纪念铁链女四周年
猪圈旁的铁链，锁住的不是一个人，
而是尊严、正义与良知。
我们只是比她幸运，
若不砸碎心中的铁链，终将无人幸免。
希望更多人站出来，一起纪念她，也守住我们共同的底线。
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2026.1.4 14:00-16:00
被操纵的悼念与南京叙事
作者：刘芳
编辑：李晶 校对：程筱筱 翻译：吕峰
南京大屠杀是否发生，本身并不存在争议。真正需要被讨论的，是死亡数字如何被统计、如何被解释，以及这些数字在政治叙事中如何被使用。任何历史结论，一旦无法通过最基本的人口结构与算术检验，就已经偏离了史学讨论的轨道，转而成为政治工具。
1937 年以前，南京作为国民政府首都，人口接近百万。随着战局迅速恶化，政府南迁、军队撤离、学校停办、工厂内迁，大规模疏散迅速展开。离城者以青壮年男性为主，南京成为全国撤离最为彻底的城市之一，这直接改变了城内人口规模与结构。
多方第三方记录对南京沦陷前后的城内人口规模给出了高度一致的判断。1937 年 12 月，南京安全区国际委员会在正式文件中提到，集中在安全区内的平民约二十万人；美国外交人员的公务电报估计，城内人口在二十万至二十五万之间；负责安全区事务的德国人士，以及多位传教士和医务人员，根据避难点容量得出的结论亦大致相同。这些来源彼此独立，却从未出现五十万，更没有“城内三十万平民被杀”的说法。
由此可以确定第一组基础事实：南京城内平民总数约为二十多万人。
第二个无法回避的事实，是幸存者规模。日军进城后，南京安全区并未立即瓦解，而是持续运作，集中收容并保护了约二十万平民。这些幸存者并非事后推算的抽象数字，而是有明确居住、配给与管理记录的具体人群。任何关于南京的叙事，都必须承认：城内至少有约二十万平民被明确记录为存活。
第三组证据，是占领初期之后南京出现的人口回流与基本社会恢复，这一现实情形，与“城内发生三十万级别平民大屠杀”在社会学与人口学层面形成明显矛盾。 随着战事结束、局势相对稳定，一部分此前逃离的市民陆续返城，城市开始重新运转。一些研究者指出，人口回流本身不足以单独决定死亡规模，但若城内在短时间内发生三十万量级的平民屠杀，其社会后果不应仅体现为人口减少，而必然表现为长期、系统性的恢复障碍：大量岗位空缺、生产与服务链条断裂，以及由极端暴力所造成的持续恐惧，对回城意愿形成强烈抑制，其结果更应是回流迟缓、恢复困难。然而，结合战前人口基数、安全区幸存者记录与随后出现的人口回归情况，南京并未呈现出与如此规模屠杀相匹配的长期社会失序状态。基本生活秩序得以维持，社会运转逐步恢复。这一现实状况并不能用于“证明”具体死亡数字，却在既定人口结构框架下，进一步削弱了高死亡估计在城内语境中的合理性。
将上述事实合并考察，矛盾便十分清楚：城内平民总数只有二十多万，其中约二十万人被明确记录为幸存者，同时还存在战后回流现象。在这样的条件下，“南京城内三十万平民被杀”在算术层面难以成立。要维持这一说法，必须假定城内曾存在远超五十万的平民人口，或否认安全区幸存者的存在，又或将回流人口视为凭空出现，但这些假定均缺乏同时期证据支持。
正是在这里，中共叙事引入了一个关键前提：南京城内曾有“五十万平民”。这一数字并未见于 1937 年当时的安全区文件、外交电报或现场记录，更像是为既定结论倒推出来的人口设定，其功能在于为“三十万”提供算术空间。
为回避由此产生的矛盾，相关叙事不断模糊统计边界，将城内与城外、平民与士兵、战俘与溃兵、战斗死亡与非战斗死亡混合计算，最终把性质各异、责任不同的死亡压缩进一个情绪化的整数。这种处理方式并非史学研究，而是一种政治叙事策略。
更值得警惕的是，这一叙事体系对数字讨论实行事实上的垄断。任何质疑都会被迅速转化为道德或政治指控，方法问题被等同为立场问题，证据讨论被排除在公共空间之外。在这种语境下，历史不再允许被检验，只能被重复。
这一选择性执着，与中共对自身统治下大规模死亡的长期沉默形成了鲜明对照。大跃进时期造成的饥荒被定性为“三年自然灾害”，政策责任被系统性抹去；新冠疫情早期因隐瞒、封锁和打压信息而导致的死亡，则迅速被去责任化、去政治化处理。这些生命既缺乏持续、公开的统计，也不允许被严肃追问，更谈不上制度性的纪念。在这种选择性记忆中，南京被不断放大，成为转移责任与制造情绪的安全对象。
当南京被反复强调、并被赋予“不可讨论”的数字时，真正需要被追问的已不只是历史细节，而是动机本身。一个政权为何执着于放大他人造成的死亡，却对自身统治下的大规模死亡长期保持沉默，甚至系统性抹除？
南京在这种叙事中不再是理解战争残酷的历史事件，而被转化为政治工具，用以制造仇恨、转移视线。受难者被抽象为数字与符号，历史被固定为情绪表达与忠诚测试。这既是对南京死者的再次利用，也构成了对所有无法被纪念的受害者的共同伤害。
Manipulated Mourning and the Nanjing Narrative
Author: Liu Fang
Editor: Li Jing Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Lyu Feng
Abstract:This article is dedicated to commemorating the innocent lives lost in the Nanjing Massacre and to discussing this history on the basis of respect for facts.
Whether the Nanjing Massacre occurred is not itself in dispute. What truly requires discussion is how the death toll has been calculated, how it has been interpreted, and how these numbers have been used within political narratives. Any historical conclusion that cannot withstand the most basic tests of population structure and arithmetic has already departed from the realm of historiography and entered that of political instrumentation.
Before 1937, Nanjing, as the capital of the Nationalist government, had a population approaching one million. As the military situation deteriorated rapidly, the government relocated southward, troops withdrew, schools were closed, and factories moved inland. Large-scale evacuation unfolded swiftly. Those leaving the city were predominantly young and middle-aged men, making Nanjing one of the cities with the most thorough evacuations nationwide—directly altering both the scale and structure of the city’s population.
Multiple independent third-party records provide highly consistent assessments of Nanjing’s population immediately before and after its fall. In December 1937, the International Committee for the Nanking Safety Zone stated in official documents that approximately 200,000 civilians were concentrated within the Safety Zone. Official telegrams from U.S. diplomatic personnel estimated the city’s population at between 200,000 and 250,000. German nationals responsible for Safety Zone affairs, as well as several missionaries and medical workers, reached similar conclusions based on shelter capacity. These sources were independent of one another, yet none ever cited a figure of 500,000—still less the claim that “300,000 civilians within the city were killed.”
From this, the first set of basic facts can be established: the total number of civilians inside Nanjing was approximately a little over 200,000.
The second unavoidable fact concerns the scale of survivors. After the Japanese army entered the city, the Nanjing Safety Zone did not immediately collapse; it continued to operate, concentrating and protecting approximately 200,000 civilians. These survivors were not abstract figures inferred after the fact, but concrete populations with documented residences, rations, and administrative records. Any narrative of Nanjing must acknowledge that at least around 200,000 civilians were clearly recorded as having survived within the city.
A third body of evidence lies in the population return and basic social recovery that occurred after the initial occupation period. This reality stands in evident tension, at the sociological and demographic levels, with the claim that a massacre of 300,000 civilians took place within the city. As hostilities subsided and conditions stabilized, some residents who had previously fled gradually returned, and the city began to function again. Some scholars note that population return alone cannot determine the scale of deaths; however, if a civilian massacre on the order of 300,000 had occurred within a short period, its social consequences would not be limited merely to population reduction. It would necessarily manifest as long-term, systemic obstacles to recovery: massive labor shortages, broken chains of production and services, and persistent terror induced by extreme violence, strongly suppressing any willingness to return. The expected outcome would therefore be slow return and prolonged dysfunction. Yet when the prewar population base, Safety Zone survivor records, and subsequent population return are considered together, Nanjing did not display the enduring social disorder commensurate with such a massive massacre. Basic living order was maintained, and social operations gradually resumed. This reality cannot be used to “prove” a specific death toll, but within the established population framework, it further weakens the plausibility of high death estimates in the context of the city proper.
When these facts are examined together, the contradiction becomes clear: the total number of civilians in the city was only a little over 200,000; approximately 200,000 were explicitly recorded as survivors; and postwar population return also occurred. Under these conditions, the claim that “300,000 civilians were killed within Nanjing city” is arithmetically untenable. To sustain this claim, one would have to assume that the city once contained far more than 500,000 civilians, or deny the existence of Safety Zone survivors, or treat returning residents as having appeared out of thin air—assumptions for which no contemporaneous evidence exists.
It is precisely here that the Chinese Communist Party’s narrative introduces a key premise: that there were once “500,000 civilians” within Nanjing. This figure does not appear in Safety Zone documents, diplomatic telegrams, or on-site records from 1937. It more closely resembles a population assumption retroactively constructed to accommodate a predetermined conclusion, its function being to create arithmetical space for the figure “300,000.”
To avoid the contradictions that follow, related narratives increasingly blur statistical boundaries, mixing city and countryside, civilians and soldiers, prisoners of war and routed troops, combat deaths and non-combat deaths—ultimately compressing deaths of different natures and responsibilities into a single emotionally charged integer. This approach is not historical scholarship, but a political narrative strategy.
