揭露真相 从我做起
中共自建政以来，通过残酷镇压异见人士、海外渗透和跨国打压手段维护统治，甚至在多国设立秘密警察站，威胁侨民。但正义不会沉默，美国政府已抓获并定罪多名中共特务，为民主自由反击！
中国民主党举办第三十八期“中共百年暴行展”。本次展览内容：揭露中共暴行，支持海内外民主人士，一起了解真相！推翻中共，再造共和！！！
活动详情
时间：9月7日(星期日） 14：00—17：00
地点：丁胖子广场
内容：揭露中共暴行、美国政府反击中共特务！
本周举办单位：中国民主党江西工委
现场负责人：曾禹寒
中共镇压无孔不入，但我们团结的力量能推动改变。让我们用行动支持正义，为民主自由站台！
作者：陀先润
编辑：周志刚 责任编辑 胡丽莉
我们这一代三十八九岁的人，大多是在“增长神话”和KPI语言里长大的，习惯了用经济学的曲线解释一切转弯。可要读懂过去四十多年，你得先把顺序摆正：先开放，后改革；开放向外，改革向内。开放是外交筹码，用来换技术、换市场、换时间；改革是统治修复，用来把秩序收回来、把资源再分配的阀门握紧。经济只是扳手，不是方向盘。权力才是那只不会放手的手。
很多人相信“经济危机逼出来改革”。这话好听，也最能安慰市场派的自尊：只要增长下滑，政策就会转向。但回头看，恰恰相反。六七十年代对外“开放”的起点，不是慈悲，也不是市场共识，而是安全焦虑。中苏翻脸、边境压顶，才有了对美和解与引资的窗口。开放不是为了老百姓口袋鼓一点，而是为了把国家机器的短板补起来，把卡脖子的装备补齐，把时间赢到自己一边。“改革”也并非要动根基。真正被触碰的，始终是非命脉地带：能放给市场的就放一点，放出来再随时回收；不能放的——军工、能源、金融枢纽、信息阀门——一寸不让。八十年代那套“双轨制”把计划与市场绑在一起跑，结果不是自动到站，而是一路颠簸，1988年价格闯关差点把经济掀翻。你可以说那是“改革成本”，但它更像一次内部压力测试：放到哪一步会触发系统性不稳，触发就回头。经济在这里不是目标，而是表。表针抖得太厉害，就拧回去。九十年代的“外向型理性”同样如此。每年和美国谈最惠国待遇，谈的是时间与空间——用人情、用姿态、用有限释放换一个年度通行证。直到加入世贸组织，才把筹码一次性推了上去。很多人把入世解读成“倒逼国内改革”，可真实的执行逻辑是：先拿到十五年的高速发展窗口，至于承诺，能拖则拖，能打补丁就打补丁。开放从来是单向的：要你的技术、要你的订单、要你的资本，但我的壁垒、我的口岸、我的红线，仍然归我。
2008 年之后的剧本更直白。四万亿不是去托举现金流断裂的民营外贸，而是去喂养“看得见”的铁公鸡与大国企。民营像孵化器，不停下蛋；国企像保温箱，把能量集中到可控处。理由很简单：当经济与稳权发生冲突，先稳权。一个路灯公司的电源都不能完全市场化，因为“断电”的按钮象征着政治风险。金融与数据更不用说，连“谁能发声、怎么发声”都要纳管。边界不是写在法条里，而是写在“风险叙事”里——凡是可被解读为组织风险的，都不属于市场。这就是为什么，每当民间资本试图自我组织、试图建制度、试图把“企业家共同体”变成公共议题时，红灯就会亮。不是你做得不够好，而是你做得太像制度要件。大学、基金会、行业自治、跨区域的职业资格——凡是能产生独立秩序的东西，都会被归类为“可疑的权力替代”。这不是经济学问题，是政治学问题：秩序来源必须唯一。把这条主线放回历史坐标，你就不再指望“危机推动善意拐点”。危机只会推动两种动作：一是对外更激进的讨价还价，争取喘息；二是对内更坚决的结构回收，确保关键阀门不在别人手里。市场与法治只有在不威胁阀门时才会得到扩容，一旦触线，就缩回去。所谓“中国式现代化”，核心机制就是“可增长的边界”：边界在，增长就存在；边界被触动，增长就让路。这并不意味着增长不重要。恰恰相反，增长是合法性叙事的底座，是“绩效政治”的KPI。投资、地价、出口、产业迭代，这些指标变成了“统治会计”的科目表。你能在表上交出成绩，就能在政治上换来安全。但当“绩效”和“安全”发生冲突，选择题没有悬念。于是我们看到“先放后收”的循环：放，是为了把经济这匹马拉起来；收，是为了确保缰绳在手。对我们这代人而言，真正需要更新的认知是：不要用经济逻辑套政治抉择。你可以用现金流模型估企业，用需求曲线看行业，但不要用它来预测“何时转向”。转向从来不是由GDP 的同比数决定的，而是由“风险感知”的温度计决定的。今天的外部压力会带来一些短期的姿态调整、一些技术型的“开放修辞”，但这不代表边界被重写。边界的书写者只认一条：政权安全。
那么，我们是不是在走一条熟悉的老路？如果“老路”指的是“以安全为纲、以经济为器、以开放求时、以改革修政”的路径，那么答案八九不离十。不同的是，外部世界更复杂，国内结构更庞大；相同的是，方向盘握在同一只手上。看懂这点，才知道该把哪些期待放低、哪些行动提速：做生意要看边界，做公共议题要看风险叙事；与其把希望交给“转向”，不如把准备交给“常态”。这不是犬儒，是成年人的清醒。我们这一代人，至少要把清醒当作基本素养。
The upper limit of reform and the lower limit of opening up
Author: Tuo Xianrun
Editor: Zhou Zhigang Responsible Editor Hu Lili
Abstract: The path of China’s “reform and opening up” for more than 40 years is “opening up first, reform later”. The economy has always served power; the crisis is not driving institutional breakthroughs, but external bargaining and internal tightening. The core logic is growth is important, but the security of the regime is a priority.
