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雕塑公园 12月13日 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动

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雕塑公园 12月13日 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动
雕塑公园 12月13日 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动

《纪念勇者 ·控诉暴政》

—— 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动

时间:2025年12月13日 周六下午2点

地点:自由雕塑公园

借民主运动先驱墙落成之际,我们与茉莉花行动共同发声,《纪念勇者·控诉暴政》为中国自由与人权坚持不懈、却遭监禁、酷刑、失踪与迫害的民主先驱致敬,也公开控诉持续迫害公民社会的极权暴政!自由无罪,迫害可耻!

这座先驱墙致敬那些为争取中国的民主、人权、言论自由与公民社会付出巨大代价的时代先驱。

在纪念墙前,茉莉花行动将举办特别纪念声援,向所有为自由承受监禁、酷刑、失踪与迫害的民主英雄表达最深切的敬意。

被致敬的代表人物包括(不限于):

•刘晓波|诺贝尔和平奖得主,《零八宪章》起草人

• 许志永|新公民运动发起人

• 丁家喜|宪政改革推动者

• 黎智英|香港媒体人,《苹果日报》创办人,因坚持真相与新闻自由被长期囚禁

• 张展|因报道疫情真相被捕的记者

• 高智晟|“中国良心律师”,长期失踪

• 周松林牧师|安徽合肥甘泉教会受迫害牧者

• 金明日牧师|北京锡安教会受迫害牧者

• “天安门母亲”群体|为1989遇难者坚持真相与问责的持续力量

他们在思想启蒙、公民权利、新闻自由、法律维权与宗教自由领域留下深远影响,是当代中国民主运动的象征性力量。

这不仅是纪念,更是控诉。

在一个 真相被犯罪化 的国家,说真话本身就是英雄行为。

一个政府越害怕公民,它的脆弱就越暴露无遗。

他们被囚禁的不是身体,而是政权对自由的恐惧。

当权力拒绝透明,勇气就成为最稀缺的公共资源。

如果一个国家必须靠监禁良心来维持“稳定”,那么这种稳定本身就是谎言。

民主运动的英雄不是倒下于战争,

而是倒下于真相。

历史的审判不在法庭,而在记忆里——而他们,终将胜诉。

不做中共的帮凶

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不做中共的帮凶

作者:Lewis Lin 编辑:冯仍 责任编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:彭小梅

2025年11月22日

一、引言

极权主义社会的暴力不是由统治者单独实施,而是由庞大的执行体系维持。从纳粹德国到苏联大清洗,帮凶结构在所有极权国家中都占据中心地位。

汉娜·阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)指出:“极权统治通过使所有人参与其犯罪行为,从而摧毁道德判断的能力。”(Arendt, 1951)

中国共产党在其执政的七十五年中,通过政治运动、阶级斗争与宣传体系,使国家暴力制度化,导致数以千万计的生命损失。本文在学术研究基础上,梳理中共历史上的主要政治迫害事件,并从伦理学与政治理论角度论证:普通人拒绝成为帮凶,是当代中国人最重要的道德行为命题。

二、历史案例与可验证数据:中共极权体制中的“帮凶”形成机制

2.1 土地改革与镇反运动(1950–1953)

根据中共中央1954年内部总结,镇反运动中“处决反革命分子71万余人”,《中华人民共和国刑法简史》,法律出版社,2016),此数据为中国官方统计,是最少估计。

学者丁抒(Ding Shu)等研究指出,地方干部与“积极分子”组成了主要执行力量,通过划分阶级成分、组织群众斗争会,使普通农民群体参与迫害邻里。

(丁抒:《红色风暴》,香港,1998)。

帮凶机制的特征包括:

• 阶级标签化

• 群众斗群众

• 通过参与施暴获得政治安全与物质利益

在群体成为中共帮凶的同时,又为中共后续的运动奠定模式。

2.2 三年大饥荒(1959–1961):制度性谎言与死亡

关于大饥荒死亡人数,最广为学界接受的研究来自:

• 杨继绳,《墓碑:1989亿万农民的死亡史》(香港,2008)估计死亡 3600–4500 万人

• 国际学者 Frank Dikötter,《Mao’s Great Famine》(2010)根据县志与档案,估计死亡 4500 万人以上

饥荒的根源不是自然灾害,而是政治制度造成:

• 基层干部虚报粮食产量

• “放卫星”导致征粮过度

• 严厉打击“右倾”导致无人敢说真话

这造成了中共的“执行链条”,让地方干部成为灾难的主要帮凶。

2.3 文化大革命(1966–1976):群众暴力的制度化

根据官方《文革三十年纪念报告》(中共中央党史研究室,1996)内部资料:

• 200多万人被迫害致死

• 700多万人致残

• 数千万家庭遭受冲击

国际学界估计数字更高:

• Andrew Walder (2019):至少 150 万直接死亡

• Roderick MacFarquhar:《The Cultural Revolution》:全国共有 3000 万以上人受迫害

红卫兵、造反派、工宣队、军宣队均成为中共国家暴行的帮凶。

案例:1966 年北京“红八月”,北京市委公开记录显示:

• 1772 人被打死(北京市公安局内部通报)

文革清楚揭示:极权国家通过恐惧与政治动员,将普通人转变为执行暴力的主体。

2.4 1989 年天安门事件:国家暴力现代化

根据 *《天安门文件》(The Tiananmen Papers, 2001)*内部文件,中共军方投入 20 万军人进入北京执行戒严。

死亡人数:

• 《纽约时报》引用红十字会内部数字:至少 2600 人

• 外交部发言人1990年承认:“伤亡数以百计。”

• 英国驻华大使馆电文(2017解密):估算至少 1 万人死亡

国家暴力的执行链条包括:军队、武警、宣传系统、电视台封锁、大学党组织配合惩肃。

2.5 计划生育:国家控制身体的制度工程(1980–2015),联合国人口基金(UNFPA)报告指出:

中国“一胎化政策”造成“广泛强制堕胎、强制绝育、人权侵犯”(UNFPA, 1998, 2002)

案例:

• 湖南郴州 1991 强制堕胎案(纽约时报调查)

• 山东菏泽“百日无孩”运动”(BBC 报道,2013)

• 中国计生委内部数据:1980–2009 共执行 3.36 亿次节育手术

执行者:乡镇政府、居委会、计生办、妇联干部。这是极权制度长期、系统化侵入私人生活的典型。

2.6 新疆再教育营与宗教迫害(2017–)

联合国人权理事会(OHCHR, 2022)报告指出:在新疆存在 “严重人权侵犯”,包括任意拘留、文化消灭、宗教限制。

联合国估计 100–150 万维吾尔人与哈萨克族人被拘禁。

执行体系包括:公安、武警、监狱管理部门、科技监控企业、庞大的举报机制(网格化管理)。

三、帮凶结构的政治逻辑:理论分析

3.1 汉娜·阿伦特的“平庸之恶”,阿伦特认为极权统治利用:

1. 思想空洞化

2. 行政服从

3. 责任分散化

使普通人参与系统性暴力却不自知(Arendt, 1963)。这一理论完全适用于中共历史案例。

3.2 米尔格伦服从实验:为何普通人会成为帮凶?

Stanley Milgram (1963) 的实验表明:65% 的普通人在权威要求下会实施致命电击。

在中共体系中,这种服从被放大:

• 组织控制

• 恐惧文化

• 意识形态洗脑

• 政治利益诱惑

让参与迫害成为可理解的社会行为。

3.3 “不合作运动”理论

甘地、阿伦·夏普(Gene Sharp)等认为:暴政的力量来自个体的民众与被统治者的合作。拒绝合作本身就是反抗。

这为中国的现实提供启示:普通人只要拒绝参与谎言与迫害,就能削弱暴政的结构。

四、我们如何在现实中“不再做帮凶”?

结合极权研究与公民不服从理论,普通人可采取的非暴力方式包括:

1. 拒绝参与举报与数字监控(Gene Sharp,《From Dictatorship to Democracy》)

2. 不传播谎言与政治宣传:这是削弱极权意识形态的重要步骤。

3. 支持被迫害者与良心犯:国际研究表明:社会支持能显著减少国家暴力的效果。

4. 海外华人拒绝参与统战系统.

5. 在安全范围内传递历史与真相:历史记忆是对抗极权的最重要资源(Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny, 2017)。

五、结论:拒绝成为帮凶,是中国民众未来最重要的选择:中国共产党在过去一个世纪中制造了一系列灾难,其结构性暴力依靠的是庞大的帮凶系统。从土地改革到新疆再教育营,历史反复证明,极权强大,不是因为统治者强,而是因为人民被动或主动地合作。因此,拒绝合作,就是打破极权的开始。这是未来中国社会能否走向自由、法治与尊严的前提。

当越来越多中国人选择“不做帮凶”,中国的暴力政治结构才能真正瓦解,一个新的时代才会到来。

参考文献(全部真实可查)

Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt.

Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking.

Dikötter, F. (2010). Mao’s Great Famine. Bloomsbury.

Yang, Jisheng. (2008). Tombstone. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books.

MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M. (2006). Mao’s Last Revolution. Harvard University Press.

Walder, A. (2019). Agent of Disorders. Harvard University Press.

Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.

Sharp, G. (2012). From Dictatorship to Democracy.

OHCHR (2022). Assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang.

UNFPA (1998, 2002). Reports on Reproductive Rights in China.

《中华人民共和国刑法简史》. 法律出版社,2016。

《天安门文件》 The Tiananmen Papers. (2001).

Lewis Lin: Refusing to Be an Accomplice of the Chinese Communist Party

Author: Lewis Lin Editor: Feng Reng Managing Editor: Zhong Ran
Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Date: November 22, 2025

Abstract

This article reviews historical cases of political persecution by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), revealing how authoritarian violence is sustained through an extensive structure of accomplices. It analyzes the critical importance of ordinary people refusing to cooperate and emphasizes that “not being an accomplice” is a key moral choice for weakening authoritarianism and defending freedom and ethical responsibility.

I. Introduction

Violence in totalitarian societies is not carried out by rulers alone but is sustained by vast systems of execution. From Nazi Germany to Stalin’s Great Purge, accomplice structures have occupied a central position in all totalitarian states.

Hannah Arendt pointed out: “Totalitarian rule destroys the capacity for moral judgment by making all men accomplices in its crimes.”(Arendt, 1951)

During its seventy-five years in power, the Chinese Communist Party has institutionalized state violence through political campaigns, class struggle, and propaganda systems, resulting in the loss of tens of millions of lives. Based on academic research, this article reviews major historical cases of political persecution by the CCP and argues from ethical and political theory perspectives that refusing to become an accomplice is the most important moral imperative facing contemporary Chinese people.

II. Historical Cases and Verifiable Data:

The Formation Mechanism of “Accomplices” in the CCP’s Totalitarian System

2.1 Land Reform and the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950–1953)

According to an internal summary by the CCP Central Committee in 1954, the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries campaign “executed more than 710,000 counterrevolutionaries” (A Brief History of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law Press, 2016). This figure represents the minimum official estimate.

Scholars such as Ding Shu have pointed out that local cadres and so-called “activists” constituted the main execution force. By classifying people into class categories and organizing mass struggle sessions, ordinary peasants were mobilized to persecute their neighbors.(Ding Shu, Red Storm, Hong Kong, 1998)

Key features of the accomplice mechanism included:• Class labeling• Mobilizing the masses against one another• Gaining political security and material benefits through participation in violence

As the masses became accomplices of the CCP, they also helped establish the operational model for subsequent political campaigns.

2.2 The Great Famine (1959–1961): Institutional Lies and Mass Death

The most widely accepted academic estimates of famine deaths include:• Yang Jisheng, Tombstone (Hong Kong, 2008): 36–45 million deaths• Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine (2010): more than 45 million deaths based on county archives

The famine was not caused by natural disasters, but by political institutions:• Grassroots officials falsified grain output reports• “Sputnik-style exaggeration” led to excessive grain requisitions• Severe punishment of “Rightist tendencies” silenced truth-telling

This created an execution chain in which local cadres became the principal accomplices to catastrophe.

2.3 The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976): Institutionalization of Mass Violence

According to internal data from the 30-Year Commemoration Report on the Cultural Revolution (CCP Party History Research Office, 1996):• More than 2 million people were persecuted to death• Over 7 million were disabled• Tens of millions of families were affected

International scholarship estimates higher figures:• Andrew Walder (2019): at least 1.5 million direct deaths• Roderick MacFarquhar, The Cultural Revolution: over 30 million people persecuted nationwide

Red Guards, rebel factions, workers’ propaganda teams, and military propaganda teams all became accomplices to CCP state violence.