More troubling still is the de facto monopoly this narrative exerts over numerical discussion. Any questioning is swiftly transformed into moral or political accusation; methodological issues are equated with ideological positions; evidentiary debate is excluded from the public sphere. In such a context, history is no longer permitted to be examined—it may only be repeated.
This selective fixation stands in stark contrast to the long-term silence surrounding mass deaths under CCP rule. The famine caused during the Great Leap Forward was labeled “three years of natural disasters,” with policy responsibility systematically erased. Deaths resulting from concealment, censorship, and repression of information during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic were quickly de-responsibilized and de-politicized. These lives lack sustained, public accounting, are not allowed to be seriously questioned, and are far from receiving institutional commemoration. Within this selective memory, Nanjing is continually magnified, becoming a safe object for deflecting responsibility and mobilizing emotion.
When Nanjing is repeatedly emphasized and endowed with a “non-negotiable” number, what truly demands scrutiny is no longer merely historical detail, but motive itself. Why does a regime obsessively amplify deaths caused by others while maintaining long-term silence—or even systematic erasure—of mass deaths under its own rule?
In such a narrative, Nanjing ceases to be a historical event for understanding the brutality of war and is transformed into a political instrument, used to manufacture hatred and divert attention. Victims are abstracted into numbers and symbols; history is frozen into an expression of emotion and a test of loyalty. This constitutes a second exploitation of the dead of Nanjing and a shared injury to all victims who are denied the right to be remembered.
归途之上——致黎智英先生
作者：赵令军
编辑：王梦梦 责任编辑：罗志飞 校对：熊辩 翻译：吕峰
摘要
本文以黎智英拒绝离港、选择入狱的决定为核心，探讨在威权体制下“回归与坚守”这一看似非理性的选择所具有的道德与历史意义。通过对黎智英、纳瓦尔尼与金明日牧师的对照，文章指出：当语言被权力占用，人的身体与命运本身便成为无法抹去的证据。他们的牺牲未必立刻改变现实，却构成这个时代最沉重的见证。
在全球持续关注中，黎智英案终于进入关键审理阶段：
黎智英老先生被判“勾结外国势力、串谋刊印煽动刊物”等3项罪名，至此，已被关押了5年多，前后被审讯了共156天的黎先生，总算被中共强按了几个正式的罪名。黎先生坚持自己无罪，但《国安法》指定的3名法官，判定他有罪。
虽然最终量刑结果尚未公布，但外界普遍认为，仅“勾结外国势力、煽动颠覆”这一项指控，便足以判处无期徒刑。黎先生已年近八旬，长期监禁对其身体的摧残早已显现；在当下的政治现实下，人们几乎看不到他重获自由的可能。
而黎老先生，显然已经做好坦然面对任何结果的准备！
事实上，这正是他的选择！
在当代政治迫害史中，有一种选择反复出现，却始终令人心惊：
明知面临牢狱之灾，甚至死亡，仍然选择坚守或回归。
黎智英先生，正是做出这种选择的人。
作为香港最具国际知名度的传媒人之一，他并非无路可退。他是非常成功的企业家，拥有巨额财富，并持有英国护照，离开香港，对他而言并不困难，继续在海外发声，也完全可行。但在香港自由迅速坠落的关键时刻，他婉拒了好友的劝说，依然选择留下，并最终被捕入狱。
在被关押前夕，他于九龙家中接受 BBC 记者采访。当记者试图询问——或者说，提醒他，是留在香港还是迁往他处生活时，他不等问题说完，便平静地回答：
在狱中。
他说：
现在在这里，我是平静地活着；在狱中，我是有意义地活着。
那不是一句即兴的话，那是一个睿智的长者对自己未来走向的清楚认知。
“有意义的活着”，不是激情的宣言，而是一条清醒而孤独的归途。
这条路，通往牢狱，通往审判，也通往历史。
选择，并非源于误判，也不是情绪化的冲动，而是一种清醒而沉重的判断。
一、为什么不走？
在威权体制下，“离开”往往被视为理性之举。
安全、自由、持续发声——这些理由看似无可反驳。
但问题在于：
当所有有能力、有影响力的人都选择离开，留下来的人将面对什么？
留下来的，不仅是风险，更是被迫承担“失败者”“被抛弃者”的身份。
而权力，也正是通过这种方式，完成对社会的清空。
黎智英拒绝让这种逻辑成立，他说：我不能离开。一旦离开，即会影响苹果日报的信誉，也会影响民主运动的团结。这件事，必须由我来承担责任！
他的留下，意味着一种立场：
不是因为走不了，而是拒绝让“离开”成为唯一正确的选择。
二、当身体成为证据
在极权环境中，语言最容易被扭曲和掏空。
“法治”、“秩序”、“稳定”、“国家安全”这些词汇被反复使用，却不断被重新定义，最终服务于独裁专制本身。
当语言失去可信度，人的遭遇，就成了最后的证据。
黎智英的被捕，清楚地表明：
所谓“依法治港”，并非法律对权力的约束，而是权力对法律的占用。
他的审判，也以最直观的方式证明：
那个曾以法治与自由著称的百年香港，在被中共统治仅二十余年后，迅速陨落——经济凋敝、法治崩塌、自由消亡，使得中共对于香港自由、繁荣状况的一切辩解，在世界舆论面前显得愈发苍白。
三、相似的归途：纳瓦尔尼先生与金明日牧师
他们来自不同国家、不同信仰，却做出了同一种选择。
俄罗斯反对派领袖阿列克谢·纳瓦尔尼，在中毒并成功治疗后，本来可以选择在德国陪伴家人并用另一种方式抗争的，但依然返回俄罗斯。他十分清楚，等待他的将是监禁，甚至更糟的结局。但他仍然选择回去。
因为他明白：如果反对只能在流亡中存在，那么权力就已经赢得了道德优势。
他的死亡，彻底暴露了俄罗斯政治体制的真实面目。
而在中国，金明日牧师所面对的，则是另一种形式的压迫。他原本可以选择在美国做牧师，家人也在身边陪伴，过着优渥的生活。
但他依然选择了宗教自由被严格控制、甚至被摧毁的中国，冒着随时被抓的危险，继续牧养、讲道、见证。
金牧师的选择并非出于政治动员，而是源自信仰本身；被捕后，面对来访者，他说：以前看到其他的牧师或传道人被捕，他无能为力，很是纠结；现在自己被抓，反而觉得很坦然了。
以生命实践信仰，以大无畏的牺牲，深刻诠释“为真理而死”境界。
他们都明白：
真理若只能在安全之地被宣讲，便失去了超越性。
四、他们的牺牲是否“值得”？
这是一个无法回避的问题。
从现实结果看，他们的选择并未带来立刻的改变：
香港未能因此恢复自由！
俄罗斯未能因此走向民主！
中国的宗教与言论空间依然严重受限！
如果仅以短期成效衡量，这些牺牲似乎“并不划算”。
历史也从来不只由结果构成。
但他们发出的光芒，会引领很多人走出黑暗！
五、不可被抹去的意义
威权最渴望塑造的，是一种顺从的共识：
低头是理性，沉默是成熟，活着比尊严重要。
而黎智英、纳瓦尔尼、金明日牧师的存在，使这种叙事在道德上彻底破产。
他们并未诉诸暴力，也未谋取私利，
他们只是拒绝配合谎言，坚持真理。
正因为如此，他们无法被彻底抹黑，也无法被轻易遗忘。
结语：归途之上的人
他们并不要求后来者复制他们的道路，因为牺牲从来不是义务。
但正是因为有人愿意承担最沉重的代价，
后来的人，才仍然拥有选择是否站立的自由。
归途之上，有人离开，有人沉默，也有人回去。
黎智英等伟大的殉道者们，选择了回归和坚守。
而这种选择本身，
已经成为这个时代最清晰、也最沉重的注脚。
赵令军（Frank），2025年12月20日星期六，加拿大
On the Road Home — In Tribute to Mr. Jimmy Lai
Author: Zhao Lingjun
Editor: Wang Mengmeng Managing Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Lyu Feng
AbstractCentered on Jimmy Lai’s decision to refuse departure from Hong Kong and instead accept imprisonment, this article examines the moral and historical significance of what appears, under authoritarian rule, to be an irrational choice of “return and steadfastness.” Through a comparative reflection on Jimmy Lai, Alexei Navalny, and Pastor Kim Myung-il, the article argues that when language is monopolized by power, the human body and one’s fate themselves become indelible evidence. Their sacrifices may not immediately alter reality, yet they constitute the heaviest testimony of our time.
Amid sustained global attention, the Jimmy Lai case has finally entered a critical stage of adjudication.Mr. Lai has been convicted on three charges, including “collusion with foreign forces” and “conspiracy to publish seditious materials.” Having been detained for more than five years and subjected to a total of 156 days of hearings, Mr. Lai has at last been formally saddled with criminal charges imposed by the Chinese Communist Party. Mr. Lai maintains his innocence; however, the three judges designated under the National Security Law have found him guilty.
Although the final sentence has yet to be announced, it is widely believed that the charge of “collusion with foreign forces and incitement to subvert state power” alone is sufficient to warrant life imprisonment. Mr. Lai is approaching eighty years of age, and the physical toll of prolonged incarceration has already become evident. Under the present political reality, there is scarcely any prospect of his regaining freedom.
And yet Mr. Lai has clearly prepared himself to face any outcome with equanimity.
In truth, this has always been his choice.
In the history of contemporary political persecution, there is a choice that appears again and again, and yet never fails to unsettle the conscience:knowing full well that imprisonment—or even death—lies ahead, one still chooses to remain, or to return.
Mr. Jimmy Lai is precisely someone who made such a choice.
