拱检刑诉[2025]Z2号

被告人邹巍，男，1970年10月23日出生，公民身份证号码330103197010231316，汉族，无业，户籍所在地杭州市拱墅区建国北路773号，住杭州市拱墅区京都苑41幢4单元301室，因本案于2024年7月20日被杭州市公安局拱墅区分局刑事拘留，经本院批准，于同年8月26日被逮捕。

本案由杭州市公安局拱墅区分局侦查终结，以被告人邹巍涉嫌寻衅滋事罪，于2025年1月26日向本院移送审查起诉。本院受理后，于法定期限内已告知被告人有权委托辩护人，依法询问了被告人，审查了全部案卷材料。期间，退回侦查机关补充侦查一次，延长审查起诉期限两次各十五日。

经依法审查查明：

2007年至2023年，被告人邹巍为达到个人目的，寻求扩大社会影响以引起关注效应等，在其住处杭州市拱墅区等地通过境外媒体自由亚洲电台等信息网络平台，多次将涉及国家和社会重大活动、热点事件等内容虚假的信息公开散布，损害国家形象，严重危害国家利益。

2024年后7月19日，被告人邹巍经刑事传唤到案。

认定上述事实的证据如下：

  1、户籍证明、归案经过、扣押决定书及清单、调取证据通知书及清单、门诊病例、违纪通报、传唤通知书、情报信息等书证；

2、证人昝爱宗、严忠良、王雪娥等人的证言；

3、被告人邹巍的供述和辩解；

4、声纹鉴定书；

5、远程勘验工作记录、电子数据检查笔录等；

6、监控录像。

本院认为，被告人邹巍通过信息网络向不特定多人传播虚假信息，起哄闹事，造成公共秩序严重混乱，其行为已触犯《中华人民共和国刑法》第二百九十三条第一款第（四）项，犯罪事实清楚、证据确凿充分，应当以寻衅滋事罪追究其刑事责任，根据《中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法》第一百七十六条之规定，提起公诉，请依法判处。

 

 

此致

杭州市拱墅区人民法院

 

 

 

检  察  官 吴冠军

检察官助理 张伊雨

2025年5月26日

（注：此上三行文字被“杭州市拱墅区人民检察院”红色印章覆盖）

 

[此页无正文]

 

附件：

1、被告人邹巍现羁押于杭州市拱墅区看守所；

2、侦查卷宗7册

 

Indictment

Case No.: Gongjian Criminal Prosecution [2025] Z2

Abstract

Hangzhou citizen Zou Wei was prosecuted by the People’s Procuratorate of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City, on the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for publishing political commentary online.The prosecution alleges that his online expressions disrupted social order and harmed the image of the state.This case concerns the limits of online free speech and the space for political expression in China.

Defendant Information

Name: Zou Wei (邹巍)Gender: MaleDate of Birth: October 23, 1970ID Number: 330103197010231316Ethnicity: HanOccupation: UnemployedRegistered Address: No. 773 Jianguo North Road, Gongshu District, Hangzhou CityResidential Address: Unit 4, Room 301, Building 41, Jingduyuan, Gongshu District, Hangzhou City

The defendant was criminally detained by the Gongshu District Branch of the Hangzhou Municipal Public Security Bureau on July 20, 2024, and, with the approval of this Procuratorate, was formally arrested on August 26, 2024.

Case Summary

This case was investigated by the Gongshu District Branch of the Hangzhou Public Security Bureau.Upon completion of the investigation, the case was transferred to this Procuratorate for review and prosecution on January 26, 2025, on suspicion that the defendant Zou Wei had committed the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

After accepting the case, the Procuratorate informed the defendant of his right to appoint defense counsel, questioned him in accordance with the law, and reviewed all case materials within the statutory time limits.During the process, the case was returned once to the investigative agency for supplementary investigation, and the period for case review and prosecution was extended twice, each for fifteen days.

Findings of the Investigation

Upon lawful examination, the Procuratorate ascertained the following facts:

From 2007 to 2023, in order to “achieve personal goals and expand his social influence to attract public attention,” the defendant Zou Wei repeatedly used overseas media platforms, including Radio Free Asia, to publicly disseminate false information concerning major national and social events while residing in Gongshu District, Hangzhou, and other locations.The prosecution alleges that such actions “damaged the image of the state and seriously endangered national interests.”

On July 19, 2024, the defendant Zou Wei was brought to justice under criminal summons.

Evidence Supporting the Charges

Documentary evidence: household registration certificate, record of arrest, seizure decisions and lists, notices and lists of collected evidence, outpatient medical records, disciplinary notices, summons records, intelligence reports, etc.;

Witness statements: including testimonies of Zan Aizong, Yan Zhongliang, Wang Xue’e, and others;

Confession and defense statements of the defendant Zou Wei;

Voiceprint identification report;

Remote inspection records and electronic data examination transcripts;

Video surveillance footage.

Procuratorate’s Opinion

The Procuratorate holds that the defendant Zou Wei used the information network to spread false information to an unspecified number of people, inciting disturbances and causing serious disruption to public order.His conduct violates Article 293, Paragraph 1, Item (4) of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, and constitutes the crime of picking quarrels and provoking trouble.

The criminal facts are clear, and the evidence is reliable and sufficient.Therefore, in accordance with Article 176 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Procuratorate hereby initiates public prosecution and requests that the court impose punishment according to law.

To:

The People’s Court of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City

Prosecutor: Wu GuanjunAssistant Prosecutor: Zhang Yiyu

Date: May 26, 2025

(Note: The above three lines are covered by the red official seal of the People’s Procuratorate of Gongshu District, Hangzhou City.)

Attachments:

The defendant Zou Wei is currently detained at the Gongshu District Detention Center, Hangzhou City;

Seven volumes of investigation files.

作者：毛一炜

编辑：邢文娟   责任编辑：罗志飞   校对：林小龙

我在小红书上，经历过两次封号“消失”。

第一次是实名认证账号。我在小红书上按要求上传身份证，绑定手机号和完成人脸识别，但当时并不觉得没有意识到这样做会带来安全有什么问题，认为这只是系统平台规定而已。然而有一次，我在主页刷到一条帖子：bi说“中国的军人永远不可能拿枪对老百姓开火”。我只是点进去评论了一句：“你可能不知道‘六加四’等于几。” 我只是提到了“六”和“四”，根本没有写什么敏感内容，但系统立刻被检测出来，并识别为敏感词，我的账号就这样被永久封号了，这是我第一次经历封号。

我尝试申诉了五次，每次都是被平台秒拒, 没有解释，没有沟通，只是发给我一条信息，冷冰冰地告诉我“违反社区规定”。见微知著，可见这说明中共政府极其害怕老百姓知道“六四”的真相。

