met in Guizhou act lawlessly, without any bottom line, still trapped in the thinking patterns of fifty years ago. They lack legal awareness and a sense for human detail. They arbitrarily violate citizens’ basic rights, despise the traditional virtue of familial loyalty, and carry to the extreme the worst relics of old culture—such as “implicating nine generations”—in the name of “distinguishing friend from foe” and “drawing clear lines.”

On the 19th, these “youths” summoned my wife to the police station, ordering her to bear full “real-name responsibility” for my phone number, threatening that if any “incident” occurred, only she would be held accountable. Such a tactic is vicious beyond measure. It shows not a trace of human compassion. Cloaked in the benevolent phrase “it’s for your own good,” they release the filth of the human soul, making people commit indecent acts with self-righteous pride.

Even the law recognizes the “concealment out of affection” between kin, acknowledging that family members have privacy and that shielding a loved one is not a crime. But these shallow “Red Guard youths,” abusing their power, coerce relatives into actions harmful to the victim—something unimaginable in any democracy, yet openly practiced in the Party-state. They do not understand the spirit of law. Their shallowness holds no compassion, no awareness of human subtlety. Even when they care about “details,” those details only disgust and anger others; true attention to detail should bring comfort and show empathy toward human fragility.

Once the Constitution is no longer respected, it becomes nothing but a scrap of paper, and everyone’s life becomes precarious. The tragedies of the Cultural Revolution—fathers and sons turning against each other, neighbors denouncing neighbors, students persecuting teachers—remain vivid. I do not want to see such horrors repeat, nor to see our country fall again into chaos.

Yet such scenes play out daily. The “Red Guard youths” fail to see the difference between dictatorship and the constitutional guarantee of human rights. Dictatorship is rule by man; the protection of human rights is rule by law. Their ignorance makes them blind to the healing power of “poisonous weeds” and contemptuous of traditional virtue.

Back then, those “youths” committed countless vile acts: forcing people to renounce kinship, making relatives betray one another, compelling students and colleagues to denounce their teachers and friends. Hu Shi’s son, who remained in mainland China, was coerced into publicly severing ties with his father—yet the “youths” still would not spare him, insisting on “beating the drowning dog.” Driven to despair, Hu San came to hate his own surname “Hu” and finally hanged himself to end the “Hu” bloodline, to nauseate the revolutionaries with his death. All of Hu Shi’s students and friends who remained in the mainland were forced to denounce him; only his student, former Beijing vice mayor Wu Han, “refused to smear Buddha’s head with dung even unto death.” The reason he was beaten to death was that his private correspondence with his teacher Hu Shi had been discovered by the revolutionaries and used as evidence of guilt.¹

When “positive energy” manufactures evil deeds, it poisons the very environment in which a nation survives—eventually that same “positive energy” becomes evidence of crime.

Here, I must warn all: beware the return of the Cultural Revolution and its “Red Guard youths”!

¹ From Southward, Northward (《南渡北归》) by Yue Nan, Part III – “Farewell,” Ch. 2 “Close Combat,” Ch. 3 “The Sacrifice of Victory.”

Written before my account was sealed and my old number deleted. I do not know whether this piece will reach you, or whether it can be used. I miss you, my fellow exiles wandering far from home. Please take care, wherever you are.

Your comrade, Chen Xi

Confined at home under guard, Guiyang, Guizhou Province October 18, 2025