作者：朱晓娜
编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩

2025年2月17日，李延贺一案在上海市第一中级人民法院一审宣判。官方通报称，其因“煽动分裂国家罪”被判处有期徒刑三年，剥夺政治权利一年，并处没收个人财产人民币五万元。通报还表示，当事人当庭表示认罪服法，在法定上诉期内未提起上诉，判决已经生效。

李延贺是台湾出版机构八旗文化的出版人，多年来出版了大量涉及中国历史、政治以及社会问题的书籍。2023年，他在上海探亲期间被有关部门带走调查。此案在很长时间里缺乏公开信息，直到判决公布，外界才逐渐了解案件结果。

作为一名曾经生活在中国大陆、如今身在海外的华人，我看到这样的新闻感到十分沉重。因为我非常清楚，在中国表达不同意见可能带来的后果。我曾经因为在社交媒体上发表个人经历以及对社会问题的看法，被当地警方上门要求删除相关内容。当时的经历让我深刻意识到，在中国，普通公民的表达空间是十分有限的。

那次事件之后，我开始更加关注中国的言论环境以及公民权利问题。我逐渐意识到，很多社会问题之所以长期存在，很大程度上是因为缺乏公开讨论和自由表达的空间。当不同意见无法被表达时，社会也就失去了自我修正的能力。

后来我来到美国，在这里接触到了更多关于民主制度、公民权利以及言论自由的理念。生活在一个可以公开表达意见的社会里，让我第一次真正体会到自由表达的重要性。正是在这样的环境下，我加入了中国民主党，并开始参与海外华人的民主活动。

过去两年中，我多次参与与中国人权和民主议题有关的公开活动，包括纪念历史事件的集会、声援政治案件的抗议活动，以及呼吁关注中国人权问题的公共活动。据不完全统计，我参与的相关活动已经超过80场。在这些活动中，我不仅参与集会，还举牌发言，表达自己对中国政治现状的看法。许多活动都有媒体报道，也留下了照片和视频记录。

对我来说，这些活动不仅仅是政治表达，更是一种责任。我相信，一个社会只有允许不同声音存在，允许历史与现实被不断讨论，才有可能真正进步。出版、写作以及公共讨论，本来就是推动社会发展的重要力量。

李延贺案再次提醒我们，在当今世界，思想与信息早已跨越国界传播，但制度之间的差异仍然深刻影响着个人命运。同样的观点、同样的书籍，在不同制度之下可能会被赋予完全不同的意义。

也正因为如此，像我这样身在海外的人，才更加珍惜表达的权利。虽然离开了中国，但我仍然关注中国社会的发展，也希望未来有一天，中国的普通公民能够在不必担心风险的情况下讨论历史、表达观点、参与公共事务。

对于很多海外华人来说，表达本身或许是一件很小的事情，但在某些环境下，它却意味着勇气。正因为经历过压抑与限制，我们才更加明白自由表达的价值。

Reflections on the Value of Freedom of Speech Through the Case of Li Yanhe

Author: Zhu XiaonaEditor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:Li Yanhe was sentenced to three years in prison on charges of “inciting separatism,” drawing attention to China’s environment for free expression. Reflecting on personal experiences, the author discusses the limitations on freedom of speech and emphasizes the importance of open expression and public discussion.

On February 17, 2025, the case of Li Yanhe was sentenced in the first instance at the Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court. According to the official announcement, he was convicted of the crime of “inciting separatism” and sentenced to three years in prison, one year of deprivation of political rights, and a fine of 50,000 RMB in confiscated personal assets. The announcement also stated that Li Yanhe accepted the verdict in court and did not file an appeal within the statutory appeal period, meaning the judgment has taken legal effect. Li Yanhe is the publisher of Gusa Press, a Taiwanese publishing house that has released numerous books concerning Chinese history, politics, and social issues. In 2023, he was taken away by authorities for investigation while visiting family in Shanghai. For a long time, the case lacked publicly available information, and it was not until the verdict was announced that the outside world gradually learned of the outcome.

As someone who once lived in mainland China and now resides overseas, I felt deeply saddened when I read this news. I understand very clearly the consequences that can arise from expressing different opinions in China. I once posted about my personal experiences and views on social issues on social media. As a result, local police visited my home and demanded that I delete the content. That experience made me realize how limited the space for expression is for ordinary citizens in China.

After that incident, I began paying closer attention to the environment for free speech and civil rights in China. Gradually, I came to realize that many social problems persist largely because there is no open space for discussion and free expression. When differing opinions cannot be voiced, society loses the ability to correct itself.

Later, I came to the United States, where I encountered more ideas about democratic institutions, civil rights, and freedom of speech. Living in a society where people can openly express their views allowed me, for the first time, to truly appreciate the importance of free expression. In such an environment, I joined the Chinese Democracy Party and began participating in democratic activities among overseas Chinese communities.

Over the past two years, I have taken part in numerous public events related to human rights and democracy in China, including commemorative gatherings for historical events, protests in support of political prisoners, and public activities calling attention to human rights issues in China. According to incomplete statistics, I have participated in more than 80 such events. In these activities, I have not only attended rallies but also held signs and spoken publicly about my views on China’s political situation. Many of these events have been covered by the media and documented through photos and videos.

For me, these activities are not merely political expressions—they represent a sense of responsibility. I believe that a society can truly progress only when it allows different voices to exist, when history and present realities can be openly discussed. Publishing, writing, and public debate are essential forces that drive social development.

The case of Li Yanhe once again reminds us that in today’s world, ideas and information easily cross-national borders, yet differences in political systems continue to profoundly shape individual destinies. The same ideas and the same books may be interpreted in completely different ways under different political systems.

It is precisely for this reason that people like me, living overseas, cherish the right to express ourselves even more. Although I have left China, I still care deeply about its future and hope that one day ordinary Chinese citizens will be able to discuss history, express opinions, and participate in public affairs without fear of punishment.

For many overseas Chinese, expression may seem like a small act. Yet in certain environments, it requires great courage. And precisely because we have experienced repression and restriction, we understand even more deeply the true value of freedom of expression.

⸺兼论现代普世⼈权与威权治理逻辑的根本冲突

作者：Cooper Guan/《在野党》采访部记者
编辑：李晶 翻译：彭小梅

⼀､ ⼀场被重新定义的“新闻审判”

黎智英案并⾮普通的刑事案件 它更像是⼀场具有象征意义的政治审判｡

案件的核⼼争议，不仅是个⼈⾏为是否触法，⽽是新闻活动本身是否被定义为国家安全威胁｡在现代法治国家，新闻⾃由是权⼒监督的重要机制，⽽在威权政治结构中信息控制则被用作维持统治合法性的核⼼⼯具｡

黎智英的审判实际上反映了⼀个问题：当权⼒将自由⾔论视为⻛险时，法律是否仍然是法律，还是仅成为政治⼯具。

⼆､ 新闻⾃由的国际法基准与现实背离

国际社会对于新闻⾃由与表达⾃由有明确规范：

世界⼈权宣⾔ 第19条，明确保障思想､ 良⼼与表达⾃由 包括传播信息的权利｡

公⺠权利和政治权利国际公约 ICCPR，将新闻与⾔论⾃由列为核⼼基本权利｡

联合国⼈权理事会多次强调，国家安全不得成为压制媒体的模糊性理由｡

黎智英案所引发的争议，恰恰集中在以下⼏点：

首先，国家安全概念的⽆限扩张。新闻评论､ 国际交流被纳⼊“危害国家安全”的范畴｡

其次，法律的模糊性与追溯性适⽤，使⾏为⼈在事前难以判断合法边界｡

第三，本案程序公正的国际质疑。包括陪审制度变化､ 审理透明度下降等｡

当法律不再提供清晰预期时，新闻⼯作者⾯对的将不再是法律⻛险，⽽是制度性危险｡

三､ 威权信息治理，从内容管理到思想控制

黎智英案并不是孤⽴事件 ⽽是更⼤信息管控体系的⼀部分｡这⼀体系具有典型特征：

特征一，从“内容审查”升级为“意图审查”

