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从黎智英案看威权体制下新闻⾃由与法治的系统性崩塌

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⸺兼论现代普世⼈权与威权治理逻辑的根本冲突

作者:Cooper Guan/《在野党》采访部记者
编辑:李晶 翻译:彭小梅

⼀、 ⼀场被重新定义的“新闻审判”

黎智英案并⾮普通的刑事案件 它更像是⼀场具有象征意义的政治审判。

案件的核⼼争议,不仅是个⼈⾏为是否触法,⽽是新闻活动本身是否被定义为国家安全威胁。在现代法治国家,新闻⾃由是权⼒监督的重要机制,⽽在威权政治结构中信息控制则被用作维持统治合法性的核⼼⼯具。

黎智英的审判实际上反映了⼀个问题:当权⼒将自由⾔论视为⻛险时,法律是否仍然是法律,还是仅成为政治⼯具。

⼆、 新闻⾃由的国际法基准与现实背离

国际社会对于新闻⾃由与表达⾃由有明确规范:

世界⼈权宣⾔ 第19条,明确保障思想、 良⼼与表达⾃由 包括传播信息的权利。

公⺠权利和政治权利国际公约 ICCPR,将新闻与⾔论⾃由列为核⼼基本权利。

联合国⼈权理事会多次强调,国家安全不得成为压制媒体的模糊性理由。

黎智英案所引发的争议,恰恰集中在以下⼏点:

首先,国家安全概念的⽆限扩张。新闻评论、 国际交流被纳⼊“危害国家安全”的范畴。

其次,法律的模糊性与追溯性适⽤,使⾏为⼈在事前难以判断合法边界。

第三,本案程序公正的国际质疑。包括陪审制度变化、 审理透明度下降等。

当法律不再提供清晰预期时,新闻⼯作者⾯对的将不再是法律⻛险,⽽是制度性危险。

三、 威权信息治理,从内容管理到思想控制

黎智英案并不是孤⽴事件 ⽽是更⼤信息管控体系的⼀部分。这⼀体系具有典型特征:

特征一,从“内容审查”升级为“意图审查”

不再仅关注具体信息真假 ⽽是追究观点⽴场与其产生的潜在影响。

特征二,从“违规处罚”转向“刑事化表达”

⾏政监管逐步升级为刑事指控 形成寒蝉效应。

特征三,从“媒体管理”延伸⾄个⼈表达

普通公⺠的社交媒体⾔论也被纳⼊管控范围。

这种模式的结果是: 新闻机构趋于⾃我审查;公共讨论空间急剧收缩;社会共识形成机制被削弱。最终,社会失去真实信息与理性讨论能⼒。

四、 新闻伦理的悖论,当追求真相成为⻛险

新闻职业伦理要求:独⽴调查、权⼒监督、公开讨论。但在被⾼度控制的信息环境中,这些职业要求反⽽可能成为⻛险来源。

这产生⼀种结构性悖论,越专业、 越独⽴的新闻⾏为,越可能被视为威胁。⻓期来看,这影响将从传媒行业扩张至整个社会。使学术研究受限,创作表达萎缩,让公共政策失去反馈机制,最终损害国家治理本身的理性基础。

五、 法治的核⼼不是法律⽂本,⽽是权⼒边界

真正的法治,不取决于律的数量,⽽是看法律是否限制权⼒,法律是否保障少数派与异⻅者,法律是否具有可预期性。如果法律主要⽤于规范⾔论、定义思想、惩罚批评,那么它更接近“统治技术” ,⽽⾮现代意义上的法治。

黎智英案引发的国际关注,本质上并⾮针对个案,⽽是对法律⼯具化趋势的系统性担忧。

六、 社会舆论的⻓远影响:信任结构的瓦解

新闻⾃由不仅是媒体⼈的权利 更是社会的公共资产。

当公众意识到媒体⽆法独⽴报道、信息存在系统性过滤、表达可能带来⻛险,社会将出现三种长期不良后果:一是信任断裂,官⽅信息与⺠间认知脱节。二是谣⾔⽣态化,真实信息缺失反⽽滋⽣谣⾔。三是公共讨论极端化,中间理性空间消失。这对任何社会的稳定与发展都是⻓期隐患。

七、 新闻⾃由不是特权,⽽是⽂明社会的基础设施

黎智英案,不仅关乎⼀个⼈的命运。当新闻成为罪名,社会失去的不只是记者,⽽是对现实的共同理解能⼒。

现代社会的稳定,不来⾃沉默,⽽来⾃开放的信息流通、多元的意⻅表达、独⽴的监督机制。真正的强⼤,不是没有批评,⽽是能够容纳批评。

新闻⾃由、 ⾔论⾃由与法治原则,并⾮⻄⽅或东⽅的专属价值,⽽是现代⽂明运⾏的基本条件。当这些原则被侵蚀时,受损的不仅是媒体行业,更是整个社会的未来。

When Journalism Becomes a Crime

The Systemic Collapse of Press Freedom and Rule of Law under Authoritarianism — Reflections from the Jimmy Lai Case

And the Fundamental Conflict Between Universal Human Rights and Authoritarian Governance

Author: Cooper Guan, Reporter, Interview Department, The Opposition PartyEditor: Li Jing Translator: Peng Xiaomei

I. A “Journalistic Trial” That Has Been Redefined

The Jimmy Lai case is not an ordinary criminal case. It more closely resembles a political trial with symbolic significance.

The central controversy of the case is not simply whether an individual’s actions violated the law. Rather, it concerns whether journalistic activity itself is being defined as a national security threat.

In modern rule-of-law societies, press freedom functions as an essential mechanism for checking power. In authoritarian political structures, however, information control becomes a core tool for maintaining the legitimacy of rule.

The trial of Jimmy Lai ultimately raises a deeper question:When those in power regard freedom of speech as a risk, does the law still remain law—or does it become merely a political instrument?

II. International Legal Standards on Press Freedom and Their Divergence from Reality

The international community has established clear norms regarding press freedom and freedom of expression.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and expression, including the right to disseminate information.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) identifies press and speech freedoms as fundamental rights.

The United Nations Human Rights Council has repeatedly emphasized that national security must not become a vague justification for suppressing the media.

The controversies surrounding the Jimmy Lai case focus on several key issues:

First, the unlimited expansion of the concept of national security.Journalistic commentary and international communication have been placed within the category of “endangering national security.”

Second, the ambiguity and retroactive application of legal provisions, making it difficult for individuals to determine the legal boundaries of their actions in advance.

Third, international concerns regarding procedural fairness, including changes to the jury system and reduced transparency in court proceedings.

When the law no longer provides clear expectations, journalists face not merely legal risk, but systemic institutional danger.

III. Authoritarian Information Governance: From Content Management to Thought Control

The Jimmy Lai case is not an isolated incident. It forms part of a broader system of information control.This system exhibits several defining characteristics:

Feature One: From “content censorship” to “intent censorship.”Authorities are no longer concerned only with whether information is true or false; they now scrutinize viewpoints and the potential influence of those viewpoints.

Feature Two: From “administrative penalties” to the criminalization of expression.Regulatory measures gradually escalate into criminal charges, producing a powerful chilling effect.

Feature Three: From “media regulation” to the control of individual expression.Even ordinary citizens’ speech on social media becomes subject to oversight.

The consequences of this model are profound:News organizations increasingly engage in self-censorship;Spaces for public discussion shrink rapidly;The mechanisms through which social consensus forms gradually weaken. Ultimately, society loses the ability to access reliable information and to conduct rational debate.

IV. The Ethical Paradox of Journalism: When Seeking Truth Becomes Risky

Professional journalistic ethics demand independent investigation, oversight of power, and open public discussion.Yet in a highly controlled information environment, these professional standards themselves may become sources of risk.

This creates a structural paradox: the more professional and independent journalistic activity becomes, the more likely it is to be perceived as a threat.Over time, the consequences extend beyond the media industry and spread across society as a whole.Academic research becomes constrained.Creative expression diminishes.Public policymaking loses its feedback mechanisms.Ultimately, this erodes the rational foundations of governance itself.

V. The Core of Rule of Law Is Not Legal Texts but the Limits of Power

True rule of law is not determined by the number of laws on the books. Instead, it depends on several fundamental questions:Do laws limit power?Do laws protect minorities and dissenters?Do laws provide predictability and clarity?If laws are primarily used to regulate speech, define thought, and punish criticism, then they resemble techniques of rule, rather than rule of law in the modern sense.The international concern surrounding the Jimmy Lai case is therefore not merely about a single individual. It reflects a broader anxiety about the systematic instrumentalization of law.

VI. The Long-Term Social Consequences: The Collapse of Trust Structures

Press freedom is not only the right of journalists—it is a public asset of society.When people realize that the media cannot report independently, that information is systematically filtered, and that expression itself may carry risks, several long-term consequences emerge:First, a breakdown of trust. Official narratives diverge sharply from public perceptions.Second, the ecology of rumors. When reliable information is scarce, misinformation spreads more easily.Third, the polarization of public debate. The space for rational, moderate discussion gradually disappears.All of these outcomes represent long-term threats to the stability and development of any society.

VII. Press Freedom Is Not a Privilege but the Infrastructure of Civilized Society

The Jimmy Lai case is not only about the fate of one individual.When journalism itself becomes a crime, society loses not only journalists but also its shared capacity to understand reality.

The stability of modern societies does not arise from silence. It arises from open flows of information, pluralistic expression of opinions, and independent oversight mechanisms.True strength does not mean the absence of criticism. It means the ability to tolerate criticism.

Press freedom, freedom of speech, and the rule of law are not values belonging exclusively to the West or the East. They are the basic conditions for the functioning of modern civilization. When these principles erode, the damage is not limited to the media industry—it affects the future of society as a whole.

从中国体制宣传到海外⺠主媒体

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当新闻成为⻛险⸺以黎智英案为镜鉴的个⼈与时代观察

作者:Cooper Guan

编辑:黄吉洲 校对:熊辩 翻译:彭小梅

⼀、 ⼀个曾在体制媒体⼯作的⼈的观察

我曾在中国体制内党群⼝从事宣传⼯作,同时为多家体制媒体撰稿与通讯。 在那个阶段,我接受的职业训练强调舆论导向、 宣传纪律与信息控制。

后来,我创办⽂化传播机构,专注创意视频制作,并逐渐转向以真实表达与创作⾃由为核⼼的职业路径。

新闻与创作让我相信:真实是职业的基础,表达是社会进步的动⼒。

然⽽,中共治下的中国现实的政治环境,使这⼀信念不断受到冲击。

黎智英案,使我不得不重新思考⼀个问题:当新闻被视为威胁时,媒体⼈还如何存在?

⼆、 从制度内部到表达受限,个⼈经历与公共现象

在中国⽣活期间,我通过⽹络逐渐接触到更多历史、 政治、 时事信息。出于对公共事务的关注,我曾在社交平台纪念"六·四"等历史事件,分享公共议题观点,呼吁法治、 ⾃由与⼈权。结果,不仅内容被删除,账号被限制,最终在⼀次全国性的⽹络整治⾏动中被永久封禁。这些经历让我意识到,表达本身可能已成为⻛险。 这种现象并⾮个案,⽽是信息治理体系的⼀部分。

三、 黎智英案 新闻活动如何被重新定义

黎智英案的核⼼问题,并不仅仅是某些具体⾏为是否合法,⽽是新闻评论是否被视为政治威胁,国际交流是否被解释为安全⻛险,媒体⻆⾊是否被重新定义。

在现代法治社会,新闻通常被视为监督机制,⽽在⾼度控制的政治结构中,新闻可能被视为潜在⻛险源。 这种转变,不仅影响个别记者,也改变整个媒体⽣态。

四、 从国内经历到海外媒体参与,表达空间的对⽐

来到海外后,我开始参与华⼈⺠主媒体的采访与志愿⼯作。 我第⼀次感受到可以公开提问、可以讨论敏感议题,可以表达不同观点。

这种对⽐使我更加清楚地认识到,⾃由表达并不是抽象⼝号,⽽是每天可以实践的现实。

同时,我也意识到,海外华⼈社区中仍存在⾃我审查与沉默⽂化。 不愿公开表达政治观点,在社交媒体避免讨论敏感议题,对媒体采访保持警惕。 这不仅是个⼈选择,更是⻓期制度环境塑造的⼼理结构与⻓期的信息控制环境和中共⼴泛的海外⻓臂监控密切相关。

当新闻活动被刑事化,所产⽣的寒蝉效应不仅局限在某个地区,它将通过社群⽹络扩散到全球华⼈社会。

五、 新闻⾃由的意义,不仅属于记者

没有独⽴媒体的社会,往往出现信息来源单⼀、谣⾔传播加剧、公共监督缺失等常见现象。因为新闻⾃由并不是媒体⼈的特权,⽽是公众获取真实信息的保障。 黎智英案之所以引发国际关注,正是因为它触及现代社会如何平衡权⼒与表达。

六、 个⼈⽴场声明

基于个⼈经历与⻓期观察 我逐渐形成明确⽴场:

第一,坚决⽀持新闻⾃由与⾔论⾃由;第二、坚定⽀持法治与⼈权原则;第三,强烈反对以模糊安全概念限制表达。这些⽴场源于我个人曾经在体制内的媒体相关⼯作经验,也来自我自身多年创作⾏业经历,尤其是遭受被封号与表达受限,⾔论审查和警察调查,甚至让⼈恐惧⼈身安全的亲身经历,以及当前参与海外⺠主媒体的实践,我的写作与采访,记录和表达正是这种⽴场的延续。

七、 记录仍然是抵抗遗忘的⽅式

黎智英案提醒我,历史不会因为沉默⽽停⽌,真实也不会因为恐惧⽽消失。

对我⽽⾔,继续写作与采访,不只是职业选择,更是对真实与⾃由的坚持。

在任何社会中,允许不同声⾳存在,才是真正稳定与成熟的标志。

From State Propaganda to Overseas Democratic Media

When Journalism Becomes a Risk — Personal and Historical Reflections Inspired by the Jimmy Lai Case

Author: Cooper GuanEditor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:From working in China’s propaganda system to practicing journalism in overseas democratic media, the author reflects on the risks surrounding press freedom and freedom of expression through the lens of the Jimmy Lai case, emphasizing the importance of rule of law and truth.

I. Observations from Someone Who Once Worked in the State Media System

I once worked in the propaganda system within China’s party-affiliated institutions, while also writing and reporting for several state-controlled media outlets. During that period, my professional training emphasized guidance of public opinion, propaganda discipline, and information control.

Later, I founded a cultural communications agency focused on creative video production and gradually shifted toward a professional path centered on truthful expression and creative freedom.

Journalism and creative work led me to believe that truth is the foundation of the profession, and expression is the driving force of social progress.however, the political reality in China under Communist Party rule has repeatedly challenged this belief. The Jimmy Lai case forced me to reconsider a difficult question: When journalism itself is treated as a threat, how can journalists continue to exist?

II. From Within the System to Restricted Expression: Personal Experience and a Broader Public Phenomenon

While living in China, I gradually gained access through the internet to more historical, political, and current affairs information.Out of concern for public affairs, I once commemorated historical events such as June Fourth on social media, shared views on public issues, and called for rule of law, freedom, and human rights. The result was that not only were my posts deleted, but my account was restricted and eventually permanently banned during a nationwide internet “rectification campaign.” These experiences made me realize that expression itself can become a risk. This phenomenon is not an isolated case; it is part of a broader system of information governance.

The Jimmy Lai Case: How Journalism Is Being Redefined

The core issue of the Jimmy Lai case is not merely whether certain actions are legal. Rather, it raises deeper questions: Can journalistic commentary be interpreted as a political threat?Can international communication be redefined as a national security risk?Is the role of the media itself being fundamentally redefined?

In modern societies governed by the rule of law, journalism is typically regarded as a mechanism of oversight.But within highly controlled political structures, journalism may instead be treated as a potential source of danger. This transformation affects not only individual journalists but also reshapes the entire media ecosystem.

IV. From Domestic Experience to Overseas Media Participation: A Contrast in Freedom of Expression

After coming overseas, I began participating in interviews and volunteer work with Chinese-language democratic media outlets. For the first time, I experienced the ability to ask questions openly, discuss sensitive topics, and express differing viewpoints. This contrast made me realize more clearly that freedom of expression is not an abstract slogan—it is a reality that can be practiced daily.

At the same time, I also noticed that within overseas Chinese communities there still exists a culture of self-censorship and silence.Many people avoid openly expressing political opinions, refrain from discussing sensitive issues on social media, and remain cautious toward media interviews.This is not merely a personal choice. It is a psychological structure shaped by long-term institutional environments, deeply connected to decades of information control and the Chinese Communist Party’s extensive long-arm surveillance overseas.

When journalistic activity becomes criminalized, the resulting chilling effect does not remain confined to a single region; it spreads through social networks to Chinese communities around the world.

The Meaning of Press Freedom Belongs Not Only to Journalists

In societies without independent media, several familiar problems often emerge:limited sources of information,the spread of rumors,the absence of public oversight.Press freedom is not a privilege for journalists. It is a guarantee for the public to obtain truthful information.The Jimmy Lai case has drawn international attention precisely because it touches upon a fundamental question of modern societies:How should power be balanced with freedom of expression?

VI. A Personal Statement of Position

Based on my personal experiences and long-term observations, I have gradually formed a clear position:

First, I firmly support freedom of the press and freedom of speech.Second, I firmly support the principles of rule of law and human rights.Third, I strongly oppose the use of vague security concepts to restrict expression.

These positions come from my earlier experience working within China’s state media system. They also arise from my years working in creative industries, particularly from my own experiences of account bans, restricted expression, censorship, police questioning, and even fear for personal safety. Today, through my participation in overseas democratic media, my writing and interviews are a continuation of this position.

VII. Recording Is Still a Way to Resist Forgetting

The Jimmy Lai case reminds me that history will not stop because of silence, and truth will not disappear because of fear.

For me, continuing to write and conduct interviews is not only a professional choice—it is also a commitment to truth and freedom.

In any society, allowing different voices to exist is the true sign of stability and maturity.

养活了中国的人,被中国遗弃了

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养活了中国的人,被中国遗弃了

——论中国农民养老困境与中共统治的道德破产

作者:周敏

编辑:周志刚 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

2026年3月,中国全国人民代表大会在人民大会堂召开。政府工作报告宣布了一项所谓惠民举措:城乡居民基础养老金月最低标准再提高20元,由143元调整至163元。

163元。折合美元,约22美元。这是这个自称世界第二大经济体的国家,给予1.3亿农村老年人的全部国家保障。

与此同时,另一组数字在同一份报告中赫然在目:2025年,中国国防预算17846亿元人民币,同比增长7.2%,折合约2458亿美元;中国GDP总量超过18万亿美元,人均GDP突破1.3万美元。习近平则在不同场合以东升西降、制度自信战略格局自居,向全世界宣扬所谓中国式现代化的历史成就。

这两组数字之间的距离,不是普通的贫富差距,而是一个政权对待其国民的基本态度的真实写照。一个军费一年增幅即超过千亿、却将最底层老人的养老金锁定在每天不足1美元的国家,其所宣扬的所谓“为人民服务”,不过是写在纸上的谎言。

养活了中国的人,被中国遗弃了

若要理解今日之不公,必须回溯历史的账单。

1953年起,中共推行“统购统销”制度,以远低于市场价的价格强制收购农民粮食,再高价卖给城市。农民的血汗,成为工业化最初的积累。与此同时,户籍制度如同一道铁幕,将农民锁死在土地上,剥夺了他们自由流动、分享城市发展红利的权利。数十年来,农民以压低自身消费的方式,补贴了整个工业体系和城市生活。

改革开放后,数亿农民工涌入城市,以廉价劳动力支撑起“世界工厂”的奇迹。他们建造了摩天大厦,却无权在那里定居;他们创造了GDP,却被排斥在社会保障体系之外。当他们踽踽老去,返乡后等待他们的,是每月不足两百元人民币的养老金,以及政府工作报告里那句轻描淡写的“再提高20元”。

历史的债务,从未被清算。中共从未正式承认这笔欠账,更遑论偿还。

中国的养老制度,是一个蓄意设计的不平等体系。数字最能说明问题。

根据《中国劳动统计年鉴》的数据,机关事业单位退休人员月均养老金为6099元人民币,企业退休职工月均3148元;而同期城乡居民养老金(农民为主体)全国人均仅205元。前者和后者之比,高达30:1。这不是市场竞争的自然结果,而是国家财政主动选择的再分配方向——权力庇护的群体,获得丰厚的公共资源;无权无势的农民,得到的是象征性的施舍。

地区差距同样触目惊心。上海城乡居民养老金已经超过1490元,而多省农村老人仅领取全国最低标准143元——同处一个国家,同顶一面国旗,两者相差十倍有余。更残酷的数据是:农民的基础养老金,在多数省份甚至低于当地农村最低生活保障标准的一半,黑龙江、安徽、四川等省的农民养老金与低保标准相差两倍以上,广东省则相差逾四倍。

还有一组数据令人心酸:农民的平均预期寿命为69.55岁,城镇居民为75.21岁。农民不仅养老金更少,还比城镇人少活约6年。在一个以“全民共济”为名的养老体系中,寿命更短、贡献更多、保障更少的农民,实际上是这个体系的净输血者。

面对批评,中共的惯常辩护是:财力有限,逐步改善。这是谎言。

2025年,中国国防预算17846亿元,增幅1200亿元。若将这一年的军费增量平均分配给全国1.3亿农村老人,每人每月可增加77元,远超政府所谓倾力惠民的20元涨幅。倘若将北京冬奥会390亿美元的耗资,或一带一路数千亿美元的海外投资中的极小部分转而用于民生,农民养老困境早已可以得到根本性改善。

2025年“两会”期间,多位人大代表和政协委员提出:应将农民养老金大幅提升至每月300-500元(约40-70美元)乃至与当地低保标准看齐。浙江大学学者张翔提出“国民基础养老金”方案,建议2030年前将标准提升至每月852元。这些建议年复一年出现,年复一年被忽视。不是预算不够,是优先级的排序——军队、维稳、形象工程在前,老农民在后。

更值得深思的是:20元的涨幅如此微薄,政府工作报告却将其作为重大民生成就大书特书,新华社发通稿,央视做专题,地方官员齐声表态。难道不是一场精心演出的戏码——用廉价的姿态,换取廉价的合法性?