封号后，我不能再用我的身份信息注册小红书了，小红书规定，一个身份证只能绑定一个账号，封号后无法解除，我被锚定实名“封杀”了，这就是这个事情的可怕之处。

经历上一次实名认证被封号后，我用新手机号未实名账号登录。半年多的时间里，账号一直能正常使用，发帖、评论、私信都没问题。就在几天前，系统突然跳出警告：“账号存在安全风险，请上传实名信息+人脸识别验证。”我拒绝了，结果发帖、评论、私信功能全部被封，之前发的内容也看不到了，这是我的第二次封号经历。

实名认证的账号会因为“敏感内容”被封；不实名又会因为“安全风险”被封，宪法给我的言论自由去哪里了呢？这或许就是现在的中国网络现状：实名认证不是为了安全，而是为了标记、筛选和控制。他们关心的不是你是谁，而是你说了什么。实名制让你无法随便发声，但能让他们顺着网线找到你。每个账号都和身份证号绑定，你的每一句话都可能被追踪，一旦触碰敏感内容，系统就会收网，把你从网络里抹杀掉，甚至还会有警察上门请“喝茶“。过去的网络里，匿名还能给人一点表达自由；现在，实名认证成了风险。我不禁想问一声：发帖要什么身份证？发声为什么要人脸识别，我发表言论需要谁的许可？

我的封号遭遇，只是千万普通中国人被剥夺言论自由的一个缩影。说真话被封号，提历史被封号我们每个人似乎都被关进了看不见的牢笼。我们必须认识到，共产党不下台，中国人永远不会有真正的言论自由，中国的自由民主也永远无法实现，中国也永远不能真正强大起来，我们要团结起来，揭露中共的邪恶本质，为自由民主中国而发声。

Real-Name Is a Cage: My Account Suspension and Disappearance on Xiaohongshu Under Censorship and the Absence of Free Speech

Author: Mao Yiwei

Editor: Xing Wenjuan   Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei   Proofreader: Lin Xiaolong

Abstract

This article recounts the author’s experiences of being twice suspended and made to “disappear” from the Chinese social-media platform Xiaohongshu (Little Red Book) for posting comments containing “sensitive words.” Even unverified accounts faced restrictions, illustrating the severity of China’s online censorship and the reality of restricted freedom of expression.

I have experienced two account suspensions — two “disappearances” — on Xiaohongshu.

The first occurred with my real-name verified account.As required, I uploaded my ID card, linked my phone number, and completed facial recognition verification. At the time, I didn’t sense any danger; I thought it was simply part of the platform’s standard procedure.

One day, I came across a post in my feed where someone claimed:

“Chinese soldiers would never open fire on their own people.”

I clicked into the post and left a short comment:

“You probably don’t know what six plus four equals.”

I merely mentioned the numbers six and four — I didn’t even write anything explicitly sensitive — yet the system immediately detected and flagged it as a “sensitive expression.”My account was permanently banned on the spot.That was the first time I was silenced.

I appealed five times, but each time, the platform instantly rejected the request.No explanation, no dialogue — only a cold automated message:

“Your post violates community guidelines.”

From small signs one can see the greater truth:this incident shows how terrified the Chinese government is of its people learning the truth about “June Fourth.”

After my account was banned, I could no longer register on Xiaohongshu using my personal identification.

The platform’s policy states that one ID card can only be linked to one account, and once that account is banned, it cannot be unbound or restored.In other words, I was blacklisted under my real name—permanently silenced and digitally erased.

That is what makes this situation so frightening.

After that first experience of being banned on a verified account, I created a new account using a different phone number, this time without real-name verification.For over six months, everything worked fine: I could post, comment, and send private messages without any issue.

But just a few days ago, a system warning suddenly popped up:

“Your account has potential security risks. Please upload your ID and complete facial-recognition verification.”

I refused.Immediately, all posting, commenting, and messaging functions were disabled, and all of my previous posts disappeared from view.That was my second experience of being banned.

Verified accounts are banned for posting “sensitive content,” while unverified accounts are banned for “security risks.”So where has my freedom of speech, guaranteed by the Constitution, gone?

Perhaps this is the true reality of China’s internet today:real-name verification is not about safety — it’s about tagging, screening, and control.They don’t care who you are; they care what you say.

The real-name system doesn’t protect your security — it silences you.It allows them to trace you through the internet, linking every account to an ID number so that every word you speak can be tracked.Once you touch a sensitive topic, the system closes in, erasing you from the digital world.Sometimes, it even leads to the police showing up at your door for a “cup of tea.”

In the past, the anonymity of the internet offered a small space for free expression.Now, real-name verification itself has become a danger.I can’t help but ask:

Why do I need an ID card to make a post?Why must I submit to facial recognition to speak?Since when did I need permission to express my thoughts?

My experience of being banned is just one small reflection of how millions of ordinary Chinese citizens have been stripped of their freedom of speech.People are banned for telling the truth, banned for mentioning history — it feels as though we’ve all been locked inside an invisible cage.

We must recognize that as long as the Communist Party remains in power, Chinese people will never truly have freedom of speech.Without its downfall, there can be no democracy, no genuine freedom, and no real national strength.

We must stand together, expose the CCP’s evil nature, and speak out for a free and democratic China.

总则概述：公民宪法的灵魂

作者：程伟
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：钟然 校对：林小龙 翻译：吕峰

引言：一部优秀的宪法乃法治之魂
在历史的洪流中，宪法的意义不仅在于规范权力，更在于勾勒出一个国家的精神与未来。《公民宪法》以民治、民主、民权、民生、民族为核心政治理论，构建了一套完整的宪政蓝图。其第一章总则，作为宪法的灵魂篇章，明确了国家、宪法和军队的定义，明确了公民的权利与义务，并以特别条款为宪法注入了特别的权力制约体系。《公民宪法》以民治为核心，超越了现代民主政治的理论范式，勾勒出未来公民自治型社会的愿景。本文将初步解读第一章内容，并在后续文章当中逐条解读每一条款的详细内容，揭开《公民宪法》的思想内核，带领读者走进中国民主未来的宏伟蓝图。

一、公民宪法的精髓：民治为魂
《公民宪法》是以“民治”为核心的全新政治哲学，由民治逐步推导出民主、民权、民生和民族，民治是“1”，民主、民权、民生、民族以及更多的公民权利则是“1”后面的“0”，没有民治这个“1”，有再多的“0”都是毫无意义的存在。民治由两个核心理论组成：一为公民自治，即自我管理，强调个人在社会生活中的自主性以及权利与义务，一个人处于社会中有义务进行自我管理，公民负有义务的同时则享有对等的权利，享有权利的同时则需要负有对等的义务；二为公民治理国家，公民治理国家是公民直接参与国家事务的权力，国家是公民组成的国家，是公民治理国家，而非国家（统治者）统治公民。这一核心理念打破了传统政治的精英垄断权力、王权（皇权）垄断权力的传统政治理论，主张公民不仅是权力的来源，更是治理的主体。是由公民来治理国家。