不再仅关注具体信息真假 ⽽是追究观点⽴场与其产生的潜在影响｡

特征二，从“违规处罚”转向“刑事化表达”

⾏政监管逐步升级为刑事指控 形成寒蝉效应｡

特征三，从“媒体管理”延伸⾄个⼈表达

普通公⺠的社交媒体⾔论也被纳⼊管控范围｡

这种模式的结果是： 新闻机构趋于⾃我审查；公共讨论空间急剧收缩；社会共识形成机制被削弱。最终，社会失去真实信息与理性讨论能⼒｡

四､ 新闻伦理的悖论，当追求真相成为⻛险

新闻职业伦理要求：独⽴调查、权⼒监督、公开讨论。但在被⾼度控制的信息环境中，这些职业要求反⽽可能成为⻛险来源｡

这产生⼀种结构性悖论，越专业､ 越独⽴的新闻⾏为，越可能被视为威胁｡⻓期来看，这影响将从传媒行业扩张至整个社会。使学术研究受限，创作表达萎缩，让公共政策失去反馈机制，最终损害国家治理本身的理性基础｡

五､ 法治的核⼼不是法律⽂本，⽽是权⼒边界

真正的法治，不取决于律的数量，⽽是看法律是否限制权⼒，法律是否保障少数派与异⻅者，法律是否具有可预期性。如果法律主要⽤于规范⾔论、定义思想、惩罚批评，那么它更接近“统治技术” ，⽽⾮现代意义上的法治｡

黎智英案引发的国际关注，本质上并⾮针对个案，⽽是对法律⼯具化趋势的系统性担忧｡

六､ 社会舆论的⻓远影响：信任结构的瓦解

新闻⾃由不仅是媒体⼈的权利 更是社会的公共资产｡

当公众意识到媒体⽆法独⽴报道、信息存在系统性过滤、表达可能带来⻛险，社会将出现三种长期不良后果：一是信任断裂，官⽅信息与⺠间认知脱节｡二是谣⾔⽣态化，真实信息缺失反⽽滋⽣谣⾔｡三是公共讨论极端化，中间理性空间消失｡这对任何社会的稳定与发展都是⻓期隐患｡

七､ 新闻⾃由不是特权，⽽是⽂明社会的基础设施

黎智英案，不仅关乎⼀个⼈的命运。当新闻成为罪名，社会失去的不只是记者，⽽是对现实的共同理解能⼒｡

现代社会的稳定，不来⾃沉默，⽽来⾃开放的信息流通、多元的意⻅表达、独⽴的监督机制。真正的强⼤，不是没有批评，⽽是能够容纳批评｡

新闻⾃由､ ⾔论⾃由与法治原则，并⾮⻄⽅或东⽅的专属价值，⽽是现代⽂明运⾏的基本条件｡当这些原则被侵蚀时，受损的不仅是媒体行业，更是整个社会的未来｡

When Journalism Becomes a Crime

The Systemic Collapse of Press Freedom and Rule of Law under Authoritarianism — Reflections from the Jimmy Lai Case

And the Fundamental Conflict Between Universal Human Rights and Authoritarian Governance

Author: Cooper Guan, Reporter, Interview Department, The Opposition PartyEditor: Li Jing Translator: Peng Xiaomei

I. A “Journalistic Trial” That Has Been Redefined

The Jimmy Lai case is not an ordinary criminal case. It more closely resembles a political trial with symbolic significance.

The central controversy of the case is not simply whether an individual’s actions violated the law. Rather, it concerns whether journalistic activity itself is being defined as a national security threat.

In modern rule-of-law societies, press freedom functions as an essential mechanism for checking power. In authoritarian political structures, however, information control becomes a core tool for maintaining the legitimacy of rule.

The trial of Jimmy Lai ultimately raises a deeper question:When those in power regard freedom of speech as a risk, does the law still remain law—or does it become merely a political instrument?

II. International Legal Standards on Press Freedom and Their Divergence from Reality

The international community has established clear norms regarding press freedom and freedom of expression.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights explicitly guarantees freedom of thought, conscience, and expression, including the right to disseminate information.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) identifies press and speech freedoms as fundamental rights.

The United Nations Human Rights Council has repeatedly emphasized that national security must not become a vague justification for suppressing the media.

The controversies surrounding the Jimmy Lai case focus on several key issues:

First, the unlimited expansion of the concept of national security.Journalistic commentary and international communication have been placed within the category of “endangering national security.”

Second, the ambiguity and retroactive application of legal provisions, making it difficult for individuals to determine the legal boundaries of their actions in advance.

Third, international concerns regarding procedural fairness, including changes to the jury system and reduced transparency in court proceedings.

When the law no longer provides clear expectations, journalists face not merely legal risk, but systemic institutional danger.

III. Authoritarian Information Governance: From Content Management to Thought Control

The Jimmy Lai case is not an isolated incident. It forms part of a broader system of information control.This system exhibits several defining characteristics:

Feature One: From “content censorship” to “intent censorship.”Authorities are no longer concerned only with whether information is true or false; they now scrutinize viewpoints and the potential influence of those viewpoints.

Feature Two: From “administrative penalties” to the criminalization of expression.Regulatory measures gradually escalate into criminal charges, producing a powerful chilling effect.

Feature Three: From “media regulation” to the control of individual expression.Even ordinary citizens’ speech on social media becomes subject to oversight.

The consequences of this model are profound:News organizations increasingly engage in self-censorship；Spaces for public discussion shrink rapidly；The mechanisms through which social consensus forms gradually weaken. Ultimately, society loses the ability to access reliable information and to conduct rational debate.

IV. The Ethical Paradox of Journalism: When Seeking Truth Becomes Risky

Professional journalistic ethics demand independent investigation, oversight of power, and open public discussion.Yet in a highly controlled information environment, these professional standards themselves may become sources of risk.

This creates a structural paradox: the more professional and independent journalistic activity becomes, the more likely it is to be perceived as a threat.Over time, the consequences extend beyond the media industry and spread across society as a whole.Academic research becomes constrained.Creative expression diminishes.Public policymaking loses its feedback mechanisms.Ultimately, this erodes the rational foundations of governance itself.

V. The Core of Rule of Law Is Not Legal Texts but the Limits of Power

True rule of law is not determined by the number of laws on the books. Instead, it depends on several fundamental questions:Do laws limit power?Do laws protect minorities and dissenters?Do laws provide predictability and clarity?If laws are primarily used to regulate speech, define thought, and punish criticism, then they resemble techniques of rule, rather than rule of law in the modern sense.The international concern surrounding the Jimmy Lai case is therefore not merely about a single individual. It reflects a broader anxiety about the systematic instrumentalization of law.