有人会问:一亿多农村老人,为何沉默?

答案如是:中共一党专政的核心逻辑,正是系统性地摧毁一切有组织的抗争渠道。没有独立工会,没有自由媒体,没有反对党,没有独立的农民协会,没有真正意义上的选举。农民在政治上从来不是平等的公民。1953年《选举法》规定,农村选区代表所代表的人口数是城市选区的8倍——也就是说,一个城市工人的政治权重,等于8个农民。这一不平等比例在1995年缩减为4:1,直到2010年才实现名义上的同等。

在铺天盖地的宣传机器面前,许多农民甚至不知道自己有权利抱怨。从取消农业税到发放养老金,每一次微薄的“恩赐”都被包装成党和政府对人民的“深切关爱”,让本应是公民权利的东西变成了感恩戴德的理由。一位山东农民的儿子这样描述他的父母:他们觉得领了这点钱已经很幸福了。因为宣传无处不在,早已将麻木顺从解读为满意。

还有更沉重的数字。武汉大学学者刘燕舞的研究揭示,许多中国农村老人因无收入、丧失劳动力、患病、子女无暇照顾,选择以自杀结束生命。统计数据显示,2006年至2015年间,每10万名65岁以上农村老人中,有21.99人选择自杀。更令人心碎的是,在刘燕舞的田野调查中,一位老人听说政府要发钱后说:那就先不自杀了,再挺两年。这句话,应当刻在每一个谈论“中国崛起”的人的心上。

今日之中国,是一个极为奇异的存在。在国际舞台上,它以大国身份纵横捭阖,与美国并称G2,主导多边论坛,倡导“人类命运共同体”;在国内,它对最需要保障的群体吝啬至极,每月163元的养老金,甚至抵不上一张北京地铁月票的价格。

这并不是发展阶段的限制,横向比较可以更清晰。印度2024年农村养老金约合人民币400元;巴西农村最低养老金与城市最低工资挂钩,约合人民币1800元;即使经济体量差很远的泰国,其农村老人也可以领取基础养老金,且配套医疗覆盖更为完善。中国的问题从来不是缺钱,而是选择把钱花在哪里。

“共同富裕”是习近平近年来最高频的口号之一。然而,当我们追问:谁的富裕?答案不言而喻。中国的财富再分配,始终都在体制内循环——从国家到中南海,从城市到城市,从官员到官员。农民,始终瑟缩在这个循环之外,用沉默和忍耐,承载着这个“崛起”奇迹的底部重量。

一个社会的文明程度,体现在它如何对待最弱势的成员。中国农民养老金问题,不只是一个轻飘飘数字游戏,不只是一个政策问题,它是关于尊严、关于公正、关于政权合法性的根本性问题。

一个不愿意善待自己农村老人的政权,不论在国际舞台上如何粉饰,其所谓“执政为民”的宣称,都是对历史的欺骗,对这片土地上每一位公民的侮辱。

老农沉默,不代表没有委屈。土地上的每一条褶皱、每一颗老茧、每一行浑浊老泪,都是这个政权亏欠人民的历史账单。历史的账,终须清算。

中国农民真的等待了太久。他们等待的,不是又一次涨价20元的恩赐,而是作为公民理应得到的平等与尊严。

The People Who Fed China Have Been Abandoned by China

—On the Pension Crisis Facing Chinese Farmers and the Moral Bankruptcy of the CCP’s Rule

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: The Chinese Communist Party has long exploited the peasantry. It has done so by restricting the mobility of the peasant class and trapping farmers in rural areas.

In March 2026, the National People’s Congress of China convened at the Great Hall of the People. The Government Work Report announced a so-called “people-oriented” measure: the minimum monthly standard for the basic pension for urban and rural residents would be raised by another 20 yuan, from 143 yuan to 163 yuan.

163 yuan. Converted to U.S. dollars, that is approximately $22. This is the total state support provided by a country that claims to be the world’s second-largest economy to 130 million elderly rural residents.

Meanwhile, another set of figures stands out starkly in the same report: in 2025, China’s defense budget was 1.7846 trillion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 7.2%, equivalent to approximately $245.8 billion; China’s total GDP exceeded $18 trillion, with per capita GDP surpassing $13,000. Xi Jinping, on various occasions, has positioned himself within a strategic framework of “the East rising and the West declining” and “confidence in the system,” touting the so-called historical achievements of “Chinese-style modernization” to the world.

The gap between these two sets of figures is not merely a standard wealth disparity; it is a true reflection of a regime’s fundamental attitude toward its citizens. In a country where annual military spending increases by over 100 billion yuan, yet the pensions of the most vulnerable elderly are capped at less than $1 per day, the so-called “serving the people” it touts is nothing more than a lie on paper.

养活了中国的人,被中国遗弃了

To understand today’s injustices, we must examine the historical ledger.

Beginning in 1953, the Chinese Communist Party implemented a “centralized purchasing and marketing” system, forcibly buying grain from farmers at prices far below market value and then selling it at a premium to urban areas. The farmers’ blood, sweat, and tears became the initial capital for industrialization. At the same time, the household registration system acted as an iron curtain, locking farmers to the land and depriving them of the right to move freely and share in the dividends of urban development. For decades, farmers subsidized the entire industrial system and urban life by suppressing their own consumption.

After the reform and opening-up, hundreds of millions of migrant workers flooded into cities, supporting the miracle of the “world’s factory” with cheap labor. They built skyscrapers but had no right to settle there; they generated GDP but were excluded from the social security system. As they grow old and return to their hometowns, what awaits them is a monthly pension of less than 200 yuan, along with the government work report’s dismissive mention of “a further increase of 20 yuan.”

This historical debt has never been settled. The Chinese Communist Party has never formally acknowledged this debt, let alone repaid it.

China’s pension system is a deliberately designed system of inequality. The numbers speak for themselves.

According to data from the *China Labor Statistics Yearbook*, the average monthly pension for retirees from government agencies and public institutions is 6,099 yuan, while that for retired enterprise employees is 3,148 yuan; during the same period, the national average pension for urban and rural residents (primarily farmers) was a mere 205 yuan. The ratio between the former and the latter is as high as 30:1. This is not the natural result of market competition, but rather the direction of redistribution actively chosen by the state treasury—groups protected by power receive generous public resources, while powerless farmers receive only symbolic handouts.

Regional disparities are equally shocking. The pension for urban and rural residents in Shanghai has already exceeded 1,490 yuan, while elderly people in rural areas of many provinces receive only the national minimum standard of 143 yuan—despite living in the same country and under the same national flag, the gap between the two is more than tenfold. Even more stark are the figures showing that in most provinces, farmers’ basic pensions are less than half the local rural subsistence allowance. In provinces such as Heilongjiang, Anhui, and Sichuan, the gap between farmers’ pensions and the subsistence allowance is more than twofold, while in Guangdong, it exceeds fourfold.

Another set of figures is heartbreaking: the average life expectancy for farmers is 69.55 years, compared to 75.21 years for urban residents. Not only do farmers receive smaller pensions, but they also live about six years less than their urban counterparts. In a pension system purportedly based on “mutual support for all,” farmers—who have shorter lifespans, make greater contributions, and receive less protection—are, in reality, the net contributors to this system.

In the face of criticism, the CCP’s standard defense is that financial resources are limited and improvements must be made gradually. This is a lie.

In 2025, China’s defense budget stood at 1.7846 trillion yuan, an increase of 120 billion yuan. If this year’s military budget increase were distributed equally among the nation’s 130 million rural seniors, each person would receive an additional 77 yuan per month—far exceeding the 20-yuan increase the government claims to have prioritized for the people’s welfare. Had even a tiny fraction of the $39 billion spent on the Beijing Winter Olympics, or the hundreds of billions of dollars in overseas investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, been redirected toward public welfare, the plight of farmers in old age could have been fundamentally resolved long ago.

During the 2025 “Two Sessions,” several deputies to the National People’s Congress and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference proposed that farmers’ pensions should be significantly increased to 300–500 yuan (approximately $40–$70) per month, or even brought in line with local subsistence allowance standards. Zhang Xiang, a scholar at Zhejiang University, put forward a “national basic pension” proposal, recommending that the standard be raised to 852 yuan per month by 2030. These proposals have been made year after year, only to be ignored year after year. It is not a matter of insufficient budget, but one of prioritization—the military, social stability, and vanity projects come first, while elderly farmers come last.

What is even more thought-provoking is this: despite the increase of 20 yuan being so meager, the Government Work Report touted it as a major achievement in people’s livelihoods, with Xinhua News Agency issuing a press release, CCTV airing a special report, and local officials unanimously expressing their support. Is this not a carefully staged performance—exchanging a token gesture for a token legitimacy?

Some may ask: Why do over 100 million rural seniors remain silent?

The answer is this: The core logic of the CCP’s one-party dictatorship lies precisely in the systematic destruction of all organized channels for resistance. There are no independent trade unions, no free media, no opposition parties, no independent farmers’ associations, and no elections in the true sense of the word. Politically, farmers have never been equal citizens. The 1953 Election Law stipulated that the population represented by a rural constituency was eight times that of an urban constituency—meaning the political weight of one urban worker equaled that of eight farmers. This unequal ratio was reduced to 4:1 in 1995, and it was not until 2010 that nominal equality was achieved.

Faced with a pervasive propaganda machine, many farmers do not even know they have the right to complain. From the abolition of the agricultural tax to the distribution of pensions, every meager “handout” has been packaged as the Party and government’s “deep concern” for the people, turning what should be a citizen’s right into a reason for gratitude. The son of a farmer in Shandong described his parents this way: they feel happy just to receive this small amount of money. Because propaganda is everywhere, it has long interpreted numb compliance as satisfaction.

There are even more sobering statistics. Research by Liu Yandou, a scholar at Wuhan University, reveals that many elderly people in rural China choose to end their lives by suicide due to lack of income, loss of labor capacity, illness, and children who are too busy to care for them. Statistical data shows that between 2006 and 2015, 21.99 out of every 100,000 rural seniors aged 65 and older chose to take their own lives. Even more heartbreaking is that, in Liu Yandou’s field research, an elderly person, upon hearing that the government was going to distribute money, said: “Then I won’t kill myself just yet; I’ll hang on for another two years.” These words should be etched into the hearts of everyone who speaks of “China’s rise.”

Today’s China is an extremely peculiar entity. On the international stage, it acts as a major power, maneuvering with influence; it is often referred to alongside the United States as the “G2,” dominates multilateral forums, and advocates for a “community with a shared future for mankind.” Domestically, however, it is extremely stingy toward the very groups most in need of protection: a monthly pension of 163 yuan is not even enough to cover the cost of a monthly Beijing subway pass.

This is not a limitation imposed by the stage of development; a comparative analysis makes this even clearer. In 2024, India’s rural pension amounts to approximately 400 yuan; Brazil’s rural minimum pension is linked to the urban minimum wage, totaling about 1,800 yuan; even in Thailand, whose economy is far smaller, rural seniors receive a basic pension, accompanied by more comprehensive healthcare coverage. China’s problem has never been a lack of money, but rather a choice of where to spend it.

“Common Prosperity” has been one of Xi Jinping’s most frequently used slogans in recent years. However, when we ask: Whose prosperity? The answer is self-evident. Wealth redistribution in China has always circulated within the system—from the state to Zhongnanhai, from city to city, from official to official. Farmers have always been left out of this cycle, bearing the weight at the bottom of this “rise” miracle with silence and endurance.

The level of civilization in a society is reflected in how it treats its most vulnerable members. The issue of pensions for China’s farmers is not merely a superficial numbers game, nor is it simply a policy matter; it is a fundamental question of dignity, justice, and the legitimacy of the regime.

A regime unwilling to treat its own rural elders with kindness—no matter how it may gloss over its image on the international stage—its so-called claim of “governing for the people” is a deception of history and an insult to every citizen on this land.

The silence of the elderly farmers does not mean they have no grievances. Every wrinkle on their skin, every callus on their hands, and every tear of sorrow is a historical debt this regime owes the people. The accounts of history must eventually be settled.

China’s farmers have truly waited far too long. What they await is not another 20-yuan increase as a favor, but the equality and dignity they deserve as citizens.

哈梅内伊伏法:敲响中共暴政的丧钟

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作者:张维清

编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

一、 60秒的雷霆:神权的幻灭与暴政的终结

2026年2月28日,一个足以载入史册的日子。世界屏息凝神,目睹了一个血腥时代的戛然而止。伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊——这个自诩“真主代理人”、统治波斯大地数十年的独裁者,在美以联军的精准斩首行动中,成为掩体下的亡魂。

这场持续仅60秒的定点清除,不仅仅是军事科技的胜利,更是一场政治图腾的彻底崩塌。多年来,哈梅内伊依靠残酷的伊斯兰革命卫队,通过秘密警察、酷刑室和公开绞刑,在伊朗构筑了一座恐惧的迷宫。他曾傲慢地宣称其统治“神圣不可侵犯”,但在高精度导弹穿透加固混凝土的那一刻,那层虚假的神圣外衣被撕得粉碎。暴君的死亡向全球残存的独裁者们发出了震耳欲聋的警告:依靠屠杀本国人民来维系的非法统治,本质上是沙上之塔,无论防御工事多么坚固,都无法阻挡正义从天而降的审判。

二、 历史的共振:从德黑兰的冷藏车到天安门的坦克

哈梅内伊的覆灭,是他多年积攒血债的必然因果。在政权倒塌的前夕,由于伊朗民众对自由的渴望突破了临界点,德黑兰街头一度演变成屠宰场。伊朗政府动用大口径机枪对示威人群进行无差别扫射,甚至由于太平间爆满,卑劣地动用冷藏车秘密转运年轻抗议者的尸体。

这种令人发指的暴行,让人们无法不联想到1989年那个血色的初夏。在天安门广场上,中共同样动用了国家战争机器,用坦克碾碎了青年学子的民主梦想,用刺刀封锁了通向文明的出口。两场横跨三十余年、相隔数千公里的暴行,其内在逻辑竟然如出一辙:当独裁者意识到自己的谎言不再起作用时,暴力便成了他们最后的“救命稻草”。

然而,中共比哈梅内伊更加狡诈。在“六·四”之后的三十多年里,他们利用全球化带来的红利作为经济诱饵,搭建起号称“金盾工程”的数字监狱,试图用物质享受换取民众的沉默,用信息防火墙抹去历史的记忆。但哈梅内伊的结局证明了一点:没有任何防火墙能挡住正义的意志,也没有任何洗脑术能平息深藏于民心的愤怒之火。

三、 连锁反应:北京红墙内的阵阵寒意

当哈梅内伊在掩体中伏法的信息传遍全球时,最感到恐惧的莫过于北京红墙内的独裁核心。中伊两国作为威权阵营的“背靠背”盟友,长期在压制人权和挑战国际秩序上同气相求。如今,伊朗这座“邪恶轴心”的重要堡垒瞬间崩塌,这种巨大的地缘政治震荡和心理冲击,正以前所未有的速度传导至中南海。

历史的清算从未消散,只是在等待合适的时机。当年坦克碾过广场,留下的不只是血迹,更是政权合法性的彻底破产。如今,随着中国经济幻影的破灭、地方债务的暴雷以及社会管控的极端化,曾经的“经济契约”已经作废。当底层民众的生存权受到威胁,当“白纸运动”的火种在灰烬中复燃,独裁者所依仗的暴力机器将面临严重的内耗与瓦解。

德黑兰的今天,就是北京的明天。这种审判或许表现为内部权力结构的剧烈崩塌,或许表现为经济危机触发的全国性觉醒,亦或是国际正义力量在全球格局重组中的总清算。当正义的铁拳挥下,那堵看似坚不可摧的“高墙”,在觉醒的民意面前将如枯槁般不堪一击。

四、 觉醒时刻:让自由的光芒照亮审判台

从哈梅内伊的倒台到中共统治的摇摇欲坠,事实反复证明:没有任何屠杀能永远阻挡自由的意志,没有任何暴政能逃脱历史的法庭。当年在天安门广场下达开火命令的罪人,以及如今在德黑兰街头扣动扳机的施暴者,最终都将被钉在历史的耻辱柱上,被万世唾弃。

这是一场光明与黑暗的终极博弈。哈梅内伊的伏法,正是全球独裁阵营全面溃败的第一块多米诺骨牌。对于每一个身处黑暗、向往自由的人来说,现在是觉醒的时刻,是呐喊的时刻!我们不仅是在见证一个暴君的消亡,更是在共同参与一个新时代的诞生。

正义或许会迟到,但当它以雷霆万钧之势降临时,任何高墙都无法遮蔽自由的光芒。让我们共同期待,在那不久的将来,天安门广场不再是坦克的领地,而是自由人民欢庆胜利的海洋。在那一天,全世界被压迫的人民将齐声宣告:暴政已死,自由永存!

Khamenei’s Death: The Death Knell for the CCP’s Tyranny

Author: Zhang Weiqing

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: Khamenei’s death during a joint U.S.-Israel operation has sparked reflection on the history of tyranny in Iran. By drawing parallels with the June 4th Incident, this article discusses the crisis facing authoritarian rule and the potential for historical reckoning.

I. 60 Seconds of Thunder: The Demise of Theocracy and the End of Tyranny

February 28, 2026, a date destined to go down in history. The world held its breath as it witnessed the abrupt end of a bloody era. Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei—the dictator who styled himself “God’s representative” and ruled the Persian lands for decades—became a corpse beneath a bunker during a precision decapitation strike by the U.S.-Israel coalition.

This targeted elimination, lasting merely 60 seconds, was not merely a victory of military technology, but the complete collapse of a political totem. For years, Khamenei relied on the brutal Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to construct a labyrinth of fear in Iran through secret police, torture chambers, and public hangings. He once arrogantly declared his rule “sacred and inviolable,” but the moment a high-precision missile pierced the reinforced concrete, that false cloak of sanctity was torn to shreds. The tyrant’s death sends a deafening warning to the world’s remaining dictators: an illegitimate regime sustained by the slaughter of its own people is, at its core, a tower built on sand; no matter how fortified the defenses, they cannot withstand the judgment of justice descending from the heavens.

II. Historical Resonance: From the Refrigerated Trucks of Tehran to the Tanks of Tiananmen

Khamenei’s downfall was the inevitable consequence of the blood debt he had accumulated over many years. On the eve of the regime’s collapse, as the Iranian people’s yearning for freedom surpassed the tipping point, the streets of Tehran briefly turned into a slaughterhouse. The Iranian government deployed heavy machine guns to indiscriminately mow down the demonstrators; when morgues became overcrowded, they even resorted to the despicable tactic of using refrigerated trucks to secretly transport the bodies of young protesters.

Such heinous atrocities inevitably bring to mind that blood-soaked early summer of 1989. In Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party similarly deployed the state’s war machine, crushing the democratic dreams of young students with tanks and sealing off the path to civilization with bayonets. These two atrocities, spanning more than three decades and separated by thousands of kilometers, share an identical underlying logic: when dictators realize their lies no longer work, violence becomes their last “straw of hope.”

Yet the CCP is even more cunning than Khamenei. In the more than three decades since “June 4th,” they have used the dividends of globalization as economic bait, erecting a digital prison known as the “Golden Shield Project,” attempting to trade material comforts for the people’s silence and erase historical memory with a Great Firewall. But Khamenei’s fate proves one thing: no firewall can block the will of justice, and no brainwashing can extinguish the fire of anger deep within the hearts of the people.