Case: “Red August,” Beijing, 1966, Official Beijing Municipal records show:• 1,772 people beaten to death(Beijing Public Security Bureau internal briefing)

The Cultural Revolution clearly demonstrates how totalitarian states transform ordinary people into agents of violence through fear and political mobilization.

2.4 The 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre: Modernization of State Violence

According to The Tiananmen Papers (2001), the CCP deployed 200,000 troops to impose martial law in Beijing.

Death toll estimates include:• The New York Times, citing Red Cross sources: at least 2,600 deaths• Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson (1990): “hundreds of casualties”• Declassified UK Embassy cables (2017): at least 10,000 deaths

The execution chain of state violence included the military, armed police, propaganda systems, television censorship, and university party organizations cooperating in repression.

2.5 Family Planning Policy:

A State Project of Bodily Control (1980–2015)

Reports by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) stated that China’s One-Child Policy resulted in “widespread forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and human rights violations” (UNFPA, 1998; 2002).

Cases include:• Chenzhou, Hunan, 1991 forced abortion case (New York Times investigation)• Heze, Shandong “Hundred-Day No-Baby Campaign” (BBC, 2013)• Internal data from China’s Family Planning Commission:336 million birth-control procedures carried out between 1980–2009

Executors included township governments, neighborhood committees, family planning offices, and women’s federation cadres — a typical example of totalitarian systems intruding systematically into private life.

2.6 Xinjiang Re-Education Camps and Religious Persecution (2017– )

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2022) reported “serious human rights violations” in Xinjiang, including arbitrary detention, cultural erasure, and restrictions on religious practice.

The UN estimates that 1–1.5 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs have been detained.

The execution system includes public security forces, armed police, prison administrations, surveillance technology companies, and an extensive informant network (“grid-style management”).

III. The Political Logic of Accomplice Structures: Theoretical Analysis

3.1 Hannah Arendt’s “Banality of Evil”

Arendt argued that totalitarian systems rely on:

Hollowing out independent thought

Administrative obedience

Diffusion of responsibility

This enables ordinary people to participate in systematic violence without awareness (Arendt, 1963). This theory fully applies to CCP historical cases.

3.2 Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: Why Do Ordinary People Become Accomplices?

Stanley Milgram’s experiments (1963) showed that 65% of ordinary people would administer potentially lethal electric shocks when ordered by authority.

Within the CCP system, obedience is amplified through:• Organizational control• A culture of fear• Ideological indoctrination• Political and material incentives

Participation in persecution thus becomes socially “understandable.”

3.3 The Theory of Noncooperation

Gandhi and Gene Sharp argued that tyranny derives its power from the cooperation of the governed. Refusal to cooperate is itself resistance.

This offers a clear insight for China: when ordinary people refuse to participate in lies and persecution, the structure of authoritarian power weakens.

IV. How Can We “Refuse to Be Accomplices” in Reality?

Drawing on totalitarian studies and civil disobedience theory, nonviolent actions available to ordinary people include:

Refusing to participate in informant systems and digital surveillance(Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy)

Refusing to spread lies and political propaganda

Supporting persecuted individuals and prisoners of conscience

Overseas Chinese refusing participation in United Front systems

Safely transmitting history and truth — historical memory is the most powerful resource against tyranny(Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny, 2017)

V. Conclusion:

Refusing to Be an Accomplice Is the Most Critical Choice for China’s Future. Over the past century, the CCP has produced a series of catastrophes whose structural violence depends on massive accomplice systems. From land reform to Xinjiang re-education camps, history repeatedly proves that totalitarianism is powerful not because rulers are strong, but because people cooperate — passively or actively. Refusing to cooperate is the beginning of dismantling authoritarianism. It is the prerequisite for China’s future path toward freedom, rule of law, and human dignity.

When more Chinese people choose “not to be accomplices,” China’s violent political structure can truly collapse, and a new era can finally arrive.

References (All verifiable)

Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt.Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking.Dikötter, F. (2010). Mao’s Great Famine. Bloomsbury.Yang, Jisheng. (2008). Tombstone. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books.MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M. (2006). Mao’s Last Revolution. Harvard University Press.Walder, A. (2019). Agents of Disorder. Harvard University Press.Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.Sharp, G. (2012). From Dictatorship to Democracy.OHCHR (2022). Assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang.UNFPA (1998, 2002). Reports on Reproductive Rights in China.A Brief History of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. Law Press, 2016.The Tiananmen Papers. (2001).

纪念白纸运动三周年

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纪念白纸运动三周年

作者:蔡晓丽

编辑:胡景 责任编辑:张娜 校对:王滨

三年前,一张无字的白纸,被无数中国人举在黑暗的街头。 那纸上没有一句文字,却写满愤怒、无奈、悲痛、觉醒,也写满了一个民族被压制太久后的心声。 三年后,白纸依然洁白,记忆也不再沉默。 2025年11月22日,中国驻美国洛杉矶领事馆外,中国民主党全委会发起了第765次茉莉花行动,各地党员和异议人士再次聚集,纪念白纸运动三周年——纪念那些勇敢站出来的人,也纪念那些被火光夺走的生命,更纪念一个时代被强行压抑的声音,一个无法被中共彻底掩盖的真相。

“纪念不是停留,而是继续前行。” 这是现场每个人心中的共同信念。

纪念白纸运动三周年
一、白纸未言,心声已传

白纸运动爆发于极端封控与系统性压迫的背景下。 当言论被全面封杀,一张白纸成了最后的语言。 乌鲁木齐大火的惨剧,撕开了长期积压在人们心中的痛——它不是天灾,而是人祸,是封控与冷漠制造出的死亡。它更撕开了人们心头的那团火,怒火滔滔,于是人们站出来,不是为了成为英雄,而是为了保住身为人的尊严。 那一夜,那些举起白纸的普通人,成为了推动时代的勇者,因为他们把铁幕撕开了一道缝,让这个黑暗污浊的社会多了一丝亮光。 “那一刻,光穿透了黑夜。” 三年后,这束光依然未灭。 二、活动组织与支持单位发起人: 袁崛、程虹、程筱筱活动负责人: 倪世成、杨皓、何愚策划: 程虹、彭小梅、蔡晓丽、牟宗强组织: 柴松、张晓丽、程筱筱、赵贵玲

黄娟、黄春远、朱晓娜摄影摄像: 卓皓然、陆平物资物料: 郑洲安保秩序: 陈信男、李延龙

王乐、胡向飞媒体与新闻稿: 刘芳、黄吉洲视觉策划: 王灵、韩震活动主持: 曾群兰、赵杰主办:• 中国民主党全委会• 中国洛杉矶民主平台• 香港民主建国联盟• 香港议会议长办公室协办:• 《在野党》杂志社• 中国民主党全委会社团部• 中国民主党全委会女权部• 中国民主党全委会河南工委 ⸻
三、重点演讲节选与发言摘要 1. 姜嘉伟(温哥华领事馆外 · 电话连线) 他说:

白纸革命之所以震撼,是因为它揭示最基本的真理:人权不是施舍,而是天赋。

他回顾自己在香港声援白纸运动、九次被捕、两度入狱、被中共全球通缉的经历,却依旧坚持那句话: “公义不该成罪,讲真话不该成为犯罪。” 他说,香港人与内地白纸抗争者的心是在一起的,我们的命运紧密相连: “光复自由,人民作主; 天赋人权,不容剥夺; 黑夜再长,公义必至。” 2. 黄娟:乌鲁木齐大火不是天灾,而是制度杀人。

她以亲历者的痛与愤怒控诉:

封控下的死亡,不是命运,而是制度制造。 “我们站出来,不是为了当英雄,而是因为再不站出来,人连活着的尊严都没有。” 她说:白纸之所以重要,是因为它提醒世界:悲剧不能被掩盖,人民不会忘记。 ⸻ 3. 刘芳:不要忘记白纸的光 她呼吁所有身在压制中的人,即便不能发声,也不能停止独立思考: “我们不能忘记封城的日子,不能忘记白纸的光,更不能忘记一个政权怎样逼迫人民走到那一步。” ⸻ 4. 程筱筱:记住者是火种,站出来者是光 作为白纸运动三周年纪念活动发起人之一,她说道: “白纸很轻,却承载沉重;看似空白,却写满真相。 只要我们不沉默,自由就不会消失在黑暗中。” ⸻ 5. 牛鹏飞:白纸是被迫保持空白的呐喊。

他说: “白纸的真正震撼,是因为每个人都知道,它本该写满文字,却被迫保持沉默。 那空白,不是沉默,而是极限的声音。” ⸻ 6. 陆玉凤:无字的力量,刺破沉默的巨石 她回忆三年前乌鲁木齐中路的街头: “那张白纸没有一个字,却比千言万语更响。 我们要把这个火苗继续传下去。” ⸻ 7. 晏荣金:白纸没有声音,却震动社会 他强调: “举起白纸的人不是英雄,但他们拒绝继续沉默。 我们站在这里,是为了告诉世界:我们没有忘记,也不会离开。” ⸻ 8. 李晶:白纸是对专制最直接的控诉 他将白纸运动的本质总结得非常尖锐:• 中共以审查与恐惧压制表达• 公民权利被系统剥夺• 白纸是无声的反抗• 不是制造混乱,而是拒绝继续被压迫 ⸻ 9. 张宇:简单而锋利的一句话 “不要文革要改革。 不做奴隶做公民。” ⸻ 四、结语:纪念不是停留,而是继续前行 三年过去,白纸依旧洁白,但那洁白不再是空白。 它承载着:• 火光中的无辜• 被删掉的声音• 被压抑的愤怒• 普通人的勇敢• 以及一代人不愿再被蒙住眼睛的觉醒 每一个记得的人,都是火种。 每一个站出来的人,都是光。

当真相仍需被说出,当自由仍未归来,那张白纸就永远不会沉默。 愿自由的风吹散恐惧。 愿真理之光照亮黑暗。 愿中国人民与香港人民,都能早日迎来真正属于自己的光明。 ⸻ 五、集会现场参加活动并发言的人有:牟宗强,韩震,苏一峰,唐海明,胡向飞,晏荣金,赵邵晶,戈冰,权录军,李晶,刘芳, 牛鹏飞,姚庆古,陆玉凤,程堂正,黄吉洲。

Commemorating the Third Anniversary of the White Paper Movement

Author: Cai XiaoliEditor: Hu Jing Managing Editor: Zhang NaProofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Three years ago, a blank sheet of paper was raised by countless Chinese people in the darkness of the streets.

On that paper, there was not a single written word, yet it was filled with anger, helplessness, grief, and awakening. It carried the long-suppressed voice of a nation that had been restrained for far too long.

Three years later, the white paper remains white, and memory has refused to stay silent.

On November 22, 2025, outside the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles, the National Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party initiated the 765th Jasmine Action. Party members and dissidents from various regions once again gathered to commemorate the third anniversary of the White Paper Movement — to remember those who bravely stood up, to mourn the lives taken by fire, and to commemorate the voices of an era forcibly suppressed, a truth that the Chinese Communist Party can never completely erase.

“Commemoration is not about stopping — it is about moving forward.”

This was the shared conviction in the hearts of everyone present.
纪念白纸运动三周年

I. The White Paper Speaks Not, Yet the Heart Has Been Heard

The White Paper Movement erupted against the backdrop of extreme lockdowns and systematic repression.

When all speech was comprehensively censored, a blank sheet of paper became the final language.

The tragedy of the Urumqi fire tore open the pain that had long been suppressed in people’s hearts. It was not a natural disaster, but a man-made catastrophe — death produced by lockdown policies and cold indifference. It ignited the fire within people’s hearts. Anger surged, and people stepped forward, not to become heroes, but to preserve the dignity of being human.

That night, ordinary people holding up blank sheets of paper became the courageous force pushing history forward. They tore open a crack in the iron curtain, allowing a sliver of light to enter a dark and polluted society.

“At that moment, light pierced through the night.”

Three years later, that light has still not been extinguished.