VI. The Long-Term Social Consequences: The Collapse of Trust Structures

Press freedom is not only the right of journalists—it is a public asset of society.When people realize that the media cannot report independently, that information is systematically filtered, and that expression itself may carry risks, several long-term consequences emerge:First, a breakdown of trust. Official narratives diverge sharply from public perceptions.Second, the ecology of rumors. When reliable information is scarce, misinformation spreads more easily.Third, the polarization of public debate. The space for rational, moderate discussion gradually disappears.All of these outcomes represent long-term threats to the stability and development of any society.

VII. Press Freedom Is Not a Privilege but the Infrastructure of Civilized Society

The Jimmy Lai case is not only about the fate of one individual.When journalism itself becomes a crime, society loses not only journalists but also its shared capacity to understand reality.

The stability of modern societies does not arise from silence. It arises from open flows of information, pluralistic expression of opinions, and independent oversight mechanisms.True strength does not mean the absence of criticism. It means the ability to tolerate criticism.

Press freedom, freedom of speech, and the rule of law are not values belonging exclusively to the West or the East. They are the basic conditions for the functioning of modern civilization. When these principles erode, the damage is not limited to the media industry—it affects the future of society as a whole.

当新闻成为⻛险⸺以黎智英案为镜鉴的个⼈与时代观察

作者：Cooper Guan

编辑：黄吉洲 校对：熊辩 翻译：彭小梅

⼀､ ⼀个曾在体制媒体⼯作的⼈的观察

我曾在中国体制内党群⼝从事宣传⼯作，同时为多家体制媒体撰稿与通讯｡ 在那个阶段，我接受的职业训练强调舆论导向､ 宣传纪律与信息控制｡

后来，我创办⽂化传播机构，专注创意视频制作，并逐渐转向以真实表达与创作⾃由为核⼼的职业路径｡

新闻与创作让我相信：真实是职业的基础，表达是社会进步的动⼒。

然⽽，中共治下的中国现实的政治环境，使这⼀信念不断受到冲击｡

黎智英案，使我不得不重新思考⼀个问题：当新闻被视为威胁时，媒体⼈还如何存在？

⼆､ 从制度内部到表达受限，个⼈经历与公共现象

在中国⽣活期间，我通过⽹络逐渐接触到更多历史､ 政治､ 时事信息｡出于对公共事务的关注，我曾在社交平台纪念＂六·四＂等历史事件，分享公共议题观点，呼吁法治､ ⾃由与⼈权。结果，不仅内容被删除，账号被限制，最终在⼀次全国性的⽹络整治⾏动中被永久封禁。这些经历让我意识到，表达本身可能已成为⻛险｡ 这种现象并⾮个案，⽽是信息治理体系的⼀部分｡

三､ 黎智英案 新闻活动如何被重新定义

黎智英案的核⼼问题，并不仅仅是某些具体⾏为是否合法，⽽是新闻评论是否被视为政治威胁，国际交流是否被解释为安全⻛险，媒体⻆⾊是否被重新定义。

在现代法治社会，新闻通常被视为监督机制，⽽在⾼度控制的政治结构中，新闻可能被视为潜在⻛险源｡ 这种转变，不仅影响个别记者，也改变整个媒体⽣态｡

四､ 从国内经历到海外媒体参与，表达空间的对⽐

来到海外后，我开始参与华⼈⺠主媒体的采访与志愿⼯作｡ 我第⼀次感受到可以公开提问、可以讨论敏感议题，可以表达不同观点｡

这种对⽐使我更加清楚地认识到，⾃由表达并不是抽象⼝号，⽽是每天可以实践的现实｡

同时，我也意识到，海外华⼈社区中仍存在⾃我审查与沉默⽂化｡ 不愿公开表达政治观点，在社交媒体避免讨论敏感议题，对媒体采访保持警惕｡ 这不仅是个⼈选择，更是⻓期制度环境塑造的⼼理结构与⻓期的信息控制环境和中共⼴泛的海外⻓臂监控密切相关｡

当新闻活动被刑事化，所产⽣的寒蝉效应不仅局限在某个地区，它将通过社群⽹络扩散到全球华⼈社会｡

五､ 新闻⾃由的意义，不仅属于记者

没有独⽴媒体的社会，往往出现信息来源单⼀、谣⾔传播加剧、公共监督缺失等常见现象。因为新闻⾃由并不是媒体⼈的特权，⽽是公众获取真实信息的保障｡ 黎智英案之所以引发国际关注，正是因为它触及现代社会如何平衡权⼒与表达｡

六､ 个⼈⽴场声明

基于个⼈经历与⻓期观察 我逐渐形成明确⽴场：

第一，坚决⽀持新闻⾃由与⾔论⾃由；第二、坚定⽀持法治与⼈权原则；第三，强烈反对以模糊安全概念限制表达。这些⽴场源于我个人曾经在体制内的媒体相关⼯作经验，也来自我自身多年创作⾏业经历，尤其是遭受被封号与表达受限，⾔论审查和警察调查，甚至让⼈恐惧⼈身安全的亲身经历，以及当前参与海外⺠主媒体的实践，我的写作与采访，记录和表达正是这种⽴场的延续｡

七､ 记录仍然是抵抗遗忘的⽅式

黎智英案提醒我，历史不会因为沉默⽽停⽌，真实也不会因为恐惧⽽消失｡

对我⽽⾔，继续写作与采访，不只是职业选择，更是对真实与⾃由的坚持｡

在任何社会中，允许不同声⾳存在，才是真正稳定与成熟的标志｡

From State Propaganda to Overseas Democratic Media

When Journalism Becomes a Risk — Personal and Historical Reflections Inspired by the Jimmy Lai Case

Author: Cooper GuanEditor: Huang Jizhou Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Abstract:From working in China’s propaganda system to practicing journalism in overseas democratic media, the author reflects on the risks surrounding press freedom and freedom of expression through the lens of the Jimmy Lai case, emphasizing the importance of rule of law and truth.

I. Observations from Someone Who Once Worked in the State Media System

I once worked in the propaganda system within China’s party-affiliated institutions, while also writing and reporting for several state-controlled media outlets. During that period, my professional training emphasized guidance of public opinion, propaganda discipline, and information control.

Later, I founded a cultural communications agency focused on creative video production and gradually shifted toward a professional path centered on truthful expression and creative freedom.

Journalism and creative work led me to believe that truth is the foundation of the profession, and expression is the driving force of social progress.however, the political reality in China under Communist Party rule has repeatedly challenged this belief. The Jimmy Lai case forced me to reconsider a difficult question: When journalism itself is treated as a threat, how can journalists continue to exist?

II. From Within the System to Restricted Expression: Personal Experience and a Broader Public Phenomenon

While living in China, I gradually gained access through the internet to more historical, political, and current affairs information.Out of concern for public affairs, I once commemorated historical events such as June Fourth on social media, shared views on public issues, and called for rule of law, freedom, and human rights. The result was that not only were my posts deleted, but my account was restricted and eventually permanently banned during a nationwide internet “rectification campaign.” These experiences made me realize that expression itself can become a risk. This phenomenon is not an isolated case; it is part of a broader system of information governance.

The Jimmy Lai Case: How Journalism Is Being Redefined

The core issue of the Jimmy Lai case is not merely whether certain actions are legal. Rather, it raises deeper questions: Can journalistic commentary be interpreted as a political threat?Can international communication be redefined as a national security risk?Is the role of the media itself being fundamentally redefined?

In modern societies governed by the rule of law, journalism is typically regarded as a mechanism of oversight.But within highly controlled political structures, journalism may instead be treated as a potential source of danger. This transformation affects not only individual journalists but also reshapes the entire media ecosystem.