III. A Chain Reaction: A Chill Within the Red Walls of Beijing

As news of Khamenei’s execution in his bunker spread across the globe, none felt greater fear than the dictatorial core within the red walls of Beijing. As “back-to-back” allies within the authoritarian camp, China and Iran have long been kindred spirits in suppressing human rights and challenging the international order. Now, with the sudden collapse of Iran—a key stronghold of the “Axis of Evil”—this massive geopolitical upheaval and psychological shockwave is reverberating through Zhongnanhai at an unprecedented speed.

History’s reckoning has never faded; it has merely been biding its time. When tanks rolled over the square all those years ago, they left behind not only bloodstains but also the complete collapse of the regime’s legitimacy. Today, with the shattering of China’s economic illusion, the explosion of local government debt, and the radicalization of social control, the once-sacred “economic pact” has been nullified. When the right to survival of the common people is threatened, and when the embers of the “White Paper Movement” reignite from the ashes, the machinery of violence upon which the dictator relies will face severe internal erosion and disintegration.

What is happening in Tehran today is what will happen in Beijing tomorrow. This reckoning may manifest as a violent collapse of the internal power structure, a nationwide awakening triggered by an economic crisis, or a final reckoning by international forces of justice amid the global realignment. When the iron fist of justice strikes down, that seemingly impregnable “high wall” will crumble like withered wood before the awakened will of the people.

IV. The Moment of Awakening: Let the Light of Freedom Illuminate the Judgment Seat

From the downfall of Khamenei to the precarious state of the CCP’s rule, facts have repeatedly proven: no massacre can forever block the will of freedom, and no tyranny can escape the court of history.The criminals who gave the order to open fire on Tiananmen Square all those years ago, as well as the perpetrators who are now pulling the triggers on the streets of Tehran, will ultimately be branded with infamy in the annals of history and condemned by all generations to come.

This is the ultimate struggle between light and darkness. Khamenei’s downfall is the first domino to fall in the complete collapse of the global dictatorship bloc. For every person living in darkness who yearns for freedom, now is the moment to awaken, the moment to raise our voices! We are not only witnessing the demise of a tyrant, but also participating together in the birth of a new era.

Justice may be delayed, but when it strikes with thunderous force, no high wall can obscure the light of freedom. Let us look forward together to a not-too-distant future when Tiananmen Square is no longer the domain of tanks, but a sea of free people celebrating victory. On that day, the oppressed peoples of the world will declare in unison: Tyranny is dead, and freedom lives forever!

记中国民主党人毛庆祥的夫人胡晓玲女士

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作者:司空先让

编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:周敏

 

    在浙江有这么一个类似当年沙俄时期“十二月党人”夫人的群体,这个群体的代表人物就是中国民主党人毛庆祥的夫人胡晓玲女士。

     胡晓玲女士出生于名门之后,母亲祖上是嘉兴名门望族蒋光焴,蒋光焴,清著名藏书家。(1825—1892)当年在嘉兴赫赫有名的“衍芬堂”就是祖上在嘉兴府的府邸。

    胡晓玲女士的母亲,年轻时非常漂亮,接受过现代西方教育,加上性格活泼,更是受人尊敬喜爱。胡晓玲的母亲在民国时期就在杭州铁路公司重要部门工作。

    1947年,胡晓玲的母亲因曾无意间被同学拉进国民党的“三青团”组织,加上其出生成分不好,在共党掌权后的历次政治运动中经历过不同程度的政治迫害甚至差点送命。胡晓玲也因此从小就遭受歧视和不公,这经历对胡晓玲之后支持民主党人毛庆祥反中共政权有着不可分割的关系。

       1980年,被政治运动整怕了的胡晓玲女士的母亲当得知胡晓玲与79年“民主墙”的热血青年毛庆祥谈恋爱时,是坚决反对的。

   毛庆祥,杭州人,出生于1950年。曾在上海警备区服役,1971年服役期满,退伍后分配到杭州磁钢厂工作。

       1979年,发端于北京西单民主墙的民主运动影响到浙江,以76年“四·五”运动参与者(毛庆祥曾参与天安门“四五”运动被判过刑,后平反)为基础的浙江有志之士也纷纷行动起来,将杭州的民主墙活动搞得红红火火,并形成了一个部落“黑暗中的盗火者”,相互交流思想与认识,并萌发了许多生机勃发的民刊(起源“出自民间”“宣扬民主”故称民刊),而毛庆祥就是参与其中的杰出人士之一。

      正是这段时期,冥冥之中自有天意,有着共同志向的胡晓玲与毛庆祥在一次偶然的相遇之后,进入了爱恋阶段。在世俗人的眼里出生于名门望族之后的胡晓玲下嫁出生贫寒的毛庆祥是件不可思议的事,尽管受到家人的强烈反对,但意决已定的胡晓玲还是将户口本偷了出来毅然决然地与毛庆祥走进了民政局登记拿到了结婚证书。

      1981年4月1日,毛庆祥先生和胡晓玲女士喜结伉俪,婚后不久借蜜月之旅,花了一个多月的时间游历了福州、广州、桂林、北京、青岛、上海等地,见到了王希哲、刘国凯等民运先驱,还带回了《告各界(行业)人民书》广为应用,加强了浙江民运与全国各地同仁的交流与联系。同年8月13日,新婚不久的毛庆祥被中共当局抓走,不久,被浙江省杭州市中级人民法院杭法刑(81)47号以“反革命宣传罪”判刑三年。

      1984年8月刑满释放后,毛庆祥不畏当局的打压继续从事民运活动。

     1999年6月因参与组建中国民主党再次被捕,11月9日被当局以“颠覆国家政权罪”判处有期徒刑8年,剥夺政治权利3年,毛庆祥拒绝认罪服法,服满刑期。

      浙江自成立中国民主党以来,监狱中就一直有中国民主党人在坐牢,前后坐牢的达36人,至今仍在坐牢的有3人。这些民主党人的刑期加起来近200年。

     1999年,毛庆祥第二次被当局逮捕并判刑8年。就在毛庆祥被判刑的当年,胡晓玲上班的杭州棉纺针织厂,出台了所谓企业转制政策,就是裁减员工,让工人拿很少一点钱买断工龄,或提早退休每月拿很少一点退休金。胡晓玲选择了提早退休,可胡晓玲一个人这点退休金根本无法养家糊口,孩子还小,正是长身体需要营养的时候,孩子的学杂费等也是一笔不小的开支……没办法只能寻求再去打工上班,经好姐妹的介绍,去了一家杭州邮政器材厂工作,可没上几天班就因毛庆祥在狱中申诉,并将申诉材料在探监时交给了胡晓玲……

当时的国保为了阻止胡晓玲将“申诉材料”递交到检察院,先是威胁胡晓玲,如果递交上去的话,在狱中的毛庆祥是没有好果子吃的,胡晓玲没理会国保。可国保没过几天竟然去了“邮政材料厂”对胡晓玲进行威胁和施压……结果厂方领导一见阵势也倍感紧张,所以第二天厂领导就让胡晓玲不要去上班了。胡晓玲因此失去了好不容易得来的工作。陷入困境的胡晓玲其生活的艰难是常人难以想象的……没办法只能不时向亲戚朋友借钱,时常打点零工艰难度日。胡晓玲深明大义,独自承担起全部家庭重任。赡养父母,养育孩子,全力支持毛庆祥的民运事业。

      每当看到中国民主党人被判刑,胡晓玲心痛无比。她深知,在这个艰难的时刻,被判刑的民主党人最需要的就是家人的支持和陪伴。于是,她毫不犹豫地站了出来,主动联系其家人尽可能提供帮助和情绪安抚……在胡晓玲的带动和帮助鼓励下,不少民主党

人的夫人们也勇敢站出来,自发团结起来与当局抗争并呼吁国际社会予以关注和谴责。

    在毛庆祥坐牢期间,胡晓玲不仅要照顾年老的双亲、培育孩子、上班工作,还坚持每个月去监狱探望夫君。

就探监这事,对于中国民主党人夫人这个群体来说,是件很重要的事,因为只有通过探监,才能知道丈夫在监狱里是否遭受不公或虐待,更重要的是通过探监能安抚亲人情绪。可以想像,一个人在大牢里呆着,如果没有亲人的关心和探望,是一件多么痛苦的事!这种痛苦有时可能比坐牢本身还受煎熬!

    这里我特别提一下,民主党人吕耿松第二次坐牢11年,在浙江长湖监狱服刑期间,其妻汪雪娥每月至少一次前往探望。杭州至湖州长湖监狱为90公里,来回是180公里,刑期是11年要来回跑132次(132次x180公里=23760公里)相当于绕地球大半圈还多!

     由于组建中国民主党案同案的民主党人吴义龙是外地人,在杭州生活相当困难,胡晓玲时常给他送些钱物,在杭州的其他中国民主党人夫人群体也会伸出援助之手,让他度过艰难困苦时期。

    如今胡晓玲已70多岁了,身体也不是很好,可还经常去养老院看望照顾身陷囹圄的中国民主党人邹巍90多岁的老母亲。

     中国民主党主要创始人之一朱虞夫先生,在谈到胡晓玲帮助受难者民主党人家人时是深有体会和感触的。当朱虞夫先生第一次坐牢时,最担心的是自己的夫人性格内向懦弱,怕接受不了这突如其来的打击。朱虞夫先生托人带话给胡晓玲,希望她能帮助其夫人克服恐惧和焦虑。在胡晓玲的鼓励帮助下,朱虞夫先生的夫人走过了那段最难熬的日子。

     就这样,在浙江中国民主党人的夫人群体一直以来相互鼓励,相互支持下度过了一个个的艰难时刻。

     在民主党人毛庆祥前后获刑11年多中。胡晓玲和儿子相依为命,艰难地过着常人不可想象的日子。

     胡晓玲就靠自己的一点微薄的退休工资生活,到孩子念大学了,教育费很高,只靠这点退休金根本不够,还要打零工,跟朋友借点钱和亲友的资助。儿子13岁的时候,爸爸就不在身边,在性格等方面对孩子的成长都可能产生负面影响。

      就在这样艰难日子里,胡晓玲坦然面对现实,引导鼓励孩子要坚强,不要因为爸爸的事情而自卑,自暴自弃;培养其积极向上的性格。儿子在母亲良好品格潜移默化地影响下,非常努力地读书学习。大学毕业后,只身一人前往迪拜发展,历经千辛万苦和不懈努力终于在迪拜站住了脚跟:创办了网络媒体,传播介绍阿联酋(迪拜)和中国的历史、文化、经济、旅游、美食……成为了两国文化交流使者。

     胡晓玲以坚韧不拔的品格和实际行动不仅默默守住了心中的信念,更是守护支撑起了一个被当局击碎了的家庭。是当之无愧的中国现代版的“十二月党人”夫人!

      向中国民主党人夫人群体致敬!

  

Remembering Ms. Hu Xiaoling, Wife of Chinese Democrat Mao Qingxiang

Author: Sikong Xianrang

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: Hu Xiaoling, a descendant of a prestigious family, held firm to her convictions in supporting Chinese Democrat Mao Qingxiang and the Zhejiang democracy movement. During her husband’s long-term imprisonments, she raised their child alone, cared for her parents, maintained their livelihood, and showed concern for the families of other Democrats. She is worthy of being called a modern-day “Decembrist” wife.

There is a group in Zhejiang similar to the “Decembrist” wives of the Tsarist Russian era, and the representative figure of this group is Ms. Hu Xiaoling, the wife of Chinese Democrat Mao Qingxiang.

Ms. Hu Xiaoling was born into a prestigious family. Her mother’s ancestors were the famous Jiang family of Jiaxing, specifically Jiang Guangyu (1825–1892), a famous Qing Dynasty book collector. The “Yanfen Hall,” which was illustrious in Jiaxing at that time, was the ancestral mansion in Jiaxing Prefecture.

Ms. Hu Xiaoling’s mother was very beautiful in her youth and had received a modern Western education; combined with her lively personality, she was highly respected and loved. During the Republican era, Hu Xiaoling’s mother worked in an important department of the Hangzhou Railway Company.

In 1947, because Hu Xiaoling’s mother had been inadvertently pulled into the Kuomintang’s “Three People’s Principles Youth League” by a classmate, and because of her “bad” family background, she experienced varying degrees of political persecution and nearly lost her life in the successive political movements after the Communist Party took power. Consequently, Hu Xiaoling suffered discrimination and injustice from childhood. This experience is inextricably linked to Hu Xiaoling’s subsequent support for the Democrat Mao Qingxiang in opposing the CCP regime.

In 1980, Hu Xiaoling’s mother—who had been terrified by political movements—resolutely opposed the news that Hu Xiaoling was dating Mao Qingxiang, a passionate youth from the 1979 “Democracy Wall” movement.

Mao Qingxiang, a native of Hangzhou, was born in 1950. He served in the Shanghai Garrison District. After completing his service in 1971, he was discharged and assigned to work at the Hangzhou Magnetic Steel Plant.

In 1979, the democracy movement originating from the Xidan Democracy Wall in Beijing influenced Zhejiang. Based on the participants of the 1976 “April 5th” movement (Mao Qingxiang had participated in the Tiananmen “April 5th” movement, was sentenced, and later rehabilitated), people of high ideals in Zhejiang took action one after another, making the Democracy Wall activities in Hangzhou very successful. They formed a group called “The Fire-Stealers in the Dark,” exchanging thoughts and understandings, which gave rise to many vibrant “folk publications” (so-called because they “originated from the people” and “promoted democracy”). Mao Qingxiang was one of the outstanding individuals involved.

It was during this period—as if destined by heaven—that Hu Xiaoling and Mao Qingxiang, who shared common aspirations, entered a stage of love after a chance encounter. In the eyes of worldly people, it was inconceivable for Hu Xiaoling, born of a prestigious family, to marry down to Mao Qingxiang, who was born into poverty. Despite strong opposition from her family, the determined Hu Xiaoling stole the household registration book (Hukou), resolutely went to the Civil Affairs Bureau with Mao Qingxiang to register, and obtained their marriage certificate.

On April 1, 1981, Mr. Mao Qingxiang and Ms. Hu Xiaoling were joined in matrimony. Shortly after the wedding, using their honeymoon trip as an opportunity, they spent over a month traveling to Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Guilin, Beijing, Qingdao, Shanghai, and other places. They met democracy pioneers such as Wang Xizhe and Liu Guokai and brought back the “Letter to People of All Circles (Industries)” for wide application, strengthening the communication and contact between the Zhejiang democracy movement and colleagues across the country. On August 13 of the same year, the newlywed Mao Qingxiang was taken away by the CCP authorities. Soon after, he was sentenced to three years in prison by the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court [Case No. Hang Fa Xing (81) 47] for the crime of “counter-revolutionary propaganda.”

After completing his sentence in August 1984, Mao Qingxiang, undeterred by the authorities’ suppression, continued to engage in pro-democracy activities.

In June 1999, he was arrested again for participating in the formation of the China Democracy Party. On November 9, he was sentenced by the authorities to eight years of fixed-term imprisonment and three years of deprivation of political rights for the crime of “subverting state power.” Mao Qingxiang refused to plead guilty or accept the verdict and served his full term.

Since the establishment of the China Democracy Party in Zhejiang, there have always been members in prison. A total of 36 people have been imprisoned at different times, and three remain in prison today. The combined sentences of these Democrats total nearly 200 years.

In 1999, Mao Qingxiang was arrested and sentenced to eight years by the authorities for the second time. In the same year he was sentenced, the Hangzhou Cotton Textile and Knitting Mill, where Hu Xiaoling worked, introduced a so-called “enterprise restructuring” policy. This involved cutting staff and forcing workers to “buy out” their years of service for a very small amount of money or retire early with a very small monthly pension. Hu Xiaoling chose early retirement, but her pension alone was simply not enough to support the family. Her child was still young, at an age requiring nutrition for growth, and the child’s school fees were also a significant expense. Having no choice, she sought work again. Through a friend’s introduction, she got a job at a Hangzhou Postal Equipment Factory. However, she had only been working for a few days when Mao Qingxiang filed an appeal from prison and handed the appeal materials to Hu Xiaoling during a visit.

To prevent Hu Xiaoling from submitting the “appeal materials” to the procuratorate, the Domestic Security (Guobao) first threatened her, saying that if she submitted them, Mao Qingxiang would have a hard time in prison. Hu Xiaoling ignored them. A few days later, the Domestic Security actually went to the “Postal Equipment Factory” to threaten and pressure Hu Xiaoling. Consequently, the factory leaders became extremely nervous upon seeing this situation, and the next day they told Hu Xiaoling not to come to work anymore. Thus, Hu Xiaoling lost the hard-won job. Falling into dire straits, the hardship of Hu Xiaoling’s life was beyond ordinary imagination. With no other choice, she occasionally borrowed money from relatives and friends and worked odd jobs to scrape by. Hu Xiaoling was deeply sensible and took on the entire family burden alone—supporting her parents, raising her child, and fully supporting Mao Qingxiang’s democracy cause.

Whenever she saw a member of the China Democracy Party being sentenced, Hu Xiaoling felt immense pain. She knew that at this difficult moment, the sentenced Democrats needed the support and companionship of their families most. Thus, she stood up without hesitation, actively contacting their families to provide as much help and emotional comfort as possible. Driven and encouraged by Hu Xiaoling, many wives of other Democrats also bravely stood up, spontaneously uniting to struggle against the authorities and appealing for international attention and condemnation.

During Mao Qingxiang’s imprisonment, Hu Xiaoling not only had to care for her elderly parents, raise her child, and work, but also insisted on visiting her husband in prison every month.

Regarding prison visits, for the group of wives of Chinese Democrats, it is a very important matter. Only through visits can they know if their husbands are suffering injustice or abuse in prison; more importantly, visits can soothe the emotions of their loved ones. One can imagine how painful it is for a person to stay in a large prison without the care and visits of relatives! This pain is sometimes more agonizing than the imprisonment itself.

Here I would like to specifically mention that when the Democrat Lyu Gengsong was imprisoned for 11 years for the second time, his wife Wang Xue’e traveled to visit him at least once a month while he served his sentence in Zhejiang Changhu Prison. The distance from Hangzhou to Changhu Prison is 90 kilometers—a round trip of 180 kilometers. Over a term of 11 years, she had to travel back and forth 132 times ($132 \times 180 \text{ km} = 23,760 \text{ km}$), which is equivalent to more than halfway around the earth!

Since Wu Yilong, a fellow Democrat in the China Democracy Party formation case, was from out of town and lived in great difficulty in Hangzhou, Hu Xiaoling often sent him money and items. The group of other Democrat wives in Hangzhou would also lend a helping hand to help him through difficult times.

Now Hu Xiaoling is over 70 years old and her health is not very good, yet she still frequently goes to a nursing home to visit and care for the 90-plus-year-old mother of the imprisoned Democrat Zou Wei.

Mr. Zhu Yufu, one of the main founders of the China Democracy Party, has deep personal experience and feelings regarding Hu Xiaoling’s help for the families of suffering Democrats. When Mr. Zhu Yufu was imprisoned for the first time, his greatest worry was his wife, who had an introverted and weak personality; he feared she would not be able to handle this sudden blow. Mr. Zhu Yufu sent a message through someone to Hu Xiaoling, hoping she could help his wife overcome fear and anxiety. With Hu Xiaoling’s encouragement and help, Mr. Zhu Yufu’s wife made it through those most difficult days.

In this way, the group of wives of the Zhejiang China Democracy Party members has spent one difficult moment after another under mutual encouragement and support.

During the more than 11 years that the Democrat Mao Qingxiang was imprisoned, Hu Xiaoling and her son depended on each other, living a life of hardship unimaginable to ordinary people.

Hu Xiaoling lived on her meager retirement pension. By the time her son went to university, the education costs were very high; the pension alone was not enough, so she had to work odd jobs and rely on money borrowed from friends and assistance from relatives. When the son was 13 years old, his father was not by his side, which could have had a negative impact on the child’s growth and personality.

In those difficult days, Hu Xiaoling faced reality calmly, guiding and encouraging her child to be strong and not to feel inferior or give up on himself because of his father’s situation; she cultivated a positive and proactive character in him. Under the subtle influence of his mother’s good character, the son studied very hard. After graduating from university, he went to Dubai alone to develop his career. Through immense hardship and unremitting efforts, he finally established himself in Dubai: he founded a web media outlet to spread and introduce the history, culture, economy, tourism, and food of the UAE (Dubai) and China, becoming a messenger for cultural exchange between the two countries.

With her indomitable character and practical actions, Hu Xiaoling not only silently held onto her inner beliefs but also protected and supported a family that had been shattered by the authorities. She is truly a modern-day Chinese version of a “Decembrist” wife!

Salute to the group of wives of the Chinese Democrats!