由民治出发，引导出民主为公民表达意志的机制制度，即为民主之制度；因有民主之制度，方可保障个人的自由与尊严，以及其他诸多方面的公民权利，即为民权；因公民有了民权，公民能有效行使民权，以建立一个关注公平与福祉的社会，即为民生；公民的生存得以更好的保障，人们才有更多的可能复兴民族的文化，民族文化能守护国家的独立与文化传承，民族即民族之文化。《公民宪法》以民治为根，串联起民主、民权、民生、民族，形成一个逻辑闭环的政治理论体系，为中国未来的民主化政治体制提供了理论支点。

二、《公民宪法》的核心内容：第一章 总则
第一章总则作为《公民宪法》的开篇，奠定了宪法的基调与框架，其内容涵盖以下关键要素： 

国家的定义：第一章明确国家为“民治之国”，主权完全归于全体公民。国家不仅是一个政治实体，更是公民共同意志的体现，旨在实现民治之下的公平、正义与繁荣。 

宪法的定义：宪法被定义为国家的最高法律，超越一切权势，确保民治、民主、民权、民生、民族的原则贯穿治理始终，确保国家的法治根基牢固，公权力的来源正当。 

军队的定义：军队被定义为“公民的军队、国家的军队”，其核心职责是保卫国家主权与公民权利，而非服务于任何个人或派系，杜绝军事干政的可能性。 

公民的权利与义务：公民享有广泛的自由，包括言论、结社、信仰等，同时负有参与公共事务、维护社会秩序的义务。民治理念贯穿其中，鼓励公民通过选举、监督与直接参与，共同塑造国家的未来。 

宪法的特别条款：第一章引入创新的特别条款，为宪法的灵活性与适应性提供保障。这些条款允许在特殊情况下调整治理机制，以应对危机或重大社会变革，确保宪法的生命力。

三、公民宪法对中国民主的启示
《公民宪法》第一章以民治为核心，勾勒出中国民主的独特路径。它回应了西方民主在中国的“水土不服”，避免了过度集权与民粹主义的双重陷阱。通过将公民自我管理与国家治理相结合，《公民宪法》赋予公民前所未有的主体地位，打破了传统政治的被动参与模式。同时，其对军队的严格定义与公民权利义务的平衡设计，确保了政治体制的稳定性和可持续性。特别条款的设置则为宪法注入动态适应能力，使其能够应对技术革命、全球化等新挑战。在当今世界，民主的实践面临诸多困境：西方民主饱受分裂与低效之苦，威权体制则难以回应人民对自由的渴望。《公民宪法》提供了一种“第三条道路”，既继承了中国传统的政治智慧，又吸纳了现代民主的普世价值，并结合了中国的实际国情和世界主流政治体制发展的方向。它不仅是一部法律文本，更是一场关于中国民主未来的思想实验，也是全体中国人相互签署的共同契约，激发我们思考，促使我们团结：如何在保持国家稳定与文化自信的同时，赋予公民真正的治理权力？

结语：迈向民主的星辰大海
《公民宪法》第一章总则以民治为魂，勾勒出一幅令人振奋的民主图景。它告诉我们，中国的民主未来不是对西方的简单模仿，而是植根于自身文明的创新实践。践行民治、民主、民权、民生和民族政治理念，促进中国迈向一个自由、民主、正义、平等、求实和繁荣的未来。

点击查看《公民宪法》原文

————《公民宪法》撰写人程伟/何清风，一身正气、两袖清风。

On the Future of Chinese Democracy: An Interpretation of The Citizen Constitution, Part IGeneral Principles: The Soul of the Citizen Constitution

Author: Cheng Wei
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Executive Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Lin Xiaolong Translator: Lyu Feng

Abstract:The Citizen Constitution centers on the principle of “government by the people” (minzhi), constructing an integrated political framework based on five interrelated pillars — governance by the people, democracy, civil rights, people’s livelihood, and national identity. It advocates citizen self-governance and participatory state management, establishing foundational principles concerning the constitution, the state, the military, and citizens’ rights and duties. Through this design, it provides both a theoretical blueprint and a practical direction for China’s democratization.

Introduction: A Great Constitution Is the Soul of the Rule of Law
Throughout the tides of history, the meaning of a constitution lies not merely in regulating power, but in outlining the spirit and the future of a nation. The Citizen Constitution takes “government by the people,” democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national identity as its central political doctrines, and on this basis constructs a comprehensive constitutional vision.

The first chapter — the General Principles — serves as the soul of the Constitution, defining the nature of the state, the constitution, and the military, while also specifying the rights and obligations of citizens. Through its special provisions, it introduces a distinctive system of checks and balances on power. Centered on minzhi, or rule by the citizens, The Citizen Constitution transcends the theoretical paradigms of modern democratic politics and sketches a vision for a future society of autonomous citizens.

This article offers an initial interpretation of the first chapter’s contents and will, in subsequent essays, analyze each provision in detail — unveiling the intellectual core of The Citizen Constitution and guiding readers toward the grand blueprint of China’s democratic future.

I. The Essence of the Citizen Constitution: “Government by the People”
as Its SoulThe Citizen Constitution represents a new political philosophy centered on the principle of minzhi—“government by the people.” From this core concept, the ideas of democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national identity are progressively derived. “Government by the people” is the “1,” while democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national culture are the “0” that follow it. Without the “1,” no matter how many “0s” there are, they amount to nothing.

Minzhi is composed of two foundational theories. The first is citizen self-governance—self-management—which emphasizes the individual’s autonomy and the balance of rights and duties within social life. A person living in society bears the duty of self-discipline: with every right comes a corresponding obligation, and with every obligation, a corresponding right. The second is citizen governance of the state—the right of citizens to directly participate in national affairs. The state is a nation formed by its citizens; it is governed by the citizens, not a regime where rulers govern the people.

This core philosophy breaks from traditional political theories that centralize power in elites or monarchs, advocating instead that citizens are not merely the source of political authority, but its actual executors. It is the citizens who govern the nation.

From minzhi flows democracy, the institutional mechanism through which citizens express their will. Democracy then guarantees personal freedom, dignity, and other civil rights—minquan. With civil rights established, citizens can exercise them to build a fair and prosperous society—minsheng, the concern for people’s livelihood. When livelihood is secured, citizens have the foundation to rejuvenate their cultural identity—minzu, the essence of national culture that preserves independence and heritage.

Thus, rooted in minzhi, The Citizen Constitution interconnects democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national culture into a coherent and self-reinforcing political framework. It offers the theoretical foundation for China’s future democratization.