Most of our generation of thirty-eight-nine-year-olds grew up in the “growth myth” and KPI language and are used to explaining all the turns with the curve of economics. But to understand the past 40 years, you must first correct the order: first open up, then reform; open outward, reform inward. Opening up is a diplomatic chip, which is used to change technology, market and time; reform is the repair of rule, which is used to bring back order and redistribute resources. Economy is just a wrench, not a steering wheel. Power is the hand that won’t let go.
Many people believe that “the economic crisis has forced reform”. This is nice to hear, and it can also comfort the self-esteem of the market faction: as long as the growth declines, the policy will turn around. But looking back, it’s just the opposite. The starting point of “opening up” to the outside world in the 1960s and 1970s was not compassion or market consensus, but security anxiety. Only by turning the face of China and the Soviet Union and pressing the border to the top, there is a window for reconciliation with the United States and attracting investment. Opening up is not to make up the pockets of the common people, but to make up for the shortcomings of the national machinery, make up for the equipment of the stuck neck, and win time on your side. “Reform” does not need to be rooted. What is really touched is always the non-lifeblood zone: if you can release it to the market, put a little, release it and recycle it at any time; what can’t be released – military industry, energy, financial hub, information valve – don’t give up an inch. The “dual-track system” in the 1980s tied the plan to the market. The result was not automatic arrival but bumps all the way. In 1988, the price breakthrough almost overturned the economy. You can say that it is the “cost of reform”, but it is more like an internal stress test: whichever step it is put, it will trigger systemic instability, and if it is triggered, it will turn back. The economy here is not a goal, but a table. The needle of the watch shook too much, so I screwed it back. The same is true for the “extroverted rationality” in the 1990s. Every year, we talk about most-favored-nation treatment with the United States, which is about time and space – using kindness, posture, and limited release in exchange for an annual pass. It was not until he joined the WTO that the chips were pushed up at once. Many people interpret the accession to the WK as “reverse domestic reform”, but the real implementation logic is getting the 15-year window of high-speed development first, as for the promise, drag it if you can, and patch it if you can patch it. Opening up has always been one-way: I want your technology, I want your order, I want your capital, but my barriers, my port, my red line, still belong to me.