威权时代的女性声音

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——写在2026年的国际妇女节

作者:张致君
编辑:胡丽莉 校对:熊辩 翻译:吕峰

三月的风吹进城市,空气带着潮湿与寒意。街角的梧桐树在风中轻轻摇晃,枝叶摩擦发出细碎的声响,像某种被压低的低语。

城市看起来依然正常:地铁照常运行,咖啡店门口排着队,商场的大屏幕滚动着广告和节日祝福。

但在中国的互联网空间里,一些声音正在悄然消失。

女性博主的账号消失了,性少数群体的讨论区消失了,脱口秀演员小帕的社交媒体账号也被封禁。她们曾经写下的文字、发出的笑声、表达的愤怒与困惑,就像被风卷走的落叶,在互联网的地面上再也找不到停留的地方。

许多人曾经相信,互联网会让表达变得更加自由。但在中国,这片海洋布满了看不见的渔网。人们看不见它,却随时可能被困住。人们以为自己在自由地游动,实际上每一步都在被监控、被记录、被计算。

中国女性与性少数群体的公共表达空间正在迅速缩小。那些曾经可以被讨论的话题——身体、婚姻、性别平等、性取向、家庭暴力——逐渐被重新划入危险的领域。

红线在移动,在收紧。而这一切,并不是突然发生的。

在中国当代政治叙事中,女性问题从来不仅仅是社会问题,它同时也是一个政治问题。

长期以来,中国官方意识形态强调一种以国家发展和社会稳定为核心的国家主义叙事。在这种叙事中,个人权利往往被置于国家目标之后,而社会角色则被赋予明确的政治意义。

女性在这种叙事中通常被定义为三种角色:母亲、妻子和家庭照顾者。

这种角色定义并非偶然。随着中国人口结构迅速老龄化、出生率持续下降,人口问题逐渐被视为国家安全与经济发展的重要议题。近年来,中国政府不断鼓励生育,从二孩政策到三孩政策,再到各地推出的生育补贴和住房奖励,国家正在试图重新塑造一种以家庭和生育为核心的社会价值。

在这种政策逻辑下,女性的身体逐渐被纳入国家治理的框架。

官方媒体频繁强调婚姻与生育的重要性,一些地方政府甚至通过行政手段鼓励女性尽早结婚生子。与此同时,一些关于女性独立、性别平等或婚育选择的讨论,却被视为“西方思想”或“极端女权”。

这种意识形态上的冲突,使女性主义与国家主义之间逐渐形成张力。

女性主义关注的是个人权利、身体自主与社会平等,而国家主义更强调人口结构、社会秩序与家庭稳定。当女性开始公开讨论不婚、不育、家庭暴力或职场性别歧视时,这些讨论往往被视为对传统家庭结构和社会秩序的挑战。

因此,许多女性主义议题在中国的公共空间中逐渐被边缘化,甚至被压制。

这种冲突并不仅仅发生在网络审查或个别案件中,而是反映出一种更深层的意识形态矛盾:当国家试图通过家庭和人口政策塑造社会结构时,女性的自主选择往往成为最先受到限制的领域。

2022年初,一段来自江苏徐州农村的短视频在中国互联网迅速传播。

视频里,一个女人被铁链锁在一间破旧的小屋里。她的脖子被粗重的铁链拴在墙上,牙齿几乎全部脱落,头发凌乱,眼神空洞而惊恐。

据当地村民说,她已经为所谓的“丈夫”生下了八个孩子。

这就是后来震惊中国社会的“铁链女事件”。

许多女性在深夜刷到这段视频时,感到一种难以言说的震动。一个现代国家,一个每天谈论科技与繁荣的社会,却仍然存在这样的场景:一个女人像牲畜一样被锁在屋里,被迫不断生育。

公众开始追问:她是谁?她从哪里来?是谁把她卖到这里?

但随着调查的展开,官方通报却一次次改变说法。地方政府先称她是“精神病患者”,后来又说她是“走失人口”,再后来又承认她可能是拐卖受害者。

几份通报之间互相矛盾,却始终没有给出清晰解释。

与此同时,大量前往徐州调查的志愿者和公民记者遭到警方阻拦,一些女性调查者甚至被警方带走讯问。互联网上关于铁链女的讨论迅速被删除。

一个女人被铁链锁住的身体,最终变成了一个被锁住的公共话题。

在铁链女事件之前,中国的女性主义运动就已经经历过一次重要的打击。

2015年3月,五名女性权利活动者计划在妇女节前夕发起反性骚扰宣传活动。她们原本只是计划在地铁和公交车上发放反性骚扰贴纸。

后来被称为“女权五姐妹”的她们,行动尚未开始,便被警方同时带走,以“寻衅滋事”的名义拘留。

这一事件引起国际社会关注。联合国和多个国家政府呼吁中国释放她们。37天后,她们被取保候审。

但这一事件成为中国女权运动的重要转折点。

许多女性主义组织被迫关闭,一些长期关注性别议题的 NGO 逐渐消失。

李翘楚长期关注劳工和女性权益。2021年,她因发布有关人权和刑讯逼供的文章被逮捕;2023年,被以“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判刑三年八个月。

在中国,女性不仅难以讨论性别议题,也难以参与更广泛的公共事务。

2018年,中国媒体人弦子公开指控知名主持人朱军曾在央视后台对她实施性骚扰。

这一案件迅速引发中国版的 #MeToo 讨论。

许多女性开始公开讲述自己的经历。

但案件审理过程异常艰难,相关讨论在社交媒体上频繁被删除,弦子本人也遭遇巨大舆论压力。

2022年,北京法院判决弦子败诉。

这起案件在许多人看来,不仅是一场性骚扰诉讼,更像一次社会试验:女性是否能够公开讲述自己的经历。

答案令人沮丧。而发起“米兔运动”的黄雪琴,至今仍在狱中。

2021年,中国网球运动员彭帅在微博发布长文,指控一名高层官员性侵。

帖子在二十分钟内被删除。随后,彭帅从公众视野中消失。

国际社会要求调查,但在中国国内几乎无法讨论这一事件。后来,彭帅在官方安排的采访中表示自己“从未提出性侵指控”。

她在镜头前微笑。那种微笑平静得让人不安。

习近平上台后,中国多所大学的 LGBTQ 学生社团公众号被集中关闭,一些高校要求相关社团停止活动。

在官方媒体的叙述中,“性别多元”被描述为“西方文化渗透”。许多年轻人发现,她们曾经用来交流的社群一夜之间消失。

沉默再次成为一种生存方式。更多女性少数群体选择隐瞒自己的性取向,选择结婚或者形式婚姻,而性别暴力隐藏在这些不真实的关系中,许多犯罪在婚姻框架下变成“合法”。

这些现象的背后,其实还有一个更深层的政治背景:人口政策。

中国长期实行严格的计划生育政策。从1980年代的一胎政策,到后来逐步放宽为二孩,再到2021年的三孩政策。

当人口出生率持续下降时,国家的政策叙事开始发生转变。女性被越来越多地视为“人口生产者”。

官方媒体不断强调婚育责任,地方政府推出各种鼓励生育的政策——从现金补贴到住房优惠。与此同时,离婚冷静期被写入法律,一些地方开始限制单身女性冷冻卵子。

这种政策逻辑下,女性的身体再次被纳入国家治理的框架,处处彰显了中共统治下威权国家的性别政治。而在国际上中国也并不是唯一一个把性别问题纳入政治叙事的国家。伊朗的女性必须遵守严格的着装规定,2022年年轻女性马赫萨·阿米尼因“头巾佩戴不当”被道德警察拘捕并死亡,引发全国抗议。俄罗斯政府近年来强调传统家庭价值,并通过法律限制“同性恋宣传”。匈牙利总理欧尔班政府也不断强调“家庭主义”,反对性别多元政策。

这些国家的政治制度不同,但在性别议题上却呈现出相似趋势:国家试图重新定义女性角色,将其纳入民族、人口或传统价值的叙事之中。

而在这种政治逻辑下,女性与性少数群体的空间往往最先受到压缩。

从政治学的角度来看,女性运动之所以常常成为威权政府警惕的对象,并不仅仅因为性别议题本身,而是因为女性运动往往具有跨阶层、跨群体的社会动员能力。

在许多国家的历史中,女性运动往往是社会变革的重要推动力量。

女性问题几乎涉及每一个家庭。无论是婚姻、教育、就业还是生育,这些议题都与日常生活密切相关。当女性开始组织、发声和行动时,她们往往能够迅速触及广泛的社会群体。

这种广泛的社会联系使得女性运动具有一种特殊的政治潜力。

在威权体制中,政府通常通过控制媒体、压制反对党和限制公民社会来维持权力。然而,女性议题往往从日常生活出发,很难完全被政治化,也很难完全被压制。

当一个关于家庭暴力、性骚扰或拐卖人口的事件引发讨论时,它就不仅限于一个个案,也可能迅速演变为对制度的反思。

正是如此,许多威权政府往往对女性运动保持高度警惕。

在中国,“女权五姐妹”因反对性骚扰活动而被拘留,弦子的#MeToo 案件遭遇重重阻碍,铁链女事件的讨论被迅速压制,这些现象在一定程度上都反映出中共政府对社会动员的恐惧。

在中共的威权政治的逻辑中,任何能够跨越社会阶层、激发公众共鸣的议题,都被视为潜在的政治风险。

而女性运动,恰恰具备这样的力量。

当中国的女性开始讲述自己的经历、讨论自己的身体和权利时,这些看似私人和日常的议题,往往会被中共置于高度敏感的位置。

在这样的环境中,中国女性的声音就不单纯是一种社会表达,也可以被理解为一种政治行为。

历史也一再证明,极权可以压制声音,却很难彻底消灭记忆。

每一次被删除的帖子、每一个被封禁的账号、每一段被消失的讨论,都不会真正消失。它们会在人们的记忆里留下痕迹,在私人聊天、海外媒体和零散的叙述中继续流传。

铁链女的影像曾震动整个中国互联网;女权五姐妹的拘押让许多年轻人第一次意识到:性别平等也可能成为一种“敏感议题”;弦子的控诉、彭帅的失声、李翘楚的判刑,也让更多人看见权力与沉默之间的关系。

这些事件被压下了热度,但它们改变了许多人的认知。

在中共的威权社会中,权力往往试图让历史变得短暂,让公众忘记昨天发生过什么。

但社会记忆并不会完全消失。它会在新的代际之间缓慢传递,在新的语言和新的叙述中重新出现。

女性和性少数群体的声音,也许会被迫沉默一段时间,但它们不会真正消失。

因为这些声音所表达的,并不仅仅是个体的不满,而是关于尊严、身体与自由的基本问题。

三月的风仍然在城市之间吹过。

梧桐叶一片一片落下,是时间留下的痕迹。

哪怕红线不断收紧,哪怕沉默再次降临,那些微弱却真实的光点仍然存在——在记忆里,在语言里,在那些仍然愿意讲述的人心中。

Women’s Voices in an Authoritarian Era—Written on the Occasion of International Women’s Day 2026

Author: Zhang Zhijun
Editor: Hu Lili Proofreading: Xiong BianTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: In China, the space for public expression by women and sexual minority groups is increasingly restricted. Feminist activism and related events are frequently suppressed, and online discussions are often deleted. State policies and governance logic surrounding population and social management politicize women’s roles, turning private issues into sensitive public topics.

The winds of March sweep into the city, carrying dampness and a lingering chill in the air. At the street corner, the plane trees sway gently in the wind, their branches and leaves rubbing together and producing faint rustling sounds—like whispers deliberately lowered.

The city still appears normal. Subways run as usual, lines form outside coffee shops, and giant screens in shopping malls roll through advertisements and holiday greetings.

Yet within China’s online space, certain voices are quietly disappearing.

The accounts of female bloggers have vanished. Discussion forums for sexual minorities have disappeared. The social media account of stand-up comedian Xiao Pa has also been banned. The words they once wrote, the laughter they shared, the anger and confusion they expressed—like fallen leaves swept away by the wind—can no longer find a place to settle on the surface of the internet.

Many people once believed that the internet would make expression freer. But in China, this ocean is filled with invisible fishing nets. People cannot see them, yet they may be trapped at any moment. People believe they are swimming freely, but in reality every step is being monitored, recorded, and calculated.

The public space for expression by Chinese women and sexual minorities is rapidly shrinking. Topics that were once openly discussed—bodies, marriage, gender equality, sexual orientation, domestic violence—are gradually being reclassified as dangerous territory.

The red lines are shifting. They are tightening. And none of this has happened suddenly.

In contemporary Chinese political narratives, women’s issues have never been merely social issues; they are also political issues.

For a long time, official Chinese ideology has emphasized a nationalist narrative centered on national development and social stability. Within this narrative, individual rights are often placed after state goals, and social roles are endowed with explicit political meaning.

Women are typically defined within this narrative in three roles: mother, wife, and family caregiver.

This role definition is not accidental. As China’s population structure rapidly ages and the birth rate continues to decline, demographic issues have increasingly been framed as matters of national security and economic development. In recent years, the Chinese government has continuously encouraged childbirth—from the two-child policy to the three-child policy, and through various local policies offering birth subsidies and housing incentives. The state is attempting to reshape a social value system centered on family and reproduction.

Under this policy logic, women’s bodies are gradually incorporated into the framework of state governance.

Official media frequently emphasize the importance of marriage and childbirth. Some local governments have even used administrative measures to encourage women to marry and have children earlier. At the same time, discussions about female independence, gender equality, or reproductive choice are sometimes labeled as “Western ideas” or “extreme feminism.”

This ideological conflict has gradually created tension between feminism and nationalism.

Feminism focuses on individual rights, bodily autonomy, and social equality, while nationalism emphasizes demographic structure, social order, and family stability. When women begin publicly discussing remaining unmarried, choosing not to have children, domestic violence, or gender discrimination in the workplace, such discussions are often viewed as challenges to traditional family structures and social order.

As a result, many feminist issues in China’s public sphere have gradually been marginalized or even suppressed.

This conflict does not occur only in cases of internet censorship or isolated incidents. It reflects a deeper ideological contradiction: when the state attempts to shape social structures through family and population policies, women’s autonomy often becomes one of the first areas to be restricted.

In early 2022, a short video from a rural village in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province spread rapidly across the Chinese internet.

In the video, a woman was chained inside a dilapidated room. A heavy iron chain was locked around her neck and attached to the wall. Most of her teeth were missing. Her hair was disheveled, and her eyes looked hollow and terrified.

According to local villagers, she had given birth to eight children for the man who claimed to be her husband.

This was the case that later shocked Chinese society: the “Chained Woman” incident.

Many women who came across the video late at night felt a shock that was difficult to describe. In a modern nation that speaks daily about technology and prosperity, such a scene still existed: a woman locked in a room like livestock, forced to continuously give birth.

The public began asking questions: Who was she? Where did she come from? Who sold her into this situation?

But as the investigation unfolded, official statements repeatedly changed their explanations. Local authorities initially claimed she was a “mentally ill patient.” Later they said she was a “missing person.” Eventually they admitted she might be a victim of human trafficking.

These statements contradicted one another, yet none offered a clear explanation.

Meanwhile, volunteers and citizen journalists who traveled to Xuzhou to investigate were blocked by police. Some female investigators were even taken away for questioning. Online discussions about the chained woman were quickly deleted.

The body of a woman locked by an iron chain ultimately became a public issue that was also locked away.

Even before the Chained Woman incident, China’s feminist movement had already experienced a major setback.

In March 2015, five women’s rights activists planned to launch an anti-sexual-harassment campaign ahead of International Women’s Day. They intended to distribute anti-harassment stickers on subways and buses.

Before the campaign could even begin, they were simultaneously detained by police on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

They later became known as the “Feminist Five.”

The case drew international attention. The United Nations and several governments called on China to release them. After 37 days in detention, they were released on bail.

However, the incident became an important turning point for China’s feminist movement.

Many feminist organizations were forced to shut down. Some NGOs that had long focused on gender issues gradually disappeared.

Li Qiaochu had long advocated for labor rights and women’s rights. In 2021, she was arrested for publishing articles about human rights and torture. In 2023, she was sentenced to three years and eight months in prison on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.”

In China, women not only struggle to discuss gender issues; they also face obstacles in participating in broader public affairs.

In 2018, Chinese journalist Xianzi publicly accused the well-known television host Zhu Jun of sexually harassing her backstage at China Central Television.

The case quickly sparked a Chinese version of the #MeToo movement.

Many women began publicly sharing their own experiences.

But the legal proceedings were extremely difficult. Related discussions were frequently deleted from social media, and Xianzi herself faced enormous public pressure.

In 2022, a Beijing court ruled against her.

To many observers, the case was not merely a sexual harassment lawsuit—it resembled a social experiment: could women publicly tell their stories?

The answer was discouraging. Meanwhile, Huang Xueqin, a journalist who helped initiate China’s #MeToo movement, remains imprisoned.

In 2021, Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai posted a long message on Weibo accusing a senior official of sexual assault.

The post was deleted within twenty minutes. Shortly afterward, Peng Shuai disappeared from public view.

International organizations called for an investigation, but inside China the topic was nearly impossible to discuss. Later, in a carefully arranged interview with state media, Peng Shuai stated that she had “never made allegations of sexual assault.”

She smiled in front of the camera. The calmness of that smile made many people uneasy.

After Xi Jinping came to power, LGBTQ student organizations at many Chinese universities saw their social media accounts shut down simultaneously, and some universities required such groups to cease activities.

In official media narratives, “gender diversity” has been described as “Western cultural infiltration.” Many young people discovered that the communities they once used to communicate had disappeared overnight.

Silence once again became a way to survive. More women and sexual minorities chose to conceal their sexual orientation, to enter marriages or even sham marriages. Gender-based violence often remained hidden within these relationships, and some forms of abuse became “legal” under the framework of marriage.

Behind these developments lies a deeper political background: population policy.

China long implemented strict birth-control policies—from the one-child policy introduced in the 1980s to the later two-child policy, and eventually the three-child policy announced in 2021.

As birth rates continued to decline, the state’s policy narrative began to shift. Women were increasingly viewed as “producers of population.”

Official media repeatedly emphasize responsibilities related to marriage and childbirth, while local governments introduce incentives ranging from cash subsidies to housing benefits. At the same time, a mandatory “cooling-off period” for divorce was written into law, and some regions began restricting egg-freezing for unmarried women.

Under such policy logic, women’s bodies once again become integrated into the machinery of state governance—reflecting the gender politics of an authoritarian state under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.

Internationally, China is not the only country that incorporates gender issues into political narratives. In Iran, women must follow strict dress codes; in 2022, the death of young woman Mahsa Amini after being detained by morality police for “improper hijab” sparked nationwide protests. In Russia, the government has increasingly emphasized traditional family values and passed laws restricting so-called “homosexual propaganda.” Hungary’s government under Viktor Orbán has also emphasized “familyism” and opposed gender diversity policies.

These countries have different political systems, yet similar trends emerge regarding gender issues: the state attempts to redefine women’s roles and incorporate them into narratives of nationhood, demography, or traditional values.

Under such political logic, the space for women and sexual minorities is often among the first to shrink.

From a political science perspective, women’s movements often attract the attention of authoritarian governments not simply because of gender issues themselves, but because such movements possess the ability to mobilize across social classes and groups.

In the history of many countries, women’s movements have been important drivers of social change.

Women’s issues touch nearly every family. Whether concerning marriage, education, employment, or childbirth, these issues are closely tied to everyday life. When women begin organizing, speaking out, and taking action, they often quickly reach broad segments of society.

This extensive social connection gives women’s movements a particular political potential.

In authoritarian systems, governments typically maintain power by controlling media, suppressing opposition parties, and restricting civil society. Yet women’s issues often originate in everyday life and cannot easily be fully politicized or entirely suppressed.

When an incident involving domestic violence, sexual harassment, or human trafficking sparks public discussion, it may quickly expand beyond a single case and evolve into reflection on institutions themselves.

For this reason, many authoritarian governments remain highly wary of women’s movements.

In China, the detention of the Feminist Five for anti-harassment activism, the obstacles faced by Xianzi’s #MeToo lawsuit, and the rapid suppression of discussion about the Chained Woman incident all reflect, to some degree, the Chinese Communist Party’s fear of social mobilization.

Within the logic of the CCP’s authoritarian politics, any issue capable of crossing social boundaries and generating widespread public resonance is viewed as a potential political risk.

Women’s movements possess precisely such power.

When Chinese women begin telling their stories, discussing their bodies and rights, these issues—seemingly personal and everyday—often become highly sensitive under the CCP’s political system.

In such an environment, women’s voices in China are not merely social expressions; they can also be understood as political acts.

History repeatedly demonstrates that authoritarian power can suppress voices, but it rarely eliminates memory entirely.

Every deleted post, every banned account, and every vanished discussion does not truly disappear. They leave traces in people’s memories, circulating through private conversations, overseas media, and fragmented narratives.

The image of the Chained Woman once shook the entire Chinese internet. The detention of the Feminist Five made many young people realize for the first time that gender equality could itself become a “sensitive issue.” Xianzi’s accusation, Peng Shuai’s disappearance from public speech, and Li Qiaochu’s imprisonment revealed to many the relationship between power and silence.