II. Core Content of The Citizen Constitution: Chapter One – General Principles
As the opening chapter, the General Principles establish the tone and framework of the entire Constitution. It encompasses several key elements:

Definition of the State: Chapter One defines the nation as a “state governed by the people”, where sovereignty resides entirely with all citizens. The state is not merely a political institution but the embodiment of the collective will of its people, aiming to achieve fairness, justice, and prosperity under popular governance.

Definition of the Constitution: The Constitution is defined as the supreme law of the land, standing above all powers. It ensures that the principles of minzhi (governance by the people), democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national culture are upheld throughout governance, securing the foundation of the rule of law and the legitimacy of public authority.

Definition of the Military: The military is defined as “the people’s army, the nation’s army.” Its core duty is to defend national sovereignty and citizens’ rights, not to serve any individual or faction, thereby preventing any possibility of military interference in politics.

Rights and Duties of Citizens: Citizens enjoy broad freedoms—including freedom of speech, association, and belief—while bearing the responsibility to participate in public affairs and maintain social order. The spirit of minzhi runs throughout, encouraging citizens to shape the nation’s future through elections, supervision, and direct participation.

Special Provisions of the Constitution: Chapter One introduces innovative special clauses to ensure flexibility and adaptability. These provisions allow the constitutional system to adjust in times of crisis or major social transformation, preserving its vitality and resilience.

III. The Citizen Constitution’s Inspiration for Chinese DemocracyCentered on minzhi,
Chapter One outlines a uniquely Chinese path to democracy. It directly addresses why Western democratic models often fail to take root in China, avoiding both the extremes of authoritarian centralization and populist chaos.

By combining citizen self-governance with participation in state affairs, The Citizen Constitution grants citizens unprecedented agency, moving beyond the passive political roles of traditional systems. Its clear definition of the military’s apolitical nature and its balanced design of citizens’ rights and duties safeguard institutional stability and sustainability. The inclusion of special clauses injects adaptive capacity, enabling the Constitution to respond to new challenges such as technological revolutions and globalization.

In today’s world—where Western democracies suffer from division and inefficiency, and authoritarian regimes fail to satisfy the people’s yearning for freedom—The Citizen Constitution offers a “third path.” It inherits China’s traditional political wisdom, integrates universal democratic values, and aligns them with China’s contemporary realities and the global evolution of political systems. It is more than a legal document—it is an intellectual experiment for the future of Chinese democracy, a social contract jointly signed by all Chinese citizens, urging reflection and unity: How can we maintain national stability and cultural confidence while granting citizens genuine governing power?

Conclusion: Sailing Toward the Democratic HorizonChapter One of The Citizen Constitution
—the General Principles—takes minzhi as its soul, painting an inspiring vision of democracy. It reminds us that China’s democratic future is not a mere imitation of the West, but an innovative practice grounded in its own civilization. By upholding the principles of minzhi, democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national identity, China can move toward a freer, fairer, more just, rational, and prosperous future.

Click here to read the full text of The Citizen Constitution.
— Written by Cheng Wei and He Qingfeng, men of upright virtue and integrity.

作者：张致君
编辑：李聪玲 校对：林小龙 翻译：吕峰

世上最怕鬼的，不是病弱之人，不是孤魂野宿的孩子，而是手里握着刀子、腰上挂着印章的那些“大人”。

他们说自己无所畏惧，铁腕而威严，号称一声就能让千万人肃立如僵。但只要一个死人名字被人低声提起，他们就如同看见了厉鬼：眉毛竖起，耳朵发抖，腿脚不由得发软，急急忙忙把嘴堵上，把海边封了，把花束扔走。

奇怪么？不奇怪。

因为鬼不可见，所以最难防。活人你可以关，报纸你可以删，手机你可以查，但死人呢？死人什么都不做，却偏偏什么都能做。一个死人若活在记忆里，便比千军万马还要厉害。于是他们怕死人，怕得比怕活人还厉害。

我听说好些名字不能提，提了就是“寻衅滋事”。寻衅？谁寻谁的衅？一个躺在海里的骨灰，如何去寻活人的衅？倒像是活人自己寻着鬼，日日夜夜不让它安息。

古时候，人们敬鬼神，祭之以酒肉，图个心安。如今政权怕鬼魂，见之如仇敌，怕得要把海封上，把风管住，把浪也圈起来。仿佛风若呼一声，浪若翻一下，就会喊出那个名字。

于是出现了奇观：世上最强大的政府，拥有最庞大的警察队伍，最尖锐的机器，却要耗费千百人力去对付一把纸灰，一束花，一声低语。

有人在海边轻轻放下一朵花，转身就走。

花没开口，海没作声，只有浪一层一层打过来。过后几个人半夜冲到他们家里，紧张得像大战之前，把放花的人投入监狱，想把记忆踩进暗无天日的深渊中。我心里忽然明白：原来他们不是在踩记忆，他们是在踩自己心里的影子。

这影子是什么？是怕。

怕一个死人被记起，怕一个名字传下去。怕久了，就连空气里都充满那名字。你越怕，它越近。你越压，它越响。于是，他们像和空气打仗。手里拿着刀，却砍不着空气；砍不着，就只好乱砍活人。

我笑他们像夜里怕鬼的孩子。孩子怕鬼，拉着被子捂头，还要喊“我不怕我不怕”。喊得多了，正好证明他就是怕。

他们也一样：号称强大，偏要天天警惕一个死人；口口声声稳定，偏要四处捕人；整日嚷嚷信心，偏要删帖删得手忙脚乱。这不就是捂头喊的孩子么？只不过孩子丢的是觉，这些“大人”丢的是脸。

死人本无害。死人若真有害，那只能说明活人的心亏。你若心正，他就是灰；你若心虚，他就是鬼。

可惜他们宁肯把死人当鬼，也不敢让死人当人。

于是海不能望，碑不能立，花不能放，名字不能说。一个国家几亿人，竟然要与一个名字决斗。斗来斗去，名字还在，人心也还在。到最后，只剩他们自己被名字逼得发狂。

“中国人的脊梁，总是从死人那里长出来的。”——这话怕是真的。

因为活人弯腰，死人反而直立。死人直立着，便成了镜子。镜子照见谁低头了，谁弯腰了，谁在替权力磕头。

所以他们最怕镜子。怕死人立着。怕死人在记忆里站直。怕活人看见后，心里也要试着直一回。

他们可以堵嘴，却堵不了心思；他们可以删字，却删不掉回声。名字被禁，名字反而更响。就像一口井被板子盖住，底下的水声反而闷得更沉。时间一长，板子还是要烂开，水要冲出来。

怕鬼的政权，其实早就是鬼。

他们活着，却日日担心阴魂，夜夜检查墓碑，连死人都不敢让人去祭。活人怕死人，死人却让活人失眠。若真有鬼，鬼大约也是笑的。笑活人劳师动众，弄出一个笑话：生人怕死鬼，死鬼反成主人。

我在心里冷冷地想：连死人都怕的统治者，还能怕谁呢？他们怕的是影子，怕的是空气，怕的是自己。

终有一日，他们要被自己吓死。到那时，也要进墓地。他们到那边去，大约还得继续抓鬼。

A Ruler’s Word Is No Jest: A Regime Afraid of Ghosts

Author: Zhang Zhijun
Editor: Li Congling Proofreader: Lin XiaolongTranslator: Lyu Feng

The ones most afraid of ghosts are not the sick or the weak, nor the children wandering alone in the dark.They are the “adults” who hold knives in their hands and official seals at their waists.