As one of Hong Kong’s most internationally renowned media figures, he was by no means without an exit. He was a highly successful entrepreneur, possessed immense personal wealth, and held a British passport. Leaving Hong Kong would not have been difficult for him; continuing to speak out from overseas was entirely possible. Yet at the critical moment when Hong Kong’s freedoms were rapidly collapsing, he declined the advice of close friends, chose to stay, and was ultimately arrested and imprisoned.
On the eve of his detention, he gave an interview at his home in Kowloon to a BBC journalist. When the reporter attempted to ask—or rather, to remind him—whether he would remain in Hong Kong or move elsewhere to live, he answered calmly before the question was even finished:
“In prison.”
He said:
“Here, I am living calmly; in prison, I am living meaningfully.”
That was not a spontaneous remark. It was the clear self-understanding of a wise elder, fully aware of the path that lay ahead of him.
“To live meaningfully” was not a declaration of passion, but a lucid and solitary road of return.
That road leads to prison, to judgment, and also to history.
The choice did not arise from miscalculation, nor from emotional impulse, but from a sober and weighty judgment.
I. Why Not Leave?
Under authoritarian systems, “leaving” is often regarded as the rational choice.Safety, freedom, the ability to continue speaking out—these reasons appear unassailable.
But the real question is this:when all those with capacity and influence choose to leave, what remains for those who stay?
What is left behind is not only risk, but the forced burden of being labeled “losers” or “the abandoned.”Power completes the hollowing-out of society precisely through this mechanism.
Jimmy Lai refused to let such logic prevail. He said: I cannot leave. Once I leave, it would damage the credibility of Apple Daily and undermine the unity of the democratic movement. This responsibility must be borne by me.
His decision to stay signified a clear stance:not that he was unable to leave, but that he refused to allow “departure” to become the only legitimate choice.
II. When the Body Becomes Evidence
In totalitarian environments, language is the first thing to be distorted and emptied of meaning.Terms such as “rule of law,” “order,” “stability,” and “national security” are endlessly repeated, yet constantly redefined—until they ultimately serve dictatorship itself.
When language loses credibility, human experience becomes the final form of evidence.
Jimmy Lai’s arrest makes one thing unmistakably clear:the so-called “governing Hong Kong according to law” is not the law restraining power, but power commandeering the law.
His trial, in the most direct way possible, also demonstrates this reality:a Hong Kong that once prided itself on the rule of law and freedom has, in just over two decades of CCP rule, rapidly fallen—economic vitality eroded, the legal order collapsing, freedoms extinguished. As a result, all of the CCP’s justifications regarding Hong Kong’s freedom and prosperity appear increasingly hollow before global public opinion.
III. Parallel Roads of Return: Mr. Navalny and Pastor Kim Myung-il
They came from different countries and different faiths, yet they made the same choice.
Alexei Navalny, the Russian opposition leader, after being poisoned and successfully treated, could have chosen to remain in Germany—staying with his family and continuing his struggle by other means. Yet he returned to Russia nonetheless. He knew perfectly well that what awaited him would be imprisonment, and possibly an even grimmer fate. Still, he chose to go back.
Because he understood this: if opposition can exist only in exile, then power has already secured the moral high ground.
His death ultimately laid bare the true nature of Russia’s political system.
In China, by contrast, Pastor Kim Myung-il confronted a different form of oppression. He could originally have chosen to remain in the United States, serve as a pastor there, live comfortably, and stay close to his family.
Yet he chose instead to return to China, where religious freedom is strictly controlled and even systematically dismantled. Fully aware of the constant risk of arrest, he continued to shepherd his congregation, preach, and bear witness.
Pastor Kim’s choice did not arise from political mobilization, but from faith itself. After his arrest, when speaking with visitors, he said that in the past, when he saw other pastors or preachers being detained, he felt powerless and deeply torn; now that he himself had been arrested, he instead felt a sense of calm.
By living out his faith with his own life—through fearless sacrifice—he gave profound expression to what it means to “die for the truth.”
They all understood this:if truth can be proclaimed only in places of safety, it loses its transcendence.
IV. Were Their Sacrifices “Worth It”?
This is a question that cannot be avoided.
Judged by immediate outcomes, their choices did not bring about instant change:Hong Kong did not regain its freedom.Russia did not move toward democracy.China’s space for religion and free expression remains severely constrained.
If measured solely by short-term effectiveness, these sacrifices might seem “not worth the cost.”
But history has never been composed of outcomes alone.The light they cast, however, will guide many out of darkness.
V. An Erasable Meaning That Cannot Be Erased
What authoritarian power most longs to manufacture is a consensus of submission:that lowering one’s head is rational,that silence is maturity,that survival matters more than dignity.
The very existence of Jimmy Lai, Alexei Navalny, and Pastor Kim Myung-il renders this narrative morally bankrupt.
They did not resort to violence, nor did they seek personal gain.They simply refused to cooperate with lies and insisted on truth.
For this very reason, they cannot be completely smeared—and they cannot be easily forgotten.
Conclusion: Those on the Road of Return
They do not ask those who come after them to replicate their path, for sacrifice has never been an obligation.Yet it is precisely because some are willing to bear the heaviest cost that those who follow still retain the freedom to choose whether to stand upright.
On the road of return, some depart, some fall silent, and others go back.
Jimmy Lai and other great martyrs chose return and steadfastness.And that choice itself has already become the clearest—and heaviest—annotation of our time.
Zhao Lingjun (Frank), Saturday, December 20, 2025, Canada
危险国家是天堂，安全国家是地狱—中共的旅行逻辑
作者：毛一炜
编辑：胡景 校对：熊辩 翻译：吕峰
最近看到中国忽然刮起一阵奇怪的风——俄罗斯免签刚落地，各种宣传就像接到命令一样，满屏在喊“快去！特别安全！”柬埔寨那边也是同样的夸法，一个是现实里电诈、绑架频发的国家，一个是前线每天还有炮火，战争都还没结束的国家，能被吹成地球上最值得旅游的地方。要是不知道的人，真的会以为那里是度假胜地。
可偏偏，日本、韩国、欧美这些治安好、制度成熟、游客体验稳定的地方，却被描绘得像洪水猛兽一样。“不安全”、“排华”、“千万别去”——这种话每隔几个月就在国内循环播放。即使是全球犯罪率最低的国家之一的日本，在他们嘴里也是险象环生。
一个常识是，正常国家不会鼓励自己的公民去战区旅行，也不会让人往治安混乱、制度薄弱的地方扎堆。可现实是，中共不仅不提醒，反而拼命催你去。 这不是因为那里安全，而是因为——它放心那些地方不会让你“看清世界”。
你真要去了日本，去了美国，去了欧洲，你看到的新闻自由、社会秩序、法治结构，都足以把它几十年的宣传撕开一个口子。而去俄罗斯、去柬埔寨，你看到的混乱和腐败，反而让你更不会质疑“中国模式”。宣传不是为了你的体验，而是为了它的政治需要。
最讽刺的是，我这段时间在社交平台已经反复刷到中国游客在俄罗斯被黑警勒索的经历：以“没有居住证”为名罚款。免签国家的游客怎么可能有“居住证”？这就是赤裸裸的敲诈。全世界都知道俄警腐败不是一天两天了，但国内宣传从来不提一句，因为那会影响他们塑造的“友好兄弟形象”。
于是就出现了荒诞的反差——中共拼命吹的地方，处处是坑；中共极力阻止你去的地方，反而最安全。
而这种反差在国内早就埋下了伏笔。公务员、老师、银行系统、国企员工，一大片群体的护照被集中收走，不能自由出国。理由永远是那几句机械的“涉密”、“统一管理”，但大家心里都知道：这不是怕泄密，而是怕他们看见自由世界的模样。
所以它必须不断夸大危险、制造恐惧、扭曲现实，让你对真正正常的国家望而却步；同时又极力吹捧那些它能掌控叙事的国家，好让你以为自己“出去看世界”了，实际上不过是在一个更大的信息笼子里打转。
它口中的“危险”，往往只是自由； 它口中的“安全”，往往才是真正的风险。
世界并不是中共描述的那样，但中共最怕的，就是你亲自去看看真正的世界。
Dangerous Countries as Paradise, Safe Countries as Hell — The CCP’s Travel Logic
Abstract:China encourages its citizens to travel to dangerous destinations such as Russia and Cambodia, while issuing travel warnings against one of the world’s safest countries—Japan. This reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s need to maintain its rule through propaganda and ideological conditioning, thereby legitimizing its own oppressive governance.
Author: Mao Yiwei
Editor: Hu Jing Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Lyu Feng
Recently, a peculiar trend has suddenly swept across China. No sooner had visa-free entry to Russia been announced than propaganda surged as if following orders, flooding screens with calls of “Go now! It’s especially safe!” Cambodia has been praised in much the same way. One is a country plagued in reality by rampant telecom fraud and kidnappings; the other is a country where artillery fire continues daily along the front lines, with the war not yet over. Yet both are being touted as the most worthwhile tourist destinations on Earth. Anyone unfamiliar with the facts might truly believe they are idyllic vacation paradises.
Yet paradoxically, places such as Japan, South Korea, Europe, and the United States—countries with good public security, mature institutions, and stable tourist experiences—are portrayed like ferocious beasts. “Unsafe,” “anti-Chinese,” “absolutely don’t go”—such phrases resurface in domestic discourse every few months. Even Japan, one of the countries with the lowest crime rates in the world, is depicted as fraught with danger in their narrative.
A basic common sense is this: a normal country does not encourage its citizens to travel to war zones, nor does it urge people to flock to places with chaotic public security and weak institutions. Yet in reality, the Chinese Communist Party not only fails to warn people, but actively pressures them to go.