These events were suppressed, but they changed many people’s understanding.

In the CCP’s authoritarian society, power often attempts to shorten history—to make the public forget what happened yesterday.

Yet social memory does not vanish completely. It passes slowly between generations, reappearing in new languages and new narratives.

The voices of women and sexual minorities may be forced into silence for a time, but they will not truly disappear.

Because what those voices express is not merely individual dissatisfaction, but fundamental questions about dignity, the body, and freedom.

The winds of March continue to blow through the city.

Plane-tree leaves fall one by one, traces left behind by time.

Even as red lines tighten, even as silence returns, those faint yet genuine points of light still exist—in memory, in language, and in the hearts of those who remain willing to tell the story.

3月10日,不该被遗忘:一个流亡者对西藏人民起义日的纪念与思考

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3月10日,不该被遗忘:一个流亡者对西藏人民起义日的纪念与思考

作者:冯仍
编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:吕峰

每年的3月10日,对很多中国人来说,往往只是日历上平常的一天。但对藏人来说,这一天不是普通的纪念日,而是一道至今仍在流血的历史伤口。

1959年3月10日,拉萨爆发大规模抗争,随后局势急转直下,达赖喇嘛出走印度,西藏从此进入一个漫长而沉重的时代。流亡藏人把这一天称为“西藏人民起义日”或“西藏抗暴纪念日”。而中共官方则一直把这一事件定性为“武装叛乱”被“平定”的开始,并将后续叙事导向定义为所谓“民主改革”。同一段历史,被两套完全不同的话语体系长期撕扯,这本身就说明:西藏问题,从来不是一句官方定性就能掩盖过去的。

3月10日,不该被遗忘:一个流亡者对西藏人民起义日的纪念与思考

图中为达赖喇嘛骑马逃亡(图片来自国际西藏运动)

说实话,在中国生活的时候,我对这段历史几乎没有真正的了解。不是因为它不重要,而是因为我们从小到大能接触到的信息,往往早已被过滤、删改、定向灌输。很多历史,不是我们不想知道,而是中共根本不想让我们知道。就像我后来到了美国,才逐渐补上一些被遮蔽的历史真相一样,西藏的1959年,也是我到海外之后才开始认真去看、去想、去面对的一段历史。

当我慢慢了解这段历史时,我心里有一种很深的震动。因为我发现,西藏人民起义日纪念的,不只是1959年3月10日那一天的抗争,更是在纪念一个民族在强权面前不肯彻底屈服的尊严。那一天之后,很多人失去了亲人,失去了寺院,失去了土地,失去了自由,甚至失去了在自己家园中按自己方式活着的权利。达赖喇嘛流亡印度以后,西藏问题再也不是一个地方性的行政问题,而成为全世界都无法回避的人权与民族自由问题。

让我特别在意的是,美国政府对这段历史并不是沉默的。1959年11月25日,美国国务院在《美国对外关系文件集》中一份正式外交电报里写到,美国支持西藏人民的“自决原则”,并表示美国人民“怀着钦佩”看待藏人捍卫自由、反抗中共压迫统治的努力。这样的表述非常值得重视,因为它不是某个学者的评论,也不是媒体报道,而是美国国务院正视历史档案中的文字。它至少说明一点:早在1959年,美国政府内部已经意识到,这不是一个简单的“地方叛乱”问题,而是关乎人民自由与政治命运的问题。

美国国会后来也多次就3月10日作出正式记录和表态。2000年《国会记录》收录的参议院文本,明确提到1959年3月10日拉萨民众因担心达赖喇嘛安危而聚集守护,并提到随后达赖喇嘛出走印度以及中国方面对事件的镇压叙述。到2018年,美国参议院通过 S. Res. 429,更直接把1959年西藏起义59周年纪念定为“西藏权利日”,并再次把3月10日界定为西藏人民反抗中国政府统治的历史节点。2024年,美国参议院又提出纪念西藏人民为自由而起义65周年的决议草案,继续沿用“the uprising of the people of Tibet”这样的表述。与此同时,美国国务院近年的涉藏报告,也持续把“1959年西藏起义周年”列为中国政府在西藏加强控制、限制进入和提高戒备的重要敏感时期。

这些美国政府文件当然不等于全部真相,也不意味着西藏问题已经得到解决。但它们至少留下了一个清楚的记录:这段历史不是不存在,不是没人看见,更不是中共一句“平叛”就可以永久盖棺定论的。

对我来说,纪念西藏人民起义日,还有另一层更深的感受。作为一个从中国走出来、在压制和遮蔽中一点点补上真相的人,我越来越明白:中共最害怕的,从来不只是某一次抗争,而是人们开始记住历史、重新命名历史、拒绝接受它强加的历史解释权。它害怕的不只是达赖喇嘛,不只是流亡藏人,不只是海外纪念活动,而是越来越多中国人开始意识到:那些年被定性为“叛乱”、“风波”、“动乱”的,也许恰恰是一个民族、一个群体、一些普通人捍卫尊严的时刻。

西藏人民起义日之所以重要,就在这里。它提醒我们,一个民族即使被强权压住,也未必会真正沉默;一个历史真相即使被封锁几十年,也不等于它已经死去。每年的3月10日都是一次警醒:不要相信暴政垄断的叙事,不要让恐惧替代记忆,不要让遗忘成为帮凶。

今天我写下这些文字,不是因为我能完全替藏人发声,而是因为我作为一个中国流亡者,越来越能理解那种被体制压迫、被历史噤声、被官方叙事掩埋的痛。也正因为如此,我更愿意在这一天,郑重地向1959年3月10日站出来的藏人致敬!

他们当年守护的,不只是达赖喇嘛,也是一个民族最后的尊严。他们留下的,也不只是一场失败的抗争,更是一段不能被中共彻底抹去的历史见证。

3月10日,不该被遗忘。西藏人民起义日,不该被遗忘。那些为了自由而站出来的人,更不该被遗忘。

March 10 Should Not Be Forgotten: A Reflection by an Exile on Tibetan Uprising Day

Author: Feng Reng

Editor: Zhong RanProofreading: Xiong BianTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: March 10 marks Tibetan Uprising Day, commemorating the 1959 Lhasa protests and the exile of the Dalai Lama. This article reviews the historical event and its competing narratives, arguing that the Tibet issue concerns national dignity, human rights, and historical memory, and should not be obscured by official political definitions.

For many Chinese people, March 10 is often just an ordinary day on the calendar.

But for Tibetans, this day is not merely a commemoration—it remains a historical wound that continues to bleed.

On March 10, 1959, a large-scale uprising broke out in Lhasa. The situation quickly escalated, and the Dalai Lama subsequently fled to India. From that moment on, Tibet entered a long and heavy period of history. Tibetans in exile refer to this day as “Tibetan Uprising Day” or “Commemoration of the Tibetan Resistance.”

The Chinese Communist Party, however, has consistently defined the event as the beginning of a “suppressed armed rebellion,” framing the subsequent historical narrative as the start of what it calls “democratic reforms.”

The same historical episode has long been torn between two completely different systems of discourse. This alone demonstrates that the Tibet issue has never been something that can be concealed by a single official characterization.

3月10日,不该被遗忘:一个流亡者对西藏人民起义日的纪念与思考

The image shows the Dalai Lama fleeing on horseback. (Image source: International Campaign for Tibet)

To be honest, when I was living in China, I knew almost nothing about this period of history.It was not because it was unimportant, but because the information we were able to access from childhood had often already been filtered, edited, and shaped through selective indoctrination. Many historical events are not unknown because people do not want to learn about them, but because the Chinese Communist Party simply does not want people to know them.

It was only after I came to the United States that I gradually began to fill in some of the historical truths that had been obscured. The events in Tibet in 1959 were also something I only began to seriously read about, reflect upon, and confront after arriving overseas.

As I slowly came to understand this history, I felt a deep sense of shock. I realized that Tibetan Uprising Day does not merely commemorate the protest that occurred on March 10, 1959. It also commemorates the dignity of a people who refused to completely submit in the face of overwhelming power.

After that day, many people lost their family members, their monasteries, their land, and their freedom. Some even lost the right to live in their own homeland according to their own traditions. After the Dalai Lama went into exile in India, the Tibet issue ceased to be a local administrative matter and instead became a global question concerning human rights and national freedom.

What particularly caught my attention was that the United States government has not been silent about this history. On November 25, 1959, in an official diplomatic cable recorded in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the U.S. Department of State wrote that the United States supported the Tibetan people’s “principle of self-determination.” The document also stated that the American people viewed with “admiration” the Tibetan people’s efforts to defend their freedom and resist oppressive rule imposed by the Chinese Communist regime.

Such wording deserves careful attention. It is not a scholar’s opinion nor a media report; it appears in the official historical records of the U.S. Department of State. At the very least, it shows that as early as 1959, within the U.S. government there was already recognition that this was not merely a simple “local rebellion,” but a matter concerning people’s freedom and political destiny.

The U.S. Congress has also recorded and commented on March 10 multiple times. In the Congressional Record of 2000, a Senate text clearly mentioned that on March 10, 1959, residents of Lhasa gathered to protect the Dalai Lama out of concern for his safety. It also referred to the Dalai Lama’s subsequent escape to India and to the Chinese government’s narrative of suppressing the events.

In 2018, the U.S. Senate passed S. Res. 429, which more directly designated the 59th anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising as “Tibetan Rights Day.” The resolution again defined March 10 as a historical moment when the Tibetan people resisted the rule of the Chinese government. In 2024, the U.S. Senate introduced another draft resolution commemorating the 65th anniversary of the Tibetan people’s uprising for freedom, continuing to use the phrase “the uprising of the people of Tibet.”

Meanwhile, in recent years the U.S. Department of State’s Tibet-related reports have continued to list the “anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising” as a sensitive period during which the Chinese government typically strengthens control in Tibet, restricts access, and heightens security measures.

Of course, these U.S. government documents do not represent the entire truth, nor do they mean that the Tibet issue has been resolved. But they at least leave a clear record: this history does exist. It has been seen. And it cannot be permanently settled by the Chinese Communist Party simply labeling it as the suppression of a “rebellion.”

For me personally, commemorating Tibetan Uprising Day also carries a deeper meaning. As someone who came out of China and gradually reconstructed the truth after years of censorship and suppression, I have come to understand something more clearly: what the Chinese Communist Party fears most is not a single act of resistance, but the moment when people begin to remember history, rename history, and refuse to accept the Party’s monopoly over historical interpretation.

What it fears is not only the Dalai Lama, not only Tibetan exiles, and not only commemorations held overseas. What it fears even more is that increasing numbers of Chinese people may come to realize that many events once labeled as “rebellions,” “incidents,” or “turmoil” may in fact have been moments when a nation, a community, or ordinary people stood up to defend their dignity.

This is precisely why Tibetan Uprising Day matters.

It reminds us that even when a people are suppressed by overwhelming power, they may not truly fall silent. A historical truth that has been sealed off for decades does not mean that it has died.

Every March 10 is therefore a warning:Do not believe narratives monopolized by authoritarian power.Do not allow fear to replace memory.Do not allow forgetting to become an accomplice.

Today I write these words not because I can fully speak on behalf of Tibetans, but because, as a Chinese exile, I increasingly understand the pain of being oppressed by a system, silenced in history, and buried beneath official narratives.

For that reason, on this day I want to express my sincere respect to the Tibetans who stood up on March 10, 1959.

What they defended at that time was not only the Dalai Lama, but also the final dignity of a people.

What they left behind was not merely a failed resistance, but a historical testimony that the Chinese Communist Party can never completely erase.

March 10 should not be forgotten.Tibetan Uprising Day should not be forgotten.And those who stood up for freedom should never be forgotten.

再来听一遍《一无所有》

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再来听一遍《一无所有》
再来听一遍《一无所有》

1989年 崔健在天安门 来源:Patrick Zachmann(玛格南)/摄

作者:余晓平

编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:吕峰

我们六零后听着崔健的《一无所有》走过了年轻岁月,尤其是走过了那个具有历史意义的1989年春夏之交。如今我想问现代的年轻人一个问题:如果对方一无所有,你还愿意跟着走吗?

在如今大陆的年轻人当中,可以说,为了理想而放弃物质诱惑的人已经越来越少了。这二十多年来,另一种价值观的长期灌输,使得物欲横流,也造就了在精神层面相对匮乏的一代年轻人。我不是说所有人,而是说大多数人。

其实,我们可以很容易从概率上判断:为了精神上的东西而宁愿一无所有的人,到底能占多大比例?而把物质财富作为主要判断标准的人,又能占多大比例?当物质与精神不可兼得的时候,人们到底会先放弃哪一个?

举一个大家都知道的例子:梅兰芳在日本占领时期蓄须明志,拒绝为日本人登台演出。这就是为了精神世界而放弃物质利益。再比如,当年唱《一无所有》的崔健,因为在天安门献唱被封杀多年,后又因不愿接受当局审查,拒上春晚舞台。这些人完全可以选择合作,那样财富会源源不断地到来。

但这样的人,在中华民族的历史中一直都是凤毛麟角。现实社会里,大多数人都会选择合作。几乎所有人都会说:“那也没办法,要不你来救救我,别在旁边说风凉话,要办实事。”

在这些人眼里,直接把好日子准备好,把钞票点好放在手里,或者干脆把绿卡发下来……这些物质上的东西都叫“实事”,而精神上的追求却被称为空话。这样的人,真的能过上真正的好日子吗?

好好想一想,这样的人在社会中究竟占了多大的比例。这个民族两千年的历史,很大程度上就是一部被侵略和被奴役的历史:不是外族打进来,就是内部不断折腾自己。更滑稽的是,当一部分人欺压另一部分人的时候,欺压者往往还会大谈“稳定”的好处。

于是,越来越多的人为了蝇头小利出卖自己的灵魂。人们都希望不要一无所有,却没有真正分清物质与精神之间的区别。灵魂如果没有了,其实就是一种更深层的、一种精神上的一无所有。

还记得当年谷歌离开中国的时候,很多人认为他们放弃了中国这么大的市场,会损失天量的财富。人们看到的只是物质上的一无所有,却很少有人去思考背后的价值选择,这其实正是价值观的问题。

我们年轻的时候,资讯不畅,而且长期受到单一叙事的影响。那么,到底有什么是今天的年轻人所缺乏的?在我看来,是一种在精神上追求自由的激情。也许正是因为曾经受到长期的压抑,而改革开放初期那短暂出现的思想松动,让一部分年轻人像井底的青蛙突然跳起,看见了一片蓝天。那种对自由的渴望和追求,可以说是奋不顾身的。

而那个时代,也正是崔健的《一无所有》红遍大江南北的时候。

那种精神,也促使了大量中国年轻人远赴海外,通过艰苦的勤工俭学去追寻外面更自由的世界。那种艰难,是很难用语言完全描述的。事实上,很多能够出国移民的人,在国内完全有能力通过违心的合作获取更高的物质利益。但他们选择了承受一切从零开始的压力,在国外一无所有重新奋斗,最终换取精神上的自由。

而如今,很多人出国,追求的已经不再是精神上的东西,而更多只是物质环境上的改善。同时,在国内的很多人,则在追求物质的过程中逐渐放弃精神追求,失去了独立思考的能力,过着只要有吃有睡就满足的生活。

如果一个社会越来越多的人只满足于这种状态,那么最终的结局,往往就是被人随意摆布、任人宰割。

最后我们再来听一遍《一无所有》

我曾经问个不休

你何时跟我走

可你却总是笑我,一无所有

我要给你我的追求

还有我的自由

可你却总是笑我,一无所有

噢……你何时跟我走

噢……你何时跟我走

脚下这地在走

身边那水在流

可你却总是笑我,一无所有

为何你总笑个没够

为何我总要追求

难道在你面前

我永远是一无所有

噢……你何时跟我走

噢……你何时跟我走

脚下这地在走

身边那水在流

告诉你我等了很久

告诉你我最后的要求

我要抓起你的双手

你这就跟我走

这时你的手在颤抖

这时你的泪在流

莫非你是在告诉我

你爱我一无所有

噢……你这就跟我走

噢……你这就跟我走

噢……你这就跟我走

Listen to “Nothing to My Name” Once Again

再来听一遍《一无所有》

1989: Cui Jian at Tiananmen. Source: Patrick Zachmann (Magnum Photos)

Author: Yu Xiaoping

Editor: Zhong RanProofreading: Xiong BianTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: Cui Jian’s Nothing to My Name once symbolized a generation’s pursuit of ideals and freedom. This song and the reflections around it criticize the materialistic values of contemporary society, arguing that when people abandon spiritual life and independent thought in favor of material gain alone, society gradually loses its dignity and freedom.

Those of us born in the 1960s passed through our youth listening to Cui Jian’s Nothing to My Name, especially through that historically significant spring and summer of 1989. Today, I want to ask younger people a question: if someone had nothing to their name, would you still be willing to follow them?

Among young people in mainland China today, it can be said that fewer and fewer are willing to give up material temptations for the sake of ideals. Over the past two decades, the long-term indoctrination of another value system has fueled rampant materialism and also produced a generation of young people who are relatively impoverished at the spiritual level. I do not mean everyone, but the majority.

In fact, we can judge this quite easily in terms of probability: what proportion of people would rather have nothing materially for the sake of spiritual values? And what proportion take material wealth as their primary standard of judgment? When material and spiritual values cannot both be kept, which one do people abandon first?

Take an example everyone knows: during the Japanese occupation, Mei Lanfang grew a beard to show his resolve and refused to perform for the Japanese. That was a case of giving up material benefit for the sake of the spirit. Another example is Cui Jian, who sang Nothing to My Name. After performing at Tiananmen, he was banned for many years, and later, because he was unwilling to submit to official censorship, he refused to appear on the Spring Festival Gala. These people could easily have chosen cooperation; had they done so, wealth would have flowed to them endlessly.

But such people have always been exceedingly rare in Chinese history. In real society, most people choose to cooperate. Almost everyone says: “There’s nothing I can do. Why don’t you come save me instead of standing there making empty comments? What matters is doing something practical.”

In the eyes of such people, handing them a comfortable life directly, counting out cash into their hands, or simply issuing them a green card… these material things are what they call “practical matters,” while spiritual pursuits are dismissed as empty talk. Can such people truly live a genuinely good life?

Think carefully: what proportion of society do such people make up? Much of this nation’s two-thousand-year history has, in large part, been a history of invasion and enslavement: either foreign powers invaded, or internal forces endlessly tormented their own people. Even more absurdly, when one group oppresses another, the oppressors often speak grandly of the benefits of “stability.”

As a result, more and more people sell their souls for petty gains. Everyone wants to avoid having nothing, yet few truly distinguish between the material and the spiritual. If the soul is gone, that is in fact a deeper kind of nothingness—a spiritual nothingness.

When Google left China, many people thought it was giving up such a huge market and would lose an astronomical amount of wealth. What people saw was only the material sense of having nothing; very few reflected on the value choice behind it. But that is precisely a question of values.

When we were young, information did not flow freely, and we lived for a long time under the influence of a single dominant narrative. So what is it that today’s young people lack? In my view, it is a passion for spiritual freedom. Perhaps it was precisely because of long years of repression that the brief ideological loosening in the early years of reform and opening up made some young people feel like frogs suddenly leaping out of a well and seeing a patch of blue sky. That yearning and pursuit of freedom could truly be described as reckless and wholehearted.

And that was exactly the era when Cui Jian’s Nothing to My Name swept across the country.

That same spirit also drove large numbers of young Chinese to travel overseas, pursuing a freer world through years of hard study and labor. That hardship is difficult to fully describe in words. In fact, many people who were able to emigrate or study abroad were fully capable, back in China, of gaining greater material benefits through compromises against their conscience. But they chose instead to bear the pressure of starting from zero in a foreign country, to have nothing materially and struggle anew, in exchange for spiritual freedom.

Today, however, many people who go abroad are no longer pursuing spiritual things, but mainly seeking an improved material environment. At the same time, many people who remain in China gradually abandon spiritual pursuits in the process of chasing material gain. They lose the ability to think independently and live lives in which having food and sleep is enough to satisfy them.

If more and more people in a society are content with such a state, then the final outcome is often that they can be manipulated at will and treated as prey.

So let us listen once again to Nothing to My Name:

I kept asking without end,When will you come with me?But you always laughed at me, for having nothing.I want to give you my pursuit,And also my freedom,But you always laughed at me, for having nothing.

Oh… when will you come with me?Oh… when will you come with me?

The ground beneath my feet is moving,The water beside me is flowing,But you always laughed at me, for having nothing.Why do you keep laughing without end?Why must I always keep pursuing?Could it be that before you,I will forever have nothing to my name?

Oh… when will you come with me?Oh… when will you come with me?

The ground beneath my feet is moving,The water beside me is flowing,Let me tell you, I have waited a long time,Let me tell you my final request,I want to seize both of your hands,And you will come with me right now.