They claim to fear nothing — strong, iron-fisted, and awe-inspiring — boasting that a single command of theirs can make millions stand still like statues.But when a dead person’s name is whispered, they tremble as if seeing a vengeful spirit:their brows shoot up, ears twitch, legs go weak; they rush to shut mouths, seal the shore, and throw away the flowers.

Is that strange? Not at all.Because ghosts are unseen, and what is unseen is the hardest to guard against.The living can be jailed, newspapers censored, phones searched —but the dead? The dead do nothing, yet they can do everything.Once a dead person lives in people’s memory, he becomes mightier than an army.And so, they fear the dead — more than they fear the living.

I have heard that certain names must not be mentioned, or it becomes “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”Trouble? Who provokes whom?How can a handful of ashes lying in the sea provoke the living?It seems more like the living are the ones haunting the dead, refusing to let them rest in peace.

In ancient times, people revered spirits, offering them wine and meat for peace of mind.Now, the rulers fear ghosts as enemies.They seal off seas, hold back winds, and try to fence in the waves —as if a gust or a ripple might cry out the forbidden name.

Thus we witness a grotesque spectacle:the most powerful government on earth, with the largest police force and the sharpest machines,mobilizing thousands to fight against a handful of ashes, a bouquet, a whisper.

Someone lays a flower gently by the sea and walks away.The flower says nothing. The sea says nothing. Only the waves keep rolling in.Yet a few men burst into the house that night, nervous as soldiers before battle,dragging the one who laid the flower into prison — as if they could stomp memory into a sunless pit.

Then I understood: they are not trampling on memory — they are trampling on their own shadows.

And what is that shadow? Fear.Fear that a dead person might be remembered.Fear that a name might endure.Fear, until even the air hums with that name.The more they fear, the closer it comes; the more they suppress, the louder it resounds.They are fighting against air — slashing at nothing.And when their blades strike nothing, they turn to slash the living.

I laugh at them, like children afraid of ghosts.A child pulls a blanket over his head and cries, “I’m not afraid, I’m not afraid!”The louder he shouts, the clearer it shows that he is.

They are the same.Proclaiming strength, yet living in dread of the dead;declaring stability, yet arresting people everywhere;boasting confidence, yet deleting posts in panic.A child loses sleep — but these “adults” lose their dignity.

The dead are harmless.If the dead truly frighten you, it only proves your heart is guilty.When your heart is upright, the dead are but ashes;when your heart is corrupt, the dead become ghosts.

Sadly, they would rather treat the dead as ghosts than allow the dead to remain human.

And so: the sea cannot be gazed upon, monuments cannot stand, flowers cannot be laid, names cannot be spoken.A nation of hundreds of millions has made an enemy of a single name.They fight and fight, but the name remains — and so does the conscience of the people.In the end, it is they who are driven mad by that name.

“The backbone of the Chinese people has always grown from the dead.”

Perhaps that is true.For when the living bend, the dead stand tall.And when the dead stand tall, they become mirrors —mirrors that show who has bowed, who has knelt, who worships power.

Thus, they fear mirrors most of all.They fear the dead standing upright.They fear the dead standing tall in memory.They fear that when the living see it, they too might try to stand straight.

They can silence mouths, but not thoughts;erase words, but not echoes.A banned name rings louder — like water under a boarded well,its sound deep and muffled, until the planks rot and the water bursts forth.

A regime that fears ghosts has already become one.It lives, yet spends its days dreading spirits, its nights checking gravestones.The living tremble before the dead; the dead rob the living of sleep.

If ghosts truly exist, they must be laughing —laughing at the living for their panic, for turning the world into farce:the living fear the dead, and the dead rule over the living.

And I think coldly to myself:A ruler who fears the dead — whom else could he fear?He fears his own shadow.He fears the air.He fears himself.

One day, he will be frightened to death by his own fear.And when he goes to the grave, he will probably go on hunting ghosts there, too.

作者：张致君 校对：林小龙

（中国新华社新闻截图）

（自由时报网图）

2025年10月25日，中国新华社发布通告，中国全国人大常委会宣布将这一天定为“台湾光复日”。消息一出，舆论即刻两极。北京方面称这是“历史正义的昭告”，而台湾社会则出现另一种声音——“这不是光复日，而是台湾再沦陷日。”同样的一段历史，却在不同体制与自由程度下，讲出了完全不同的故事。

1945年10月25日，台北中山堂。日本第十方面军司令安藤利吉向中华民国代表陈仪递交降书。那一天，被写入台湾课本，称作“台湾光复日”——台湾重归祖国怀抱。但在国际法的框架下，现实远比宣传复杂。

二战结束时，《开罗宣言》、《波茨坦宣言》乃至《日本降伏文书》，都仅为政治声明与投降条款，并无法律上领土转移的效力。日本确实放弃了台澎，但未指明归属哪国。《旧金山和约》亦仅写道“日本放弃对台湾、澎湖的一切权利”，却未将主权移交中国。换句话说——1945年的台湾，只是由中华民国代表盟军暂时接受管理，而非“主权归还中国”。

因此，从国际法的角度，“台湾光复”并不存在。存在的，是一次军事接收与随后持续数十年的威权统治。1947年的“二二八事件”，白色恐怖与戒严长夜，让许多台湾人意识到，这个名为“光复”的日子，开启的不是自由的黎明，而是另一次的压迫。

于是，历史的意义被倒置——“光复”成了“沦陷”的起点。台北的街头有人举牌：“那一天，我们失去了声音。”

那么，中共为何在2025年重新宣布“台湾光复日”？答案不在历史，而在政治。

对中共而言，这不仅是一种“纪念”，而是一种“法理塑形”，通过“国家纪念日”的名义，将“台湾属于中国”的叙事制度化、官方化、法律化。当历史被写进法律，记忆便成为统治的延伸。正如《国家安全法》将“统一”定为国家使命，如今的“光复日”则成为一块“法理统一”的地基。未来无论是否动武，这一天都可被援引为“历史依据”——一个象征台湾“理应归属”的法源基础。