This is not because those places are safe, but because—those are places where the authorities feel confident you will not “see the world clearly.”
If you truly go to Japan, to the United States, to Europe, what you encounter—press freedom, social order, and the structure of the rule of law—is enough to tear open a crack in decades of propaganda. But if you go to Russia or Cambodia, the chaos and corruption you witness instead make you less likely to question the so-called “Chinese model.” Propaganda is not designed for your experience; it serves their political needs.
The greatest irony is that recently, I have repeatedly come across accounts on social media of Chinese tourists being extorted by corrupt police in Russia—fined under the pretext of “not having a residence permit.” How could tourists from a visa-free country possibly have a “residence permit”? This is naked extortion. The world has long known that police corruption in Russia is nothing new, yet domestic propaganda never mentions it even once, because that would undermine the carefully crafted image of a “friendly brotherly nation.”
Thus an absurd contrast emerges: the places the CCP desperately promotes are riddled with traps, while the places it fiercely tries to stop you from visiting are in fact the safest.
And this contrast was foreshadowed long ago at home. Passports of large groups—civil servants, teachers, banking system employees, and state-owned enterprise staff—are centrally confiscated, depriving them of the freedom to travel abroad. The justification is always the same mechanical phrases: “involving state secrets,” “unified management.” But everyone knows the truth: it is not about preventing leaks; it is about preventing them from seeing what the free world actually looks like.
That is why it must constantly exaggerate danger, manufacture fear, and distort reality—so that you recoil from truly normal countries; while at the same time lavishly praising those countries whose narratives it can control, making you believe you have “gone out to see the world,” when in fact you are merely circling within a larger information cage.
What it calls “danger” is often nothing more than freedom;what it calls “safety” is often the real risk.
The world is not as the CCP describes it—and what the CCP fears most is that you might go and see the real world for yourself.
当反对派被清除，制度便不再需要解释
——写在香港民主党解散之后
作者：张致君
编辑：李聪玲 责任编辑：钟然 校对：王滨 翻译：刘芳
2025年12月14日，香港民主党宣布解散。
在任何一个正常的政治体制中，反对派的存在，从来不是威胁。恰恰相反，它是一种证明——证明权力仍然承认自身有限，证明制度仍然相信辩论，证明统治仍然愿意被质询、被监督、被纠错。而当一个政权不再允许反对派存在，它真正表达的只有一件事：它已经不再需要被解释。
香港民主党的角色，从来不是推翻秩序。它所做的，只是提醒秩序仍需回应人民。
12月14日，这个成立逾三十年、曾是香港立法会最大反对党的政党，走到了终点。据路透社报道，民主党高层曾被中国官员或中间人接触，被明确告知：若不解散，将面临被捕等严重后果。这不是一次政治竞争的失败，而是一次制度性“清场”的完成。
民主党成立于1994年，诞生于香港仍被视为一个“可以讨论未来”的地方。它长期作为反对派领头羊，主张民主改革，维护自由、人权与法治——这些在过去曾被写入香港政治语言的词汇，如今却变得危险。
2020年，民主党公开反对《国安法》。同年，自行规划初选。结果并非选举失败，而是政治后果：时任党主席胡志伟被捕，反对派整体被视为“风险源”。
2021年，北京彻底重塑香港选举制度，只允许经审查的“爱国者”参选。反对派从议会被逐步清除，不是因为输了选票，而是因为失去了被允许存在的资格。政治不再是竞争，而变成筛选。最终的结局，并不突然。
2025年2月，民主党宣布启动解散程序；4月，授权中委会处理解散与清盘。而12月14日，只是制度逻辑的最后一步。一个不再允许反对派存在的体制，并不是更稳定，而是更脆弱。
因为反对派真正的功能，从来不是夺权，而是让权力记住：它仍然需要解释自己。
当反对派被清除，权力不再需要回答“为什么”；当议会只剩一种声音，错误也失去了被纠正的路径；当制度不再容许不同意见，社会便只剩下顺从与沉默。
而沉默，并不等于认同。香港民主党的解散，并不意味着它曾经代表的价值消失了。它只意味着，这些价值已经无法在公开政治中被表达。在一个仍然自信的制度里，反对派是被容忍的；在一个失去安全感的体制里，反对派是必须被消灭的。
历史会记住的，并不只是一个政党的终结，而是一个城市何时、如何，被剥夺了说“不”的权利。当反对派不再存在，问题从来不是“谁赢了”，而是：这个制度，已经不打算再回答任何人。
When the Opposition Is Eliminated, the System No Longer Needs to Explain Itself
—Written after the Dissolution of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party
Abstract:
The dissolution of the Democratic Party in 2025 marks the institutional eradication of Hong Kong’s opposition. This was not an electoral defeat, but the outcome of political screening. With dissent eliminated, power no longer needs to explain itself, and the system moves toward fragility and enforced silence.
Author: Zhang Zhijun
Editor: Li Congling Executive Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Liu Fang
On December 14, 2025, Hong Kong’s Democratic Party announced its dissolution.
In any normal political system, the existence of an opposition has never been a threat. On the contrary, it is a form of proof—proof that power still recognizes its own limits, that the system still believes in debate, and that governance remains willing to be questioned, supervised, and corrected. When a regime no longer allows an opposition to exist, it is expressing only one thing: it no longer needs to be explained.
The role of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party was never to overthrow the order. What it did was simply to remind that the order still needed to respond to the people.
On December 14, this political party—founded more than thirty years ago and once the largest opposition force in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council—reached its end. According to Reuters, senior figures in the Democratic Party had been approached by Chinese officials or intermediaries and were explicitly told that failure to dissolve the party would result in severe consequences, including arrest. This was not the failure of political competition, but the completion of an institutional “clearance operation.”
Founded in 1994, the Democratic Party was born at a time when Hong Kong was still regarded as a place where the future could be discussed. For many years it served as the leading opposition force, advocating democratic reform and defending freedom, human rights, and the rule of law—terms that were once written into Hong Kong’s political language but have since become dangerous.
In 2020, the Democratic Party openly opposed the National Security Law. That same year, it helped plan a primary election on its own initiative. The outcome was not electoral defeat, but political retribution: then–party chairman Wu Chi-wai was arrested, and the opposition as a whole was treated as a “risk factor.”
In 2021, Beijing comprehensively reshaped Hong Kong’s electoral system, allowing only vetted “patriots” to run for office. The opposition was gradually expelled from the legislature—not because it lost votes, but because it lost the permission to exist. Politics ceased to be competition and became screening. The final outcome was not sudden.
In February 2025, the Democratic Party announced the initiation of dissolution procedures; in April, it authorized its central committee to handle dissolution and liquidation. December 14 was merely the final step in the system’s logic. A system that no longer allows an opposition to exist is not more stable, but more fragile.
Because the true function of an opposition has never been to seize power, but to remind power that it still needs to explain itself.
When the opposition is eliminated, power no longer needs to answer “why”; when the legislature is left with only one voice, errors lose their path to correction; when a system no longer tolerates dissent, society is left with only obedience and silence.
And silence does not equal consent. The dissolution of Hong Kong’s Democratic Party does not mean that the values it once represented have disappeared. It only means that these values can no longer be expressed in open politics. In a system that remains confident, the opposition is tolerated; in a system that has lost its sense of security, the opposition must be destroyed.
History will remember not merely the end of a political party, but when and how a city was stripped of its right to say “no.” When the opposition no longer exists, the question is never “who won,” but whether this system has already decided that it will no longer answer to anyone at all.