At this moment your hands are trembling,At this moment your tears are falling,Could it be you are telling meThat you love me with nothing to my name?

Oh… now you will come with me.Oh… now you will come with me.Oh… now you will come with me.

宗教大法官的传说(二)

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——软弱的人如何承受自由

作者:韩立华

编辑:周志刚 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

阿廖沙说,耶稣是唯一一个“能够宽恕而且有权宽恕的人”,人类命运的大厦不是建立在小女孩的眼泪之上,而是建立在耶稣身上。阿廖沙说,伊凡忘记了耶稣。

伊凡说,他没有忘记耶稣,而且他还为耶稣写了一部长诗(名字叫《宗教大法官》),这就是《卡拉马佐夫兄弟》第五卷第五章中著名的《宗教大法官》。虽然他没有把这首诗写下来,但诗的内容他记得。

作为开场白,伊凡介绍了过去时代类似的诗歌和戏剧,就是“把天神引向人间”的时尚。他提到但丁,提到雨果的《巴黎圣母院》,提到俄国彼得大帝以前的时代演的戏剧,他还特别提到鞑靼人统治时代的一首长诗,叫《圣母游地狱》。伊凡认为诗中的描写不亚于但丁。

伊凡说,他的长诗也是这样的题材,就是耶稣再次来到地上,来到人间。耶稣在圣经中已经应许说:“我必快来”(启示录3:11“我必快来,你要持守你所有的,免得人夺去你的冠冕。”),但他什么时候来,“但那日子、那时辰没有人知道,连天上的使者也不知道,子也不知道,唯有父知道。”(马可福音13:32)

于是,地上的人们一代又一代地等待着他的再来,“满怀着当年的信仰和当年感动的心情在等待着他。”

十五个世纪过去了,人们已经整整十五个世纪没有得到来自天上的保证了。正巧那时候,在欧洲北部出现了一种“新的、可怕的邪教”,就是波及西欧各国的宗教改革运动。“那些邪教徒开始亵渎上帝,否认奇迹,但是虔诚如初的教徒们对上帝的信仰变得更加炽烈了。”他们一代一代地祈祷:“主啊,快降临吧”。最后耶稣终于怀着无限怜悯之情降临到祈求者面前,回到那些“受苦受难,罪孽深重,但婴儿般爱他的百姓面前”。

那是在十六世纪,西班牙南部的塞维尔(塞维利亚),耶稣再次降临人间。那是在宗教裁判制度最猖獗的时代。耶稣来到这里,“只是想看一眼他的孩子们,看一看架起火堆活活烧死异教徒的那个地方。”

就在前一天,在这个城市的广场上,“为了上帝的荣耀,一下子活活烧死了上百个异教徒。”“他悄悄地不知不觉地来到广场,但是很奇怪,大家马上认出了他。……人们势不可挡地纷纷向前拥去,将他团团围住。……他默默地在他们中间走过,脸上挂着无限同情的宁静的微笑。爱的太阳在他心中燃烧,光明、智慧和力量的光辉从他眼中闪射出来,照耀着人们,震撼着他们的心灵,向他们报以深情厚爱。”

他让一个瞎子重新看见,让一个躺在棺材里的小女孩死而复生。就像一千五百年前,他在地上三年时间所做的一样。

就在这时,宗教大法官经过广场,书中描述他的样子,“这是个将近九十岁的老人,高个子,腰板笔直,一张干瘪的脸,眼眶深陷,但目光炯炯,犹如两颗火星。”他看到了广场上发生的一切,于是他命令卫队把耶稣抓起来,押到宗教法院那幢古老大楼里的一间带穹顶的狭小而阴暗的牢房里。

到了夜里,“在一片漆黑中,牢房的铁门打开了,年迈的宗教大法官亲自提着灯,慢慢地走进监狱。他独自一人,铁门在他身后又立刻关上了。”

宗教大法官和基督就在这昏暗的牢房里面对面了,开始了他们的谈话。其实不是交谈,只是宗教大法官一个人的独白,因为从头到尾,基督一直保持沉默。

大法官也让基督不要回答,他的理由是“你也没有权利对自己说过的话再增添什么新内容”,“既然你把一切都交给了教皇,现在一切都在教皇手里,那你现在完全没有必要再来了,至少暂时不要来妨碍。”

其实,耶稣在当年受犹太的大祭司审判时就是这样一言不发。

现在,他当年亲自建立的教会,再一次地审判他,不让他开口。因为按照大法官的说法,基督现在再说什么的话,将会侵犯人们的信仰自由,因为人们是按照一千五百年前基督的话去自由信仰的。而基督又把信仰自由看得比一切都宝贵。“你们必晓得真理,真理必叫你们得以自由。”(约翰福音8:32)

大法官说,基督白天已经在广场上看到了那些信仰他的“自由的人”,他们恐惧地、顺服地跪在大法官面前,眼看着基督被卫兵抓走。

“现在,就是目前,这些人比任何时候更加坚信自己是完全自由的,而实际上是他们亲自把自己的自由交给我们,服服帖帖地把它放在我们脚下。”大法官认为这样的结果正是他和他手下的人的功劳,因为他们终于压制了自由,为了使人们得到幸福。

这就是大法官的立场:为了人类的幸福否定人的自由。

他对基督说:“对你的警告和指示的次数不能算少了,但是你却一次次不听警告,你放弃了那条唯一可以使人幸福的道路。”

他所说的“警告和指示的次数不能算少”,指的就是圣经中记载的耶稣在开始传道之前所受的魔鬼的三个诱惑(试探)。

当时,耶稣被圣灵引到旷野,受魔鬼的试探。他禁食四十昼夜,后来就饿了。那试探人的进前来,对他说:“你若是神的儿子,可以吩咐这些石头变成食物。”耶稣却回答说:“经上记着说:‘人活着,不是单靠食物,乃是靠神口里所出的一切话。’”

魔鬼就带他进了圣城,叫他站在殿顶上,对他说:“你若是神的儿子,可以跳下去。因为经上记着说:‘主要为你吩咐他的使者,用手托着你,免得你的脚碰在石头上。’”

耶稣对他说:“经上又记着说:‘不可试探主你的神。’”魔鬼又带他上了一座最高的山,将世上的万国与万国的荣华都指给他看,对他说:“你若俯伏拜我,我就把这一切都赐给你。”耶稣说:“撒但退去吧!因为经上记着说:‘当拜主你的神,单要侍奉他。’”

于是魔鬼离了耶稣,有天使来伺候他。(马太福音4:1-11)

从圣经上我们看到,基督拒绝了魔鬼的三个诱惑,照大法官的说法是魔鬼的三个警告。因为大法官认为这是一个“伟大的魔鬼”,并且他认为这三个“诱惑”是加引号的。因为在大法官眼里,魔鬼的三个诱惑不是坏东西,而是切切实实、千真万确的东西。他认为,魔鬼向基督提出的这三个问题是一个奇迹,超越了现有全部的人类智慧,而且是永恒的抽象智慧。“因为这个问题似乎把人类未来的整个历史集合成一个整体,并且预告了它的前途,同时也出现了三个形象,它们囊括了全世界人类本性中所有无法解决的矛盾。”

大法官说,“现在,过了十五个世纪以后,我们看到这三个问题所包含的一切已经被认识、被预告、被证实了,再也不能增添或删减任何内容了。”

现在,对我们来说,经过了不是十五个世纪,而是二十个世纪,特别是二十世纪中,随着极权主义的产生,魔鬼的这三个诱惑在世界历史和人的本性当中,更加直接、更加惨烈地显明出来。所以,圣经,以及宗教大法官的故事,在我们所处的时代仍然具有极为重要的意义,对于我们如何分辨真理和谎言,如何选择人生的道路具有重要的启发作用。

第一个诱惑——将石头变成面包

基督降临人间,想要人们得到自由,“但是他们由于单纯和与生俱来卑劣的天性,不可能正确理解自由,他们对自由感到害怕和恐惧。因为对人类和人类社会来说从来没有什么东西比自由更加无法容忍!”

魔鬼对基督说,“只要你把石头变成面包,那么人类就会像羊群那样跟你走,对你感恩戴德,俯首听命。”但是,这样的跟随是带着恐惧的,因为他们害怕有一天你缩回手,不再供他们面包。

基督拒绝了这种面包换来的驯服。他要的跟随是自由的,出于爱的,而不是作为生存的手段进行的交换。所以在圣经上,当耶稣行使“五饼二鱼”的神迹喂饱了五千人以后,那些人到处追着跟随他,耶稣并没有为此高兴,而是责备他们跟随他是为了“吃饼得饱”,就这样使其中大部分人离他而去。

从作为一个领袖的角度来看,耶稣这样做真是太不明智了。他完全可以先带他们“打土豪,分田地”,等事业成功了再把田地从他们手中收回来。不,基督要的不是这样的跟随者,他不愿利用人卑劣的天性;他要的是有尊严的、有人最初的荣耀形象的自由跟随他的人。所以,基督说,“人不是单靠面包活着。”(这也是中国国内一本陀思妥耶夫斯基的书信选的书名)

但是,“地上的魔鬼为了这面包可以起来反对你,跟你交战,并且战胜你,而大家会跟着他跑,赞美他。”(“东方红,太阳升,中国出了个毛泽东。他为人民谋幸福,他是人民的大救星。”)

这就是马克思主义和社会主义所宣称的:“不存在犯罪,也无所谓罪孽,只有饥肠辘辘的人”,“先填饱他们的肚皮,然后再叫他们讲道德。”

这就是斗地主、公私合营,这就是“我穷我有理”。为了所谓的均贫富,他们掀起了一阵阵血雨腥风,“在你圣殿的废墟上,将耸立起一座新的大厦和可怕的巴比伦塔。”这座新的大厦,新的巴比伦塔,或者叫人间天堂,或者叫共产主义社会,它们在二十世纪给全人类带来了无尽的混乱与苦难。

宗教大法官对人性抱持着轻蔑的看法,认为他们“软弱、渺小、无德无行、不仁不义”,他们对于基督视为宝贵的自由最难以忍受。在他们的心目中,天上的面包不能跟地上的面包相比。这里“天上的面包”指的是人的永恒的自由,他的绝对尊严,他与永恒的联系。“地上的面包”指的就是生活的安宁,肉体的满足,地上的幸福,“岁月静好”。

大法官认为,只有几万个“强者”愿意为了天上的面包自由跟随基督;而还有几百万的“弱者”不能为了天上的面包放弃地上的面包,谁给他们地上的面包,他们就跟随谁,并将自由拱手交出。

大法官指责基督是精英主义者,只把地上那几万个看重天上的面包的强者视为宝贵,而对剩下的几百万贪恋地上面包宁愿放弃自由的人不管不问。大法官说:“我们也关心弱者。”大法官和他的随从们掌管了这些弱者的自由,统治他们,并且是假借基督的名义进行统治。

也就是说,大法官的统治是建立在欺骗的基础上的。他装扮成民主主义者,弱者和被压迫者的朋友,然后声称珍惜爱护他们。他所谓的对弱者的爱其实是对他们的轻蔑。因为他不相信人的崇高来源,认为只有少数人才有能力走上崇高的生命之路,不被地上的面包诱惑,爱天上的面包高于一切。

别尔嘉耶夫说:“宗教大法官的精神,为了虚假的、尘世的爱,而不是为了天上的爱,怀疑人们有登上高山、不断提高的权利,为了同情人们,它号召与自己的兄弟分享贫穷,是贫穷而不是财富。丰富的精神生活被禁止。不准考虑永生,称其为个人主义,只称颂对暂时的关心。你们要卑贱、贫穷,永远放弃自己的自由,到那时候你们才会得到地上的面包,那时候你们才会安宁,那时候大家才会幸福。”

大法官认为弱者不配享有自由,当自由临到弱者身上,他们只想要地上的面包,这种自由对他们来说就成了一种负担和煎熬。“难道你没有想过,假如选择的自由成了他们一种可怕的负担而压得他们喘不过气来,那么他们到最后会放弃甚至反对你的形象和你的真理。”

这些弱者,只看重地上面包的人,他们不准备为自由付上代价,他们不想要真正的信仰,而宁愿选择信仰的代替品——奇迹、神秘和权威。

“世界上有三种力量,只有这三种力量才能永远征服并俘虏这些软弱无能的叛逆的良心,使他们得到幸福——这三种力量就是奇迹、神秘和权威。”

基督把这三种力量都拒绝了。

第二个诱惑——从殿顶往下跳

基督再次拒绝了魔鬼的这个诱惑。他没有跳下来,没有创造奇迹。

就像当他被那些人钉上十字架,那些人在十字架下讽刺他,嘲笑他,对他说:“你如果是神的儿子,就从十字架上下来吧”,“我们就信你。”那时候,他并没有从十字架上下来。

他没有从十字架上下来和他没有从殿顶跳下来的原因是一样的。“你没有从十字架上走下来,你没有走下来的原因还是因为你不想用奇迹征服人,你渴望自由的信仰,而不是奇迹的信仰,你渴望的是自由的爱,而不是奴隶面对将他吓得永远胆战心惊的强权而表现出来的那种奴隶式的狂喜。”

大法官说,“人一旦抛弃了奇迹,同时也就抛弃了上帝。因为人寻找的与其说是上帝,不如说是奇迹。”

这让我想到中国人的“明君崇拜”,“清官崇拜”,他们几千年来就渴望跪在上帝般的君王和官长面前,否则宁愿自相残杀,他们从未想过把领袖当成会犯错的普通人,从未想过把权力关进笼子。所以,香港某无良明星才说“中国人是需要被管的”。可能这就是中国人固有的劣根性,不知自由的宝贵,他们人生最大的目标只是“活着”。

大法官再一次指责基督过于尊重人的自由,尊重到似乎不爱他们,因为他不体贴人的软弱。

而大法官所谓的对人少一点尊重,对他的要求低一些,意思就是诉诸于人们的盲从和无知。那些没有勇气自由地信仰的人,那些不相信基督在十字架上的死是一种胜利、是唯一拯救方式的人,就只好去接受大法官带来的表面的奇迹和人造的神秘,而这一切的底下只不过是欺骗、谎言和暴力而已。

中国战国时期的商鞅有本书叫《商君书》,里面提到“驭民五术”,就和大法官的思想颇为一致:

①壹民(统一思想)

②弱民(国强民弱)

③疲民(一场接一场运动;996)

④辱民(大法官说的:软弱,卑贱;使他们互相检举,内斗)

⑤贫民(剥夺他们多余的财富,使他们每日只为生计奔波,无暇他顾)

“我们纠正了你的行为,把你的行为置于奇迹、神秘和权威的基础之上。”——“我们拥护的不是你,而是他(魔鬼)。”这就是宗教大法官的秘密。

第三个诱惑——向魔鬼下拜

“我们从他那里接受了被你愤然拒绝的东西”,“我们从他那儿接受了罗马和恺撒的宝剑,并且宣布自己是人间的王,唯一的王。”

这就是魔鬼的第三个诱惑。

“假如你听从了伟大的魔鬼的第三个劝告,你就满足了人类在地上追求的一切,那就是:崇拜谁?把良心交给谁?通过什么方式大家才能最后结成一个没有争吵、和睦一致的蚂蚁窝?因为全世界团结一致的要求正是令人们痛苦的第三个也是最后一个问题。整个人类始终追求全世界的联合。”

第三个诱惑在罗马帝国时代表现为对恺撒的崇拜,中世纪时期表现为教皇崇拜,在现代社会体现为极权、独裁国家的领袖崇拜。第三个诱惑是权力归属谁的问题。归属于某一个人,就是极权国家(纳粹德国,斯大林苏联),归属所谓的“人民”,就是多数人的暴政(法国大革命)。而将二者混合起来的就是中国的“文化大革命”。

第三个诱惑重要的体现就是国家崇拜,就是民族主义、爱国主义的甚嚣尘上。他们宣扬领袖崇拜,政党崇拜,打造民族神话,国家神话,让所谓的爱国、爱党、爱领袖变成真理本身,成为人们的集体无意识。

基督拒绝了魔鬼的这一诱惑,拒绝了恺撒的剑,拒绝作地上的王,拒绝这些自我崇拜的国家或全世界的联合,在上帝之外的联合。

这世上总有人因着骄傲和野心要在地上建造巴别塔,为了传扬自己的名。无论是扩张国土(“如果俄罗斯不存在了,我们还要世界干什么?”),还是扩张经济(全球化,一带一路),还是扩张意识形态(共产主义),都是接受了基督所拒绝的魔鬼的第三个诱惑。它的诱惑如此之大,甚至陀思妥耶夫斯基本人在他的思想里都有建立俄罗斯“第三罗马”的梦想,去维护沙皇专制。

在宗教大法官长篇独白快要结束的时候,他用一大段充满恶魔激情的话,表达了他理想中的人类生活,这也是大法官和他几十万手下所统治的数十亿弱者的幸福生活。

这些驯服的羊群,他们所享受的是只配弱者享受的幸福,他们用自由换来的幸福。他们带着恐惧战兢的心偎依在统治者周围,并为这些统治者的强大和聪明感到骄傲。他们的脑子不再胡思乱想。他们被迫劳动,他们也有劳动之余被安排好的空闲时间,用来“背儿歌,练合唱,跳天真烂漫的舞蹈”。他们甚至被允许犯罪、干坏事。

“他们再也不会向我们隐瞒任何秘密”,“我们可以允许或者禁止他们跟妻子或情妇同房,是否生育孩子——这全看他们听话不听话。”

经历过计划生育和无所不在的摄像头监控,经历过人与人互相警惕、互相举报的耳语者年代,经历过高科技的网络审查、许多的词语只能用谐音和拼音代替的时代,你就会深切感受到,宗教大法官梦想中的人类图景,在我们这个时代已经一步步变为了现实。

但是有一点不同,宗教大法官原是在自由的强者之列,他也在沙漠里呆过,吃过蝗虫和草根,后来据说他是“迷途知返”,加入到纠正基督的事业的行列中。而大法官后来的那些徒子徒孙,远比他更卑劣。比如毛泽东,从他被打造的形象来看,他几乎是一个完美的宗教大法官,伟大的舵手,伟大的导师,作风朴素,为官清廉。实际上他不是。他性格乖戾,喜怒无常,心胸狭窄,生活腐化,他连面包都不能提供给那几万万跪在他面前的臣民。

可悲的是他现在仍在被某些组织和个人膜拜着,无论出自假意还是真心。甚至还有人想要回到他统治的那个时代。这是整个民族的悲哀。

这就是宗教大法官所纠正的基督的事业,他们要在地上建造一座巴别塔来传扬自己的名,但最终无一例外的成了烂尾工程。只是在这个过程中,一代一代的人已经成为了这项工程的材料和代价,烂尾的大厦下面埋葬了累累的白骨和无尽的血泪。

在大法官滔滔不绝的言辞下,在他打着同情、爱护弱者的旗号下,我们看到他对人的极度蔑视。他们不讲道德,叛逆成性,眼睛只盯住地上的面包和自我的欲望,他们带着深深的恐惧匍匐在领袖面前,惟恐他们手上的面包重新变成石头。就是他们,为了三十块钱,出卖了自己的灵魂;就是他们,刚刚还在对着基督欢呼“和散那”,转眼就围住他高喊“钉他十字架”。那么,他们只配交出自己的自由,聚在一起成为一个蚂蚁窝吗?

圣经和基督教怎样看待这个问题的呢?怎样看待人的自由?怎样看待魔鬼的问题和人类的命运的呢?

上帝造人之初,是照着自己的形象造人,并且把自己最宝贵的属性——自由,加在了人的身上。

魔鬼是怎么来的?按照基督教的说法,魔鬼本是上帝所造的最高级的天使,只是它因心中高傲背叛了上帝,妄图取代上帝的地位,最后失败坠落地上。从此,它在地上所做的事情只有一件,就是诱惑、败坏上帝所造的人类,以体贴人的地上需要的名义,使人忘记自己神圣的来源,忘记自己跟另一个世界的联系。

上段时间,我无意中看到一部电影,叫《魔鬼代言人》。电影里阿尔帕西诺扮演的魔鬼对基努·里维斯扮演的律师说:“我从开天辟地以来就来到世上,深入人类生活。我挑动了人性一切潜在的欲望,我满足了人类需求却不批判他。为什么?因为即使再顽劣的人,我也不会拒绝他。我热爱人类,我是个人道主义者。”

听起来是不是特别熟悉?因为这就是宗教大法官的思想,甚至言词几乎都一模一样。

魔鬼和大法官所谓的“人道主义”,不过是纵容人性当中幽暗的一面。他们所界定的自由,是不受任何约束的、为所欲为的自由。

但是绝对的自由,正是绝对的枷锁。当人纵容自己的内心欲望时,人就成了欲望的奴隶。而且人不是独自存活于这个世界,当纵容欲望的人聚在一起,人和人之间,族群与族群之间就开始彼此仇恨,互相残杀。然后被大法官这样的欺骗家利用。他们交出自己的自由,结成一个没有争吵、和睦一致的蚂蚁窝。虽然大法官的理想尚未完全实现,现在的世界仍然充满杀戮和动荡,但是各样的小宗教大法官已经出现。真正的自由在这个世界成为了稀缺的东西。

那么,有没有另一条出路呢?人真的无法承受这宝贵的自由么?