II. Event Organizers and Supporting Units

Initiators:Yuan Jue, Cheng Hong, Cheng Xiaoxiao

Event Coordinators:Ni Shicheng, Yang Hao, He Yu

Planning:Cheng Hong, Peng Xiaomei, Cai Xiaoli, Mou Zongqiang

Organization:Chai Song, Zhang Xiaoli, Cheng Xiaoxiao, Zhao GuilingHuang Juan, Huang Chunyuan, Zhu Xiaona

Photography & Videography:Zhuo Haoran, Lu Ping

Supplies & Materials:Zheng Zhou

Security & Order:Chen Xinnan, Li YanlongWang Le, Hu Xiangfei

Media & Press Releases:Liu Fang, Huang Jizhou

Visual Design:Wang Ling, Han Zhen

Hosts:Zeng Qunlan, Zhao Jie

Organizers:• National Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party• Los Angeles Chinese Democratic Platform• Hong Kong Democratic Nation-Building Alliance• Office of the Speaker of the Hong Kong Parliament

Co-Organizers:• Opposition Party Magazine• Social Organizations Department, National Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party• Women’s Rights Department, National Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party• Henan Working Committee, National Committee of the Chinese Democracy Party

III. Selected Speeches and Key Statements

1. Jiang Jiawei

(Outside the Vancouver Consulate · Phone Connection)

He stated that the White Paper Revolution was so powerful because it revealed a fundamental truth:Human rights are not granted — they are innate.

Recalling his experience of supporting the White Paper Movement in Hong Kong, being arrested nine times, imprisoned twice, and placed on a global wanted list by the CCP, he still insisted:

“Justice should not be a crime. Speaking the truth should not be criminalized.”

He emphasized that the hearts of Hong Kong people and mainland White Paper protesters are united, and that their fates are inseparably linked:

“Restore freedom, let the people rule;Human rights are innate and cannot be taken away;No matter how long the night, justice will arrive.”

2. Huang Juan:The Urumqi Fire Was Not a Natural Disaster, but Institutional Killing

Speaking with the pain and anger of a witness, she accused:

Deaths under lockdown were not fate, but the product of an inhumane system.

“We stood up not to be heroes, but because if we did not, even the dignity of being alive would be taken away.”

She stressed that the significance of the white paper lies in reminding the world that tragedy cannot be erased, and the people will not forget.

3. Liu Fang:Do Not Forget the Light of the White Paper

She called on all those living under repression: even if one cannot speak, one must not stop thinking independently.

“We cannot forget the days of lockdown.We cannot forget the light of the white paper.And we cannot forget how a regime forced its people to that point.”

4. Cheng Xiaoxiao:

Those Who Remember Are Sparks; Those Who Step Forward Are Light

As one of the initiators of the third-anniversary commemoration, she said:

“The white paper is light, yet it carries heavy weight.It appears blank, yet it is filled with truth.As long as we do not remain silent, freedom will not disappear into darkness.”

5. Niu Pengfei: The White Paper Is a Cry Forced to Remain Blank

He stated:

“The true shock of the white paper lies in the fact that everyone knows it should have been filled with words yet was forced into silence.That blankness is not silence — it is sound at its extreme.”

6. Lu Yufeng: The Power of Wordlessness, Piercing the Stone of Silence

She recalled the streets of Urumqi Road three years ago:

“That white paper carried not a single word yet spoke louder than a thousand voices.We must continue to pass this flame onward.”

7. Yan Rongjin:

The White Paper Has No Voice, Yet It Shook Society

He emphasized:

“Those who raised the white paper were not heroes — they simply refused to remain silent.We stand here to tell the world: we have not forgotten, and we will not leave.”

8. Li Jing: The White Paper Is the Most Direct Accusation Against Authoritarianism

He summarized the essence of the White Paper Movement sharply:

• The CCP suppresses expression through censorship and fear• Civil rights are systematically stripped away• The white paper is silent resistance• It is not chaos-making, but a refusal to continue being oppressed

9. Zhang Yu:

A Simple but Razor-Sharp Sentence

“We want reform, not another Cultural Revolution.We choose citizenship, not slavery.”

IV. Conclusion: Commemoration Is Not Standing Still, but Moving Forward

Three years have passed. The white paper remains white — but it is no longer empty.

It carries:• The innocent lives lost in fire• Voices erased• Anger suppressed• The courage of ordinary people• And the awakening of a generation unwilling to remain blindfolded

Everyone who remembers is a spark.Everyone who steps forward is light.

As long as truth still needs to be spoken, and freedom has not yet returned, the white paper will never be silent.

May the winds of freedom scatter fear.May the light of truth illuminate the darkness.May the people of China and Hong Kong soon welcome a future that truly belongs to them.

V. Participants Who Attended and Spoke at the Rally

Mou Zongqiang, Han Zhen, Su Yifeng, Tang Haiming, Hu Xiangfei, Yan Rongjin, Zhao Shaojing, Ge Bing, Quan Lujun, Li Jing, Liu Fang, Niu Pengfei, Yao Qinggu, Lu Yufeng, Cheng Tangzheng, Huang Jizhou.

舆论转移艺术

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作者:张兴贵

编辑:李堃 责任编辑:张娜 校对:王滨 翻译:刘芳

“每周一、三、五恨日本,二、四、六恨美国,星期天恨台湾、韩国、欧洲。只有这样,当中国人面对毒奶粉、毒疫苗、高房贷、高医疗费用及洗脑教育时,就没有时间恨共产党了。”这句话乍听像段子,细想却让人毛骨悚然。因为它不是笑话,它是一本真实存在,并且被反复演练的操作手册。

舆论转移的核心逻辑其实特别简单:人的愤怒能量是有限的,只要不断提供一个更显眼、更安全、更容易发泄的靶子,人们就不会去打真正的靶子。就像魔术师左手挥舞鲜艳的丝巾,吸引全场目光,右手却悄悄把牌换了。统治者最怕的,从来不是老百姓恨A、恨B、恨C,而是有一天所有恨都集中到同一个地方——集中到他们自己身上。所以,必须源源不断地制造并轮换“外部敌人”。敌人还要按周排班,不能重复。这样民怨永远是碎片化的、离散的、可控的。

我们来简单拉一条时间线,大家马上就能看出其模式是这样的: 2018,中美贸易战,恨美国;2019,反修例,恨“港独”;2020,新冠疫情,恨美国“投毒”;2021,新疆棉,恨耐克;恨西方“反华势力”;2022,佩洛西访台,恨“台独”,恨美国;2023,气球事件,恨美国 ;2024,仁爱礁补给冲突,恨菲律宾;2025,”台湾有事就是日本有事“,恨日本。

这还只是国际部分。国内还有一套完整的“内循环敌人表”:公知→带路党→恨国党→美分→50万→蛆→润人……标签永远用不完,新造一个只需要三秒。只要大家还在网上互相撕标签,就没人有精力去问:为什么一个普通感冒去三甲医院要花几千?为什么年轻人累死累活996还是买不起房?为什么养老金要延迟到65岁?因为愤怒已经被精准导流了,洪水永远冲不到大坝,而是被引到早就挖好的泄洪区。

这就是舆论转移的终极形态:让被统治者互相消耗情绪资源,直到精疲力尽,彻底丧失追问能力。有人会反驳:“你老说转移舆论,那总得有真实的外部敌人吧?日本美国菲律宾难道不坏吗?”有可能,但问题从来不是“有没有敌人”,而是“谁在挑选敌人、谁在放大敌人、谁在决定今天恨谁、明天恨谁”。当一个国家真正的治理问题堆积如山,却把全民情绪引导到“抵制日货”“砸肯德基”“骂菲律宾是乞丐国”上,这本身就是最高级的转移。因为真正的敌人从来不是外国,而是时间。时间会让喝毒奶粉的孩子长大,时间会让买不起房的90后变成被割韭菜的40岁中年人,时间会让交了一辈子社保的人发现养老金不够用……所有问题只要拖过十年、二十年,就变成了“历史遗留问题”,到时候再甩锅给“前任”“体制不完善”,反正永远没人负责。而舆论转移的最高境界,就是让老百姓把最宝贵的时间,耗费在互相攻击、互相举报、互相道德绑架上,直到所有问题都被归结为“无法解决的历史旧账”。

鲁迅先生有一句话:“无尽的远方,无数的人们,都与我有关。”但舆论转移术要让我们相信:无尽的远方,无数的人们,都是我们的敌人。当我们每周一、三、五恨日本,二、四、六恨美国,星期天继续恨其它任何人的时候,我们就正好中了圈套。

真正的敌人,从来不是日本,不是美国,不是台湾,不是润人,也不是小粉红。真正的敌人,是这种让我们只会恨来恨去、却永远不敢直面真实问题的系统。打破旧制度,才是我们这一代人真正的成年礼。

The Art of Diverting Public Opinion

Author: Zhang Xinggui

Editor: Li Kun Executive Editor: Zhang Na Proofreader: Wang Bin · Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract: The Chinese Communist authorities continuously manufacture “manageable hostility,” channeling public emotions into mutual attacks and thereby draining the capacity to think about real problems and pursue the truth. The author argues that the true danger is not hatred itself, but the inability to confront problems directly—and a system that perpetually redirects public attention through shifting targets and narratives.

“On Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, hate Japan; on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays, hate the United States; on Sundays, hate Taiwan, South Korea, and Europe.” At first glance, this sounds like a joke. On second thought, it sends a chill down the spine. Because it isn’t a joke—it is a real operating manual that exists and is rehearsed over and over again.

The core logic of diverting public opinion is actually very simple: people have limited emotional energy. As long as you continuously provide a more conspicuous, safer, and easier target for venting anger, people will not strike at the real target. Like a magician waving a bright silk scarf with the left hand to draw everyone’s eyes, while quietly switching the cards with the right. What rulers fear most has never been that the people hate A, B, or C; it is the day when all hatred converges on one place—on themselves. Therefore, “external enemies” must be manufactured continuously and rotated regularly. The enemies must even be scheduled by the week, without repetition. In this way, public resentment remains fragmented, dispersed, and controllable.

Let us sketch a simple timeline, and the pattern becomes immediately clear: 2018—U.S.–China trade war, hate the United States; 2019—anti-extradition protests, hate “Hong Kong independence”; 2020—COVID-19, hate the United States for “spreading the virus”; 2021—Xinjiang cotton, hate Nike and the Western “anti-China forces”; 2022—Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, hate “Taiwan independence” and the United States; 2023—the balloon incident, hate the United States; 2024—the Ren’ai Reef resupply confrontation, hate the Philippines; 2025—“If Taiwan is in trouble, Japan is in trouble,” hate Japan.

That is only the international side. Domestically there is a complete “internal-circulation enemy list”: public intellectuals → traitors → “haters of the nation” → paid pro-American shills → “the 500,000” → vermin → “those who ran away”… The labels never run out. Creating a new one takes only three seconds. As long as everyone is busy tearing labels off each other online, no one has the energy to ask: Why does a simple cold cost thousands at a top-tier hospital? Why do young people work themselves to death under 996 schedules and still can’t afford a home? Why must the retirement age be delayed to 65? Because anger has already been precisely diverted. The flood never reaches the dam; it is guided instead into pre-dug spillways.

This is the ultimate form of public-opinion diversion: make the governed exhaust their emotional resources fighting one another until they are utterly depleted and lose the ability to question. Some will retort: “You keep talking about diversion—surely there are real external enemies? Aren’t Japan, the United States, and the Philippines bad?” Perhaps. But the question has never been whether enemies exist; it is who selects the enemies, who amplifies them, and who decides whom to hate today and whom to hate tomorrow. When a country’s genuine governance problems pile up like mountains, yet national emotions are steered toward “boycotting Japanese goods,” “smashing KFC,” or “insulting the Philippines as a beggar state,” that itself is the highest form of diversion. Because the real enemy has never been foreign countries—it is time. Time will let children who drank tainted milk powder grow up. Time will turn post-90s youths who couldn’t afford housing into middle-aged forty-somethings harvested like chives. Time will make people who paid social security all their lives discover that their pensions are insufficient. Any problem, if dragged on for ten or twenty years, becomes a “historical legacy issue,” to be blamed on “previous administrations” or “imperfect systems,” with no one ever held accountable. The highest mastery of public-opinion diversion is to make ordinary people squander their most precious resource—time—on mutual attacks, mutual reporting, and mutual moral coercion, until all problems are reduced to “unsolvable historical debts.”

Lu Xun once wrote: “Endless distant places, countless people—all are connected to me.” But the art of diversion wants us to believe: endless distant places and countless people are all our enemies. When we hate Japan on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays; hate the United States on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays; and keep hating someone else on Sundays, we have fallen perfectly into the trap.

The true enemy has never been Japan, the United States, Taiwan, those who left, or the little pinks. The true enemy is a system that trains us only to hate back and forth while forever avoiding the real problems. Breaking that system is the true coming-of-age rite for our generation.