IV. From Domestic Experience to Overseas Media Participation: A Contrast in Freedom of Expression

After coming overseas, I began participating in interviews and volunteer work with Chinese-language democratic media outlets. For the first time, I experienced the ability to ask questions openly, discuss sensitive topics, and express differing viewpoints. This contrast made me realize more clearly that freedom of expression is not an abstract slogan—it is a reality that can be practiced daily.

At the same time, I also noticed that within overseas Chinese communities there still exists a culture of self-censorship and silence.Many people avoid openly expressing political opinions, refrain from discussing sensitive issues on social media, and remain cautious toward media interviews.This is not merely a personal choice. It is a psychological structure shaped by long-term institutional environments, deeply connected to decades of information control and the Chinese Communist Party’s extensive long-arm surveillance overseas.

When journalistic activity becomes criminalized, the resulting chilling effect does not remain confined to a single region; it spreads through social networks to Chinese communities around the world.

The Meaning of Press Freedom Belongs Not Only to Journalists

In societies without independent media, several familiar problems often emerge:limited sources of information,the spread of rumors,the absence of public oversight.Press freedom is not a privilege for journalists. It is a guarantee for the public to obtain truthful information.The Jimmy Lai case has drawn international attention precisely because it touches upon a fundamental question of modern societies:How should power be balanced with freedom of expression?

VI. A Personal Statement of Position

Based on my personal experiences and long-term observations, I have gradually formed a clear position:

First, I firmly support freedom of the press and freedom of speech.Second, I firmly support the principles of rule of law and human rights.Third, I strongly oppose the use of vague security concepts to restrict expression.

These positions come from my earlier experience working within China’s state media system. They also arise from my years working in creative industries, particularly from my own experiences of account bans, restricted expression, censorship, police questioning, and even fear for personal safety. Today, through my participation in overseas democratic media, my writing and interviews are a continuation of this position.

VII. Recording Is Still a Way to Resist Forgetting

The Jimmy Lai case reminds me that history will not stop because of silence, and truth will not disappear because of fear.

For me, continuing to write and conduct interviews is not only a professional choice—it is also a commitment to truth and freedom.

In any society, allowing different voices to exist is the true sign of stability and maturity.

作者：张维清

编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：戈冰

一、 60秒的雷霆：神权的幻灭与暴政的终结

2026年2月28日，一个足以载入史册的日子。世界屏息凝神，目睹了一个血腥时代的戛然而止。伊朗最高领袖哈梅内伊——这个自诩“真主代理人”、统治波斯大地数十年的独裁者，在美以联军的精准斩首行动中，成为掩体下的亡魂。

这场持续仅60秒的定点清除，不仅仅是军事科技的胜利，更是一场政治图腾的彻底崩塌。多年来，哈梅内伊依靠残酷的伊斯兰革命卫队，通过秘密警察、酷刑室和公开绞刑，在伊朗构筑了一座恐惧的迷宫。他曾傲慢地宣称其统治“神圣不可侵犯”，但在高精度导弹穿透加固混凝土的那一刻，那层虚假的神圣外衣被撕得粉碎。暴君的死亡向全球残存的独裁者们发出了震耳欲聋的警告：依靠屠杀本国人民来维系的非法统治，本质上是沙上之塔，无论防御工事多么坚固，都无法阻挡正义从天而降的审判。

二、 历史的共振：从德黑兰的冷藏车到天安门的坦克

哈梅内伊的覆灭，是他多年积攒血债的必然因果。在政权倒塌的前夕，由于伊朗民众对自由的渴望突破了临界点，德黑兰街头一度演变成屠宰场。伊朗政府动用大口径机枪对示威人群进行无差别扫射，甚至由于太平间爆满，卑劣地动用冷藏车秘密转运年轻抗议者的尸体。

这种令人发指的暴行，让人们无法不联想到1989年那个血色的初夏。在天安门广场上，中共同样动用了国家战争机器，用坦克碾碎了青年学子的民主梦想，用刺刀封锁了通向文明的出口。两场横跨三十余年、相隔数千公里的暴行，其内在逻辑竟然如出一辙：当独裁者意识到自己的谎言不再起作用时，暴力便成了他们最后的“救命稻草”。

然而，中共比哈梅内伊更加狡诈。在“六·四”之后的三十多年里，他们利用全球化带来的红利作为经济诱饵，搭建起号称“金盾工程”的数字监狱，试图用物质享受换取民众的沉默，用信息防火墙抹去历史的记忆。但哈梅内伊的结局证明了一点：没有任何防火墙能挡住正义的意志，也没有任何洗脑术能平息深藏于民心的愤怒之火。

三、 连锁反应：北京红墙内的阵阵寒意

当哈梅内伊在掩体中伏法的信息传遍全球时，最感到恐惧的莫过于北京红墙内的独裁核心。中伊两国作为威权阵营的“背靠背”盟友，长期在压制人权和挑战国际秩序上同气相求。如今，伊朗这座“邪恶轴心”的重要堡垒瞬间崩塌，这种巨大的地缘政治震荡和心理冲击，正以前所未有的速度传导至中南海。

历史的清算从未消散，只是在等待合适的时机。当年坦克碾过广场，留下的不只是血迹，更是政权合法性的彻底破产。如今，随着中国经济幻影的破灭、地方债务的暴雷以及社会管控的极端化，曾经的“经济契约”已经作废。当底层民众的生存权受到威胁，当“白纸运动”的火种在灰烬中复燃，独裁者所依仗的暴力机器将面临严重的内耗与瓦解。

德黑兰的今天，就是北京的明天。这种审判或许表现为内部权力结构的剧烈崩塌，或许表现为经济危机触发的全国性觉醒，亦或是国际正义力量在全球格局重组中的总清算。当正义的铁拳挥下，那堵看似坚不可摧的“高墙”，在觉醒的民意面前将如枯槁般不堪一击。

四、 觉醒时刻：让自由的光芒照亮审判台

从哈梅内伊的倒台到中共统治的摇摇欲坠，事实反复证明：没有任何屠杀能永远阻挡自由的意志，没有任何暴政能逃脱历史的法庭。当年在天安门广场下达开火命令的罪人，以及如今在德黑兰街头扣动扳机的施暴者，最终都将被钉在历史的耻辱柱上，被万世唾弃。

这是一场光明与黑暗的终极博弈。哈梅内伊的伏法，正是全球独裁阵营全面溃败的第一块多米诺骨牌。对于每一个身处黑暗、向往自由的人来说，现在是觉醒的时刻，是呐喊的时刻！我们不仅是在见证一个暴君的消亡，更是在共同参与一个新时代的诞生。

正义或许会迟到，但当它以雷霆万钧之势降临时，任何高墙都无法遮蔽自由的光芒。让我们共同期待，在那不久的将来，天安门广场不再是坦克的领地，而是自由人民欢庆胜利的海洋。在那一天，全世界被压迫的人民将齐声宣告：暴政已死，自由永存！

Khamenei’s Death: The Death Knell for the CCP’s Tyranny

Author: Zhang Weiqing

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: Khamenei’s death during a joint U.S.-Israel operation has sparked reflection on the history of tyranny in Iran. By drawing parallels with the June 4th Incident, this article discusses the crisis facing authoritarian rule and the potential for historical reckoning.