周敏：冻馁的幼童与权力垄断的恐惧：为何中共视民间慈善为眼中钉？
作者：周敏
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅
在凛冽的寒风中，偏远地区的孩子穿着破烂单衣，脚上还是夏天的凉鞋，小手被冻得一道道开裂。这是许多中国人都见过的刺痛人心的画面。2015年贵州毕节，四名长期缺乏照料与御寒条件的留守儿童死于破旧屋中，这一事件曾短暂震动全国，却很快被舆论封存。在任何一个正常的文明社会，都会激发起民间排山倒海般的援助。然而，在中国，伸向这些孩子的温暖的手，却总是被名为“政治安全”的冰冷手铐锁住。
人们难道不奇怪吗？一个拥有核武器、拥有庞大的维稳机器的政权，怎么偏偏怕几件棉衣、几箱牛奶和那些奔走在穷乡僻壤的好心人？2018年，多名志愿者在甘肃、青海等地为牧区儿童募集御寒物资时，被以“未经批准开展活动”为由约谈，部分物资被扣留，相关人员被警告不得再组织类似捐助。
现在，让我们像剥洋葱一样慢慢剥开核心。
首先是，救助者有罪：人们的善良超过了权力的边界。
在极权逻辑下，善，不是一种普世价值，而是一种特许经营权。听起来可能荒谬，但是有许多例子。比如，立人图书馆。曾经试图在乡村建立图书馆、开启民智的民间组织“立人”，在云南、贵州等地建立了数十所乡村图书室，却因被认定存在“意识形态风险”，负责人被长期约谈，项目被全面叫停，图书被封存，志愿者网络被强行解散。政府害怕的不是那些书，而是怕孩子们在棉衣之外，还获得了思考的能力。
比如，天使妈妈。多年来，无数非官方的孤独院被强制取缔。一些跨省救助病童、弃婴的志愿者，曾被以“非法社会组织”“扰乱社会管理秩序”为由调查，救助通道被迫中断。官方宁愿让孩子在福利院的破窗里无助地消瘦，也不允许像天使妈妈这样的民间团体展现出超越体制的温情。自2016年《境外非政府组织境内活动管理法》出台以来，无数深耕基层、为弱势群体发声的劳工、性别、教育类NGO被扣上了“境外渗透”的帽子，被连根拔起。在北京、广州、深圳等地，大量民间公益项目被迫注销，负责人被限制出境或长期监控。
这些案例反复证明，在中共当局眼中，一个不受控的救助者，比一个受冻的孩子要危险得多。
其次是独裁者的逻辑：宁愿“绝对控制”，也不要“社会自己救自己”。中国政府对民间慈善的排斥，源自其骨髓深处的三个深度恐惧。
一是恐惧“组织化”的萌芽。独裁政权最害怕的是民众产生横向的联系。慈善活动天然具有动员力和凝聚力，能让互不相识的人为了一个目标团结起来。2021年河南洪灾期间，部分不隶属于官方体系的民间救援队因拒绝接受统一指挥，被禁止进入灾区，而救援迟滞的现场画面却被迅速清理。对于一个推崇“原子化社会”的政权来说，任何能绕过基层党组织的社会纽带，都是对其统治权力的直接威胁。
然后是恐惧“合法化”的流失。中共始终强调，共产党才是幸福的源泉。如果民间组织在灾难和贫困面前表现得比政府更迅速、更透明、更具人文关怀，那民众就会发问：“既然民间能做得更好，我要这个臃肿贪腐的官僚系统何用？”在多次灾害中，民间志愿者通过社交媒体实时公布救援与物资信息，反而被要求删除内容，而官方通报却往往迟至数日之后才出现。为了掩盖无能，它必须扼杀卓越。
第三个恐惧，也是最虚伪的一个原因，就是恐惧真相。每一个需要民间求助的孩子，都是对“大国崛起”和“全面脱贫”谎言的无声控诉。民间慈善的介入，必然伴随着实地调查和信息传播，这会刺破官媒编织的盛世幻境。类似的逻辑在新冠疫情初期已被反复验证：民间记录与求助信息被迅速删除，但问题并未因此消失。他们于是出手了—–既要捂住受难者的嘴，又要斩断救助者的手。
洋葱被剥开以后，就可以站上高墙，低头俯瞰这权力下的寒冬如何凛冽。慈善被收编为“官僚红十字会”式的权力寻租场。当爱心必须经过层层政审才能到达基层，这种体制已经彻底丧失了自我修复的能力。它不仅是在拒绝外界的帮助，更是在扼杀整个国民的道德活力与同情心。
冰天雪地里，孩子依然在瑟瑟发抖，而那个自称为人民服务的政权，正躲在高墙背后，警惕地盯着每一件试图递过墙去的棉衣与书。这种对温情的恐惧，恰恰是共产党内心极度虚弱与恐惧的明证。
Starving Children and the Fear of Power Monopoly
— Why Does the CCP Regard Grassroots Charity as a Thorn in Its Side?
Author: Zhou Min
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Responsible Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei
Abstract:This article aims to explore the deep political logic behind the Chinese government’s high level of vigilance toward grassroots charitable organizations (NGOs), analyzing its fear of “governing legitimacy” and “social mobilization capacity.”
In the biting cold wind, children in remote areas wear tattered thin clothes, still with summer sandals on their feet, their small hands cracked open by the freezing cold. This is a heart-piercing image that many Chinese people have seen. In 2015, in Bijie, Guizhou, four left-behind children who had long lacked care and protection from the cold died in a dilapidated house. This incident briefly shocked the entire country but was quickly sealed off by public opinion. In any normal civilized society, such a tragedy would trigger an overwhelming wave of grassroots assistance. However, in China, the warm hands reaching out to these children are always locked by cold handcuffs called “political security.”
Isn’t this strange? How can a regime that possesses nuclear weapons and a massive stability-maintenance apparatus be afraid of a few padded jackets, several boxes of milk, and kind-hearted people running around remote poor areas? In 2018, when several volunteers raised winter supplies for children in pastoral areas in Gansu and Qinghai, they were summoned for talks on the grounds of “conducting activities without approval.” Some supplies were confiscated, and those involved were warned not to organize similar donations again.
Now, let us slowly peel back the core like peeling an onion.
First, the helpers are guilty: people’s kindness has crossed the boundary of power.
Under totalitarian logic, goodness is not a universal value, but a licensed franchise. This may sound absurd, but there are many examples. Take the Liren Library as one example. The grassroots organization “Liren,” which once attempted to establish libraries in rural areas and awaken public consciousness, built dozens of village reading rooms in Yunnan, Guizhou, and other regions. Yet it was deemed to pose “ideological risks.” Its leaders were repeatedly summoned for talks, projects were completely halted, books were sealed, and volunteer networks were forcibly dismantled. What the government fears is not those books, but the possibility that children might gain the ability to think in addition to receiving padded clothing.
Another example is Angel Moms. For many years, countless unofficial orphanages have been forcibly shut down. Some volunteers who rescued sick children and abandoned infants across provinces were investigated on charges such as “illegal social organizations” and “disrupting social management order,” and rescue channels were forcibly cut off. The authorities would rather let children waste away helplessly behind broken windows of welfare institutions than allow grassroots groups like Angel Moms to display compassion that goes beyond the system. Since the promulgation of the Law on the Management of Domestic Activities of Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations in 2016, countless labor, gender, and education NGOs that worked deeply at the grassroots level and spoke for vulnerable groups have been labeled as “foreign infiltration” and uprooted entirely. In cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, a large number of grassroots public-interest projects were forced to deregister, and their leaders were restricted from leaving the country or placed under long-term surveillance.
These cases repeatedly prove that, in the eyes of the CCP authorities, an uncontrolled helper is far more dangerous than a freezing child.
Second comes the logic of dictators: they would rather maintain “absolute control” than allow “society to save itself.” The Chinese government’s rejection of grassroots charity stems from three deep-seated fears embedded in its very bones.
The first fear is the germination of “organization.” What authoritarian regimes fear most is the emergence of horizontal connections among the populace. Charitable activities naturally possess mobilizing and cohesive power, enabling strangers to unite around a common goal. During the Henan floods in 2021, some grassroots rescue teams not affiliated with the official system were barred from entering disaster areas for refusing to accept unified command, while images of delayed rescue scenes were quickly erased. For a regime that promotes an “atomized society,” any social bond that bypasses grassroots Party organizations constitutes a direct threat to its ruling power.
The second fear is the loss of “legitimacy.” The CCP has long emphasized that only the Communist Party is the source of happiness. If grassroots organizations perform more quickly, more transparently, and with greater humanitarian concern than the government in the face of disasters and poverty, the public will inevitably ask: “If civil society can do better, what use is this bloated and corrupt bureaucratic system?” In multiple disasters, grassroots volunteers released real-time rescue and supply information through social media, only to be ordered to delete the content, while official announcements often appeared days later. In order to conceal incompetence, excellence must be strangled.
The third fear, and the most hypocritical one, is fear of the truth. Every child who requires grassroots assistance is a silent indictment of the lies of “national rejuvenation” and “comprehensive poverty alleviation.” Grassroots charity inevitably involves field investigation and information dissemination, which pierces the illusion of prosperity woven by state media. Similar logic was repeatedly verified in the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic: grassroots records and calls for help were swiftly deleted, yet the problems themselves did not disappear. Thus, they took action—covering the mouths of the suffering while severing the hands of the helpers.
Once the onion is fully peeled, one can stand atop the high walls and look down upon how bitter the winter beneath this power truly is. Charity has been absorbed into a “bureaucratic Red Cross”-style arena of power rent-seeking. When compassion must pass through layers of political vetting before reaching the grassroots, such a system has completely lost its capacity for self-repair. It is not merely rejecting outside help; it is suffocating the moral vitality and compassion of the entire nation.
In the ice and snow, children still shiver, while the regime that claims to serve the people hides behind high walls, vigilantly staring at every padded jacket and every book that attempts to be passed over the wall. This fear of warmth is precisely the clearest proof of the Communist Party’s profound inner weakness and terror.