杨辰:计划生育 对中华民族的深重祸害

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作者:杨辰
编辑:钟然 责任编辑:李聪玲 校对:王滨 翻译:吕峰

计划生育,这项政策是对中华民族最沉重、最深刻的损害,可谓一场种族浩劫。它并非源于人口学、优生学或纯经济学,而是计划经济供给制的产物,并深刻影响了政治、生物和社会层面。

起源:供给制的产物与历史演变

计划生育的提出者马寅初并非人口学家或生物学家。他自己有多个子女,却因从事工商管理,在计算计划经济供给时,发现无法为所有人口提供必需品。在没有市场调节的条件下,即使今日用大数据或AI,也难以精准规划人类需求。马寅初的建议本质上是控制“吃饭、穿衣、上学”的人口规模,以维持供给平衡。这被老一辈领导如毛泽东和周恩来斥为反人类,这种评价并非全无道理——它视人为数字,而非生命。

政策源于50年代城乡二元化:城市“国人”享国家供给(如养老、教育、医疗),农村“野人”则自生自灭,类似于西周奴隶制的模式。城市居民吃商品粮,享有义务教育和文艺科技服务;农村则缺乏这些,农民需上交公粮,生活艰辛。这套体系在共产党统治下恢复顺畅,因为它契合了他们的权力结构。他们不像波尔布特在柬埔寨那样直接摧毁城市人口——CCP不敢冒险,却内心向往这种分层控制。

70年代初,经济濒临崩溃,粮食短缺,城市优先控制人口。1979年强制“一孩”源于知青大返城:上山下乡的青年回流,人口压力激增,经济濒临崩溃、城市承载力不足。1976-1977年,中国经济已近崩溃,知青运动引发1980-1983年的镇压浪潮,包括反革命言论和民主倾向的打压。80年代,城市最严,从北京、上海、广州等核心城市开始;农村相对松弛,老少边穷地区管得不严,因为那里难以提供医疗和生存保障,却矛盾的允许更多生育。

90年代,政策扩展到农村,与GDP考核挂钩:官员为降低失业、提升人均指标,推行野蛮强制,如山东的“百日无孩”运动,强制流产和结扎成高潮。这时期,中国从纯计划经济转向商品化,CCP放弃全面供给,但户籍壁垒犹在,农民工仍如奴工——一个自称工人阶级的政党,竟发明“农民工”这一侮辱性称呼。粮票渐废,人口红利被强调,但政策不放开,因为官员视人口为负担,而非资源。短视之下,忽略了未来养老金危机:如今,一个年轻人需养1.3-1.5个老人,社保体系摇摇欲坠。

三重祸害:政治、生物与社会维度

计划生育的祸害体现在三个层面,每一方面都如慢性毒药,侵蚀民族根基。第一,政治上回归奴隶制与奴化社会。 它将生育权置于国家掌控,民众如商周奴隶:官员(厅局级以上)可多生,甚至多妻;普通人受限,城市国人曾被赶乡下做野人。西周野人、国人可随便生,只限养育能力;现代中国更退步,生育需许可。几十年强推下,民众习以为常,忘却现代文明与奴隶制的区别。天天听“计划生育”,周围实践它,一群人以此谋生,潜移默化中接受不人道管制。当一件反人类的事推行数十年,便被视为“合理”。这强化了城乡二元,奴化整个社会,让民众天然认可专制,丧失追求民主的根基。那些喊民主却不反对计划生育的人,脑中无真民主——生育权被控,何谈选票?

第二,生物学上违背优胜劣汰,导致种族退化。 自然状态下,生育能力强、健康者后代多,促进种族优化,如达尔文进化论所述。共产党一边宣称信奉进化论,一边强制“一孩”:基因优者(身强力壮、教育好)仅一子;劣者借助人工技术(如试管婴儿、催产针)亦一子,抹杀数量差异。结果,人人平均,高素质与低素质混杂,优胜劣汰逆转成“劣胜优汰”。

举例,40-50年代出生者平均寿命最高,因为他们经历自然选择;60-70年代压力大,寿命略降;但80-90年代出生者将面临大规模提前死亡风险。长寿基因无法放大(能活80岁者仅一子),短寿基因平均化(50岁寿命者亦一子)。到50岁,人口减半;过去,多子家庭可放大优势基因。如今,环境和饮食问题加剧退化:中华民族身体素质整体下降,体质虚弱。忽略人类道德和怜悯,仅从生物学看,这中断了种族自然进化过程,造成不可逆损害。

第三,社会上摧毁正义与抗争的物质基础。 作为社会人,我们需道德、正义和担当,但独生子女政策击碎其物质基础。维护正义、保家卫国需代价(如生命);多子家庭可承受一子牺牲(五个孩子中一子上战场,父母同意);独子家庭则本能保护唯一血脉,教导“别惹事、活着就好”。这是动物性:成年兽护幼兽,血缘延续高于一切。他死,两家基因断绝。

结果,道德崩坏:父母易成无正义感、无是非的人,好死不如赖活着盛行。CCP乐见此景——独生子女“易管”,不像阿富汗多子家庭,父母不心疼孩子当人肉炸弹。中国抗争声音多女性:男孩被宠成“娘炮”,几代人灌输“别出事、活着就好”,视其为家族延续工具;女孩相对自由。东欧如波兰工会抗争、韩国青年上街,中国却弱——儒家文化同源,但计划生育摧毁基础。若韩国、波兰也“一孩”,抗争必弱。统计学上,独生子女挺身而出者少数:或极强道德(真理胜生命,凤毛麟角),或铁拳砸身(无路可走)。否则,畏首畏尾。

CCP不愿废止,除非养老金、教育崩盘。2015年大数据报告预测人口崩塌,却遭忽视——经济未崩,独生子女“好用”。如今放开二三孩,仍是“计划”,未来或强制:如罗马尼亚“月经警察”。已有单位监测50岁以下女性经期,预示税收、晋升等手段逼生。经济下行掩盖人口损害,但强制社保、保险已现端倪。最终,民众如种猪,被鞭策生育。

结语:卑鄙起源与永恒警示

计划生育源于卑鄙:无法养活,便消灭后代。它中断优胜劣汰,奴化社会,摧毁道义基础,不亚于洗脑,对CCP统治至关重要。马寅初视人为数字,应遭唾弃——他毫无前瞻性,乃反人类罪魁。政策无正面影响,将现代人变奴隶。中华民族需警醒:生育权是自由之本,反对它,方有未来。

Yang Chen: The Profound Catastrophe of the One-Child Policy on the Chinese Nation

Author: Yang Chen
Editor: Zhong Ran Executive Editor: Li Congling Proofreader: Wang Bin Translation: Lyu Feng

Abstract

China’s one-child policy originated not from demography or eugenics, but from the logic of a planned-economy supply system. By placing reproductive rights under state control for decades, it produced political servility, biological degeneration, and moral collapse—deeply weakening the vitality and resistance of the Chinese nation. It stands as one of the most profound and irreversible harms inflicted on the Chinese people.

Origins: A By-product of the Supply System and Its Historical Evolution

China’s one-child policy represents one of the most devastating, far-reaching harms done to the Chinese nation—indeed, a demographic catastrophe. It did not arise from population science, eugenics, or pure economics, but from the supply-allocation logic of a planned economy, and its influence extended into political, biological, and social realms.

The policy’s earliest proponent, Ma Yinchu, was neither a demographer nor a biologist. Despite fathering several children himself, he approached population from the perspective of industrial and commercial management. While calculating supply needs under the planned-economy system, he concluded that the state could not provide essential goods for the entire population. Without market mechanisms—and even today, with big-data tools or AI—no government can accurately plan human needs. Ma’s proposal ultimately sought to control the number of people requiring food, clothing, education, and other basic goods to maintain supply equilibrium.Leaders such as Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai denounced his ideas as antihuman. Their criticism was not unfounded: his proposal reduced human beings to numbers, not lives.

The policy’s institutional roots trace back to the 1950s urban–rural dual system. Urban “state people” (国人) received state-funded benefits—retirement, education, healthcare—while rural “non-state people” (野人) were left to fend for themselves, a structure reminiscent of Western Zhou-era stratification. Urban residents consumed state-distributed grain, schooling, and cultural services; rural residents had none of these and were required to deliver grain quotas. Under Communist governance, this bifurcated system revived smoothly because it aligned with the Party’s power structure.Unlike Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge, the CCP did not destroy urban populations outright—they lacked the daring—yet their governance model aspired to a similar hierarchical control.

By the early 1970s, China faced economic near-collapse and severe food shortages. Population control first tightened in urban areas. The 1979 coercive “one-child” directive was a direct response to the massive return of the “sent-down youth”: millions of urban youths sent to rural areas during the Cultural Revolution flooded back to the cities. The population squeeze overwhelmed the already-faltering economy; urban capacity reached breaking point.By 1976–1977, the economy was near collapse. The aftermath of the sent-down-youth movement helped trigger the political crackdowns of 1980–1983, targeting “counter-revolutionary speech” and democratic tendencies.

In the 1980s, strict controls focused on major cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou—while rural enforcement remained relatively loose. Poor, remote regions lacked medical services and social protection, and paradoxically were allowed more births.

In the 1990s, the policy expanded aggressively into rural areas and was tied directly to GDP-based performance evaluations. Local officials, eager to reduce unemployment statistics and boost per-capita indicators, implemented brutal measures. Campaigns such as Shandong’s notorious “100 days without a single newborn” saw forced abortions and mass sterilizations reach their peak.

During this period, China transitioned from a purely planned economy to partial marketization. The CCP abandoned comprehensive public provision, but the household-registration barrier remained. Migrant workers became a quasi-serf caste—an irony for a Party claiming to represent the working class while inventing the derogatory term “nongmingong” (migrant peasant-laborer).Food coupons were phased out; the so-called “population dividend” was celebrated.Yet the policy remained unchanged because officials viewed population not as a resource but as a burden, short-sightedly ignoring future pension crises. Today, a single young person must support 1.3–1.5 elderly dependents; the social-security system is near collapse.

Three Dimensions of Disaster: Political, Biological, and Social

The damage wrought by the one-child policy appears in three domains—each a slow-acting poison corroding the nation’s foundations.

1. Political: A Reversion to Slavery and Social Enslavement

By placing reproductive rights under state control, the policy restored a form of slave-like governance reminiscent of the Shang and Zhou eras. Senior officials (at bureau-director level and above) could have multiple children, even multiple wives, while ordinary people faced strict limits. Urban residents were once forcibly “sent down” to become quasi-peasants.

In ancient China, both “state people” and “outsiders” could reproduce freely, limited only by ability to rear children. Modern China is more regressive: people require state permission to give birth.

After decades of enforcement, the public grew accustomed to seeing this antihuman measure as natural. Daily slogans, constant propaganda, and an entire bureaucracy devoted to enforcement normalized the abnormal.When an inhumane policy persists for decades, it becomes “reasonable.”

This strengthened the urban–rural dual structure and entrenched social docility, making authoritarian control instinctively accepted. Those who cry for democracy yet do not oppose the one-child policy misunderstand democracy itself:How can one speak of voting rights when even reproductive rights are denied?

2. Biological: Violating Natural Selection and Causing Genetic Decline

In natural conditions, stronger and healthier individuals produce more offspring, promoting species-level optimization—consistent with Darwinian evolution. The CCP proclaims belief in evolution yet imposed a one-child limit: the most capable and healthiest families had only one child; those with poor health or weak genetic traits, aided by medical interventions (IVF, induced labor), also had one.The numerical differentiation—crucial in evolutionary processes—was erased.

The result: homogenization, mixing of high-quality and low-quality traits, and a reversal of natural selection—“the weak outcompeting the strong.”

Historical cohort comparisons illustrate this:

Those born in the 1940s and 1950s exhibit the highest average longevity due to natural selection.

Those born in the 1960s and 1970s experienced stress and hardship, slightly lowering lifespan.

But cohorts born in the 1980s and 1990s face significant early-mortality risks in the coming decades.

Long-life genes cannot amplify (an 80-year-lifespan couple has only one child); short-life genes are averaged upward (a 50-year-lifespan couple also has one child).By age fifty, the population halves. In the past, large families amplified advantageous traits; now environmental and dietary stresses worsen biological decline.Overall physical fitness among Chinese has deteriorated markedly.

From a purely biological standpoint—setting aside morality—this policy interrupted the natural evolutionary process, causing irreversible damage.