I. 60 Seconds of Thunder: The Demise of Theocracy and the End of Tyranny

February 28, 2026, a date destined to go down in history. The world held its breath as it witnessed the abrupt end of a bloody era. Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei—the dictator who styled himself “God’s representative” and ruled the Persian lands for decades—became a corpse beneath a bunker during a precision decapitation strike by the U.S.-Israel coalition.

This targeted elimination, lasting merely 60 seconds, was not merely a victory of military technology, but the complete collapse of a political totem. For years, Khamenei relied on the brutal Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to construct a labyrinth of fear in Iran through secret police, torture chambers, and public hangings. He once arrogantly declared his rule “sacred and inviolable,” but the moment a high-precision missile pierced the reinforced concrete, that false cloak of sanctity was torn to shreds. The tyrant’s death sends a deafening warning to the world’s remaining dictators: an illegitimate regime sustained by the slaughter of its own people is, at its core, a tower built on sand; no matter how fortified the defenses, they cannot withstand the judgment of justice descending from the heavens.

II. Historical Resonance: From the Refrigerated Trucks of Tehran to the Tanks of Tiananmen

Khamenei’s downfall was the inevitable consequence of the blood debt he had accumulated over many years. On the eve of the regime’s collapse, as the Iranian people’s yearning for freedom surpassed the tipping point, the streets of Tehran briefly turned into a slaughterhouse. The Iranian government deployed heavy machine guns to indiscriminately mow down the demonstrators; when morgues became overcrowded, they even resorted to the despicable tactic of using refrigerated trucks to secretly transport the bodies of young protesters.

Such heinous atrocities inevitably bring to mind that blood-soaked early summer of 1989. In Tiananmen Square, the Chinese Communist Party similarly deployed the state’s war machine, crushing the democratic dreams of young students with tanks and sealing off the path to civilization with bayonets. These two atrocities, spanning more than three decades and separated by thousands of kilometers, share an identical underlying logic: when dictators realize their lies no longer work, violence becomes their last “straw of hope.”

Yet the CCP is even more cunning than Khamenei. In the more than three decades since “June 4th,” they have used the dividends of globalization as economic bait, erecting a digital prison known as the “Golden Shield Project,” attempting to trade material comforts for the people’s silence and erase historical memory with a Great Firewall. But Khamenei’s fate proves one thing: no firewall can block the will of justice, and no brainwashing can extinguish the fire of anger deep within the hearts of the people.

III. A Chain Reaction: A Chill Within the Red Walls of Beijing

As news of Khamenei’s execution in his bunker spread across the globe, none felt greater fear than the dictatorial core within the red walls of Beijing. As “back-to-back” allies within the authoritarian camp, China and Iran have long been kindred spirits in suppressing human rights and challenging the international order. Now, with the sudden collapse of Iran—a key stronghold of the “Axis of Evil”—this massive geopolitical upheaval and psychological shockwave is reverberating through Zhongnanhai at an unprecedented speed.

History’s reckoning has never faded; it has merely been biding its time. When tanks rolled over the square all those years ago, they left behind not only bloodstains but also the complete collapse of the regime’s legitimacy. Today, with the shattering of China’s economic illusion, the explosion of local government debt, and the radicalization of social control, the once-sacred “economic pact” has been nullified. When the right to survival of the common people is threatened, and when the embers of the “White Paper Movement” reignite from the ashes, the machinery of violence upon which the dictator relies will face severe internal erosion and disintegration.

What is happening in Tehran today is what will happen in Beijing tomorrow. This reckoning may manifest as a violent collapse of the internal power structure, a nationwide awakening triggered by an economic crisis, or a final reckoning by international forces of justice amid the global realignment. When the iron fist of justice strikes down, that seemingly impregnable “high wall” will crumble like withered wood before the awakened will of the people.

IV. The Moment of Awakening: Let the Light of Freedom Illuminate the Judgment Seat

From the downfall of Khamenei to the precarious state of the CCP’s rule, facts have repeatedly proven: no massacre can forever block the will of freedom, and no tyranny can escape the court of history.The criminals who gave the order to open fire on Tiananmen Square all those years ago, as well as the perpetrators who are now pulling the triggers on the streets of Tehran, will ultimately be branded with infamy in the annals of history and condemned by all generations to come.

This is the ultimate struggle between light and darkness. Khamenei’s downfall is the first domino to fall in the complete collapse of the global dictatorship bloc. For every person living in darkness who yearns for freedom, now is the moment to awaken, the moment to raise our voices! We are not only witnessing the demise of a tyrant, but also participating together in the birth of a new era.

Justice may be delayed, but when it strikes with thunderous force, no high wall can obscure the light of freedom. Let us look forward together to a not-too-distant future when Tiananmen Square is no longer the domain of tanks, but a sea of free people celebrating victory. On that day, the oppressed peoples of the world will declare in unison: Tyranny is dead, and freedom lives forever!

作者：司空先让

编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

 

    在浙江有这么一个类似当年沙俄时期“十二月党人”夫人的群体，这个群体的代表人物就是中国民主党人毛庆祥的夫人胡晓玲女士。

     胡晓玲女士出生于名门之后，母亲祖上是嘉兴名门望族蒋光焴，蒋光焴，清著名藏书家。(1825—1892)当年在嘉兴赫赫有名的“衍芬堂”就是祖上在嘉兴府的府邸。

    胡晓玲女士的母亲，年轻时非常漂亮，接受过现代西方教育，加上性格活泼，更是受人尊敬喜爱。胡晓玲的母亲在民国时期就在杭州铁路公司重要部门工作。

    1947年，胡晓玲的母亲因曾无意间被同学拉进国民党的“三青团”组织，加上其出生成分不好，在共党掌权后的历次政治运动中经历过不同程度的政治迫害甚至差点送命。胡晓玲也因此从小就遭受歧视和不公，这经历对胡晓玲之后支持民主党人毛庆祥反中共政权有着不可分割的关系。

       1980年，被政治运动整怕了的胡晓玲女士的母亲当得知胡晓玲与79年“民主墙”的热血青年毛庆祥谈恋爱时，是坚决反对的。

   毛庆祥，杭州人，出生于1950年。曾在上海警备区服役，1971年服役期满，退伍后分配到杭州磁钢厂工作。

       1979年，发端于北京西单民主墙的民主运动影响到浙江，以76年“四·五”运动参与者（毛庆祥曾参与天安门“四五”运动被判过刑，后平反）为基础的浙江有志之士也纷纷行动起来，将杭州的民主墙活动搞得红红火火，并形成了一个部落“黑暗中的盗火者”，相互交流思想与认识，并萌发了许多生机勃发的民刊（起源“出自民间”“宣扬民主”故称民刊），而毛庆祥就是参与其中的杰出人士之一。

      正是这段时期，冥冥之中自有天意，有着共同志向的胡晓玲与毛庆祥在一次偶然的相遇之后，进入了爱恋阶段。在世俗人的眼里出生于名门望族之后的胡晓玲下嫁出生贫寒的毛庆祥是件不可思议的事，尽管受到家人的强烈反对，但意决已定的胡晓玲还是将户口本偷了出来毅然决然地与毛庆祥走进了民政局登记拿到了结婚证书。

      1981年4月1日，毛庆祥先生和胡晓玲女士喜结伉俪，婚后不久借蜜月之旅，花了一个多月的时间游历了福州、广州、桂林、北京、青岛、上海等地，见到了王希哲、刘国凯等民运先驱，还带回了《告各界（行业）人民书》广为应用，加强了浙江民运与全国各地同仁的交流与联系。同年8月13日，新婚不久的毛庆祥被中共当局抓走，不久，被浙江省杭州市中级人民法院杭法刑（81）47号以“反革命宣传罪”判刑三年。