这是一种极具政治工程意味的历史再造：北京不需要真正的历史真相，它只需要一个能在法律条文、外交辞令和宣传影片中反复引用的符号。“光复日”就是这种符号的典型产物。而大陆的民众不能提出任何不一样的声音，台湾的归属不容讨论，而真正的历史不允许传播。

相较之下，台湾社会的反应体现出另一种制度力量：言论自由。当北京宣布“光复”，台湾的民间社群却能公开说“这是沦陷”；台湾人在社交媒体发文：“我们从小被教导台湾光复了，但那只是另一场占领。”有人用《黑客帝国》的隐喻写道：“红色药丸是真相，蓝色药丸是课本。”

在一个言论自由的社会，人们有权质疑权力的叙事，有权重新解读历史。这恰恰是民主与极权的分界线：在台湾，你可以怀疑“光复”；而在大陆，你不能怀疑“统一”。前者容许历史成为争论的场域，后者只容许它成为政治的祭坛。

正如日籍评论员矢板明夫所言：“如果国民党将9月23日越南受降日也称为‘光复越南’，那将是外交笑话。”但在中共语境里，这样的逻辑却被当作理所当然——因为那不是在追问真相，而是在编写合法性。

“光复日”在北京，是政权自我合法化的神圣仪式；在台北，却可能是人民反思专制历史的纪念。

这两种纪念方式，本质上是两种国家形态的投影：一种是将历史定格为政治命令的国家，另一种是允许历史被质疑、被重写、被辩论的社会。

在中共体制下，纪念日是一种纪律—它告诉人们应当记得什么、忘记什么；而在民主制度下，纪念日是一种对话——它让人们讨论记忆本身的意义。

因此，“光复”与“沦陷”的冲突，不只是两种叙事的对抗，更是权力与自由的对抗。北京用纪念日塑造“历史必然性”；台湾用言论自由揭示“历史的不确定性”。

历史不会因为一个法令而光复，也不会因为一个口号而沦陷。它存在于每个人敢不敢发声、敢不敢质疑的勇气中。当一方以“光复”之名继续要求统一，而另一方以“沦陷”之痛提醒人们警惕历史重演，真正的差异不在领土，而在心灵的疆界。

在某种意义上，2025年的“光复日”与1945年的那天并无不同——那时台湾接受外来政权的接管，如今，北京试图以话语再度接管台湾的记忆。

但不同的是：今天的台湾，已经拥有选择红色药丸的自由——哪怕真相刺痛人心，也不必再为说出它而坐牢。

而这，才是真正的“光复”。

“我们不是在讨论台湾到底是不是一个独立的国家，或者是属于谁。而能不能公开讨论这件事更重要。而公开讨论后会不会因此因言获罪更重要。”

探讨历史真相，在台湾可以，而在中共国不可以。

Taiwan’s “Restoration” and “Fall”: An Eighty-Year Narrative War Over Freedom of Speech

Author: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Lin Xiaolong

(Screenshot of a Xinhua News Agency report from China)

(Image from Liberty Times Net)

On October 25, 2025, China’s official news agency, Xinhua, announced that the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress had designated this day as “Taiwan Restoration Day.”The declaration immediately polarized public opinion.Beijing called it “a proclamation of historical justice,” while many in Taiwan responded differently: “This is not a restoration day — it’s the day Taiwan fell again.”

The same piece of history, told under different systems and degrees of freedom, has become two completely different stories.

A Tale of Two Histories

On October 25, 1945, at Taipei’s Zhongshan Hall, General Andō Rikichi, commander of Japan’s Tenth Area Army, formally surrendered to Chen Yi, the representative of the Republic of China.

That day was written into Taiwan’s textbooks as “Taiwan Restoration Day” — the day Taiwan “returned to the embrace of the motherland.”

But under international law, the truth was far more complex.At the end of World War II, the Cairo Declaration, Potsdam Declaration, and Japanese Instrument of Surrender were all political statements and terms of capitulation, not legally binding instruments transferring sovereignty.

Japan indeed renounced sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores, but none of these documents specified to which country those territories were transferred.Even the San Francisco Peace Treaty merely stated that “Japan renounces all right, title, and claim to Taiwan and the Pescadores,” without assigning sovereignty to China.

In other words, in 1945 Taiwan was placed under the temporary military administration of the Republic of China on behalf of the Allied Powers — not legally “returned” to China.

From the standpoint of international law, therefore, there was no “Restoration of Taiwan.”What truly occurred was a military occupation followed by decades of authoritarian rule.

The February 28 Incident of 1947, the ensuing White Terror, and the long night of martial law awakened many Taiwanese to a grim realization:the so-called “restoration” had not brought the dawn of freedom — it had ushered in a new era of oppression.

History’s meaning was reversed:“Restoration” became the beginning of subjugation.As one placard seen in Taipei read:

“That day, we lost our voices.”

Beijing’s 2025 Revival: History as Political Engineering

Why, then, did the Chinese Communist Party in 2025 once again proclaim “Taiwan Restoration Day”?The answer lies not in history, but in politics.

For Beijing, this is not merely a commemoration — it is an act of legal and ideological engineering: a way to institutionalize, officialize, and legalize the narrative that “Taiwan belongs to China.”

When history is written into law, memory becomes an instrument of governance.Just as the National Security Law defines “national reunification” as a legal mission, the new “Restoration Day” serves as the foundation of a legal doctrine of unification.

Whether or not military force is ever used, this symbolic date can be invoked as a “historical justification” — a supposed source of legitimacy for China’s claim over Taiwan.

This is a calculated reconstruction of history.Beijing does not need factual accuracy; it needs a symbol — one that can be endlessly cited in legal documents, diplomatic statements, and propaganda films.

“Restoration Day” is exactly such a symbol.And in mainland China, no dissenting voice may question it.The status of Taiwan cannot be discussed, and genuine history cannot be published.

Freedom of Speech: Taiwan’s Different Path

By contrast, Taiwan’s response demonstrates the power of a free society.

When Beijing declared “Restoration,” Taiwanese citizens openly replied: “It’s the day of our fall.”Social media filled with posts like:

“We were taught that Taiwan was restored, but it was just another occupation.”

Some used metaphors from The Matrix:

“The red pill is truth; the blue pill is what the textbooks told us.”

In a society with freedom of speech, people have the right to question official narratives and reinterpret history.That is the essential boundary between democracy and authoritarianism:

In Taiwan, you can doubt “restoration.”In China, you cannot doubt “reunification.”

In the former, history is a field of debate;in the latter, it is an altar of ideology.

As Japanese commentator Akio Yaita observed:

“If the Kuomintang were to declare Vietnam’s September 23 surrender day as ‘Vietnam Restoration Day,’ it would be a diplomatic joke.”

But in the CCP’s political language, such logic is treated as natural — because the goal is not to seek truth, but to construct legitimacy.