旧金山民运人士集会声援黎智英
抗议中共国安法摧毁香港繁荣 呼吁释放所有政治犯
《在野党》记者 缪青 旧金山报道
编辑：钟然 责任编辑：张娜 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅
摄影：关永杰
旧金山讯：2025年12月21日下午，中国民主党旧金山党部在旧金山中国领事馆前举行公开抗议集会，强烈谴责中共当局以《香港国安法》对香港民主人士、壹传媒创办人、《苹果日报》创办人黎智英作出有罪判决，要求中共立即释放黎智英，并释放所有因言获罪、因和平表达而被关押的政治犯与良心犯。
本次集会以“要求中共立即释放黎智英！民主英雄无罪！独裁暴政有罪！”为主题，吸引多位中国民主党党员、民主人士及国际友人到场参与。现场气氛庄重而坚定，抗议者持续向外界传递反对中共极权、捍卫自由法治的明确立场。
政治判决震动国际社会
2025年12月15日，香港高等法院裁定78岁的黎智英两项“串谋勾结外国势力危害国家安全罪”及一项“串谋发布煽动刊物罪”罪名成立。该案被广泛视为一宗彻头彻尾的政治审判，是中共借《国安法》之名，对香港新闻自由、司法独立和社会良知实施系统性清算的标志性事件。
黎智英自1989年“六·四”事件后公开反对中共暴政，1995年创办《苹果日报》，长期坚持报道“六·四”真相、揭露专制体制、支持香港民主运动。2019年“反送中”运动期间，他多次走上街头声援抗争者。2020年被捕后，壹传媒资产被冻结，《苹果日报》被迫停刊，香港言论自由由此遭受重创。
集会发言：为自由与未来发声
本次集会由中国民主党党员高应芬女士主持。她在开场发言中指出，黎智英本可安享自由与财富，却因选择良知与信念失去了自由，这种牺牲本身已揭示判决的不公正。她强调，坚持良知不是罪行，今天的抗议不仅是为了黎智英，更是为了所有被囚禁的良心犯。
中国民主党党员 活动主持人高应芬（摄影关永杰）
作为活动组织者之一，中国民主党旧金山支部党员李栩在发言中指出，12月15日的判决不是司法，而是赤裸裸的政治迫害。黎智英唯一的“罪行”，就是坚持自由、捍卫新闻、说出真相。“一国两制”早已名存实亡，香港法律正被扭曲为镇压工具。他呼吁社会拒绝沉默，停止纵容中共的政治审判，还香港自由，还中国自由。
活动组织者之一 中国民主党党员李栩（摄影关永杰）
中国民主党党员庄帆在发言中指出，黎智英是民主英雄，是香港自由精神的重要象征。中共对其长期关押，是对人权与法治的公然践踏。他强调，习近平利用《国安法》将个人政治意志包装成法律工具，对黎智英的定罪不是普通司法案件，而是香港的耻辱，是法治被系统性摧毁的铁证，更是对整个社会的恐吓与示范。
中国民主党党员庄帆（摄影关永杰）
国际友人、八九“六·四”天安门屠杀亲历者：赛颂菲（Valerie Sansome）在现场表示，香港长期被视为自由与机会的灯塔，许多人为此给予了极大支持。黎智英深刻理解香港的价值，并清楚自己所承担的风险，却依然选择挺身而出。她强调，尊重黎智英的选择，是对人权与自由最基本的承认，只要有机会，人们就应站出来，永远不要放弃。
国际友人、八九六四天安门屠杀亲历者：赛颂菲（Valerie Sansome）（摄影关永杰）
中国民主党党员何聪指出，香港过去的经济与国际地位，建立在民主、法治与自由基础之上，也正因为有黎智英这样的人，通过媒体传播自由思想，与世界民主国家接轨。中共一方面将黎智英投入监狱，另一方面却妄想复制香港模式建立所谓“海南自由港”，这是不可能实现的幻想。
中国民主党党员何聪（摄影关永杰）
中国民主党党员吕小静在发言中表示，人们站出来抗议，并非出于对抗的偏好，而是被迫不能再沉默。她指出，黎智英不是罪犯，真正有罪的是把法律变成武器、用《国安法》囚禁思想的独裁制度。她强调，没有自由的安全是谎言，没有法治的稳定是暴力，为了下一代不再恐惧，人们必须发声。
中国民主党党员吕小静（摄影关永杰）
中国民主党党员李小林表示，香港曾是自由民主、引以为傲的国际金融中心，而《国安法》实施后，自由、民主与人权迅速消失。中共借法律之名肆意抓捕、践踏人权，害怕真相，因此必须被揭露。他呼吁国际社会认清中共本质，对其进行制裁，并要求立即释放黎智英及所有政治犯、良心犯。
中国民主党党员李小林（摄影关永杰）
民主人士袁强在发言中指出，呼吁释放黎智英并非只为了一个人，而是关乎一个民族是否仍有未来。他强调，一个社会若连说真话、和平表达都要被送进监狱，那么被囚禁的不只是个人，而是整个社会的良知。释放黎智英，是向下一代明确宣示：讲真话不是罪，坚持良知不是罪。
民主人士袁强（摄影关永杰）
为时代良知作结
集会最后，中国民主党旧金山党部宣传部副部长缪青发言指出，黎智英案件早已超越香港本地事务，成为对全世界的警讯。当极权可以随意定义“犯罪”，法律便不再是正义的工具。他呼吁国际社会不要以沉默换取虚假的稳定，不要遗忘一位因信念而入狱的老人。
中国民主党旧金山党部宣传部副部长 本次集会发起人 缪青（摄影关永杰）
抗议仍在继续
集会期间，抗议者多次高呼“释放黎智英”“释放所有良心犯”“还我人权、还我民主、还我自由”等口号。主办方表示，将持续以和平方式发声，推动国际社会关注香港人权危机。
正如现场多位发言人所指出的那样：当一个政权害怕文字、记者与人民时，它已经失去了合法性；而黎智英，正是这个时代良知的象征。
参加本次活动的民运人士名单：方政，赛颂菲等（国际友人三人），缪青，刘静涛，关永杰，庄帆，陈森峰，郭志军，何聪，高应芬，李树青，卫仁喜，汪峰，李小林，高俊影，袁强，郭超，周志刚，吕小静，卢占强，韩锦瑞，郭鉴鑫，曾德泰（排名不分先后）
San Francisco Democracy Activists Rally in Support of Jimmy LaiProtesting the CCP’s National Security Law for Destroying Hong Kong’s Prosperity and Calling for the Release of All Political Prisoners
Opposition Party reporter Miao Qing, San Francisco
Editor: Zhong Ran Responsible Editor: Zhang Na Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei
Abstract:On December 21, 2025, the San Francisco branch of the Chinese Democracy Party held a rally in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco to protest the Chinese Communist Party’s conviction of Jimmy Lai under the Hong Kong National Security Law, condemn political trials, and call for the immediate release of Jimmy Lai as well as all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience, in defense of press freedom and the rule of law.
Photography: Guan Yongjie
San Francisco News: On the afternoon of December 21, 2025, the San Francisco branch of the Chinese Democracy Party held a public protest rally in front of the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, strongly condemning the Chinese Communist authorities for convicting Hong Kong democracy activist, founder of Next Digital, and founder of Apple Daily, Jimmy Lai, under the Hong Kong National Security Law. The rally demanded that the CCP immediately release Jimmy Lai and free all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience who have been jailed for their speech and peaceful expression.
The rally was themed “Demand the Immediate Release of Jimmy Lai! Democratic Heroes Are Not Guilty! Dictatorial Tyranny Is Guilty!” and attracted members of the Chinese Democracy Party, democracy activists, and international friends. The atmosphere at the scene was solemn and resolute, with protesters continuously conveying a clear stance opposing CCP totalitarianism and defending freedom and the rule of law.
Political Verdict Shocks the International CommunityOn December 15, 2025, the Hong Kong High Court ruled that 78-year-old Jimmy Lai was guilty on two counts of “conspiracy to collude with foreign forces to endanger national security” and one count of “conspiracy to publish seditious publications.” The case has been widely regarded as an out-and-out political trial and a landmark event in which the CCP, under the name of the National Security Law, carried out a systematic purge of Hong Kong’s press freedom, judicial independence, and social conscience.
After the 1989 June Fourth Incident, Jimmy Lai publicly opposed CCP tyranny and in 1995 founded Apple Daily, persistently reporting on the truth of June Fourth, exposing authoritarian rule, and supporting Hong Kong’s democratic movement. During the 2019 anti-extradition movement, he repeatedly took to the streets to support protesters. After his arrest in 2020, the assets of Next Digital were frozen and Apple Daily was forced to shut down, dealing a devastating blow to freedom of expression in Hong Kong.
Speeches at the Rally: Speaking for Freedom and the FutureThe rally was hosted by Ms. Gao Yingfen, a member of the Chinese Democracy Party. In her opening remarks, she pointed out that Jimmy Lai could have enjoyed freedom and wealth yet lost his freedom because he chose conscience and conviction. This sacrifice itself exposes the injustice of the verdict. She emphasized that adhering to conscience is not a crime, and that today’s protest is not only for Jimmy Lai, but for all imprisoned prisoners of conscience.
Member of the Chinese Democracy Party, Event Host Gao Yingfen (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
As one of the organizers of the event, Li Xu, a member of the San Francisco branch of the Chinese Democracy Party, stated in his speech that the December 15 verdict was not justice, but naked political persecution. Jimmy Lai’s only “crime” is his insistence on freedom, defense of journalism, and speaking the truth. “One country, two systems” has long existed in name only, and Hong Kong’s laws are being twisted into tools of repression. He called on society to refuse silence, stop condoning the CCP’s political trials, return freedom to Hong Kong, and return freedom to China.
One of the Event Organizers, Member of the Chinese Democracy Party Li Xu (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
Chinese Democracy Party member Zhuang Fan stated that Jimmy Lai is a democratic hero and an important symbol of Hong Kong’s spirit of freedom. The CCP’s long-term imprisonment of him is a blatant trampling of human rights and the rule of law. He emphasized that Xi Jinping has packaged his personal political will as a legal instrument through the National Security Law, and that Jimmy Lai’s conviction is not an ordinary judicial case but a disgrace to Hong Kong, ironclad evidence of the systematic destruction of the rule of law, and a warning and demonstration directed at the entire society.
Member of the Chinese Democracy Party Zhuang Fan (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
International friend and witness to the 1989 June Fourth Tiananmen Massacre, Valerie Sansome, stated at the scene that Hong Kong was long regarded as a beacon of freedom and opportunity, and many people offered it great support for this reason. Jimmy Lai deeply understood Hong Kong’s value and clearly knew the risks he bore yet still chose to stand up. She emphasized that respecting Jimmy Lai’s choice is the most basic recognition of human rights and freedom, and that whenever there is an opportunity, people should stand up and never give up.
International Friend and Eyewitness to the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre: Valerie Sansome (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
Chinese Democracy Party member He Cong pointed out that Hong Kong’s past economic success and international status were built on the foundations of democracy, rule of law, and freedom, and that it was precisely because of people like Jimmy Lai who spread free ideas through the media and connected Hong Kong with democratic countries around the world. On the one hand, the CCP throws Jimmy Lai into prison, while on the other hand it fantasizes about copying the Hong Kong model to build a so-called “Hainan Free Trade Port,” which is an impossible illusion.