      1984年8月刑满释放后，毛庆祥不畏当局的打压继续从事民运活动。

     1999年6月因参与组建中国民主党再次被捕，11月9日被当局以“颠覆国家政权罪”判处有期徒刑8年，剥夺政治权利3年，毛庆祥拒绝认罪服法，服满刑期。

      浙江自成立中国民主党以来，监狱中就一直有中国民主党人在坐牢，前后坐牢的达36人，至今仍在坐牢的有3人。这些民主党人的刑期加起来近200年。

     1999年，毛庆祥第二次被当局逮捕并判刑8年。就在毛庆祥被判刑的当年，胡晓玲上班的杭州棉纺针织厂，出台了所谓企业转制政策，就是裁减员工，让工人拿很少一点钱买断工龄，或提早退休每月拿很少一点退休金。胡晓玲选择了提早退休，可胡晓玲一个人这点退休金根本无法养家糊口，孩子还小，正是长身体需要营养的时候，孩子的学杂费等也是一笔不小的开支……没办法只能寻求再去打工上班，经好姐妹的介绍，去了一家杭州邮政器材厂工作，可没上几天班就因毛庆祥在狱中申诉，并将申诉材料在探监时交给了胡晓玲……

当时的国保为了阻止胡晓玲将“申诉材料”递交到检察院，先是威胁胡晓玲，如果递交上去的话，在狱中的毛庆祥是没有好果子吃的，胡晓玲没理会国保。可国保没过几天竟然去了“邮政材料厂”对胡晓玲进行威胁和施压……结果厂方领导一见阵势也倍感紧张，所以第二天厂领导就让胡晓玲不要去上班了。胡晓玲因此失去了好不容易得来的工作。陷入困境的胡晓玲其生活的艰难是常人难以想象的……没办法只能不时向亲戚朋友借钱，时常打点零工艰难度日。胡晓玲深明大义，独自承担起全部家庭重任。赡养父母，养育孩子，全力支持毛庆祥的民运事业。

      每当看到中国民主党人被判刑，胡晓玲心痛无比。她深知，在这个艰难的时刻，被判刑的民主党人最需要的就是家人的支持和陪伴。于是，她毫不犹豫地站了出来，主动联系其家人尽可能提供帮助和情绪安抚……在胡晓玲的带动和帮助鼓励下，不少民主党

人的夫人们也勇敢站出来，自发团结起来与当局抗争并呼吁国际社会予以关注和谴责。

    在毛庆祥坐牢期间，胡晓玲不仅要照顾年老的双亲、培育孩子、上班工作，还坚持每个月去监狱探望夫君。

就探监这事，对于中国民主党人夫人这个群体来说，是件很重要的事，因为只有通过探监，才能知道丈夫在监狱里是否遭受不公或虐待，更重要的是通过探监能安抚亲人情绪。可以想像，一个人在大牢里呆着，如果没有亲人的关心和探望，是一件多么痛苦的事！这种痛苦有时可能比坐牢本身还受煎熬！

    这里我特别提一下，民主党人吕耿松第二次坐牢11年，在浙江长湖监狱服刑期间，其妻汪雪娥每月至少一次前往探望。杭州至湖州长湖监狱为90公里，来回是180公里，刑期是11年要来回跑132次（132次x180公里=23760公里）相当于绕地球大半圈还多！

     由于组建中国民主党案同案的民主党人吴义龙是外地人，在杭州生活相当困难，胡晓玲时常给他送些钱物，在杭州的其他中国民主党人夫人群体也会伸出援助之手，让他度过艰难困苦时期。

    如今胡晓玲已70多岁了，身体也不是很好，可还经常去养老院看望照顾身陷囹圄的中国民主党人邹巍90多岁的老母亲。

     中国民主党主要创始人之一朱虞夫先生，在谈到胡晓玲帮助受难者民主党人家人时是深有体会和感触的。当朱虞夫先生第一次坐牢时，最担心的是自己的夫人性格内向懦弱，怕接受不了这突如其来的打击。朱虞夫先生托人带话给胡晓玲，希望她能帮助其夫人克服恐惧和焦虑。在胡晓玲的鼓励帮助下，朱虞夫先生的夫人走过了那段最难熬的日子。

     就这样，在浙江中国民主党人的夫人群体一直以来相互鼓励，相互支持下度过了一个个的艰难时刻。

     在民主党人毛庆祥前后获刑11年多中。胡晓玲和儿子相依为命，艰难地过着常人不可想象的日子。

     胡晓玲就靠自己的一点微薄的退休工资生活，到孩子念大学了，教育费很高，只靠这点退休金根本不够，还要打零工，跟朋友借点钱和亲友的资助。儿子13岁的时候，爸爸就不在身边，在性格等方面对孩子的成长都可能产生负面影响。

      就在这样艰难日子里，胡晓玲坦然面对现实，引导鼓励孩子要坚强，不要因为爸爸的事情而自卑，自暴自弃；培养其积极向上的性格。儿子在母亲良好品格潜移默化地影响下，非常努力地读书学习。大学毕业后，只身一人前往迪拜发展，历经千辛万苦和不懈努力终于在迪拜站住了脚跟：创办了网络媒体，传播介绍阿联酋（迪拜）和中国的历史、文化、经济、旅游、美食……成为了两国文化交流使者。

     胡晓玲以坚韧不拔的品格和实际行动不仅默默守住了心中的信念，更是守护支撑起了一个被当局击碎了的家庭。是当之无愧的中国现代版的“十二月党人”夫人！

      向中国民主党人夫人群体致敬！

  

Remembering Ms. Hu Xiaoling, Wife of Chinese Democrat Mao Qingxiang

Author: Sikong Xianrang

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

Abstract: Hu Xiaoling, a descendant of a prestigious family, held firm to her convictions in supporting Chinese Democrat Mao Qingxiang and the Zhejiang democracy movement. During her husband’s long-term imprisonments, she raised their child alone, cared for her parents, maintained their livelihood, and showed concern for the families of other Democrats. She is worthy of being called a modern-day “Decembrist” wife.

There is a group in Zhejiang similar to the “Decembrist” wives of the Tsarist Russian era, and the representative figure of this group is Ms. Hu Xiaoling, the wife of Chinese Democrat Mao Qingxiang.

Ms. Hu Xiaoling was born into a prestigious family. Her mother’s ancestors were the famous Jiang family of Jiaxing, specifically Jiang Guangyu (1825–1892), a famous Qing Dynasty book collector. The “Yanfen Hall,” which was illustrious in Jiaxing at that time, was the ancestral mansion in Jiaxing Prefecture.

Ms. Hu Xiaoling’s mother was very beautiful in her youth and had received a modern Western education; combined with her lively personality, she was highly respected and loved. During the Republican era, Hu Xiaoling’s mother worked in an important department of the Hangzhou Railway Company.

In 1947, because Hu Xiaoling’s mother had been inadvertently pulled into the Kuomintang’s “Three People’s Principles Youth League” by a classmate, and because of her “bad” family background, she experienced varying degrees of political persecution and nearly lost her life in the successive political movements after the Communist Party took power. Consequently, Hu Xiaoling suffered discrimination and injustice from childhood. This experience is inextricably linked to Hu Xiaoling’s subsequent support for the Democrat Mao Qingxiang in opposing the CCP regime.