回到圣经中,面对魔鬼的三个诱惑,耶稣是怎样胜过的呢?他分别使用了圣经上的三句话:

①“人活着,不是单靠食物,乃是靠神口里所出的一切话。”

②“不可试探主你的神。”

③“当拜主你的神,单要侍奉他。”

我们看到这三句话的共同点,就是面对诱惑的时候,不可忘记上帝,不可忘记和另一个世界的联系,不可忘记魔鬼只是上帝的手下败将,它所有的诱惑都带着欺骗,它应许的满足和荣光都是窃取自上帝的。它最大的目的就是领人进入地狱。

而宗教大法官,这魔鬼的随从,就“沿着那聪明的魔鬼,那可怕的死亡和毁灭的魔鬼所指点的方向前进。为此就应该采取许诺和欺骗的方法,有意识地引导人们走向死亡和毁灭,而且一路上要不断地欺骗他们,让他们不至于发觉要把他们引向何处,让这些可怜的瞎子哪怕在途中还认为自己是幸福的。”

自由人的道路是什么呢?别尔嘉耶夫的回答是:“人不是没有头脑的羊群,不是不能承受揭示秘密的重负、软弱、卑贱的动物,人——是上帝的儿女,他们被授予圣洁的使命,他们有能力承受自由的重负并能够容纳世界的真谛。”

靠着基督,这是能够的。因为两千年前,基督就在旷野胜过了魔鬼的诱惑。我们,这些有神圣来源,有自由意志,有人的尊严的人,也一定能够胜过这些诱惑。

The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor (Part II)

—How do the weak bear freedom

Author: Han Lihua

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: Drawing on *The Grand Inquisitor* and the three temptations in the Bible, this article explores why people abandon their freedom and accept enslavement. It critiques modern totalitarian politics and the cult of personality, while articulating the true Christian view of freedom. The greatest danger to humanity lies not merely in tyranny itself, but in people’s own willingness to trade their freedom for bread, miracles, and authority.

Alyosha said that Jesus was the only one “who could forgive and had the right to forgive”; the edifice of human destiny is not built upon the tears of little girls, but upon Jesus. Alyosha said that Ivan had forgotten Jesus.

Ivan replied that he had not forgotten Jesus, and that he had even written a long poem about Him (titled “The Grand Inquisitor”), which is the famous “The Grand Inquisitor” found in Chapter 5 of Volume 5 of *The Brothers Karamazov*. Although he had not written the poem down, he remembered its content.

As an introduction, Ivan discussed similar poems and plays from past eras—the fashion of “bringing the gods down to earth.” He mentioned Dante, Hugo’s *The Hunchback of Notre-Dame*, and plays performed in Russia before the time of Peter the Great. He also specifically mentioned a long poem from the era of Tatar rule titled *The Virgin’s Journey Through Hell*. Ivan believed the descriptions in that poem were no less impressive than those of Dante.

Ivan said that his epic poem dealt with the same theme: the return of Jesus to the earth, to the human world. Jesus had already promised in the Bible: “I am coming soon” (Revelation 3:11: “I am coming soon; hold fast what you have, so that no one may take your crown.”) Yet as for when He will come, “No one knows about that day or hour, not even the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but only the Father” (Mark 13:32).

Thus, generation after generation, people on earth have awaited His return, “waiting for Him with the faith and heartfelt devotion of those days.”

Fifteen centuries have passed; for a full fifteen centuries, people have received no assurance from heaven. It was precisely at that time that a “new and terrifying heresy” emerged in northern Europe—the Reformation movement that swept across Western Europe. “Those heretics began to blaspheme God and deny miracles, yet the faith of the devout believers, as steadfast as ever, grew even more fervent.” Generation after generation, they prayed: “Lord, come quickly.” Finally, Jesus descended before the supplicants with infinite compassion, returning to those “suffering, sinful, yet childlike people who loved Him.”

It was in the sixteenth century, in Seville, southern Spain, that Jesus once again came down to earth. It was during the era when the Inquisition was at its most rampant. Jesus came here “simply to catch a glimpse of his children, to see the very place where bonfires were lit to burn heretics alive.”

Just the day before, in the city’s main square, “for the glory of God, hundreds of heretics had been burned alive all at once.” He arrived at the square quietly and unnoticed, but strangely, everyone recognized him immediately. … The crowd surged forward irresistibly, surrounding him. … He walked silently among them, a serene smile of infinite compassion on his face. The sun of love burned within his heart, and the radiance of light, wisdom, and strength shone from his eyes, illuminating the people, stirring their souls, and showering them with deep, tender love.”

He restored sight to a blind man and brought a little girl lying in a coffin back to life. Just as he had done during his three years on earth fifteen hundred years earlier.

Just then, the High Priest passed through the square. The book describes him thus: “He was a man of nearly ninety, tall and upright, with a gaunt face and sunken eyes, yet his gaze was piercing, like two sparks of fire.” He witnessed everything that had taken place in the square, so he ordered the guards to seize Jesus and take him to a small, dimly lit, vaulted cell within the ancient building of the Sanhedrin.

When night fell, “in the pitch darkness, the cell’s iron door swung open, and the aged High Priest, carrying a lamp himself, slowly entered the prison. He was alone, and the iron door closed immediately behind him.”

The Grand Inquisitor and Christ stood face to face in that dim cell and began their conversation. In truth, it was no conversation at all, but merely a monologue by the Grand Inquisitor, for from beginning to end, Christ remained silent.

The Chief Justice also told Christ not to answer, reasoning that “you have no right to add anything new to what you have already said,” and that “since you have entrusted everything to the Pope, and everything is now in the Pope’s hands, there is absolutely no need for you to return now—at least not for the time being, so as not to cause any disruption.”

In fact, Jesus remained silent in exactly this way when he was tried by the Jewish high priests back then.

Now, the church He Himself established long ago is once again putting Him on trial, refusing to let Him speak. For, according to the Chief Justice, if Christ were to speak now, it would infringe upon people’s freedom of religion, since people have been freely practicing their faith according to Christ’s words from fifteen hundred years ago. And Christ Himself regarded freedom of religion as more precious than anything else. “You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.” (John 8:32)

The Chief Justice said that earlier that day, in the square, Christ had seen those “free people” who believed in him, kneeling before the Chief Justice in fear and submission as they watched Christ being led away by the guards.

“Now, at this very moment, these people are more convinced than ever that they are completely free, when in reality they have personally handed over their freedom to us, placing it meekly at our feet.” ”The Chief Justice believed that this outcome was entirely due to his own efforts and those of his subordinates, for they had finally suppressed freedom in order to bring happiness to the people.

This was the Chief Justice’s stance: to deny human freedom for the sake of human happiness.

He said to Christ, “The number of warnings and instructions given to you was by no means small, yet time and again you refused to heed them; you have abandoned the only path that can lead to human happiness.”

By “the warnings and instructions were not few,” he was referring to the three temptations (tests) by the devil that Jesus faced before beginning his ministry, as recorded in the Bible.

At that time, Jesus was led by the Holy Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted by the devil. He fasted for forty days and nights, and afterward he was hungry. Then the tempter came to him and said, “ ‘If you are the Son of God, command these stones to become bread.’ But Jesus answered, ‘It is written: “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that comes from the mouth of God.”’

Then the devil took him to the holy city, set him on the pinnacle of the temple, and said to him, ‘If you are the Son of God, throw yourself down. For it is written: “ ‘He will command his angels concerning you, and they will lift you up in their hands, so that you will not strike your foot against a stone.’”

Jesus said to him, “It is also written: ‘Do not put the Lord your God to the test.’” The devil took him to a very high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their splendor. He said to him, “ “If you will worship me, I will give you all these things.” Jesus said, “Be gone, Satan! For it is written: ‘You shall worship the Lord your God and serve Him only.’”

Then the devil left Him, and angels came and attended Him.

(Matthew 4:1–11)

From the Bible, we see that Christ rejected the devil’s three temptations—which, according to the Chief Justice, were the devil’s three warnings. This is because the Chief Justice regarded this as a “great devil,” and he viewed these three “temptations” as being in quotation marks. In the Chief Justice’s eyes, the devil’s three temptations were not evil things, but rather tangible, undeniable realities. He believed that these three questions posed by the devil to Christ were a miracle, transcending all existing human wisdom and representing eternal, abstract wisdom. “For this question seems to synthesize the entire future history of humanity into a single whole, foretelling its destiny, while simultaneously presenting three images that encompass all the insoluble contradictions within the human nature of the entire world.”

The Grand Judge said, “Now, fifteen centuries later, we see that everything contained in these three questions has been recognized, foretold, and confirmed; nothing can be added or subtracted from them.”

For us today, it has not been fifteen centuries but twenty—and particularly in the twentieth century, with the rise of totalitarianism, these three temptations of the devil have become even more direct and brutal in world history and human nature. Therefore, the Bible, along with the story of the Chief Justice, remains of immense significance in our time, offering vital insights into how we discern truth from falsehood and choose our path in life.

The First Temptation—Turning Stones into Bread

Christ came into the world so that people might attain freedom, “but because of their simplicity and innate baseness, they are incapable of understanding freedom properly; they are afraid of and terrified by it. For nothing is more intolerable to humanity and human society than freedom!”

The devil said to Christ, “If you turn stones into bread, then humanity will follow you like a flock of sheep, grateful to you and obedient to your every command.” But such following is born of fear, for they fear that one day you will withdraw your hand and no longer provide them with bread.

Christ rejected this kind of submission bought with bread. The following he sought was free and born of love, not a transaction conducted as a means of survival. Thus, in the Bible, after Jesus performed the miracle of the “five loaves and two fish” to feed five thousand people, and those people began chasing after him everywhere, Jesus was not pleased. Instead, he rebuked them for following him merely to “be filled with bread,” causing most of them to leave him.

From a leader’s perspective, Jesus’s actions were truly unwise. He could easily have led them first to “seize the landlords’ property and redistribute the land,” only to take the land back from them once his cause succeeded. No, Christ did not want such followers; he refused to exploit people’s base nature. He sought those who would follow him freely, with dignity and bearing the original image of God’s glory. Thus, Christ said, “Man does not live by bread alone.” (This is also the title of a collection of Dostoevsky’s letters published in China.)

But, “the devil on earth will rise up against you for this bread, wage war against you, and defeat you, while everyone will follow him and praise him.” (“The East is red, the sun is rising; China has produced Mao Zedong. He seeks happiness for the people; he is the people’s great savior.”)

This is what Marxism and socialism proclaim: “There is no such thing as crime, nor is there any concept of sin; there are only starving people,” and “Fill their bellies first, then teach them morality.”

This is the campaign against landlords, the public-private partnerships—this is the logic of “I am poor, therefore I am right.” In the name of so-called wealth redistribution, they unleashed wave after wave of bloodshed and violence: “Upon the ruins of your sanctuary, a new edifice and a dreadful Tower of Babel shall rise.” This new edifice, this new Tower of Babel—whether called the “paradise on earth” or “communist society”—brought endless chaos and suffering to all humanity in the twentieth century.

The religious grand justices hold a contemptuous view of human nature, regarding people as “weak, insignificant, immoral, and unjust.” They find Christ’s cherished freedom most intolerable. In their minds, the bread of heaven cannot be compared to the bread of earth. Here, “the bread of heaven” refers to man’s eternal freedom, his absolute dignity, and his connection to eternity. “Earthly bread” refers to the tranquility of life, physical satisfaction, earthly happiness, and “peaceful days.”

The Grand Inquisitor believed that only a few tens of thousands of “strong” individuals were willing to follow Christ for the sake of heavenly freedom; yet there were millions of “weak” people who could not give up earthly bread for heavenly bread. They would follow whoever provided them with earthly bread and willingly surrender their freedom.

The Chief Justice accused Christ of being an elitist, valuing only those tens of thousands on earth who cherish the bread of heaven, while ignoring the remaining millions who are so attached to the bread of this world that they are willing to give up their freedom. The Chief Justice said, “We, too, care for the weak.” The Chief Justice and his entourage have taken control of these weak ones’ freedom, ruling over them—and doing so in the name of Christ.

In other words, the Grand Inquisitor’s rule is built on deception. He disguises himself as a democrat, a friend of the weak and the oppressed, and then claims to cherish and care for them. His so-called love for the weak is, in fact, contempt for them. For he does not believe in the noble origins of humanity; he believes that only a select few are capable of walking the path of a noble life, of not being tempted by earthly bread, and of loving heavenly bread above all else.

Berdyayev said: “The spirit of the religious Grand Inquisitor, for the sake of false, earthly love rather than heavenly love, doubts that people have the right to climb high mountains and constantly improve themselves; out of compassion for people, it calls for sharing poverty with one’s brothers—poverty, not wealth. A rich spiritual life is forbidden. It is forbidden to contemplate eternal life; such contemplation is called individualism, and only concern for the transient is praised. ‘You must be lowly and poor, forever renouncing your freedom; only then will you receive the bread of the earth, only then will you find peace, and only then will everyone be happy.’”

The Chief Justice believed that the weak are unworthy of freedom; when freedom comes to them, they desire only the bread of this earth, and such freedom becomes a burden and a torment to them. “Have you not considered that if the freedom to choose becomes a terrible burden that crushes them and leaves them gasping for breath, they will ultimately abandon—or even oppose—your image and your truth?”

These weak ones, who value only the bread of this earth, are not prepared to pay the price for freedom. They do not want true faith, but rather choose substitutes for faith—miracles, mystery, and authority.

“There are three powers in the world, and only these three can forever conquer and captivate these weak, rebellious consciences, bringing them happiness—these three powers are miracles, mystery, and authority.”

Christ rejected all three of these powers.

The Second Temptation—Jumping from the Temple Roof

Christ again rejected this temptation from the devil. He did not jump down; he did not perform a miracle.

Just as when he was nailed to the cross, and those people mocked him and ridiculed him from below, saying, “If you are the Son of God, come down from the cross,” “and we will believe in you.” At that time, he did not come down from the cross.

The reason He did not come down from the cross is the same as why He did not jump from the temple roof. “You did not come down from the cross; the reason you did not come down is that you did not wish to conquer people with miracles. You longed for a faith rooted in freedom, not a faith in miracles. You longed for a love of freedom, not the slavish ecstasy a slave displays before a power that terrifies him into perpetual fear.”

The Chief Justice said, “Once a person abandons miracles, he simultaneously abandons God. For what people seek is not so much God as it is miracles.”

This reminds me of the Chinese people’s “worship of enlightened rulers” and “worship of incorruptible officials.” For thousands of years, they have yearned to kneel before monarchs and officials who are treated as gods; otherwise, they would rather turn on one another. They have never considered treating leaders as ordinary people capable of making mistakes, nor have they ever thought to cage power. That is why a certain unscrupulous celebrity in Hong Kong once said, “The Chinese people need to be controlled.” Perhaps this is an inherent flaw in the Chinese character—an ignorance of the preciousness of freedom. Their greatest goal in life is simply “to survive.”

The Chief Justice once again accused Christ of placing too much emphasis on human freedom, to the point where it seemed as though He did not love them, because He did not take into account human weakness.

What the Chief Justice means by “showing people a little less respect” and “lowering his standards for them” is, in essence, appealing to people’s blind obedience and ignorance. Those who lack the courage to believe freely, those who do not believe that Christ’s death on the cross was a victory and the only path to salvation, have no choice but to accept the superficial miracles and artificial mysteries brought by the Chief Justice—yet beneath all this lie nothing but deception, lies, and violence.

Shang Yang, a statesman from China’s Warring States period, wrote a book titled *The Book of Lord Shang*, which mentions the “Five Techniques for Governing the People”—ideas that align quite closely with the Grand Judge’s philosophy:

① Unify the People (Unify their thoughts)

② Weaken the People (A strong state, weak people)

③ Exhaust the People (One campaign after another; 996 work schedule)

④ Humiliate the People (As the Grand Judge says: Weakness, lowliness; make them denounce one another and fight among themselves)

⑤ Impoverish the People (Strip them of surplus wealth, forcing them to struggle daily just to survive, leaving them no time for anything else)

“We have corrected your behavior, grounding it in miracles, mystery, and authority.” — “We do not support you, but him (the Devil).” This is the secret of the religious Grand Inquisitor.

The Third Temptation—Bowing Down to the Devil

“We have accepted from him what you have indignantly rejected,” “We have accepted from him the sword of Rome and Caesar, and have proclaimed ourselves the King of the Earth, the sole King.”

This is the Devil’s third temptation.

“If you heed the great devil’s third counsel, you will satisfy all that humanity seeks on earth, namely: whom to worship? To whom to entrust one’s conscience? By what means can all people finally unite into a harmonious, conflict-free anthill? For the demand for global unity is precisely the third and final problem that causes people suffering. All of humanity has always sought the union of the entire world.”

The third temptation manifested as the worship of Caesar in the Roman Empire, as the worship of the Pope in the Middle Ages, and as the cult of personality in totalitarian and dictatorial states in modern society. The third temptation is the question of to whom power belongs. If power belongs to a single individual, it results in a totalitarian state (Nazi Germany, Stalinist Soviet Union); if it belongs to the so-called “people,” it leads to the tyranny of the majority (the French Revolution). A blend of the two is what we see in China’s “Cultural Revolution.”

A key manifestation of the third temptation is the worship of the state—the rampant rise of nationalism and patriotism. They promote the cult of the leader and the cult of the party, fabricating national and state myths, turning so-called love for the country, the party, and the leader into truth itself, embedding it into the collective unconscious of the people.

Christ rejected this temptation from the devil; He rejected Caesar’s sword, refused to be a king on earth, and rejected these self-worshipping nations or the union of the whole world—any union apart from God.

There are always those in this world who, driven by pride and ambition, seek to build a Tower of Babel on earth to exalt their own names. Whether it be the expansion of territory (“If Russia ceases to exist, what use is the world to us?”), the expansion of the economy (globalization, the Belt and Road Initiative), or the expansion of ideology (communism), all of these amount to accepting the devil’s third temptation—the very one Christ rejected. Its allure is so great that even Dostoevsky himself harbored, in his thoughts, the dream of establishing Russia as the “Third Rome” to uphold the tsarist autocracy.

Toward the end of the Grand Inquisitor’s lengthy monologue, he uses a passage brimming with diabolical fervor to describe his ideal human existence—a blissful life for the billions of the weak ruled by him and his hundreds of thousands of subordinates.

These tamed sheep enjoy a happiness fit only for the weak—a happiness they have traded for their freedom. With hearts trembling with fear, they huddle around their rulers, taking pride in the rulers’ strength and wisdom. Their minds no longer wander. They are forced to labor, yet they are also granted scheduled leisure time after work to “recite nursery rhymes, practice choral singing, and perform innocent, carefree dances.” They are even permitted to commit crimes and do wrong.

“They will never hide any secrets from us again,” “We can permit or forbid them from sleeping with their wives or mistresses, or from having children—it all depends on whether they obey us.”

Having lived through family planning and ubiquitous camera surveillance, having lived through the era of the Whisperers where people were constantly on guard against one another and ratted each other out, having lived through an era of high-tech internet censorship where many words could only be replaced with homophones or pinyin, you will deeply feel that the vision of humanity dreamed up by the Grand Inquisitor has, in our time, gradually become a reality.

But there is one key difference: the Grand Inquisitor originally belonged to the ranks of the free and powerful. He too had wandered in the desert, eating locusts and the roots of plants, and later, it is said, “saw the error of his ways” and joined the cause of correcting Christ. Yet the Grand Inquisitor’s later disciples and successors were far more despicable than he was. Take Mao Zedong, for example. Judging by the image crafted for him, he was almost a perfect Religious Grand Inquisitor—a great helmsman, a great mentor, frugal in his ways, and incorruptible in office. In reality, he was not. He had a volatile temperament, was capricious, narrow-minded, and led a corrupt life; he could not even provide bread for the hundreds of millions of subjects kneeling before him.

Tragically, he is still worshipped today by certain organizations and individuals, whether out of insincerity or genuine devotion. Some even yearn to return to the era of his rule. This is a tragedy for the entire nation.

This is the work of Christ that the religious high priests have perverted: they seek to build a Tower of Babel on earth to exalt their own names, yet without exception, these projects have ended as unfinished ruins. Yet in this process, generation after generation has become the building material and the cost of this project; beneath the unfinished edifice lie heaps of bleached bones and an endless sea of blood and tears.

Beneath the Grand Inquisitor’s endless rhetoric, beneath his banner of compassion and care for the weak, we see his utter contempt for humanity. They are immoral and rebellious by nature, their eyes fixed only on earthly bread and their own desires. They crawl before their leaders in deep fear, dreading that the bread in their hands might turn back into stones. It is they who sold their souls for thirty pieces of silver; it is they who, having just shouted “Hosanna” to Christ, instantly surrounded him, screaming, “Crucify him!” So, are they only fit to surrender their freedom and gather together to form an anthill?