The script after 2008 is more straightforward. Four trillion yuan is not to support private foreign trade with broken cash flow, but to feed the “visible” iron rooster and large enterprises. Private enterprises are like incubators, which do not stop laying eggs; state-owned enterprises are like incubators, concentrating energy in a controllable place. The reason is very simple: when there is a conflict between the economy and stability, the power should be stabilized first. The power supply of a streetlamp company cannot be fully marketize, because the “power off” button symbolizes political risk. Not to mention finance and data, even “who can speak out and how to speak out” needs to be managed. The boundary is not written in the law, but in the “risk narrative” – anything that can be interpreted as organizational risk does not belong to the market. That’s why whenever private capital tries to self-organize, tries to build a system, and tries to turn the “entrepreneur community” into a public issue, the red light will come on. It’s not that you don’t do it well enough, but that you do it too much like the institutional requirements. Universities, foundations, industry autonomy, and cross-regional professional qualifications – anything that can produce an independent order will be classified as “suspicious power substitution”. This is not a problem of economics, but a problem of political science: the source of order must be unique. Put this main line back to the historical coordinates, and you will no longer expect “the crisis drives the inflection point of goodwill”. The crisis will only promote two actions: one is to bargain more radically externally to fight for respite; the other is to make more resolute structural recovery internally to ensure that key valves are not in the hands of others. The market and the rule of law will only be expanded when it does not threaten the valve. Once it touches the line, it will be retracted. The core mechanism of the so-called “Chinese-style modernization” is the “border of growth”: when the boundary is there, growth exists; when the boundary is touched, growth gives way. This does not mean that growth is not important. On the contrary, growth is the basis of the narrative of legitimacy and the KPI of “performance politics”. Investment, land prices, exports, industrial iteration, these indicators have become the account list of “dominant accounting”. If you can hand in your grades on the table, you can get security in politics. But when “performance” and “safety” conflict, there is no suspense in multiple-choice questions. So, we see the cycle of “release first and then collect”: release is to bring up the economy; collect is to ensure that the reins are in hand.
For our generation, the real understanding that needs to be updated is don’t use economic logic to make political choices. You can use the cash flow model to estimate the enterprise and the demand curve to look at the industry, but do not use it to predict “when to turn”. The shift is never determined by the ratio of GDP, but by the thermometer of “risk perception”. Today’s external pressure will bring some short-term posture adjustments and some technical “open rhetoric”, but this does not mean that the boundaries have been rewritten. The writer of the boundary only recognizes one: The security of the regime.
So, are we walking a familiar old road? If the “old road” refers to the path of “security as the platform, economy as the tool, openness to seek the time, and reform and government”, then the answer is eight or nine. The difference is that the outside world is more complex, and the domestic structure is larger; the same thing is that the steering wheel is held in the same hand. Only by understanding this point can we know which expectations should be lowered and which actions should be accelerated: doing business should look at boundaries, and doing public issues should look at risk narrative; instead of giving hope to “turning”, it’s better toLeave the preparation to “normal”. This is not cynicism, but the sobriety of adults. Our generation should at least regard sobriety as a basic literacy.
各位朋友：
9月9日是毛泽东的忌日。
我们将在毛泽东逝世日前的星期六（9月6日）下午4:00，于旧金山领事馆举行 “毛泽东反思行动日”，活动预计时长约1小时。
本次活动旨在揭露毛泽东在1949–1976年间发动的政治运动、造成的惨烈死亡，以及其极权统治的恶劣本质。
欢迎大家参加，共同反思历史，认清极权的本质。
召集人：方政 赵长青 郑云
组织人：袁强 王灵 吴京 潘志坚 韩震 张善城
作者：权录军
编辑：张致君 责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：程铭
我们都知道很多中国的民主人士都因言获罪，受到中共的残酷打压和迫害
我总结了三点：
第一，中共倒行逆施迫害民主人士，打压言论自由，使得真相无法传播，是对民主自由的危害，是人类社会的倒退。
第二，中共这种行为会对世界上其他国家和政权形成极坏的示范效应，同样是对民主和自由的危害。
第三，中共自私且无底线，中共不能剥夺每个人与生俱来的各种权利，这是上帝赋予每个人的权利，中共的存在是反人类反社会的，所以终止邪恶理所应当。
参加声援活动的民主人士史庆梅说：胡洋没有罪，因为言论自由是宪法赋予中国人的权利。中共这样打压一个年轻人、公然违背自己定的宪法，会遭到文明世界人们的耻笑，另外我呼吁那些公安狱警人员，你们要善待政治犯，枪口抬高一寸，因为他们没有做错，历史会证明这一切，如果继续是非不分替中共作恶，我相信有一天历史会清算你们。
Author: Quan Lujun
Editor: Zhang Zhijun Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei Translator: Cheng Ming
We all know that many Chinese democrats have been convicted for their words and have been brutally suppressed and persecuted by the Communist Party of China.