Member of the Chinese Democracy Party He Cong (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
Chinese Democracy Party member Lü Xiaojing stated that people came out to protest not because they prefer confrontation, but because they are forced to no longer remain silent. She pointed out that Jimmy Lai is not a criminal; those truly guilty are the dictatorial system that turns law into a weapon and imprisons thought with the National Security Law. She emphasized that security without freedom is a lie, stability without the rule of law is violence, and that for the sake of the next generation living without fear, people must speak out.
Member of the Chinese Democracy Party Lü Xiaojing (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
Chinese Democracy Party member Li Xiaolin stated that Hong Kong was once a free and democratic international financial center that people were proud of, but after the implementation of the National Security Law, freedom, democracy, and human rights rapidly disappeared. The CCP arbitrarily arrests people and tramples human rights in the name of law, fearing the truth and therefore needing to be exposed. He called on the international community to recognize the true nature of the CCP, impose sanctions on it, and demand the immediate release of Jimmy Lai and all political prisoners and prisoners of conscience.
Member of the Chinese Democracy Party Li Xiaolin (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
Democracy activist Yuan Qiang stated that calling for Jimmy Lai’s release is not only about one individual, but about whether a nation still has a future. He emphasized that if a society sends people to prison simply for telling the truth and expressing themselves peacefully, then what is imprisoned is not just individuals, but the conscience of the entire society. Releasing Jimmy Lai is a clear declaration to the next generation: telling the truth is not a crime, and adhering to conscience is not a crime.
Democracy Activist Yuan Qiang (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
A Conclusion for the Conscience of the TimesAt the end of the rally, Miao Qing, Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the San Francisco branch of the Chinese Democracy Party and initiator of the event, stated that the Jimmy Lai case has long transcended Hong Kong’s local affairs and has become a warning to the entire world. When authoritarian power can arbitrarily define “crime,” the law is no longer a tool of justice. She called on the international community not to trade silence for false stability, and not to forget an elderly man imprisoned for his beliefs.
Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the San Francisco Branch of the Chinese Democracy Party, Initiator of This Rally, Miao Qing (Photo by Guan Yongjie)
The Protest ContinuesDuring the rally, protesters repeatedly chanted slogans such as “Free Jimmy Lai,” “Free All Prisoners of Conscience,” and “Give Me Back My Human Rights, Give Me Back My Democracy, Give Me Back My Freedom.” The organizers stated that they will continue to speak out in peaceful ways and push the international community to pay attention to Hong Kong’s human rights crisis.
As many speakers at the scene pointed out: when a regime fears words, journalists, and the people, it has already lost its legitimacy; and Jimmy Lai is precisely a symbol of the conscience of this era.
Participants in this event included: Fang Zheng, Valerie Sansome and others (three international friends), Miao Qing, Liu Jingtao, Guan Yongjie, Zhuang Fan, Chen Senfeng, Guo Zhijun, He Cong, Gao Yingfen, Li Shuqing, Wei Renxi, Wang Feng, Li Xiaolin, Gao Junying, Yuan Qiang, Guo Chao, Zhou Zhigang, Lü Xiaojing, Lu Zhanqiang, Han Jinrui, Guo Jianxin, and Zeng Detai (listed in no particular order).
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一党独裁，遍地是灾
作者：张维清
编辑：李堃 责任编辑：侯改英 校对：王滨 翻译：刘芳
2025年11月26日，香港新界大埔区宏福苑发生严重火灾，死亡人数达到159人。
灾难从来不是偶然，而往往是制度的产物。当权力不受制衡、新闻透明被压制、民众权利被剥夺时，一个接一个的惨剧便不再是意外，而成为可以预见的悲剧。
1994年，新疆克拉玛依友谊馆发生特大火灾。火势蔓延时，当局竟然决定“让领导先走”，最终造成325人死亡，其中绝大多数是学生。事后没有独立调查，也没有透明问责、没有制度性的反思。死亡被定性为“事故”，而不是一个需要追责和改变的社会问题。
2022年11月，乌鲁木齐一处住宅楼发生火灾。由于长期封控等制度性措施，居民逃生受阻、救援迟缓，最终造成10人死亡。民众的愤怒迅速蔓延，演化为上海、北京等地的“白纸革命”。人们用空白纸控诉审查，最终喊出了亿万人民的心声：“习近平下台”！
2025年11月26日，香港新界大埔区宏福苑发生严重火灾，死亡人数达到159人。劣质材料、层层外判、监管失能、媒体噤声、民众投诉被当作空气——这一切都不是所谓的“疏忽”。这是制度性犯罪，是政治体制从骨子里烂到外墙的结果。当大火夺走生命时，中共首先做的不是追责，而是压制；不是公布真相，而是封口；不是保护人民，而是保护官僚和利益集团。
从克拉玛依的325人死亡、乌鲁木齐的封控悲剧，到宏福苑的159人死亡，贯穿其中的不是偶发意外，而是一个清晰的制度性危机。当权力无法被监督，决策者就会漠视底层民众的生命安全；当真实信息被过滤或封锁，事故原因就无法被透明调查和追究；当没有独立调查与责任追究，错误就不会被纠正，悲剧只会再重演；当公民无法参与决策、无法表达异议，风险就无法提前暴露和防范。
独裁和极权，是最大的公共安全威胁。只要这种体制存在，火灾会继续发生，矿难会继续发生，沉船会继续发生，塌楼会继续发生。只有当公众可以质疑权力、权力必须面对公众时，制度才能真正对生命负责。
一党独裁，遍地是灾；结束一党独裁，势在必行！
One-Party Dictatorship, Disasters Everywhere
Author: Zhang Weiqing
Editor: Li Kun Executive Editor: Hou Gaiying Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Liu Fang
Abstract: By reviewing events such as the Karamay fire, the Urumqi residential building fire, and the 2025 Hong Fook Court fire in Hong Kong, this article argues that these tragedies were not accidental incidents, but the result of systemic problems rooted in a lack of power oversight, information opacity, and the suppression of civil rights. The author contends that a one-party dictatorial system is the fundamental cause of the repeated occurrence of public safety disasters.
On November 26, 2025, a major fire broke out at Hong Fook Court in Tai Po District, New Territories, Hong Kong, with the death toll reaching 159.
Disasters are never accidental; they are often products of the system itself. When power is unchecked, press transparency is suppressed, and citizens’ rights are stripped away, one tragedy after another ceases to be an accident and instead becomes a foreseeable outcome.
In 1994, a catastrophic fire occurred at the Friendship Hall in Karamay, Xinjiang. As the flames spread, the authorities astonishingly decided to “let the leaders leave first,” ultimately resulting in 325 deaths, the vast majority of whom were students. Afterward, there was no independent investigation, no transparent accountability, and no institutional reflection. The deaths were classified as an “accident,” rather than a social problem requiring responsibility and change.
In November 2022, a residential building fire broke out in Urumqi. Due to prolonged lockdowns and other systemic measures, residents were blocked from escaping and rescue efforts were delayed, resulting in ten deaths. Public anger quickly spread, evolving into the “White Paper Revolution” in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities. People used blank sheets of paper to denounce censorship, eventually voicing the cry of hundreds of millions: “Xi Jinping, step down!”
On November 26, 2025, a major fire erupted at Hong Fook Court in Tai Po District, New Territories, Hong Kong, killing 159 people. Inferior materials, layers of subcontracting, regulatory failure, silenced media, and public complaints treated as if they did not exist—none of this was mere “negligence.” This was a systemic crime, the result of a political system rotten from its very core to its outer walls. When the fire claimed lives, the CCP’s first response was not accountability but suppression; not disclosure of the truth but enforced silence; not protection of the people but protection of officials and vested interests.
From the 325 deaths in Karamay, to the lockdown tragedy in Urumqi, to the 159 deaths at Hong Fook Court, what runs through these events is not a series of isolated accidents but a clear systemic crisis. When power cannot be supervised, decision-makers will disregard the lives and safety of ordinary people; when real information is filtered or blocked, the causes of accidents cannot be transparently investigated or pursued; when there is no independent investigation or accountability, mistakes will not be corrected and tragedies will inevitably repeat; when citizens cannot participate in decision-making or express dissent, risks cannot be exposed or prevented in advance.
Dictatorship and totalitarianism are the greatest threats to public safety. As long as such a system exists, fires will continue to occur, mining disasters will continue to occur, shipwrecks will continue to occur, and building collapses will continue to occur. Only when the public can question power, and power is forced to face the public, can institutions truly be held accountable for human life.
One-party dictatorship means disasters everywhere; ending one-party dictatorship is imperative!