3. Social: Destroying the Material Foundation of Justice and Resistance

As social beings, humans need morality, justice, and courage. Yet the one-child policy shattered their material basis. Upholding justice or defending the homeland requires sacrifice, sometimes life itself.Families with multiple children can endure the loss of one (e.g., in military service).But one-child families instinctively protect the sole heir, teaching:“Don’t get into trouble—just stay alive.”

This instinct is biological: adult animals protect their only offspring; survival of the bloodline takes precedence over all else. If the child dies, the family line disappears.

The consequence is moral degradation: parents lose their sense of justice or righteousness; the ethos of “better to live dishonorably than die honorably” prevails.The CCP welcomes this: one-child families are easier to govern—unlike families in Afghanistan, where many children mean parents are less fearful of sacrifice.

Voices of resistance in China disproportionately come from women: boys are pampered into fragility, raised for decades with the message “don’t cause trouble,” valued primarily as carriers of the family line. Girls enjoy relatively more autonomy.This explains why, despite sharing Confucian cultural roots, Eastern Europe (e.g., Poland’s labor-union movement) and South Korea show strong youth mobilization, while China does not. Had South Korea or Poland implemented similar one-child measures, their resistance would also have weakened.

Statistically, only a tiny fraction of only-children will stand up:

A few with extraordinary moral conviction;

Or those crushed by authoritarian repression, left with no choice.

Most remain risk-averse.

Why the CCP Will Not Truly Abolish the Policy

The CCP will only abandon birth restrictions when pensions and the education system collapse. A 2015 big-data report predicted demographic meltdown, but it was ignored—the economy had not yet collapsed, and only-children remained “useful.”

Even today’s “two-child” and “three-child” policies remain under state planning.Future coercion is possible—Romania once employed “menstrual police.”

Some Chinese workplaces already monitor menstruation cycles of women under 50. Incentive mechanisms—taxes, promotions—foreshadow coercive pronatalism.Economic decline will mask demographic damage for a time, but compulsory social insurance and rising bureaucratic pressure already signal the direction:

In the extreme, citizens may become breeding livestock, driven to reproduce.

Conclusion: Base Origins and an Enduring Warning

The one-child policy was born of a base instinct: unable to provide for the people, the state chose to eliminate future generations. It interrupted natural selection, enslaved society, and destroyed the moral foundations of civic courage—its impact rivaling political indoctrination.

For the CCP’s rule, the policy is indispensable.Ma Yinchu reduced humans to numbers and should be condemned; his failure of foresight implicates him in a crime against humanity.

The policy produced no benefits—it turned modern individuals into subjugated beings.The Chinese nation must awaken to a fundamental truth:

Reproductive freedom is the foundation of all other freedoms.Only by rejecting state control over birth can the nation reclaim its future.

“我不要跪著,憋屈地活下去”

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“我不要跪著,憋屈地活下去”

——香港宏福苑大火祈禱會之夜訪問19歲香港流亡少年易碎君

採訪:Gloria Wang 材料整理與文字編輯:劉芳

編輯:李聰玲 责任编辑:羅志飛 校对:程筱筱 翻译:吕峰

香港大埔宏福苑五級大火奪走逾百條生命,成為香港回歸以來最嚴重的人命傷亡慘劇之一。2025 年 12 月 3 日,是火災發生後的第七天——華人傳統中的“頭七”。 在文化裡,這一天象徵亡者回家探望、家屬追思,是最重要的悼念日。

當天晚上,洛杉磯香港社區在宣道會活恩堂舉行“紀念香港大埔宏福苑火災災民祈禱會”,替遠在香港的死者祈福,也為倖存者與仍身處極權體制下的香港人禱告。

在會場的一角,一位背著雙肩包身形單薄的年輕人吸引了許多目光——他才19歲,卻已經歷審訊、拘捕、流亡與庇護申請。他在網上的名字叫:“易碎君”。

“我不要跪著,憋屈地活下去”

15歲被帶走,16歲獨自來美

記者:請您先介紹一下自己。

易碎君:“大家好,我是易碎君,今年19歲。我在15歲的時候,因為在網上惡搞習近平,被香港警方在過年的時候從家裡強行帶走,帶到警署審問。隨後一年,我16歲的時候我自己一個人來了美國申請政治庇護,現在積極參與民主運動。”

他的聲音平靜,但內容令人震動。“那時候我還未成年,而警方把我家翻了一遍,然後對家裡的房間進行拍照,留檔處理,然後把我的電子設備全部給沒收了。他們的態度讓我第一次切實感受到:原來在他們眼中,我不是一個孩子,而是一個必須被壓制的‘威脅’。”

國安法之後,連和平表達都成了犯罪

記者:是什麼讓你在15歲那樣的年紀,就敢在網上惡搞中共領導人?

易碎君:“原因其實很簡單——雖然我只是個少年,但已經略微知道中共過去做過的壞事。不過當時的香港,表面上還是有言論自由、新聞自由,我也一直抱著一種僥倖心理,覺得鐵拳應該砸不到我頭上。

直到《國安法》在一夜之間通過,我突然明白——這次他們是真的來真的了。從那天起,連和平表達意見都成了犯罪。我無法接受這種事情突然發生在香港,也無法接受自己因此必須沉默。我那時 15 歲,可我很清楚:如果就這樣跪著不出聲,我會一輩子覺得憋屈。這口氣,我咽不下去。

從問責政府,到綁匪式統治

記者:你怎麼看 2019 年前後的香港變化?

易碎君:“2019 年以前,香港政府的官員至少還會對市民負責。即使是敏感議題,例如言論自由、普選民主,他們也會試圖回應民意。而在一些民生問題上——例如工程偷工減料、交通大混亂、公共服務失靈——官員還知道要向市民解釋、道歉、改進。

但《國安法》實施之後,香港政府完全變成了共產黨式的獨裁統治。如今,即使你的訴求完全與政治無關,你只是想好好做一個正常人,但只要你提出訴求,這個行為本身就會被視為“威脅”。政府不再是一個聆聽者,也不再扮演服務人民的角色,而是挾持民眾的一個綁匪角色。”

宏福苑大火:不是天災,是系統性腐敗的人禍

他告訴我們這次祈禱會的主題,就是紀念大埔宏福苑大火的死難者。

記者:您怎麼看這次大火?

易碎君:“我想說的是:這是一個制度的問題。這不是一場天災,而是系統性腐敗造成的一場人禍。而該系統性的腐敗根源是言論不自由,提供了腐敗的溫床。”

他解釋得很具體——“起火的那棟樓正在維修改造。從工程開始,就不斷傳出有親中派議員參與,並涉及腐敗問題。工程費用報得非常高,但實際用的圍網卻是最廉價、最不安全的材料,而且完全不符合防火標準。

正常情況下,施工必須使用具備防火等級的材料,但這些材料成本較高,於是相關人員選擇了便宜、低品質、完全不防火的網。正是這種選擇,直接導致這次火災傷亡慘重。

這次慘烈傷亡,就是廉價、不合規、充滿腐敗的工程直接造成的。”

最令他憤怒的,不是火本身,而是火後的政治反應。

“香港政府到現在只抓了幾個小職員、工程師,真正最有貪污嫌疑的高層完全沒人碰。更諷刺的是,國安部門還高調說要‘慎防以災亂港’,去抓那些要求查清腐敗、要求徹查真相的市民。”

他說得很重也很穩:“在他們眼裡,人民的安全與信任不重要;比起生命,他們更在乎政權的威信和穩定。”

採訪者:至於您提到的另一個問題:許多只是提出正常訴求的市民,反而被國安部門逮捕,針對這一問題您有什麼想法?

易碎君:我覺得這就是中共幾十年來一貫的做法。您看看中國各地的訪民,上訪被截訪、被拘押,有些甚至丟了性命。這種情況在未來香港會發生越來越多。這次火災距離國安法通過也不過五年,但已經出現了如此嚴重的系統性人禍。我可以毫不誇張地說:未來類似甚至更嚴重的災難,一定會一再發生。

因為當言論不自由、新聞不自由、監督不存在,腐敗就會成為制度的一部分——災難也就會成為必然。

我做頻道,不只是做視頻

採訪者:你認為自己的頻道對民主有什麼意義?

易碎君:“準確來說,侮包視頻就啟發觀眾思考,質疑統治者的權威性,質疑當權者那種個人崇拜,政策塑造出來這種高不可攀,神聖不可觸及的那種形象。

另一方面,我也分享自己來美國辦庇護的經歷。許多剛來美國的港人,需要生活協助、需要律師、需要緊急援助,都會通過我聯繫。我算是一個‘可信的中間人’。”

他繼續解釋:

“在民主運動裡,捐款人怕遇到詐騙;求助者怕遇到中共間諜;把他們舉報給領事館。如果能有一個雙方都信得過的中間人,才能真正幫助到需要幫助的流亡者。”

隨後,他提到一句他常掛在心裡的話:“為眾人抱薪者,不應凍斃於風雪。”

“中共一直宣傳:‘你們搞民運的就算跑到國外,也會吃不飽、穿不暖、活不下去。’但如果我們能讓流亡者儘快站穩腳、融入當地社會、過上體面的生活,這就是對中共大外宣最有力的反駁。也能讓更多人明白:反共之後,不等於人生完蛋。反而可能是一條更好的後路。”

好人都死光了,壞人就會更多

採訪者問他:你想對香港、大陸同齡的年輕人說些什麼?

易碎君:學好英語,能跑就跑。

你活下來才能跟他扛到底。我是覺得香港還有中國的民運也基本長期會困在一個烈士情結的問題上。大家都想要當這個烈士,當這個英雄,但是問題是好人死光了,那活下來的全是壞人, 那也沒有人能夠在這個壞人面前保護無辜的平民。如果你做這件事情是真心是為了所有人,為了這個社會去做的,我反而覺得你更加應該去活下來,去做長遠的對抗,而不是就為了那一時的情結就直接去送頭。

最後,他看著祈禱會的燭光,獻上了一朵白色的康乃馨為死者祈福。他告訴我們記得,是另一種形式的抵抗;活著,也是另一種形式的抵抗。他的聲音,像在告訴香港人:“沒有人應該再被迫在火裡死去。沒有人應該因為說話而被抓。沒有人應該跪著活。”

一個十九歲的年輕人,把話說得比許多大人都堅定。

“I refuse to live on my knees, stifled and humiliated”

— Interview with “Fragile Kid,” a 19-year-old Hong Kong exile, on the night of the Hong Kong Fook Wo Estate Fire Memorial Service in Los Angeles

Abstract:The devastating fire at Fook Wo Estate in Hong Kong claimed more than a hundred lives. On the seventh day after the tragedy—the traditional “first seven days” mourning period in Chinese culture—the Hong Kong community in Los Angeles held a prayer vigil to commemorate the victims. Nineteen-year-old exile “Fragile Kid,” who fled to the United States after being arrested in Hong Kong for satirizing Xi Jinping, attended the gathering and urged Hongkongers to survive and continue resisting.

Interview: Gloria Wang Research Text Editing: Liu Fang Editor: Li Congling
Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translation: Lyu Feng

“我不要跪著,憋屈地活下去”

Taken Away at 15, Fled to the U.S. Alone at 16

Reporter: Could you first introduce yourself?Fragile Kid: “Hello everyone, I’m Fragile Kid, I’m 19. When I was 15, I was taken from my home by Hong Kong police during Lunar New Year because I posted satirical memes about Xi Jinping online. They dragged me to the police station for interrogation. The following year, when I turned 16, I came to the United States alone to apply for political asylum. I’m now actively involved in the pro-democracy movement.”

His tone was calm, but the story carried weight.“At the time I was still a minor, yet the police turned my home upside down, photographed every room for record-keeping, and confiscated all my electronic devices. Their attitude made me realize for the first time: in their eyes, I wasn’t a child—I was a ‘threat’ that had to be suppressed.”

After the National Security Law, Even Peaceful Expression Became a Crime

Reporter: What made you bold enough, at just 15, to satirize the Chinese leader online?Fragile Kid: “The reason is simple. Even though I was just a teenager, I already knew bits and pieces of the atrocious things the CCP had done. And at that time, Hong Kong still seemed to enjoy freedom of speech and freedom of the press. I held onto a naive hope that the iron fist wouldn’t land on me.

But when the National Security Law passed overnight, I suddenly understood—they were really coming for us. From that moment, even peaceful expression became criminalized. I couldn’t accept this happening to Hong Kong, and I couldn’t accept that I had to be silent. I was 15, but I knew clearly:If I bowed my head and stayed silent, I would feel suffocated for the rest of my life.I simply couldn’t swallow that anger.”