I have summarized three points:
First, the Communist Party of China persecutes democrats and suppresses freedom of speech, so that the truth cannot be spread, which is harmful to democratic freedom and a regression of human society.
Second, the behavior of the Communist Party of China will have a very bad demonstration effect on other countries and regimes in the world, which is also harmful to democracy and freedom.
Third, the Communist Party of China is selfish and has no bottom line. The Communist Party of China cannot deprive everyone of their innate rights. This is the right given to everyone by God. The existence of the Communist Party of China is anti-human and anti-social, so it is right to stop evil.
Shi Qingmei, a democrat who participated in solidarity activities, said: Hu Yang is not guilty, because freedom of speech is the right granted to Chinese people by the Constitution. If the Communist Party of China suppresses a young man in this way and blatantly violates its own constitution, it will be laughed at by the people of the civilized world. In addition, I appeal to those public security prison guards, you should be kind to political prisoners and raise the muzzle an inch higher, because they have not done a mistake. History will prove all this. If we continue to do evil for the Communist Party of China, I I believe that one day history will liquidate you.
【第247次民主中国阵线（纽约）&中国民主人权联盟(纽约联合反共活动通知】
【时间】
9月7日（周日）上午11点20分（最好准时到，可能会有媒体、电视台采访）（10:10法拉盛图书馆包车出发）
【地点】
布碌崙八大道66街（10:10法拉盛图书馆包车出发）
坐标(40.6320278, -74.0131389)
【注意】
（1）包车前往，车接车送（出发集合地：法拉盛图书馆），车票免费，活动完集体定免费的白宫套餐（5美元麦当劳套餐）
（2）活动完大家可决定是否去coney（康泥岛）玩，车接车送，欢迎带家庭、孩子。
游乐设施、海洋馆门票需自费；阳光沙滩免费。
最终把大家送回 法拉盛图书馆门口。
我们的理念：以最小的成本筹划、最舒服的姿势参与、最大程度反共。
反共生活两不误。
【活动入群链接】（照片/视频/报道）
https://t.me/+GFSUJYv7mohmYmQ1
【活动话题】
1、支持法轮功，祝贺4.5亿同胞退出中共党、团、队。
2、谴责习近平“九三阅兵”对“活摘器官”的支持。
3、抵制中共跨国镇压，感谢法轮功的“破墙软件”自由门等；同时声援“拆墙运动”发起人乔鑫鑫，谴责中共跨国镇压、跨国抓捕。
4、由于这次我们在布鲁克林参与游行，为牛腾宇家属募捐活动暂停一次。下周日法拉盛图书馆活动继续。
咨询电话：(929) 389-8606、(347) 880-6906
作者：罗志飞
编辑：胡丽莉 翻译：吕峰
摘要“2025年9月3日，“抗日战争胜利纪念日”阅兵式正在紧锣密鼓地筹备中。习近平也将第三次登上天安门城楼，亲自主持这一象征性强烈的仪式。
2025年9月3日，坦克将再次碾过天安门广场。按照官方设定，这一天是“抗日战争胜利纪念日”暨“世界反法西斯战争胜利纪念日”，纪念大会与大规模阅兵式正在紧锣密鼓地筹备中。习近平也将第三次登上天安门城楼，亲自主持这一象征性强烈的仪式。
阅兵，已经成为他巩固个人权威与强化意识形态叙事的政治工具。从军改、清洗军队高层，到新武器研发和国防工业扩张，阅兵成为其所谓“强军梦”的橱窗——更准确地说，是他个人崇拜工程的橱窗。
（2025年9.3阅兵，三大邪恶独裁者将联合观看军演）
从“首次”到“常态化”
习近平上台仅三年，就按捺不住真实的野心。从2015年纪念抗战胜利70周年大阅兵开始，2015年，习近平首次打破三十年来“只在国庆阅兵”的惯例，以抗战胜利70周年为名，首次设立“九三阅兵”。此后，他接连在重大节点安排阅兵，在2017年建军90周年、2018年南海海军阅兵、2019年4月青岛海军、2019年国庆70周年、2025年抗战胜利80周年等多个场合安排阅兵，甚至多次选择非首都地区，开创“沙场阅兵”之先河。
相比之下，邓小平、江泽民、胡锦涛三人任期内，均仅举行过一次天安门阅兵。习近平却几乎将阅兵变为其个人政治表演的“年度大戏”，其频率远超以往任何一位中共领导人。
极权美学的集体感官操控