How do the Bible and Christianity view this issue? How do they view human freedom? How do they view the problem of the devil and the fate of humanity?

When God first created man, He created him in His own image and endowed him with His most precious attribute—freedom.

How did the devil come to be? According to Christian teaching, the devil was originally the highest-ranking angel created by God. However, driven by pride, he rebelled against God, attempting to usurp God’s position, and ultimately failed, falling to earth. From that point on, he has had but one purpose on earth: to tempt and corrupt the human beings God created. Under the guise of catering to people’s earthly needs, he causes them to forget their divine origin and sever their connection to the other world.

A while back, I happened to come across a movie called *The Devil’s Advocate*. In the film, the devil, played by Al Pacino, says to the lawyer, played by Keanu Reeves: “I have been in this world since the dawn of time, deeply immersed in human life. I have stirred up every latent desire in human nature; I have satisfied human needs without judging them. Why? Because no matter how wicked a person may be, I will never reject them. I love humanity; I am a humanitarian.”

Doesn’t that sound particularly familiar? Because this is precisely the ideology of the Grand Inquisitor—even the wording is almost identical.

The so-called “humanitarianism” of the Devil and the Grand Inquisitor is nothing more than an indulgence of the dark side of human nature. The freedom they define is a freedom without any constraints, a freedom to do as one pleases.

But absolute freedom is, in fact, an absolute shackle. When people indulge their inner desires, they become slaves to those desires. Moreover, humans do not exist in isolation in this world; when those who indulge their desires gather together, hatred begins to breed between individuals and between groups, leading to mutual slaughter. They are then exploited by deceivers like the “Grand Judge.” People surrender their freedom to form a harmonious, conflict-free colony, much like an anthill. Although the Grand Judge’s ideal has not yet been fully realized—the world remains filled with violence and turmoil—various “minor Grand Judges” have already emerged. True freedom has become a rare commodity in this world.

So, is there another way out? Are humans truly incapable of bearing this precious freedom?

Returning to the Bible, how did Jesus overcome the devil’s three temptations? He used three verses from Scripture:

① “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God.”

② “You shall not put the Lord your God to the test.”

③ “Worship the Lord your God and serve Him only.”

We see that the common thread in these three verses is this: when facing temptation, we must not forget God; we must not forget our connection to the other world; and we must not forget that the devil is merely a defeated foe of God. All his temptations are laced with deception, and the fulfillment and glory he promises are stolen from God. His ultimate goal is to lead people into hell.

And the Grand Inquisitor, this servant of the devil, “marches in the direction pointed out by that cunning devil, that dreadful devil of death and destruction.” “To this end, one must employ the methods of promise and deception, consciously guiding people toward death and destruction, and along the way constantly deceiving them so that they do not realize where they are being led, allowing these poor blind souls to believe, even in the midst of their journey, that they are happy.”

What, then, is the path of the free? Berdyaev’s answer is: “Man is not a mindless flock, nor a weak and base animal incapable of bearing the burden of revealed secrets. Man—as a child of God—is entrusted with a sacred mission; he possesses the capacity to bear the burden of freedom and to embrace the true essence of the world.”

Through Christ, this is possible. For two thousand years ago, Christ overcame the devil’s temptations in the wilderness. We, who have a divine origin, free will, and human dignity, can certainly overcome these temptations as well.

黑暗中的灯火

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黑暗中的灯火

——我与北京锡安教会的信仰见证

作者:缪青

编辑:周志刚 校对:熊辩 翻译:戈冰

2025年10月11日清晨,旧金山湾区的天空刚刚泛起一层淡淡的晨光,太平洋的海风仍带着夜色的微凉。那是一个平静得不能再平静的清晨。然而就在这样的时刻,一条来自中国的消息,如同骤然划破天空的闪电,打破了我内心的宁静。

中共当局在全国范围内展开突袭行动,对北京锡安教会的牧师、传道人和信徒进行大规模抓捕。在短短数小时之内,已有三十余人被带走或失联。当我看到被抓捕人员名单时,几个熟悉的名字赫然映入眼帘:金明日牧师,王林牧师,高颖佳牧师,尹会彬长老,米沙传道……

那一刻,我的心仿佛被什么重重击中。

震惊、悲痛、难以置信。

这些人并不是新闻中遥远的名字,而是我曾经一同祷告、一起查经、一起服事的牧者与同工。他们温和、谦卑、虔诚,在许多人的生命中留下了深刻的印记。

然而此刻,他们却因信仰而被拘押。他们没有暴力,没有阴谋,也没有政治野心。他们唯一的“罪名”,只是坚持自由地敬拜上帝。

在中国漫长而复杂的宗教历史中,这样的故事并不陌生。但当它降临在自己熟悉的人身上时,那种沉重与痛楚,却远远超出新闻文字所能表达的范围。

那一刻,我久久无言。

黑暗中的灯火

北京锡安教会:金明日牧师(右四)、王林牧师(右三)、高颖佳牧师(右五)、尹会彬长老(右一)

一、信仰的起点:2002年的受洗

我的名字叫缪青。在公共身份上,我在《北京之春》和《在野党》两家刊物任旧金山记者站站长和采访记者。但在这些身份之外,我同时也是北京锡安教会一名普通的基督徒。

2002年,我在重庆渝中区的基督教圣爱堂受洗。那时的我年轻而懵懂,对信仰的理解还十分有限,只是觉得,在教堂里可以找到一种久违的宁静。在那个充满现实压力的社会环境中,那种宁静显得格外珍贵。

然而不久之后,我逐渐意识到一个现实问题。

圣爱堂属于中国官方的“三自教会体系”,其宗教活动受到国家宗教事务部门的严格管理。在一些主日讲道中,我开始听到一些与福音并不完全相关的政治话语。一些牧师需要在讲道中强调“爱国爱教”,甚至引用政治口号。

这种现象让我逐渐产生困惑。信仰是否必须附属于政治?教会是否可以真正独立存在?

2003年,我离开了圣爱堂。从那以后,我仿佛进入了一段漫长的信仰漂泊。在之后十余年的时间里,我依然祷告、读经,也偶尔参加一些小型聚会,但始终没有找到真正的属灵归宿。

二、漂泊中的光:重庆锡安磐石堂

直到2018年,我在重庆偶然听到一个消息:有一家庭教会:北京锡安教会在重庆设立了一个分堂,名叫重庆锡安磐石堂。

第一次参加磐石堂聚会时,我就感到一种久违的属灵震动。磐石堂的弟兄姊妹通过网络,与北京锡安教会同步敬拜和查经。当我第一次听到金明日牧师讲道时,我几乎立刻意识到:这正是我多年寻找的教会。他的讲道没有政治口号,没有意识形态的修辞。只有圣经本身。那种力量来自信仰,而不是来自任何权力。在那一刻,我感到自己终于重新找到了属灵的家。

锡安会的信众通过网络与锡安教会牧师的主日敬拜活动现场

三、北京锡安教会的诞生

北京锡安教会成立于2007年6月3日,是中国最具影响力的城市家庭教会之一。创办人是金明日牧师。

金牧师出生于黑龙江,是朝鲜族。他早年就读于燕京神学院,后来赴美国富勒神学院深造,获得新约神学博士学位。他既有深厚的神学训练,又拥有谦卑温和的牧者气质。在2000年代,中国城市社会正在发生巨大变化。大量知识分子、白领、律师、企业家开始接触基督教信仰。

他们既追求理性,也渴望灵性的归属。

北京锡安教会正是在这样的社会背景下成长起来。在最鼎盛时期,教会每周主日聚会人数超过1500人。这不仅是一间教会的规模,更象征着中国城市家庭教会的一种新形态。

四、我所认识的牧者们

我与金明日牧师正式见面,是在2023年一次灵修讲座之后。那时我已经在北京工作生活。讲座结束后,金牧师主动为我和我的家人祷告祝福。他的声音温和而沉静。在那一刻,我在他的目光中看见一种极为纯粹的信仰力量。

高颖佳牧师则是另一种性格。他热情、温暖、富有行动力。2023年冬天,北京锡安教会曾组织一次慈善义卖活动,帮助那些因疫情“白肺”而陷入困境的儿童家庭。高牧师是主要组织者之一。当他得知我捐赠了一些义卖物品后,特地向我表达感谢,并与我合影留念。

他的笑容让我明白一件事:信仰不是抽象的理论,而是行动中的爱。

尹会彬长老则常常默默在幕后工作。他负责协调物资运输与分发。做事认真踏实,不辞辛苦。

而米沙传道,则是一位充满爱心的姊妹。

她在我们北京锡安会方庄堂负责日常事务。每个主日,她总是最早到达聚会地点,准备茶水和食物,迎接每一位弟兄姊妹。

每逢节日教会团契,她总是喜欢给教会的弟兄姊妹包饺子。她包饺子的速度很快,也很好吃。

那种温暖,让人仿佛回到家中。

五、中国家庭教会七十年的历史

要理解北京锡安教会,就必须理解中国家庭教会的历史。

1949年之后,中国共产党建立政权。1950年代,政府推动宗教改造,建立“三自爱国运动委员会”。

所有教会必须纳入国家管理。

但许多信徒认为,教会不应完全依附政治。于是,一种新的信仰形态逐渐出现:家庭教会。

这些教会在私人住宅聚会,不受官方管理。在中共文革期间,几乎所有宗教活动被禁止。但家庭教会仍然秘密存在。

改革开放以后,它们迅速复兴。到21世纪,中国家庭教会信徒人数已经达到数千万。

北京锡安教会正是在这一历史传统中成长起来的。

六、制度冲突:信仰与权力

北京锡安教会事件,本质上是一种制度冲突。中国政治体系要求所有社会组织接受党的领导。

而基督教信仰强调:上帝高于一切世俗权力。

当教会坚持信仰独立时,就不可避免地与政治权力产生冲突。这种冲突,在中国已经持续了几十年。

从更广阔的历史视角来看,宗教自由并不是一个简单的政治口号。它是人类文明经过数百年斗争才获得的一项基本权利。17世纪欧洲宗教战争造成巨大灾难。

最终,人们逐渐认识到:信仰必须是自由的。

1776年美国独立革命,第一次在国家制度中确立宗教自由原则。

二战之后,《世界人权宣言》再次确认宗教自由是基本人权。

七、2025年“109教案”

2025年10月11日发生中国的针对北京锡安会教会牧者,信众成员的抓捕事件,很快被海外媒体称为:中国2025年109教案。

到2026年初,据国际人权组织统计显示:北京锡安会教会牧者,信众有超过40名教会成员被拘押。

国际社会迅速作出反应。

美国国务院、欧盟、英国外交部门相继发表声明。

联合国宗教自由特别报告员也对事件表示关注。

海外制作的抗议海报

八、信仰的力量

在历史上,每一次信仰被压制的时候,往往也是信仰最坚强的时候。

罗马帝国迫害基督徒三百年。但基督教最终改变了整个文明。

历史一再证明:信仰可以被压制,却无法被消灭。回望我的信仰旅程,从2002年的受洗,到2026年的今日。我逐渐明白:信仰从来不是一条安逸的道路,它更像是一条背负十字架的旅程。

北京锡安教会给予我的,不只是信仰的归宿,更让我看见:真正的教会,并不依附任何权力。它存在于信徒彼此相爱的团契之中!存在于那些在黑暗中仍然守望光明的人心里!

历史终将过去,政权也终将更迭。

但信仰的火焰,却会在一代又一代人的心中继续燃烧。当未来的历史学家回望这个时代时,也许会发现:那些在地下室祷告的人,那些在黑夜中聚会的人,那些因为信仰而被带走的人,正是这个时代真正的光。

而北京锡安教会,正是我信仰归途中见过的,最温柔、也最坚强的一束光。

A Light in the Darkness

——My Testimony of Faith with Beijing Zion Church

Author: Miao Qing

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: On October 11, 2025, the Chinese Communist Party launched a crackdown on Beijing Zion Church. The author shares his religious journey, the sincerity and kindness of Beijing Zion Church members, the importance of religious freedom, and the power of faith.

In the early morning of October 11, 2025, a faint glow of dawn was just beginning to appear in the sky over the San Francisco Bay Area, and the Pacific breeze still carried the slight chill of the night. It was a morning as peaceful as could be. Yet at that very moment, news from China struck like a bolt of lightning splitting the sky, shattering the tranquility within my heart.

The Chinese Communist authorities launched a nationwide raid, carrying out mass arrests of pastors, preachers, and believers from Beijing Zion Church. Within just a few hours, more than thirty people had been taken away or were unaccounted for. When I saw the list of those arrested, several familiar names immediately caught my eye: Pastor Jin Mingri, Pastor Wang Lin, Pastor Gao Yingjia, Elder Yin Huibin, Preacher Mi Sha…

In that moment, it felt as though my heart had been struck by a heavy blow.

Shock, grief, disbelief.

These people are not distant names in the news, but pastors and fellow workers with whom I once prayed, studied the Bible, and served together. They are gentle, humble, and devout, having left a deep imprint on the lives of many.

Yet now, they have been detained for their faith. They have committed no violence, hatched no conspiracies, and harbored no political ambitions. Their only “crime” is simply insisting on the freedom to worship God.

In China’s long and complex religious history, such stories are not uncommon. But when it happens to people I know personally, the weight and pain far exceed what words in a news article can convey.

At that moment, I was speechless for a long time.

黑暗中的灯火

Beijing Zion Church: Pastor Jin Mingri (fourth from right), Pastor Wang Lin (third from right), Pastor Gao Yingjia (fifth from right), Elder Yin Huibin (first from right)

I. The Beginning of Faith: My Baptism in 2002

My name is Miao Qing. Professionally, I serve as the San Francisco bureau chief and a reporter for the publications *Beijing Spring* and *The Opposition*. But beyond these roles, I am also an ordinary Christian at Beijing Zion Church.

In 2002, I was baptized at the Christian Holy Love Church in Yuzhong District, Chongqing. At that time, I was young and naive, with a very limited understanding of faith. I simply felt that I could find a long-lost sense of peace within the church. In a social environment filled with the pressures of reality, that peace seemed especially precious.

However, not long after, I gradually became aware of a practical problem.

Holy Love Church belongs to China’s official “Three-Self Church system,” and its religious activities are strictly regulated by the state’s religious affairs department. In some Sunday sermons, I began to hear political rhetoric that was not entirely related to the Gospel. Some pastors felt compelled to emphasize “love for the country and the church” in their sermons, even quoting political slogans.

This phenomenon gradually left me perplexed. Must faith be subordinate to politics? Can the church truly exist independently?

In 2003, I left Holy Love Church. From then on, I seemed to enter a long period of spiritual wandering. Over the next decade or so, I continued to pray and read the Bible, and occasionally attended small gatherings, but I never found a true spiritual home.

II. A Light in the Midst of Wandering: Chongqing Zion Rock Church

It wasn’t until 2018 that I happened to hear news in Chongqing: a house church, Beijing Zion Church, had established a branch in Chongqing called Chongqing Zion Rock Church.

The very first time I attended a service at Rock Church, I felt a long-lost spiritual stir. The brothers and sisters at Rock Church worshiped and studied the Bible in sync with Beijing Zion Church via the internet. When I first heard Pastor Jin Mingri preach, I realized almost immediately: this was the church I had been searching for all these years. His sermons contained no political slogans, no ideological rhetoric. Only the Bible itself. That power came from faith, not from any authority. In that moment, I felt I had finally found my spiritual home again.

Members of the Zion Church connect online with the live Sunday worship service led by the pastors of the Zion Church

III. The Founding of Beijing Zion Church

Beijing Zion Church was established on June 3, 2007, and is one of the most influential urban house churches in China. Its founder is Pastor Kim Myung-il.

Pastor Kim was born in Heilongjiang and is of Korean ethnicity. He attended Yenching Theological Seminary in his early years and later pursued advanced studies at Fuller Theological Seminary in the United States, where he earned a Doctor of Theology degree in New Testament studies. He possesses both a deep theological foundation and the humble, gentle demeanor of a pastor. In the 2000s, China’s urban society was undergoing tremendous changes. A large number of intellectuals, white-collar workers, lawyers, and entrepreneurs began to explore the Christian faith.

They sought both rationality and a sense of spiritual belonging.

It was against this social backdrop that Beijing Zion Church flourished. At its peak, the church’s weekly Sunday services drew over 1,500 attendees. This was not merely the scale of a single congregation; it symbolized a new form of urban house church in China.

IV. The Pastors I Have Known

I first met Pastor Jin Mingri formally after a spiritual retreat in 2023. By then, I had already been living and working in Beijing. After the lecture, Pastor Jin took the initiative to pray for and bless me and my family. His voice was gentle and calm. In that moment, I saw in his eyes a profoundly pure power of faith.

Pastor Gao Yingjia, on the other hand, has a different personality. He is passionate, warm, and proactive. In the winter of 2023, Beijing Zion Church organized a charity bazaar to help families with children who had fallen on hard times due to “white lung” caused by the pandemic. Pastor Gao was one of the main organizers. When he learned that I had donated some items for the sale, he made a point of thanking me and took a photo with me.

His smile made me realize one thing: faith is not an abstract theory, but love in action.

Elder Yin Huibin, on the other hand, often works quietly behind the scenes. He is responsible for coordinating the transportation and distribution of supplies. He is diligent and down-to-earth, never shirking from hard work.

As for Sister Mi Sha, she is a sister full of love.

She handles daily affairs at our Beijing Zion Church Fangzhuang Congregation. Every Sunday, she is always the first to arrive at the meeting place, preparing tea and food to welcome every brother and sister.

Whenever there is a church fellowship during holidays, she always enjoys making dumplings for the brothers and sisters in the church. She makes them quickly, and they taste delicious.

That warmth makes people feel as if they’ve returned home.

V. Seventy Years of History of China’s House Churches

To understand the Beijing Zion Church, one must understand the history of China’s house churches.

After 1949, the Communist Party of China established its regime. In the 1950s, the government promoted religious reform and established the “Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee.”

All churches were required to come under state control.

However, many believers felt that the church should not be entirely subservient to politics. Consequently, a new form of worship gradually emerged: the house church.

These churches gathered in private homes, free from official oversight. During the Chinese Communist Party’s Cultural Revolution, nearly all religious activities were banned. Yet house churches continued to exist in secret.

Following the Reform and Opening-Up policy, they experienced a rapid revival. By the 21st century, the number of believers in China’s house churches had reached tens of millions.

The Beijing Zion Church grew out of this historical tradition.

VI. Institutional Conflict: Faith and Power

The Beijing Zion Church incident is, at its core, a conflict of institutions. China’s political system requires all social organizations to accept the Party’s leadership.

Christian faith, however, emphasizes that God is above all secular power.

When the church insists on the independence of its faith, conflict with political power becomes inevitable. This conflict has persisted in China for decades.

From a broader historical perspective, religious freedom is not merely a political slogan. It is a fundamental right that human civilization has secured only after centuries of struggle. The religious wars of 17th-century Europe caused immense devastation.

Ultimately, people gradually came to recognize that faith must be free.

The American Revolution of 1776 established the principle of religious freedom within a national system for the first time.

After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reaffirmed that religious freedom is a fundamental human right.

After World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reaffirmed that religious freedom is a fundamental human right.

VII. The “2025 109 Religious Case”

On October 11, 2025, a series of arrests targeting pastors and members of the Beijing Zion Church took place in China. Overseas media soon dubbed this event the “2025 109 Religious Case.”

By early 2026, statistics from international human rights organizations indicated that more than 40 members of the Beijing Zion Church, including pastors and congregants, had been detained.

The international community reacted swiftly.

The U.S. State Department, the European Union, and the British Foreign Office issued statements in succession.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief also expressed concern over the incident.

Protest posters created overseas

VIII. The Power of Faith

Throughout history, whenever faith has been suppressed, it has often been at its strongest.

The Roman Empire persecuted Christians for three hundred years. Yet Christianity ultimately transformed the entire civilization.

History has repeatedly proven that faith can be suppressed, but it cannot be eradicated. Looking back on my journey of faith, from my baptism in 2002 to today in 2026, I have gradually come to understand: faith is never a path of ease; it is more like a journey of carrying the cross.

What the Beijing Zion Church has given me is not merely a spiritual home; it has also shown me that a true church does not depend on any form of power. It exists in the fellowship of believers who love one another! It exists in the hearts of those who continue to watch for the light even in the darkness!

History will eventually pass, and regimes will eventually change.

But the flame of faith will continue to burn in the hearts of generation after generation. When future historians look back on this era, they may discover that those who prayed in basements, those who gathered in the darkness, and those who were taken away for their faith were, in fact, the true light of this age.

And Beijing Zion Church is the gentlest yet strongest beam of light I have encountered on my journey of faith.