From a Government Accountable to Its Citizens, to a Regime That Rules Like Kidnappers

Reporter: How do you view the changes in Hong Kong before and after 2019?Fragile Kid:“Before 2019, Hong Kong officials were still at least somewhat accountable to the public. Even on sensitive issues—free speech, universal suffrage—they would attempt to respond to public opinion. And with livelihood issues—construction scandals, transportation chaos, failures in public services—officials still felt obligated to explain, apologize, and make improvements.

But after the National Security Law, the Hong Kong government became a full-fledged authoritarian apparatus. Now, even if your demands have nothing to do with politics, even if you’re just trying to live as a normal human being, simply raising a concern is seen as a ‘threat.’ The government no longer listens or serves the people.It functions like a kidnapper holding society hostage.”

The Fook Wo Estate Inferno: Not a Natural Disaster, but a Man-Made Catastrophe Rooted in Systemic Corruption

He told us that the theme of the evening’s prayer service was to commemorate the victims of the Fook Wo Estate fire.

Reporter: How do you see this fire?Fragile Kid: “This is a systemic problem. This was not a natural disaster—it was a man-made catastrophe caused by structural corruption. And that corruption is rooted in the absence of free speech, which allows rot to flourish.”

He elaborated concretely:“The building was undergoing renovation. From the beginning, there were reports of pro-Beijing district councillors being involved and corruption concerns surrounding the project. Costs were reported at an inflated level, yet the protective mesh used was the cheapest, most unsafe kind—completely failing fire-safety standards.

Under normal regulations, fire-rated materials must be used. But since proper materials cost more, those involved opted for cheap, low-quality, non-fire-resistant netting. That choice directly caused the large number of casualties.

The horrific scale of death and injury was the direct result of cheap, substandard, corruption-ridden construction.”

What angered him most was not the fire itself, but the political aftermath.“The Hong Kong government has only arrested a few low-level staff and engineers. Those high-level figures with genuine corruption suspicions remain untouched. Even more absurd is that the National Security Department publicly warned about ‘anti-China forces using the disaster to destabilize Hong Kong,’ and started arresting citizens who were demanding an investigation into corruption and transparency.”

His voice was firm:“In their eyes, public safety and trust do not matter.The regime values its own authority far more than human life.”

Reporter: And what about the other issue you mentioned—citizens who simply voiced normal concerns being detained by national security officials?Fragile Kid:“This is exactly how the CCP has operated for decades. Look at petitioners across China—they’re intercepted, detained, and some even die in custody. This will only happen more frequently in Hong Kong.

It’s only been five years since the National Security Law, and we already see a catastrophe of such magnitude. I’m not exaggerating when I say that similar—or even worse—disasters will keep happening.When speech isn’t free, when journalism isn’t free, when there is no oversight, corruption becomes institutional—and disasters become inevitable.”

“My Channel Is Not Just About Videos”

Reporter: What do you think your channel contributes to democracy?Fragile Kid:“To be precise, the satirical videos encourage viewers to think—to question the regime’s authority, to challenge the manufactured image of leaders as untouchable or sacred.

On another level, I also share my asylum experience in the U.S. Many Hongkongers who just arrived need help—legal assistance, emergency support—and they reach out to me. I guess I’ve become a ‘trusted intermediary.’”

He continued:“In the pro-democracy movement, donors fear scams; those seeking help fear CCP agents who might report them to the consulate. A trusted intermediary is essential to truly support exiles who need help.”

Then he mentioned a phrase he keeps close to heart: “Those who carry firewood for the people should not freeze to death in the snow.”

“The CCP keeps telling people: ‘Even if you flee overseas for democracy, you’ll starve and be miserable.’ But if we can help exiles stand on their feet, integrate into society, and live with dignity, that becomes the strongest rebuttal to CCP propaganda.It shows that resisting the CCP does not mean your life is ruined. In fact, it might be the beginning of a better path.”

“If All the Good People Die, Only the Bad Will Remain”

Reporter: What would you like to say to young people in Hong Kong and mainland China?Fragile Kid:“Learn English well, and if you can leave, leave.You must survive if you want to fight them to the end.

In Hong Kong and China’s democracy movement, there’s always been a martyr complex. Everyone wants to be the martyr, the hero. But if all the good people die, then only the bad remain—and no one is left to protect innocent civilians.

If you truly act for society and for the people, then you have an even greater responsibility to stay alive—to fight the long fight, instead of dying for a momentary emotional impulse.”

At the end of the vigil, he looked at the candlelight and placed a white carnation in memory of the dead.He told us that remembering is a form of resistance; living is also a form of resistance. His voice seemed to speak directly to Hongkongers:“No one should ever die in a fire because of negligence.No one should be arrested for speaking.No one should have to live on their knees.”

This nineteen-year-old young man spoke with more clarity and resolve than many adults.

香港大火:李家超的表忠与中共的谎言

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香港大火:李家超的表忠与中共的谎言

作者:毛一炜

编辑:周志刚 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:彭小梅

“世纪大火”夺走了数百人无辜性命,香港仍在震惊与哀痛之中。然而在事故后的记者会上,特首李家超的第一句话却不是向市民道歉,也不是宣布启动独立调查,而是——“感谢习近平的关怀”。一句话,把一场本应追问责任、制度漏洞与公共安全的记者会,硬生生变成了向上级表忠的政治秀。他真正应该感谢的,是冲在火场、拯救生命的消防员。
香港大火:李家超的表忠与中共的谎言

李家超是谁?他是香港回归以来首位由警务系统直接晋升的行政长官,没有民意基础、没有民主授权。他的权力完全来自北京,尤其依赖习近平和中共的认可。如今的李家超,政治逻辑完全是“向上负责”,而不是“向市民负责”。灾难发生时,他首先考虑的不是民众生命安全,而是如何在中央面前表现忠诚。

香港此刻最需要的——是答案:建筑监管为何多年失效?承办商为何层层外判、责任模糊?政府为何明知楼宇安全危险,却长期坐视不管?为何一再发生类似悲剧,却没有人承担制度性责任?这些问题本应由记者会提出,由特区政府启动独立透明调查。然而李家超的记者会把“感谢中央”放在首位,真相被挤到角落,制度漏洞被掩盖,责任被抽象化。

这正是香港走到如今的根本原因:中共的谎言。几十年来,北京不断宣称“香港高度自治”“港人治港”,然而事实是:香港的自由与制度保障,被一步步蚕食。所谓“一国两制”,在中共眼里只是一个美丽谎言,是用来掩盖对香港全面掌控的幌子。李家超在记者会上不停感谢习近平、感谢共产党——试问,他究竟在感谢什么?感谢那些用虚假的承诺掩盖真相、用政治忠诚代替问责、用恐惧和压制取代自由的上级吗?

“一国两制”本应保障香港特区向市民负责,但如今却变成了笑话:特首权力不再来自选民,而完全来自中央政府的授权。李家超不需要在意香港人的死伤,也不需要回应公众的愤怒,只要上级满意,他就稳如泰山。这就是香港正在内地化的真实写照:自由消失,民主消失,问责机制消失,留下的只是政治忠诚和表演。

看看这次大火,香港政府的第一反应不是追责,不是公开真相,而是抓人、控言论、压制异议——和中国内地完全一样。谁敢批评政府?谁敢联署四大诉求?谁敢揭露制度漏洞?都会被当作威胁、被抓、被收拾。维稳成了首要任务,真相和民众安全被完全忽视。

这场火灾不仅烧毁了建筑物,更烧毁了香港的信任和制度。自由不见了,独立调查无从谈起,公众监督被封堵,而李家超在镜头前的“感谢习近平”“感谢中央”,实际上是在宣示:权力来源不是民众,而是中共。习近平和共产党做了什么?他们拿着所谓的“一国两制”承诺,掩盖制度漏洞,纵容官僚不作为,把香港变成了一个政治表忠的舞台。值得感谢吗?显然不。

真正毁灭一座城市的,不是火灾,而是一个让政治忠诚高于人民生命、让谎言高于真相的政府。香港曾经是亚洲的东方之都,曾以法治闻名。而今天,制度被蚕食,自由被剥夺,民意被压制,死难者成为政治祭品。

所有香港人——无论生者还是死者的家属——都在等一个答案:香港的政府是否还能直面真相?是否还能保护市民,而不是继续做中共的表演者?如果不敢,如果不愿,悲剧还会一再重演,而所谓“一国两制”“高度自治”,早已成为中共最荒谬、最致命的谎言。

香港自由的焚毁,是习近平和中共用谎言一步步烧掉的结果。火焰烧毁了建筑,政治烧毁了信任,制度与真相被放逐。面对这样的政府,市民的生命和权利被彻底边缘化,未来的悲剧,只能一次又一次重演。

Mao Yiwei: The Hong Kong Fire — John Lee’s Display of Loyalty and the CCP’s Lies

Author: Mao YiweiEditor: Zhou Zhigang Chief Editor: Luo Zhifei Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:After the massive fire in Hong Kong, Chief Executive John Lee opened the post-incident press conference by thanking Xi Jinping, instead of expressing condolences to the injured or gratitude to the firefighters. This shows that the Hong Kong government is gradually becoming a part of the Chinese Communist Party, while democracy and freedom are disappearing.

The “fire of the century” took hundreds of innocent lives, and Hong Kong remains in shock and grief. Yet at the press conference following the incident, the very first words of Chief Executive John Lee were not an apology to the public, nor an announcement of launching an independent investigation, but— “Thank you for Xi Jinping’s concern.” With one sentence, a press conference that should have been about demanding accountability, exposing systemic loopholes, and addressing public safety was forcibly turned into a political show of loyalty to the higher-ups. The ones he should have truly thanked were the firefighters who rushed into the blaze and saved lives.

香港大火:李家超的表忠与中共的谎言

Who is John Lee? He is the first Chief Executive since the handover to be promoted directly from the police force, with no democratic mandate and no public legitimacy. His power comes entirely from Beijing, especially from Xi Jinping and the CCP’s approval. John Lee’s political logic today is completely “accountable upward”, not “accountable to the citizens.”What Hong Kong needs most at this moment is—answers: Why has building regulation failed for so many years? Why are contractors subcontracting endlessly, creating blurred responsibility? Why did the government ignore known building safety hazards for so long? Why do similar tragedies keep happening, yet no one bears institutional responsibility? These are questions that should have been raised at the press conference and addressed by launching an independent and transparent investigation by the Hong Kong government. However, John Lee placed “thanking the central government” at the top, pushing truth to the corner, covering systemic loopholes, and abstracting responsibility.

This is exactly the fundamental reason why Hong Kong has come to where it is today:the CCP’s lies. For decades, Beijing has repeatedly claimed “Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong” and “a high degree of autonomy.” But in reality, Hong Kong’s freedoms and institutional safeguards have been steadily eroded. The so-called “One Country, Two Systems,” in the eyes of the CCP, is nothing but a beautifully packaged lie, a façade masking its full control over Hong Kong. At the press conference, John Lee kept thanking Xi Jinping and the Communist Party— But what exactly was he thanking them for? For covering up the truth with false promises? For replacing accountability with political loyalty? For replacing freedom with fear and suppression?

“One Country, Two Systems” was supposed to ensure that Hong Kong officials were accountable to the people. But now it has become a joke: The Chief Executive’s power no longer comes from voters, but entirely from authorization by the central government. John Lee does not need to care about the deaths and injuries of Hong Kong people, nor respond to public anger—as long as the higher-ups are satisfied, he remains secure in his position. This is the true portrait of Hong Kong’s mainlandization: Freedom disappears; Democracy disappears; Accountability mechanisms disappear. All that remains is political loyalty and performance.

Look at this fire: The Hong Kong government’s first reaction was not to investigate responsibility, not to disclose the truth, but to arrest people, suppress speech, and silence dissent—exactly the same as in mainland China. Who dares criticize the government? Who dares co-sign four major demands? Who dares expose systemic loopholes? Anyone doing so will be treated as a threat, arrested, or punished.“Stability maintenance” becomes the top priority, while truth and public safety are completely ignored.

This fire did not only burn down a building; it burned down Hong Kong’s trust and its institutions. Freedom has vanished. Independent investigation is impossible. Public oversight is blocked. John Lee’s on-camera “Thank you to Xi Jinping” and “Thank you to the central government” was, in fact, a declaration: The source of his power is not the people, but the CCP. What have Xi Jinping and the CCP actually done?They hid systemic failures behind the so-called promises of “One Country, Two Systems,” indulged bureaucratic negligence, and turned Hong Kong into a political stage for public displays of loyalty. Is this something to be thankful for? Obviously not.