习近平时代的阅兵，不仅是军事演示，更是一场苏联式极权主义美学的集体表演。整齐划一的步伐、排山倒海的装备队列、铺天盖地的民族主义口号，共同营造出一种对“力量与秩序”的视觉崇拜。在这样的场景中，个体被抹去，集体被神化，而最高领袖的地位则在其中被无限放大。
当士兵齐声高呼“首长好”“听党指挥”，当背景音乐响起“忠诚于党”，当镜头聚焦在城楼上的习近平时，这不仅是对军队指挥权的展示，更是一种“向个人宣誓忠诚”的视觉仪式。
话语垄断与历史操控
习近平对阅兵的执念，还源于其对历史叙事的高度控制。他特别擅长将重大纪念日与党国合法性捆绑，比如在2015年九三阅兵上，刻意强调“没有共产党就没有抗战胜利”“中国共产党是抗日战争的中流砥柱”，将整个抗战成果归功于中共，而对牺牲惨烈的300百万国军却语焉不详。
不仅如此，阅兵中常穿插播放抗战老兵短片、展示老兵画像、安排抗战主题车队等，目的并非纪念历史，而是“重塑记忆”：把“中共是民族解放的唯一力量”强行塞进全民认知之中，从而进一步强化中共政权的合法性。
领袖图腾与国家宗教
2019年国庆阅兵的群众游行部分，首次安排了毛泽东、邓小平、江泽民、胡锦涛等历任领袖的巨幅画像，加上习近平他本人的，依次登场。这一安排带有强烈的政治宗教意味——领袖被塑造成图腾式存在，而历史被压缩成一条服务权力合法性的单线叙事。
观众的热泪盈眶不是偶然，而是集体仪式感和视觉操控的结果。这些精心设计的符号，无不在服务一个目的，激发全民的民族主义情感，进而将这种情感与当前政权相绑定。让人们相信，只有习近平才能捍卫民族尊严。
阅兵背后，是对未来的焦虑
在中国经济形势临近崩溃和社会矛盾持续高压的情况下，2025年的再次阅兵，更像是对不确定未来的“政治麻醉剂”。习近平深知，他必须持续制造胜利幻象，才能延续执政正当性。而阅兵，是最有效率也最具象征性的方式之一。
只不过，这种靠阅兵维持的“国家形象”背后，隐藏的是对民众信任的日益流失，是对反对声音的压制，是权力者对“权威幻觉”的沉迷。当民众从短暂的麻醉剂回过味后，依然面对的是生活的巨大压力以及作为韭菜的被收割的命运。
Author: Luo Zhifei
Editor: Hu Lili Translator: Lyu Feng
Abstract: On September 3, 2025, the military parade commemorating the “Victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan” is being prepared in full swing. Xi Jinping will once again ascend the Tiananmen Rostrum for the third time, personally presiding over this highly symbolic ceremony.
On September 3, 2025, tanks will once again roll across Tiananmen Square. According to official designation, this day marks both the “Victory of the War of Resistance Against Japan” and the “Victory of the World Anti-Fascist War.” The commemorative assembly and the large-scale military parade are being prepared with great intensity. Xi Jinping will, for the third time, appear atop Tiananmen Rostrum to personally preside over this highly symbolic ceremony.
The military parade has become his political instrument for consolidating personal authority and reinforcing ideological narratives. From military reforms and purges of top commanders, to new weapons development and defense industry expansion, the parade has become the showcase of his so-called “strong military dream”—or, more accurately, the showcase of his cult of personality project.
(The September 3, 2025 Parade: The Three Evil Dictators Will Jointly Watch the Military Display)
From “First Time” to “Normalization”Xi Jinping had been in power for only three years before he could no longer suppress his true ambitions. Beginning with the 2015 grand military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, Xi for the first time broke with the three-decade convention of holding parades only on National Day, inaugurating the so-called “September 3rd Parade” in the name of the 70th anniversary of victory.