“人类命运共同体”
——看Gloria画展有感
作者：何愚
编辑：黄吉洲 责任编辑：张娜 校对：熊辩 翻译：刘芳
Figure 1图片来自Gloria
2025年11月29日上午10点，我与朱虞夫先生、曾群兰女士等友人一同前往位于La Puente的“六·四”纪念博物馆。洛杉矶的十一月空气清新宜人，但当我们在工作人员的引导下，逐一走近那些揭露中共邪恶的画作时，心情却愈发沉重。这些作品出自艺术家Gloria及其丈夫Jin之手，既充满讽刺与现实意义，又不乏幽默。Gloria夫妇对中国政治的深刻洞察和对未来的忧虑令我印象深刻。尤其这幅讽刺中共和习近平妄图统治全球乃至全人类的画作，我将其称为“习近平的‘人类命运共同体’”，观后令人不寒而栗，深感警醒。
画中揭示了习近平试图以“武汉病毒”为手段，将全世界人民的命运捆绑在一根铁索之上，如同铁链女般，这样他就可以让自己高枕无忧并“活到一百五十岁”。这看似荒谬，实则令人恐惧——而这一切真真切切地发生了。三年疫情，从最初的隐瞒到后来的放任扩散，全球在短短数月内陷入紧急状态，几乎无一幸免。紧接着，他亲自部署、指挥，将中国的口罩销往世界各地，让N95口罩从医护专用品变为全球标配。他还将管理新疆人的极端手段，悄然推广至世界每个角落，在各国政府和人民毫无防备之时悄然实施。据世卫组织估计显示，仅在2020年1月1日至2021年12月31日，这次灾难造成全世界逾1490万人死亡。然而，这个世界终究掌握在上帝手中，疫情终将过去，世界秩序得以恢复，邪恶势力终将被抛弃。中国人的苦难虽未终结，但我相信，这既是转折，也是一个全新的开端——中国人在觉醒，世界也在觉醒。
回望七十余年，中国共产党始终以政治运动和意识形态塑造出一个与世界隔绝的铁桶社会。
建政初期，毛泽东在苏联支持下巩固权力，以“革命”之名推动社会改造，将传统文化视为落后与阻碍，进行系统性清除。中国人失去了文化与信仰的依托，取而代之的是“只有共产党才能救中国”的空洞口号。在高强度洗脑和国家机器的压迫下，国人逐渐沦为可操控的“人肉电池”，服务于国际共产主义和中共政权。
随后的阶级斗争、三反五反、大跃进等一系列运动，让政治高压和社会动员成为常态，经济则在浮夸与失序中陷入衰退。1989年的抗议，是社会不满的集中爆发，最终却以武力镇压和屠杀收场。全世界为之震惊，但大多数中国人已在饥饿、死亡、监禁与孤立中麻木，难以再抗争。
事件之后，邓小平推行改革开放，将经济增长和市场活力视为延续政权的关键。中国人为中共续命一代代付出牺牲，成为体制的“螺丝钉”。经济发展带来更严密的思想与行为控制，现代科技巨资打造的网络防火墙，让中国人只能听一种声音、看一个图像。街道和社区监控系统的建设，实现了网格化管理，十户一长，从生活细节到情感变化无所不控。960万平方公里的土地，俨然成了巨大的监狱，行走其间的公民无时无刻不在中共的严密监控之下。
Figure 2此图来自自由亚洲电台
改革开放的确推动了城市的扩张、制造业的崛起以及民众生活水平的提升，但与此同时，环境破坏、贫富差距矛盾的加剧和价值体系的断裂也随之而来。社会的急速变迁并未带来制度上的同步开放，反而催生了一种依赖经济增长却压制社会表达的畸形结构。这种结构不仅阻碍了中国经济的持续发展，甚至导致倒退。随着大型外企不断撤资，失业人口持续增加，社会的不安情绪逐渐蔓延。尽管中共不断出台各类预防措施，试图阻止农民返乡等现象，但在我看来，中国已然站在了一个即将发生巨大变革的风口之上。
进入习近平时代，官方提出了“人类命运共同体”这一概念，试图将其包装为全球合作的新愿景。然而，在许多人眼中，这更像是将国内治理模式向外延伸的工具。在“一带一路”政策遭遇失败后，习近平已然黔驴技穷，无计可施，却仍以极权体制为依托，试图通过病毒控制全人类，令全球人民在三年疫情中饱受苦难。
这一理念强调话语权主导、政治统一和制度自信，却刻意回避权力监督与个人自由。当国内经济和社会发展陷入瓶颈时，这种外向叙事成为新的政治工具，用以扩大影响力，同时缓解内部压力。
回顾历史，无论是毛泽东时期的阶级斗争，邓小平时代的经济驱动，还是习近平的全球叙事，其核心逻辑始终围绕权力的维系展开。尽管各阶段的策略和口号不断变化，但其根本目的始终未变。对于许多中国人而言，这样的逻辑带来的并非所谓的共同命运，而是持续不断的结构性束缚。
“A Community of Shared Future for Mankind”
— Reflections on Visiting Gloria’s Art Exhibition
Author: He Yu
Editor: Huang Jizhou Executive Editor: Zhang Na Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Liu Fang
Abstract: This essay reflects on an art exhibition jointly held by Gloria and her husband, using sharp satire to expose the Chinese Communist regime’s conduct during the three years of the COVID-19 pandemic. It offers an in-depth analysis of the evolution of totalitarian rule from the Mao era to the Xi era and warns the world of the need for awakening in order to bring an end to systemic bondage.
Figure 1 Image source: Gloria
At 10 a.m. on November 29, 2025, I visited the June Fourth Memorial Museum in La Puente together with friends including Mr. Zhu Yufu and Ms. Zeng Qunlan. The air in Los Angeles in November was fresh and pleasant, yet as we were guided by the staff and approached, one by one, the artworks exposing the evils of the Chinese Communist Party, our mood grew increasingly heavy. These works were created by the artists Gloria and her husband Jin. They are rich in satire and realism, while also infused with humor. The couple’s profound insight into Chinese politics and their concern for the future left a deep impression on me. In particular, this painting that satirizes the CCP and Xi Jinping’s delusional ambition to rule the world and even all humanity, which I call “Xi Jinping’s ‘Community of Shared Future for Mankind,’” is chilling to behold and deeply alarming.
The painting reveals Xi Jinping’s attempt to use the “Wuhan virus” as a means to bind the fate of all people in the world to a single iron chain, rendering them, like the chained woman, completely constrained, so that he himself could rest easy and even fantasize about “living to one hundred and fifty years old.” This may sound absurd, yet it is profoundly terrifying—and it truly happened. During the three years of the pandemic, from initial concealment to subsequent deliberate neglect and spread, the world fell into a state of emergency within just a few months, sparing almost no one. He then personally deployed and directed the export and dumping of Chinese masks around the world, turning N95 masks from specialized medical equipment into a global necessity. He also quietly extended the extreme methods used to control people in Xinjiang to every corner of the world, implementing them while governments and populations everywhere were caught unprepared. According to estimates by the World Health Organization, between January 1, 2020 and December 31, 2021 alone, this disaster caused more than 14.9 million deaths worldwide. Yet the world ultimately rests in God’s hands. The pandemic would eventually pass, order would be restored, and evil forces would be cast aside. Although the suffering of the Chinese people has not yet ended, I believe this is both a turning point and a brand-new beginning—Chinese people are awakening, and the world is awakening as well.
Looking back over more than seventy years, the Chinese Communist Party has consistently used political campaigns and ideology to shape a tightly sealed society isolated from the world.
In the early years of the regime, Mao Zedong consolidated his power with Soviet support and, in the name of “revolution,” carried out sweeping social transformations. Traditional culture was deemed backward and obstructive and was systematically eradicated. The Chinese people lost their cultural and spiritual foundations, replaced by the hollow slogan that “only the Communist Party can save China.” Under intense indoctrination and the oppression of the state apparatus, the populace gradually degenerated into controllable “human batteries,” serving international communism and the CCP regime.
Subsequent campaigns—class struggle, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and the Great Leap Forward—made political repression and mass mobilization the norm, while the economy slid into decline amid exaggeration and disorder. The protests of 1989 were a concentrated eruption of social discontent, yet they ended in military suppression and massacre. The world was shocked, but most Chinese people had already been numbed by hunger, death, imprisonment, and isolation, leaving them unable to resist.
After these events, Deng Xiaoping launched reform and opening up, treating economic growth and market vitality as the key to prolonging the regime’s survival. Generation after generation of Chinese people sacrificed themselves to keep the CCP alive, becoming mere “screws” in the system. Economic development brought with it even tighter control over thought and behavior. Massive investment in modern technology built the Great Firewall, allowing Chinese people to hear only one voice and see only one narrative. The construction of street-level and community surveillance systems enabled grid-style governance, with “one leader for every ten households,” monitoring everything from daily life to emotional changes. The 9.6 million square kilometers of land effectively became a gigantic prison, where citizens moving within it are under constant and close surveillance by the CCP.
Figure 2 Image source: Radio Free Asia
Reform and opening up did indeed drive urban expansion, the rise of manufacturing, and improvements in living standards. At the same time, however, environmental destruction, widening wealth gaps, and the collapse of value systems followed. Rapid social transformation did not bring about corresponding institutional openness; instead, it produced a distorted structure that relies on economic growth while suppressing social expression. This structure not only hinders China’s sustainable economic development but has even led to regression. As large foreign enterprises continue to withdraw and unemployment rises, social anxiety is steadily spreading. Although the CCP has introduced various preventive measures in an attempt to stop phenomena such as rural return migration, in my view China already stands at the threshold of profound transformation.
Entering the Xi Jinping era, the official slogan of a “Community of Shared Future for Mankind” was put forward, packaged as a new vision for global cooperation. In the eyes of many, however, it is more like a tool for extending domestic governance models outward. After the failure of the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi Jinping has exhausted his options, yet still relies on a totalitarian system, attempting to control all humanity through a virus and subjecting people around the world to three years of suffering.
This concept emphasizes discourse dominance, political unity, and institutional self-confidence, while deliberately avoiding power oversight and individual freedom. When domestic economic and social development fall into bottlenecks, this outward-facing narrative becomes a new political instrument to expand influence and relieve internal pressure.
Looking back at history, whether it was Mao Zedong’s class struggle, Deng Xiaoping’s economic drive, or Xi Jinping’s global narrative, the core logic has always revolved around the preservation of power. Although strategies and slogans have changed from one stage to another, the fundamental objective has remained the same. For many Chinese people, the result of this logic is not a so-called shared destiny, but an unending system of structural bondage.