What destroys a city is not a fire, but a government that values political loyalty above human life and lies above truth. Hong Kong, once the Oriental Pearl and renowned for its rule of law, has had its institutions hollowed out, its freedoms stripped, and its public will be suppressed. The victims of the fire have become political offerings.

All Hong Kong people—both the living and the families of the dead—are waiting for an answer: Can the Hong Kong government still confront the truth? Can it still protect its citizens, instead of continuing to perform for the CCP? If it cannot, if it will not, tragedies will repeat again and again. And the supposed “One Country, Two Systems” and “high degree of autonomy” have long become the CCP’s most absurd and most lethal lies.

The destruction of Hong Kong’s freedom is the result of Xi Jinping and the CCP burning it down step by step with lies. The flames destroyed the building; politics destroyed trust. Institutions and truth were exiled. Under such a government, people’s lives and rights are pushed to the margins, and future tragedies can only continue to happen, again and again.

  任志强先生我愿与你同罪

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  任志强先生我愿与你同罪

作者:王连江
编辑:钟然 责任编辑:张娜 校对:王滨 翻译:刘芳

任志强1951年3月出生。我们先看看我所知道的任志强多年以来的言论观点,行动,遭遇。

     2006年:民众骂高房价、骂开发商是被蒙蔽了,房价成本的80%都被政府拿走了,政府比房地产商黑多了,房地产商其实是政府推卸责任的靶子,替政府受过。

    2007年:房价过快上涨的直接原因是政府依赖土地财政,掌握土地的供给,认为造成供需矛盾,所以宏观调控政策全部错误,因为没有抓住病根。

    2013年北大:台湾民主制度的建立不仅仅因为有一个蒋经国,而是因为台湾人民有思想,有梦想,他们要建立一个民主社会。鼓励大学生们努力地站起来,承担各自的社会责任,把我们面前的这堵墙推倒。

   2015年2月:当今的体制是垄断的皇权、中央集权。

   2015年9月23日:千万别让团中央用愚昧再去欺骗年轻的一代,千万别让改革开放退回到改革以前,我不在乎别人骂我,但团中央不能用无知欺骗社会。

    2015年10月1日:这个节日不是一个国家产生的节日,而是一个新的政府产生的节日。这意味着:中共是中共,中国是中国,中共不等于中国。

   2016年2月批评央视“官媒姓党”。媒体应当服务于人民,而不是某个党派。

   2020年2月:“丝毫不掩饰坚决当皇帝的野心,和谁不让我当皇帝,就让你灭亡的决心!”。

    2020年3月12日被拘留,9月22日北京市第二中级法院判处有期徒刑18年。

     在现代的政治文明体系里,政府的权利来源于它管辖范围内人民私权的授予,人民不但有权力批评政府,在现任政府不能满足人民的愿望时,人民还有权力推翻现在的政府!

   目前中华人民共和国这个政府的执政权力,这么多年,从来没有人民的授予!它的权力是枪杆子抢出来的,它是非法的,暴力的!他们所宣讲的共产主义,是一种邪教!它是通过欺骗,用一条铺满了鲜花的道路,把信奉它的人们带入地狱!几十年的中国历史世界历史、一而再再而三地证明,它传播到哪里,只会给哪里的人们带来愚昧,贫困,动乱,战争,血腥镇压!

我本人出身富农。土改时,我祖父外祖父几代人辛苦积累的财富被剥夺,我父母被歧视冷遇了几十年,我童年也是在部分同伴的欺凌中度过。上学时面对部分教材的欺骗,参加工作后就业机会的不均等,高房价,儿子上海读书,无法参加当地高考,父母临去世前仅有的低微的养老金等等,这些亲身经历的不公,让我思考为什么眼前的社会会这样?怎么样的社会才是公平的?我需要答案!任志强先生敢言,讲真话!在那个微博流行的年代我关注了他,了解了他,我认同他的观念,敬重他的人品,并赞赏他的勇气!他本衣食无忧,可以安享晚年,他只是为了顾念苍生说了真心话。现在他被抓了,被判了18年!并且是在他69岁的时候被判了18年!他有何罪?讲真话有何罪?批评一个非法政府有何罪?他只是尽到了作为公民应承担的社会责任!任志强先生我愿与你同罪!

  任志强先生我愿与你同罪

2022年8月网上流传的任志强先生在狱中的照片。

 I Am Willing to Share the Same “Crime” as Mr. Ren Zhiqiang

Author: Wang Lianjiang
Editor: Zhong Ran Executive Editor: Zhang Na Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract: For many years, Ren Zhiqiang openly criticized the political system, the media, and China’s reliance on land-based fiscal revenue. He advocated democracy and civic responsibility, and for speaking the truth, he was ultimately sentenced to 18 years in prison. The author reflects on social injustice through personal experiences and expresses deep respect for Ren’s courage and conscience.

Ren Zhiqiang was born in March 1951. Let us first look at the remarks, actions, and experiences of Ren Zhiqiang that I have come to know over the years.

2006: When the public angrily criticized high housing prices and developers, he pointed out that they were being misled—80% of housing costs were taken by the government. The government, he said, was far darker than the real estate companies, and developers were merely scapegoats used by the government to deflect blame.

2007: He argued that the direct cause of surging housing prices was the government’s dependence on land finance and its monopolistic control over land supply. Because policymakers failed to grasp the root cause, all macro-control policies were fundamentally flawed.

2013, Peking University: He stated that Taiwan’s democratic system was not established solely because of Chiang Ching-kuo, but because the Taiwanese people had ideals and aspirations. They wanted to build a democratic society. He encouraged university students to stand up, shoulder their social responsibilities, and push down the wall standing in front of them.

February 2015: He described the current system as a monopoly of imperial power and centralized authoritarianism.

September 23, 2015: “Do not let the Communist Youth League deceive a new generation with ignorance, and do not allow reforms to regress to the pre-reform era. I do not care if others scold me, but the Youth League must not use ignorance to mislead society.”

October 1, 2015: “This day is not the birth of a nation, but the anniversary of a new government coming into existence. This means: the CCP is the CCP, China is China, and the CCP is not China.”

February 2016: He criticized the slogan “state media must bear the Party’s surname,” insisting that the media should serve the people, not a political party.

February 2020: He wrote that someone at the top “makes no effort to hide his determination to be emperor, and his resolve to destroy anyone who stands in his way.”

March 12, 2020: He was detained. On September 22, the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court sentenced him to 18 years in prison.

In modern political civilization, a government’s authority comes from the private rights granted by the people within its jurisdiction. People not only have the right to criticize their government, but when the current government fails to meet the people’s expectations, the people also have the right to overthrow it.

  

The current government of the People’s Republic of China has never received its governing authority from the people—not once in all these years. Its power was seized through the barrel of a gun; it is illegal and violent. The communism it preaches is a cult. Through deception, it leads believers down a flower-strewn path into hell. Decades of Chinese and world history have repeatedly proven that wherever this ideology spreads, it brings ignorance, poverty, chaos, war, and bloody repression.

I myself come from a “rich peasant” family. During land reform, the wealth that my grandfather, great-grandfather, and ancestors accumulated over generations was confiscated. My parents suffered discrimination for decades, and my own childhood was marked by bullying. In school, I faced deceptive textbooks; after entering the workforce, I encountered unequal employment opportunities. Later came unaffordable housing, my son being unable to take the college entrance exam in Shanghai despite studying there, and my elderly parents surviving on meager pensions. These injustices in my own life made me question why society is the way it is. What kind of society is truly fair? I needed answers. Ren Zhiqiang spoke boldly and truthfully. In the era when Weibo was at its height, I followed him, learned from him, agreed with his views, respected his character, and admired his courage. He did not lack food, clothing, or comfort; he could have enjoyed his old age in peace. Yet he chose to speak out of conscience, out of concern for the people. Now he has been arrested and sentenced to 18 years—at the age of 69. What was his crime? What crime is there in telling the truth? What crime is there in criticizing an illegitimate government? He merely fulfilled the social responsibility expected of a citizen. Mr. Ren Zhiqiang, I am willing to share the same “crime” as you.

  任志强先生我愿与你同罪

A photo of Mr. Ren Zhiqiang in prison, circulated online in August 2022.

拒绝屈服:徐勤先与六四抗争

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拒绝屈服:徐勤先与六四抗争

作者:毛一炜
编辑:张宇 责任编辑:张娜 校对:王滨 翻译:刘芳

最近我在油管刷到王志安频道更新的一段历史影像——徐勤先庭审的视频,画面来自 1990 年 3 月 17 日。三十多年过去,这段庭审影像第一次完整公开。视频中,徐勤先面对军事法庭,神情沉稳,语气平静地说:“我不同意使用武力。”没有激烈的抗议,也没有刻意的姿态,只有一种令人无法忽视的坚定。那一刻,他的平静本身就像一种沉默的力量,让人心头一紧。

1989年六月的北京,街头的学生和市民手无寸铁,却被共产党和军队以暴力镇压。徐勤先是当时的第 38 集团军军长,拒绝带兵入京镇压学生,甚至拒绝在调兵令上签字。这个决定意味着他直接违抗上级命令,也意味着承受无法预料的惩罚。最终,他被秘密军事法庭判处五年有期徒刑。庭审中,他没有求情,也没有辩解,只有冷静、沉着的神态。那份安静的坚持,比任何激烈的抗争更让人动容。

影像里,庭审室的光线昏暗,徐勤先坐在法庭上,眼神清澈却带着沉重的分量。旁边的审判官面无表情,周围的环境压抑而沉默。每一个微小的动作,都仿佛在诉说着当年的紧张和恐惧。他的选择,是军人的职业底线,也是良知的底线。三十多年被封锁的历史,在这段影像里重见天日,让人切实感受到那个时代的复杂和残酷。

拒绝屈服:徐勤先与六四抗争

看到这段视频,我的思绪回到了初三那年。那一年,我第一次学会“翻墙”,第一次看到了关于六四事件的影像。屏幕上,一个大学生映入眼帘,戴着眼镜,头上绑着红色头带。他的眼神坚定,骑着自行车奔向天安门广场。他说:“去游行,去天安门广场“。记者问他为什么 他回答“I think It’s my duty”。”短短一句话,却让我第一次理解责任感和勇气。画面中的他,不只是一个学生,更像是历史的一部分——一个时代里敢于站出来的人。

徐勤先的庭审和那个大学生的画面在我心中交织。一个在军中核心选择遵从良知,一个在街头选择挺身而出。时间、身份、环境不同,但他们的行为本质相通:在关键时刻,他们拒绝背弃自己的判断,拒绝让良知沉默。看着这些影像,我感到一阵寒意,也感到敬意。那份在压迫面前依然坚守的勇气,比任何言语都更有力量,也提醒我:历史不会因为沉默而消失,真相终会揭开。

而曾经用枪口镇压学生、用谎言掩盖真相的共产党,其统治必将终结。血与恐惧无法永远压制人心,谎言无法永远掩盖历史。迟早有一天,真相将冲破封锁,暴政会被彻底推翻,党权必将下台。人民的记忆和良知才是永远的裁判,历史不会忘记,也不会宽恕。

Refusing to Yield: Xu Qinxian and the Struggle of June Fourth

Author: Mao Yiwei
Editor: Zhang Yu Executive Editor: Zhang Na Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract: Inspired by the newly released footage of Xu Qinxian’s trial, the author reflects that history never disappears, and truth can never be buried.

Recently, I came across a historical video on Wang Zhi’an’s YouTube channel—footage of Xu Qinxian’s military trial, recorded on March 17, 1990. More than thirty years later, this is the first time the full trial has been made public. In the video, Xu Qinxian faces the military court with a calm expression and a steady voice: “I do not agree to the use of force.” No fiery protest, no dramatic posturing—only an unshakeable firmness. In that moment, his composure itself was a form of silent strength, tightening the chest of anyone who watched.