Since then, he has repeatedly staged parades at major political moments: the 90th anniversary of the PLA in 2017, the South China Sea naval parade in 2018, the Qingdao naval review in April 2019, the 70th anniversary of the PRC’s founding in 2019, and again in 2025 for the 80th anniversary of the victory over Japan. He even chose locations outside the capital on multiple occasions, creating the precedent of “field parades.”
By contrast, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each presided over only one Tiananmen military parade during their tenures. Xi Jinping, however, has turned parades into his own annual political spectacle, with a frequency that surpasses any previous CCP leader.
The Totalitarian Aesthetics of Collective Sensory Manipulation
Under Xi Jinping, the military parade is not merely a demonstration of armed strength, but a collective performance steeped in Soviet-style totalitarian aesthetics. The synchronized marching, the overwhelming phalanxes of weaponry, and the ubiquitous nationalist slogans together construct a visual cult of “power and order.”
In such scenes, the individual is erased, the collective is deified, and the status of the supreme leader is infinitely magnified. When soldiers shout in unison, “Greetings, Commander!” and “Obey the Party’s command,” when the background music swells with refrains of “Loyalty to the Party,” and when the camera invariably lingers on Xi atop the Tiananmen Rostrum, this is not merely a display of command over the military—it is a visual ritual of swearing personal allegiance.
Discourse Monopoly and Historical ManipulationXi Jinping’s obsession with military parades also stems from his tight control over historical narratives. He is particularly adept at binding major commemorative days to the legitimacy of the Party-state. For instance, at the 2015 September 3rd parade, he deliberately stressed that “without the Chinese Communist Party there would have been no victory in the War of Resistance” and that “the CCP was the backbone of the war effort,” attributing the entirety of the victory to the Party while remaining vague about the immense sacrifices of the three million Nationalist troops.
Moreover, parades often intersperse short films of veteran soldiers, display portraits of war veterans, and arrange floats with resistance themes. The purpose is not to commemorate history, but to “remold memory”: to forcibly implant into the national consciousness the idea that “the CCP was the sole force of national liberation,” thereby further strengthening the regime’s claim to legitimacy.
Leader as Totem and the Religion of the State
In the mass procession segment of the 2019 National Day parade, for the first time, giant portraits of former leaders—Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao—were displayed in sequence, alongside that of Xi Jinping himself. This arrangement carried an overt political-religious symbolism: the leaders were cast as totemic figures, while history was compressed into a single linear narrative serving the legitimacy of power.
The tears streaming down the faces of spectators were no accident, but rather the product of orchestrated ritual and visual manipulation. These meticulously crafted symbols all served one purpose: to stir nationwide nationalist emotion and then bind that emotion to the current regime. The ultimate message was clear—people were to believe that only Xi Jinping could safeguard national dignity.
Behind the Parade Lies Anxiety About the Future
Against the backdrop of an economy on the verge of collapse and mounting social tensions, the 2025 parade serves more as a “political anesthetic” for an uncertain future. Xi Jinping is acutely aware that he must continuously manufacture the illusion of victory in order to sustain the legitimacy of his rule. Among the tools available, the military parade is one of the most efficient and most symbolic.
Yet behind this state image propped up by parades lies a deepening erosion of public trust, the suppression of dissenting voices, and the leader’s obsession with an “illusion of authority.” Once the masses recover from the fleeting intoxication of the spectacle, they are left to confront the crushing pressures of daily life and the fate of being harvested like chives.