In Beijing, “Restoration Day” becomes a sacred ritual of regime legitimation;in Taipei, it serves as a day of reflection on past authoritarianism.

These two forms of commemoration mirror two models of the state:one that fixes history as a political command,and another that allows history to be questioned, rewritten, and debated.

Under the CCP, a national holiday functions as a form of discipline — it dictates what people must remember and what they must forget.Under democracy, a commemoration becomes a conversation — it invites people to discuss the meaning of memory itself.

Thus, the clash between “Restoration” and “Fall” is not only a battle of narratives; it is a confrontation between power and freedom.Beijing uses commemorations to assert historical inevitability;Taiwan uses free speech to reveal historical uncertainty.

History, Memory, and Freedom

History is neither restored by a decree nor lost to a slogan.It lives in the courage of people — the courage to speak, to question, to remember.

When one side invokes “restoration” to demand unification, and the other recalls “fall” to warn against the return of tyranny,the real divide is not one of territory, but of the human mind.

In a sense, the “Restoration Day” of 2025 is not so different from that of 1945:then, Taiwan was handed over to a foreign regime’s administration;now, Beijing seeks to reclaim Taiwan’s memory through narrative domination.

The difference is this:Today’s Taiwan has the freedom to choose the red pill —to face painful truths without fearing imprisonment for speaking them aloud.

And that, ultimately, is the truest form of restoration.

“The question is not whether Taiwan is an independent country or belongs to someone else.The real issue is whether people can discuss it openly — and whether they can do so without fear of punishment.”

To seek historical truth is possible in Taiwan.Under the CCP’s rule, it is not.

作者：申育龙 编辑：黄吉洲 责任编辑：侯改英 校对：熊辩

关键词建议：申育龙、三里屯勇士、彭立发、四通桥事件、中国民主、人权、自由、法治、反共、茉莉花行动。

上周我在美国参加了纪念“四通桥勇士”彭立发被中共抓捕三周年的抗议集会。今天，2025年10月25日，北京三里屯又现孤勇者拉起条幅手持扩音器控诉中共邪教，呼吁自由组党，建立自由人性法治新中国。

从六四，四通桥，到四中全会中共这个邪教独裁组织即将走向那一天这白底黑的控诉64天安门毛泽东画像上的墨水，在中共守卫最严密的地方，撕开了中共邪恶政权的遮羞布。 我是80后，年幼时曾听父亲说，八九学潮，军队清洗天安门静坐学生，殷红的鲜血把天安门广场染红了为了不让美国卫星拍到，连夜清洗了广场上的血那时候懵懵懂懂并不。

在我的记忆力里，我们那一代人学校洗脑教育，虽贫穷，淳朴，坊间一句：毛泽东领了一群穷光蛋，江泽民带了一群贪污犯。，。 到后来母亲患病，天价医疗费用把我们家带了深渊父亲，哥哥背上了巨额债务，国家级的大医院因为而停止为母亲，我因不满医疗制度发帖被抓一系列的家庭变故让我感到和无助。

一次偶然机会，我学会了翻墙上网。才一个正常国家应自由民主法治，而中共将医疗教育固化，而我们普通老百姓永远看不到

来到美国后我积极投身反共动，把海外的真相传到国内微信群，却得不到一点回应，人心的冷漠让我感到难过悲哀，”支黑” 言论中国不适合民主。

彭立发三里屯勇士黑夜燃起的火把让我们这些反共不再孤独囹圄，以身赴死的勇气呐喊！

自由民主法治的中国，我们一定会等到这一天 

The Lone Warrior of Sanlitun — I Will Shout for You

Author: Shen Yulong
Editor: Huang Jizhou Executive Editor: Hou Gaiying Proofreader: Xiong Bian

Abstract
On October 25, 2025, in Beijing’s Sanlitun district, a lone anti-communist protester raised a banner calling for freedom and the rule of law.Author Shen Yulong reflects on his own journey — from childhood indoctrination and family tragedy to political awakening — and reaffirms his faith in China’s democratization.From the Sitong Bridge protest to the Sanlitun demonstration, he sees a spark of hope and calls on Chinese people at home and abroad to speak with conscience and continue shouting for a free China.

Suggested Keywords:Shen Yulong, Sanlitun warrior, Peng Lifa, Sitong Bridge protest, Chinese democracy, human rights, freedom, rule of law, anti-Communism, Jasmine Revolution.

Text

Last week, I joined a protest rally in the United States commemorating the third anniversary of the arrest of Peng Lifa, the “Sitong Bridge warrior.”And today, October 25, 2025, in Beijing’s Sanlitun, another lone warrior appeared — a “Peng-style” protester.He stood in the middle of the city holding a loudspeaker and a banner condemning the Chinese Communist cult, calling for freedom of association and the establishment of a new China founded on liberty, humanity, and the rule of law.

From June Fourth (1989) to the Sitong Bridge incident, to the Fourth Plenum, all these moments seem to foreshadow the eventual collapse of the CCP’s dictatorial cult.The black characters on the white banner of the Sanlitun warrior are like the black ink splashed on Mao’s portrait at Tiananmen during 1989 — in the most heavily guarded place in China, a moment of defiance suddenly tore open the façade of the regime’s evil.

I was born in the 1980s. When I was a child, my father told me about the Tiananmen massacre: how the army used live ammunition to clear out the peaceful student sit-ins, how the blood of the young turned Tiananmen Square red.To prevent American satellites from photographing the evidence, the authorities scrubbed the square overnight.But at the time, I was too young to understand.

In my early memories, our generation’s schooling was not yet saturated with propaganda.People still dared to talk about politics, to joke about leaders.We were poor, but genuine.There was a popular saying:

“Mao led a group of paupers; Jiang led a group of thieves.”

There was still a space for truth and laughter then.Schools didn’t necessarily teach us to “love the Party,” but films and TV dramas had already quietly shaped the myth of its “greatness, glory, and correctness.”Movies like Tunnel Warfare, Gunfire on the Plains, The Bandits of Wulong Mountain, and the leaders’ smiling faces on the CCTV Spring Festival Gala all made us believe that the Communist Party would lead China to prosperity.

Until one day, tragedy struck.My mother fell ill, and the astronomical medical bills dragged our family into despair.My father and brother fell deeply into debt, and when we could no longer afford the hospital’s fees, the national-level hospital stopped treatment, letting my mother die in pain.When I posted about the injustice of China’s medical system online, I was arrested.Those family tragedies left me hopeless and angry.

Then, by chance, I learned to “climb the wall” — bypass the internet blockade.That moment changed my life.For the first time, I saw the other side of the world —that a normal country should be built upon freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.

Yet the CCP maintains its rule through dictatorship and deceit, turning healthcare and education into tools for profit and social control.Red aristocrats monopolize power, while ordinary people struggle between poverty and silence.A single illness can destroy a family;a single truthful sentence can lead to prison.