In 1980, Hu Xiaoling’s mother—who had been terrified by political movements—resolutely opposed the news that Hu Xiaoling was dating Mao Qingxiang, a passionate youth from the 1979 “Democracy Wall” movement.

Mao Qingxiang, a native of Hangzhou, was born in 1950. He served in the Shanghai Garrison District. After completing his service in 1971, he was discharged and assigned to work at the Hangzhou Magnetic Steel Plant.

In 1979, the democracy movement originating from the Xidan Democracy Wall in Beijing influenced Zhejiang. Based on the participants of the 1976 “April 5th” movement (Mao Qingxiang had participated in the Tiananmen “April 5th” movement, was sentenced, and later rehabilitated), people of high ideals in Zhejiang took action one after another, making the Democracy Wall activities in Hangzhou very successful. They formed a group called “The Fire-Stealers in the Dark,” exchanging thoughts and understandings, which gave rise to many vibrant “folk publications” (so-called because they “originated from the people” and “promoted democracy”). Mao Qingxiang was one of the outstanding individuals involved.

It was during this period—as if destined by heaven—that Hu Xiaoling and Mao Qingxiang, who shared common aspirations, entered a stage of love after a chance encounter. In the eyes of worldly people, it was inconceivable for Hu Xiaoling, born of a prestigious family, to marry down to Mao Qingxiang, who was born into poverty. Despite strong opposition from her family, the determined Hu Xiaoling stole the household registration book (Hukou), resolutely went to the Civil Affairs Bureau with Mao Qingxiang to register, and obtained their marriage certificate.

On April 1, 1981, Mr. Mao Qingxiang and Ms. Hu Xiaoling were joined in matrimony. Shortly after the wedding, using their honeymoon trip as an opportunity, they spent over a month traveling to Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Guilin, Beijing, Qingdao, Shanghai, and other places. They met democracy pioneers such as Wang Xizhe and Liu Guokai and brought back the “Letter to People of All Circles (Industries)” for wide application, strengthening the communication and contact between the Zhejiang democracy movement and colleagues across the country. On August 13 of the same year, the newlywed Mao Qingxiang was taken away by the CCP authorities. Soon after, he was sentenced to three years in prison by the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court [Case No. Hang Fa Xing (81) 47] for the crime of “counter-revolutionary propaganda.”

After completing his sentence in August 1984, Mao Qingxiang, undeterred by the authorities’ suppression, continued to engage in pro-democracy activities.

In June 1999, he was arrested again for participating in the formation of the China Democracy Party. On November 9, he was sentenced by the authorities to eight years of fixed-term imprisonment and three years of deprivation of political rights for the crime of “subverting state power.” Mao Qingxiang refused to plead guilty or accept the verdict and served his full term.

Since the establishment of the China Democracy Party in Zhejiang, there have always been members in prison. A total of 36 people have been imprisoned at different times, and three remain in prison today. The combined sentences of these Democrats total nearly 200 years.

In 1999, Mao Qingxiang was arrested and sentenced to eight years by the authorities for the second time. In the same year he was sentenced, the Hangzhou Cotton Textile and Knitting Mill, where Hu Xiaoling worked, introduced a so-called “enterprise restructuring” policy. This involved cutting staff and forcing workers to “buy out” their years of service for a very small amount of money or retire early with a very small monthly pension. Hu Xiaoling chose early retirement, but her pension alone was simply not enough to support the family. Her child was still young, at an age requiring nutrition for growth, and the child’s school fees were also a significant expense. Having no choice, she sought work again. Through a friend’s introduction, she got a job at a Hangzhou Postal Equipment Factory. However, she had only been working for a few days when Mao Qingxiang filed an appeal from prison and handed the appeal materials to Hu Xiaoling during a visit.

To prevent Hu Xiaoling from submitting the “appeal materials” to the procuratorate, the Domestic Security (Guobao) first threatened her, saying that if she submitted them, Mao Qingxiang would have a hard time in prison. Hu Xiaoling ignored them. A few days later, the Domestic Security actually went to the “Postal Equipment Factory” to threaten and pressure Hu Xiaoling. Consequently, the factory leaders became extremely nervous upon seeing this situation, and the next day they told Hu Xiaoling not to come to work anymore. Thus, Hu Xiaoling lost the hard-won job. Falling into dire straits, the hardship of Hu Xiaoling’s life was beyond ordinary imagination. With no other choice, she occasionally borrowed money from relatives and friends and worked odd jobs to scrape by. Hu Xiaoling was deeply sensible and took on the entire family burden alone—supporting her parents, raising her child, and fully supporting Mao Qingxiang’s democracy cause.

Whenever she saw a member of the China Democracy Party being sentenced, Hu Xiaoling felt immense pain. She knew that at this difficult moment, the sentenced Democrats needed the support and companionship of their families most. Thus, she stood up without hesitation, actively contacting their families to provide as much help and emotional comfort as possible. Driven and encouraged by Hu Xiaoling, many wives of other Democrats also bravely stood up, spontaneously uniting to struggle against the authorities and appealing for international attention and condemnation.

During Mao Qingxiang’s imprisonment, Hu Xiaoling not only had to care for her elderly parents, raise her child, and work, but also insisted on visiting her husband in prison every month.

Regarding prison visits, for the group of wives of Chinese Democrats, it is a very important matter. Only through visits can they know if their husbands are suffering injustice or abuse in prison; more importantly, visits can soothe the emotions of their loved ones. One can imagine how painful it is for a person to stay in a large prison without the care and visits of relatives! This pain is sometimes more agonizing than the imprisonment itself.

Here I would like to specifically mention that when the Democrat Lyu Gengsong was imprisoned for 11 years for the second time, his wife Wang Xue’e traveled to visit him at least once a month while he served his sentence in Zhejiang Changhu Prison. The distance from Hangzhou to Changhu Prison is 90 kilometers—a round trip of 180 kilometers. Over a term of 11 years, she had to travel back and forth 132 times ($132 \times 180 \text{ km} = 23,760 \text{ km}$), which is equivalent to more than halfway around the earth!

Since Wu Yilong, a fellow Democrat in the China Democracy Party formation case, was from out of town and lived in great difficulty in Hangzhou, Hu Xiaoling often sent him money and items. The group of other Democrat wives in Hangzhou would also lend a helping hand to help him through difficult times.

Now Hu Xiaoling is over 70 years old and her health is not very good, yet she still frequently goes to a nursing home to visit and care for the 90-plus-year-old mother of the imprisoned Democrat Zou Wei.

Mr. Zhu Yufu, one of the main founders of the China Democracy Party, has deep personal experience and feelings regarding Hu Xiaoling’s help for the families of suffering Democrats. When Mr. Zhu Yufu was imprisoned for the first time, his greatest worry was his wife, who had an introverted and weak personality; he feared she would not be able to handle this sudden blow. Mr. Zhu Yufu sent a message through someone to Hu Xiaoling, hoping she could help his wife overcome fear and anxiety. With Hu Xiaoling’s encouragement and help, Mr. Zhu Yufu’s wife made it through those most difficult days.

In this way, the group of wives of the Zhejiang China Democracy Party members has spent one difficult moment after another under mutual encouragement and support.

During the more than 11 years that the Democrat Mao Qingxiang was imprisoned, Hu Xiaoling and her son depended on each other, living a life of hardship unimaginable to ordinary people.

Hu Xiaoling lived on her meager retirement pension. By the time her son went to university, the education costs were very high; the pension alone was not enough, so she had to work odd jobs and rely on money borrowed from friends and assistance from relatives. When the son was 13 years old, his father was not by his side, which could have had a negative impact on the child’s growth and personality.