作者：张兴贵（大陆）
编辑：冯仍 翻译：何兴强
冷战是社会主义与资本主义两种制度、封闭专制与开放民主两种价值观的全面对决。只要还存在社会主义制度，存在计划经济和公有制为主体的经济模式，冷战就没有结束，只是按下了暂停键。中美贸易战不仅是经济领域的博弈，更是冷战的延续，以经济为始，以政治为终。
一、中美贸易战：冷战的重启
冷战，20世纪人类历史上一场没有硝烟的对抗，深刻塑造了现代国际格局。美苏两大阵营在意识形态、社会制度、经济模式和军事力量上的较量，不仅划分了世界版图，也在全球埋下了竞争与冲突的种子。苏联解体，世界似乎迎来了“历史的终结”，但冷战并未彻底消散。中美战，正是这一延续的生动写照。首先，意识形态的对抗贯穿始终。美国以自由市场和民主价值观为核心，试图维护其主导的全球秩序；中国则以中国特色社会主义为旗帜，强调国家主权与发展权，无不带有冷战时期美苏“自由世界”“资本主义阵营”与“1984世界”“社会主义阵营”对立的色彩。其次，技术与经济霸权的争夺是贸易战的核心。冷战时期，美苏在核武器、航天技术等领域展开激烈竞争；今天，中美在5G、人工智能、半导体等前沿技术领域的博弈同样如火如荼。最后，全球秩序的重塑是贸易战更深层次的目标。冷战时期，美苏通过结盟、分化等方式争夺全球影响力；今天，中美通过贸易协定、区域合作和国际组织，试图重塑有利于自身的全球经济规则。
二、两种制度与文明的对决
中美战不仅是冷战的延续，更是两种制度——社会主义与资本主义，两种文明——东方集体主义与西方个人主义的正面交锋。资本主义以个人自由、市场竞争和私有制为核心，孕育了工业革命以来全球经济的飞速发展。中国特色社会主义则以国家主导、集体主义和公有制为特点。文明的差异进一步加剧了冲突。西方文明以个人主义为核心，强调个人权利、自由表达和民主制度。中国文化注重集体主义、和谐共生与社会稳定，强调中央集权、权威和社会控制。这场较量不仅关乎当下利益的分配，更将决定哪种制度更优越， 哪条道路更能引领历史发展的未来；这场决战不仅是制度与文明的较量，更是关于人性需求与历史方向的抉择。
Author: Zhang Xinggui (Mainland China)
Editor: Feng Reng
Translator:He XingQiang
The Cold War was a comprehensive showdown between two systems—socialism and capitalism, between two sets of values—closed authoritarianism and open democracy. As long as socialist systems exist, along with economic models dominated by planned economies and public ownership, the Cold War has not ended—it has merely been put on pause. The U.S.–China trade war is not just an economic contest but the continuation of the Cold War: beginning with economics, ending with politics.
I. The U.S.–China Trade War: The Cold War Restarted
The Cold War, a confrontation without gunfire in the 20th century, profoundly shaped the modern international order. The competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in ideology, social systems, economic models, and military power not only divided the world map but also planted the seeds of global rivalry and conflict. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world seemed to usher in the “end of history,” yet the Cold War never fully dissipated. The U.S.–China struggle is a vivid continuation of that legacy.
First, ideological confrontation runs throughout. The U.S., centered on free markets and democratic values, seeks to maintain its dominant global order; China, flying the banner of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” emphasizes national sovereignty and the right to development—echoing the Cold War-era opposition between the U.S.-led “free world” and the “capitalist camp” versus the Orwellian “1984 world” and the “socialist bloc.”
Second, the struggle for technological and economic supremacy is at the heart of the trade war. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in fierce competition in nuclear weapons and space technology. Today, the U.S. and China are locked in intense rivalry in frontier technologies such as 5G, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors.
Finally, the reshaping of the global order is the deeper goal of the trade war. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union fought for global influence through alliances and divisions. Today, the U.S. and China attempt to reshape global economic rules in their favor through trade agreements, regional cooperation, and international organizations.
II. A Clash of Two Systems and Civilizations
The U.S.–China struggle is not only a continuation of the Cold War but also a direct confrontation between two systems—socialism and capitalism—and two civilizations—Eastern collectivism and Western individualism.
Capitalism, centered on individual freedom, market competition, and private ownership, has driven the rapid global economic growth since the Industrial Revolution. Socialism with Chinese characteristics, on the other hand, emphasizes state leadership, collectivism, and public ownership.
Civilizational differences further intensify the conflict. Western civilization, rooted in individualism, emphasizes individual rights, freedom of expression, and democratic institutions. Chinese culture stresses collectivism, harmony, and social stability, underpinned by centralized authority, hierarchy, and social control.
This contest is not merely about the distribution of present-day interests but about determining which system is superior, which path can better lead the future of history. This decisive struggle is not only a clash of systems and civilizations but also a choice about human needs and the direction of history.
© 1998–2026 在野党(Opposition Party).