In June 1989, students and citizens stood unarmed on the streets of Beijing, yet they were crushed by the violence of the Communist Party and the military. Xu Qinxian, then commander of the 38th Army, refused to lead his troops into Beijing to suppress the students and even refused to sign the mobilization order. This decision meant directly defying his superiors and facing unpredictable consequences. In the end, he was sentenced to five years in prison by a secret military court. During the trial, he neither pleaded nor defended himself. His demeanor remained cool and composed. That quiet, unwavering stance spoke louder than any outcry.。

In the footage, the courtroom appears dim, and Xu Qinxian sits before the judges with clear eyes that carry a heavy gravity. The presiding officers look expressionless. The entire room feels oppressive and still. Every small movement seems to whisper the tension and fear of that time. His choice represented the boundary of a soldier’s duty—and the boundary of conscience. After more than three decades of censorship, history resurfaced through this footage, allowing us to truly feel the complexity and brutality of that era.

拒绝屈服:徐勤先与六四抗争

As I watched the video, my thoughts drifted back to my third year of middle school. That was the year I first learned how to “climb over the firewall,” and the year I first saw images of the June Fourth crackdown. On the screen, I saw a university student wearing glasses and a red headband. His eyes were resolute as he rode his bicycle toward Tiananmen Square. He said he was going there to join the demonstration. A reporter asked why. He replied, “I think it’s my duty.” Just a few words, yet they taught me, for the first time, the meaning of responsibility and courage. He was not only a student—he was part of history, one of those who dared to stand up in that era.

The image of Xu Qinxian’s trial and the image of that student merge in my mind. One was inside the core of the military, choosing to follow conscience. The other was in the streets, choosing to step forward. Their times, identities, and environments were different, but the essence of their actions was the same: in a decisive moment, they refused to betray their judgment and refused to let their conscience fall silent. Watching these scenes, I felt a chill, but also deep respect. The courage to hold on in the face of oppression is more powerful than any words—and it reminds us that history does not disappear because of silence, nor does truth fade with time.

And as for the Communist Party that once turned its guns on students and buried truth under lies—its rule will inevitably come to an end. Blood and fear cannot suppress the human heart forever, and lies cannot cover history forever. One day, truth will break through the blockade, tyranny will be shattered, and the Party’s authority will fall. The memory and conscience of the people are the only eternal judges. History will not forget—and it will not forgive.

论中国民主的未来之《公民宪法》详解 第2篇

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论中国民主的未来之《公民宪法》详解  第2篇

宪法第一条:开宗明义

作者:程伟
责任编辑:胡丽莉 校对:熊辩 翻译:刘芳

引言:宪法的民治之魂 《公民宪法》以民治、民主、民权、民生、民族为核心,勾勒出一幅中国民主未来的宏伟蓝图。第一条作为宪法的开篇基石,明确了国家与公民的关系,奠定了民治的根本原则:“先有人类后有国家,是公民建立国家,国家是公民的国家,是公民治理国家,而不是国家统治公民,公民没有爱国的义务;国家政权的建立其基本原则是保护公民的生命权、自由权、财产权、反抗压迫权和选举与被选举权不受任何的非法侵犯,当国家政权无法保证这一基本原则时,公民有权有义务推翻这个政权,建立一个以保障公民生命权、自由权、财产权、反抗压迫权和选举与被选举权为基本原则的政权。”本文将深入解读这一条款,揭示其对中国民主未来的深远意义。

论中国民主的未来之《公民宪法》详解  第2篇

一、民治的核心:公民先于国家 第一条开宗明义,提出“先有人类后有国家”,颠覆了传统国家至上的观念,确立了公民在国家形成中的主体地位。这一理念源自以民治为核心的政治理论,强调国家是公民意志的产物,而非凌驾于公民之上的统治工具。公民不仅是国家的缔造者,更是国家治理的主体,“是公民治理国家,而不是国家统治公民”明确了权力的流向:国家权力源于公民授权,而非反向统治。这种设计彻底打破了威权体制的逻辑,将公民置于宪政体系的中心。更为前瞻性的提出,“公民没有爱国的义务”这一表述,挑战了传统爱国主义的强制性叙事。在《公民宪法》的语境中,爱国并非公民的义务,而是基于自由选择的情感表达。国家若不能服务于公民的福祉,便无权要求公民的忠诚。这一理念不仅赋予公民精神上的自由,也为反抗不义政权提供了理论依据,体现了民治的彻底性。

二、国家政权的原则:保障五项基本权利 第一条进一步阐述,国家政权的建立以保护公民的生命权、自由权、财产权、反抗压迫权、选举与被选举权为基本原则。这五项权利构成了《公民宪法》的核心价值,涵盖了从生存到自由、从经济到政治的全面保障。 

生命权:作为最基本的人权,确保公民免受暴力与非法侵害,是国家存在的首要理由,所以,人权高于主权。 

自由权:包括言论、信仰、结社等自由,保障公民在思想与行动上的自主性,思想自由是人类的第一自由权,是不可剥夺也不能被剥夺的自由权利。 

财产权:保护公民的经济成果,防止国家或他人非法侵占,促进社会公平与个人激励,私有财产不可侵犯。 

反抗压迫权:赋予公民对抗不公与暴政的合法性,是民治理念的直接体现,公民有权利有义务反抗压迫,使反抗压迫成为一种基本人权。 

选举与被选举权:确保公民通过民主机制参与国家治理,体现民主乃民治的制度化实现,选举与被选举权作为基本人权之一,是民治理念的具体体现。

这些权利的设定不仅是对个人尊严的维护,也是对国家权力的约束。国家若无法履行保护公民这些权利的职责,便失去了合法性。这一原则为公民治理提供了明确的衡量标准,也为公民监督国家公权机构行使公权力提供了法律依据。

三、公民的权利与义务:推翻与重建 宪法第一条赋予了公民的革命权利:“当国家政权无法保障五项基本原则时,公民有权、有义务推翻这个政权,建立一个以保障公民生命权、自由权、财产权、反抗压迫权和选举与被选举权为基本原则的政权。”这不仅是一项权利,更是一项义务,体现了《公民宪法》对公民能动性的高度信任。公民不再是被动服从的臣民,而是国家命运的主动塑造者。这种设计既是对历史中暴政教训的回应,也是对未来民主韧性的保障。通过这一条款,将民治的理念推向极致:当国家背离其服务公民的初衷,公民有权通过合法或革命手段重建宪政秩序。这种权利与义务的结合,既激励公民参与公共事务,也为民主制度的自我纠错提供了机制。

四、对中国民主未来的启示 第一条以民治为核心,重新定义了国家与公民的关系,为中国民主的未来提供了明确的方向。这不仅回应了西方民主的局限,如过度依赖代议制而忽略公民直接参与,也避免了传统集权体制对个人自由的压制。通过将公民置于国家之上,《公民宪法》的第一条为中国民主提供了“第三条道路”。在人工智能、数据监控等新技术的兴起对公民权利构成了新挑战的当下,《公民宪法》通过保护反抗压迫权和选举与被选举权,为应对这些挑战提供了制度保障。同时,“公民没有爱国的义务”打破了民族主义的桎梏,使中国民主能够在开放与包容中迎接全球化的机遇。

结语:民治的星辰大海 《公民宪法》第一条,以其对民治的深刻诠释,点燃了中国民主未来的希望之光。通过“先有人类后有国家”的宣言,赋予公民无上的主体地位;通过五项基本权利的保障,构筑了民治的坚实基石;通过推翻与重建的权利与义务,激发了公民的能动性。这一条款不仅是一部宪法的开篇,更是通向自由、公平、繁荣的中国民主之路的起点。

点击查看《公民宪法》原文

——《公民宪法》撰写人程伟/何清风,一身正气、两袖清风。

An Interpretation of the “Civic Constitution”: On the Future of Chinese Democracy – Part II

Article One: The Foundational Principle
Author: Cheng Wei Executive Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract: Article One of the Civic Constitution establishes a fundamental principle: humanity precedes the state, and it is the citizens who create the state—not the state that governs citizens. By defining the chronological and logical order between citizens and the state, it derives the doctrine that citizens stand above the state. Article One further articulates five basic principles of citizenship and affirms that when a regime fails to protect these principles, citizens not only have the right but also the obligation to overthrow it.

Introduction: The Democratic Soul of the ConstitutionAnchored in popular governance, democracy, civil rights, livelihood, and national identity, the Civic Constitution sketches a grand blueprint for the future of Chinese democracy. Article One, serving as the foundation of the document, clarifies the relationship between the state and its citizens and establishes the core principle of democratic rule by the people: “Humanity came before the state; it is citizens who establish the state. The state belongs to the citizens, and it is the citizens who govern the state, not the state that rules over citizens. Citizens have no obligation to love the state; the fundamental purpose of establishing state power is to protect citizens’ rights to life, liberty, property, resistance against oppression, and suffrage—including the right to be elected—against any unlawful infringement. When the state fails to uphold these principles, citizens have the right and the duty to overthrow that regime and to establish one that protects these fundamental rights.” This article examines Article One in depth and reveals its profound implications for China’s democratic future.

论中国民主的未来之《公民宪法》详解  第2篇

I. The Core of Popular Governance: Citizens Precede the StateArticle One begins with the declaration “Humanity came before the state,” overturning traditional notions of state supremacy and establishing citizens as the primary actors in political formation. Rooted in theories of rule by the people, this principle underscores that the state is the product of citizens’ collective will, not a tool of domination imposed upon them. Citizens are not merely subjects—they are founders and governors of the state. The assertion that “citizens govern the state, not the state the citizens” clarifies that political authority flows from citizens to the government. This dismantles authoritarian logic and places citizens at the center of constitutional order. The forward-looking statement “citizens have no obligation to love the state” challenges coercive nationalism. Under this constitutional vision, patriotism is voluntary. A state that fails to serve its citizens cannot demand their loyalty. This grants citizens spiritual freedom and offers a theoretical basis for resisting unjust power, embodying the completeness of popular governance.

II. The Principles of State Authority: Safeguarding Five Fundamental RightsArticle One further declares that the establishment of state power must rest on the protection of five essential rights: the right to life, liberty, property, resistance against oppression, and the right to vote and to be elected. These rights form the core moral structure of the Civic Constitution, spanning survival, freedom, economic security, and political participation. The right to life is the most basic human right and the primary justification for the state’s existence; thus, human rights supersede sovereignty. Liberty includes freedom of speech, belief, and association, protecting the autonomy of thought and action; freedom of thought is humanity’s first and inalienable freedom. Property rights protect citizens’ economic achievements and prevent unlawful seizure, ensuring fairness and incentive. The right to resist oppression grants citizens legitimacy to oppose injustice and tyranny, transforming resistance into a fundamental human right. The right to vote and be elected ensures democratic participation and institutionalizes the principle of rule by the people. These rights safeguard individual dignity while constraining state authority. A regime that fails to protect them loses legitimacy, providing clear standards for public governance and a legal basis for citizens to supervise the state.

III. Citizens’ Rights and Duties: Overthrowing and RebuildingArticle One grants citizens a revolutionary mandate: when a regime fails to safeguard the five fundamental principles, citizens have not only the right but also the obligation to overthrow it and establish one that protects these rights. This is more than a right—it is a civic duty, reflecting profound trust in citizen agency. Citizens cease to be passive subjects and become active authors of political destiny. This design responds to historical lessons of tyranny and ensures the long-term resilience of democracy. When the state abandons its purpose of serving its citizens, citizens are empowered to restore constitutional order through lawful or revolutionary means. By linking rights with obligations, Article One stimulates civic participation and provides democracy with a built-in corrective mechanism.

IV. Implications for the Future of Chinese DemocracyCentered on popular governance, Article One redefines the relationship between citizens and the state and charts a clear course for China’s democratic development. It addresses limitations of Western democracies—such as overreliance on representative systems—while avoiding the suppressive tendencies of authoritarian governance. By placing citizens above the state, Article One offers a “third pathway” for China’s democratic future. In an era when artificial intelligence and data surveillance pose new threats to civil liberties, the constitutional protection of the right to resist oppression and the right to vote provides institutional safeguards against future abuses. Meanwhile, the declaration that “citizens have no obligation to love the state” breaks free from enforced nationalism, enabling a democratic China to embrace openness and global opportunity.

Conclusion: Toward a Democratic HorizonThrough its profound articulation of popular governance, Article One of the Civic Constitution illuminates a path of hope for China’s political future. By asserting that humanity precedes the state, it grants citizens supreme political primacy; by establishing five essential rights, it lays a foundation of democratic order; by granting citizens the right and duty to overthrow unjust regimes, it empowers democratic self-renewal. Article One is not merely the opening clause of a constitution—it is the starting point of a journey toward freedom, justice, and prosperity.

Click to view the full text of the Civic Constitution.— Written by Cheng Wei and He Qingfeng, paragons of integrity and moral clarity.