After arriving in the United States, I threw myself into anti-CCP activism, sending uncensored information back into Chinese chat groups.But the indifference I met — the apathy of people living under dictatorship — broke my heart.At times, I even felt shaken by cynical voices on Twitter, those who sneered:

“China is not fit for democracy.”

Yet when Peng Lifa and now the Sanlitun warrior appeared, they were like torches igniting the night.They burned their bodies to light the path of hope.Their courage — to face prison or death without fear — reminded us exiles and dissidents to hold our ground, to despise fear, and to fight for a constitutional China.

Conclusion

One day, China will be free —a nation of liberty, democracy, and the rule of law.That day, I believe, will come.

——自由中国理念在重凝结

作者：刘芳
编辑：胡丽莉 责任编辑：罗志飞 校对：程筱筱 翻译：刘芳

2025年10月18日，由对话中国智库与洛杉矶六四纪念馆联合主办，“自由钟”基金会、中国民主党全国联合总部及中国民主党全国委员会洛杉矶党部协办的“中国论坛”在美国洛杉矶隆重举行。

多位知名学者、六四参与者、中国民主党等民运人士齐聚一堂，一起总结历史经验，探讨如何迎接历史变局。

论坛现场气氛庄重而热烈。汉学家林培瑞（Perry Link）直言：习近平对中国没有信心，因为“真正有信心的人，不会天天喊‘我有信心’。只有彻底搞垮中国共产党才能让中国变好。”他强调，目前国内状况很不好，经济不好，年轻人失业率升高，外企逃离，中共之所以不断高喊口号，正因其体制内在空虚与恐惧，政治谎言与思想控制使中国无法复苏。

八九学运领袖王丹表示：“不是因为有希望才抗争，而是因为抗争才有希望。”他指出，正是一次次看似微小的抵抗，让中国的未来仍保有火种。中国论坛旨在建立一个沟通与对话的平台，为中共脆断做好充分准备。

著名民运人士、《在野党》总编辑朱虞夫先生回顾了自己1998年在杭州创立中国民主党浙江筹备委员会的经历——那是中国民间首次以公开、和平方式挑战一党专政的历史时刻。当听众问他，是什么样的勇气支撑他几十年来始终不屈不悔的抗争时，他平静地回答：“我是求仁得仁。为民主与自由而奋斗的事业，总要有人去承担。”

资深评论人吴建民则指出：“八九学运最大的错误，是没有推翻中共的诉求。这个政权，只能被埋葬。”他呼吁海内外华人认清现实，不再对专制存有幻想，应团结推动体制性变革。

牧师、民运人士张伯笠在发言中回顾“六四”血案，指出中共至今未为屠杀平民道歉。他呼吁为不能自辩之人开口，为一切被压迫、被遗忘的人伸张正义。

与会者们积极参与讨论民运者关系的问题：如何发动更多年轻一代参与到民主运动中来为推翻集权后的建立民主国家积蓄力量；觉醒的普通人能为民主贡献哪些力量；宗教信仰的力量如何帮助中国人实现民主。

参会者一致指出，中共集权政权必然走向脆断，而“自由中国”的理念正在重新凝聚。“中国论坛”的意义不仅在于讨论政治议题，更在于重建一个自由表达与思想交汇的公共空间。

在中共封锁言论、压制异议的背景下，这样的论坛象征着“自由中国”思想的延续与生长，也让国际社会看到中国人民与中共并非一体。

The First “China Forum” Held in Los Angeles— The Re-Consolidation of the Free China Ideal

Author: Liu Fang
Editor: Hu Lili Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreading: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract: On October 18, 2025, the “China Forum” was grandly held in Los Angeles, USA. Well-known scholars, participants of the 1989 movement, members of the China Democracy Party, and other democracy activists gathered to review historical experiences and explore how to respond to upcoming political changes.

On October 18, 2025, the “China Forum,” co-hosted by the Dialogue China think tank and the Los Angeles June Fourth Memorial Hall, and co-sponsored by the Freedom Bell Foundation, the National Joint Headquarters of the China Democracy Party, and the Los Angeles Branch of the CDP National Committee, was ceremoniously held in Los Angeles.

Well-known scholars, participants of the 1989 movement, members of the China Democracy Party, and other democracy activists gathered to review historical experiences and explore how to respond to upcoming political changes.

The atmosphere of the forum was solemn yet passionate. Sinologist Perry Link stated bluntly that Xi Jinping has no confidence in China, because “a person who truly has confidence does not constantly proclaim ‘I have confidence.’ Only by completely dismantling the Chinese Communist Party can China improve.” He emphasized that the situation inside China is dire: a failing economy, rising youth unemployment, and the exodus of foreign enterprises. The CCP’s repeated slogans are a sign of inner hollowness and fear, and political lies along with ideological control have made national recovery impossible.

Wang Dan, a leader of the 1989 student movement, said: “We do not resist because hope already exists; we resist because resistance creates hope.” He noted that it is precisely the seemingly small acts of defiance that keep the spark of China’s future alive. The China Forum aims to build a platform for communication and dialogue, fully preparing for the CCP’s eventual collapse.

Renowned democracy activist and editor-in-chief of The Opposition Party, Zhu Yufu, recalled his experience in 1998 when he founded the Zhejiang Preparatory Committee of the China Democracy Party in Hangzhou—a historic moment in which Chinese citizens publicly and peacefully challenged one-party rule for the first time. When the audience asked what gave him the courage to persist for decades without yielding, he calmly replied: “I sought righteousness and accepted its consequences. The struggle for democracy and freedom must be undertaken by someone.”

Senior commentator Wu Jianmin pointed out: “The greatest mistake of the 1989 movement was that it did not demand the overthrow of the CCP. This regime can only be buried.” He urged Chinese people both inside and outside the country to recognize the reality of authoritarianism, abandon illusions, and unite to push for systemic change.

Pastor and democracy activist Zhang Boli reflected on the June Fourth massacre, noting that the CCP has never apologized for killing unarmed civilians. He called on people to speak for those who cannot defend themselves, and to seek justice for all who are oppressed or forgotten.

Participants actively discussed issues concerning the future of the democracy movement: how to mobilize more young people to join the struggle and build momentum for a democratic state after the fall of authoritarianism; what awakened citizens can contribute to democracy; and how religious faith can help Chinese people achieve democratic transformation.Attendees unanimously agreed that the CCP’s authoritarian regime is destined to collapse, and that the ideal of a “Free China” is gathering strength once again. The significance of the “China Forum” lies not only in political discussion but also in rebuilding a public space where free expression and the exchange of ideas can flourish.

Amid the CCP’s suppression of dissent and its blockade of free speech, such a forum symbolizes the continuation and growth of the “Free China” ideal and shows the international community that the Chinese people are not the same as the CCP.