In those difficult days, Hu Xiaoling faced reality calmly, guiding and encouraging her child to be strong and not to feel inferior or give up on himself because of his father’s situation; she cultivated a positive and proactive character in him. Under the subtle influence of his mother’s good character, the son studied very hard. After graduating from university, he went to Dubai alone to develop his career. Through immense hardship and unremitting efforts, he finally established himself in Dubai: he founded a web media outlet to spread and introduce the history, culture, economy, tourism, and food of the UAE (Dubai) and China, becoming a messenger for cultural exchange between the two countries.

With her indomitable character and practical actions, Hu Xiaoling not only silently held onto her inner beliefs but also protected and supported a family that had been shattered by the authorities. She is truly a modern-day Chinese version of a “Decembrist” wife!

Salute to the group of wives of the Chinese Democrats!

——写在2026年的国际妇女节

作者：张致君
编辑：胡丽莉 校对：熊辩 翻译：吕峰

三月的风吹进城市，空气带着潮湿与寒意。街角的梧桐树在风中轻轻摇晃，枝叶摩擦发出细碎的声响，像某种被压低的低语。

城市看起来依然正常：地铁照常运行，咖啡店门口排着队，商场的大屏幕滚动着广告和节日祝福。

但在中国的互联网空间里，一些声音正在悄然消失。

女性博主的账号消失了，性少数群体的讨论区消失了，脱口秀演员小帕的社交媒体账号也被封禁。她们曾经写下的文字、发出的笑声、表达的愤怒与困惑，就像被风卷走的落叶，在互联网的地面上再也找不到停留的地方。

许多人曾经相信，互联网会让表达变得更加自由。但在中国，这片海洋布满了看不见的渔网。人们看不见它，却随时可能被困住。人们以为自己在自由地游动，实际上每一步都在被监控、被记录、被计算。

中国女性与性少数群体的公共表达空间正在迅速缩小。那些曾经可以被讨论的话题——身体、婚姻、性别平等、性取向、家庭暴力——逐渐被重新划入危险的领域。

红线在移动，在收紧。而这一切，并不是突然发生的。

在中国当代政治叙事中，女性问题从来不仅仅是社会问题，它同时也是一个政治问题。

长期以来，中国官方意识形态强调一种以国家发展和社会稳定为核心的国家主义叙事。在这种叙事中，个人权利往往被置于国家目标之后，而社会角色则被赋予明确的政治意义。

女性在这种叙事中通常被定义为三种角色：母亲、妻子和家庭照顾者。

这种角色定义并非偶然。随着中国人口结构迅速老龄化、出生率持续下降，人口问题逐渐被视为国家安全与经济发展的重要议题。近年来，中国政府不断鼓励生育，从二孩政策到三孩政策，再到各地推出的生育补贴和住房奖励，国家正在试图重新塑造一种以家庭和生育为核心的社会价值。

在这种政策逻辑下，女性的身体逐渐被纳入国家治理的框架。

官方媒体频繁强调婚姻与生育的重要性，一些地方政府甚至通过行政手段鼓励女性尽早结婚生子。与此同时，一些关于女性独立、性别平等或婚育选择的讨论，却被视为“西方思想”或“极端女权”。

这种意识形态上的冲突，使女性主义与国家主义之间逐渐形成张力。

女性主义关注的是个人权利、身体自主与社会平等，而国家主义更强调人口结构、社会秩序与家庭稳定。当女性开始公开讨论不婚、不育、家庭暴力或职场性别歧视时，这些讨论往往被视为对传统家庭结构和社会秩序的挑战。

因此，许多女性主义议题在中国的公共空间中逐渐被边缘化，甚至被压制。

这种冲突并不仅仅发生在网络审查或个别案件中，而是反映出一种更深层的意识形态矛盾：当国家试图通过家庭和人口政策塑造社会结构时，女性的自主选择往往成为最先受到限制的领域。

2022年初，一段来自江苏徐州农村的短视频在中国互联网迅速传播。

视频里，一个女人被铁链锁在一间破旧的小屋里。她的脖子被粗重的铁链拴在墙上，牙齿几乎全部脱落，头发凌乱，眼神空洞而惊恐。

据当地村民说，她已经为所谓的“丈夫”生下了八个孩子。

这就是后来震惊中国社会的“铁链女事件”。

许多女性在深夜刷到这段视频时，感到一种难以言说的震动。一个现代国家，一个每天谈论科技与繁荣的社会，却仍然存在这样的场景：一个女人像牲畜一样被锁在屋里，被迫不断生育。

公众开始追问：她是谁？她从哪里来？是谁把她卖到这里？

但随着调查的展开，官方通报却一次次改变说法。地方政府先称她是“精神病患者”，后来又说她是“走失人口”，再后来又承认她可能是拐卖受害者。

几份通报之间互相矛盾，却始终没有给出清晰解释。

与此同时，大量前往徐州调查的志愿者和公民记者遭到警方阻拦，一些女性调查者甚至被警方带走讯问。互联网上关于铁链女的讨论迅速被删除。

一个女人被铁链锁住的身体，最终变成了一个被锁住的公共话题。

在铁链女事件之前，中国的女性主义运动就已经经历过一次重要的打击。

2015年3月，五名女性权利活动者计划在妇女节前夕发起反性骚扰宣传活动。她们原本只是计划在地铁和公交车上发放反性骚扰贴纸。

后来被称为“女权五姐妹”的她们，行动尚未开始，便被警方同时带走，以“寻衅滋事”的名义拘留。

这一事件引起国际社会关注。联合国和多个国家政府呼吁中国释放她们。37天后，她们被取保候审。

但这一事件成为中国女权运动的重要转折点。

许多女性主义组织被迫关闭，一些长期关注性别议题的 NGO 逐渐消失。

李翘楚长期关注劳工和女性权益。2021年，她因发布有关人权和刑讯逼供的文章被逮捕；2023年，被以“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”判刑三年八个月。

在中国，女性不仅难以讨论性别议题，也难以参与更广泛的公共事务。

2018年，中国媒体人弦子公开指控知名主持人朱军曾在央视后台对她实施性骚扰。

这一案件迅速引发中国版的 #MeToo 讨论。

许多女性开始公开讲述自己的经历。

但案件审理过程异常艰难，相关讨论在社交媒体上频繁被删除，弦子本人也遭遇巨大舆论压力。

2022年，北京法院判决弦子败诉。

这起案件在许多人看来，不仅是一场性骚扰诉讼，更像一次社会试验：女性是否能够公开讲述自己的经历。

答案令人沮丧。而发起“米兔运动”的黄雪琴，至今仍在狱中。

2021年，中国网球运动员彭帅在微博发布长文，指控一名高层官员性侵。

帖子在二十分钟内被删除。随后，彭帅从公众视野中消失。

国际社会要求调查，但在中国国内几乎无法讨论这一事件。后来，彭帅在官方安排的采访中表示自己“从未提出性侵指控”。

她在镜头前微笑。那种微笑平静得让人不安。

习近平上台后，中国多所大学的 LGBTQ 学生社团公众号被集中关闭，一些高校要求相关社团停止活动。

在官方媒体的叙述中，“性别多元”被描述为“西方文化渗透”。许多年轻人发现，她们曾经用来交流的社群一夜之间消失。

沉默再次成为一种生存方式。更多女性少数群体选择隐瞒自己的性取向，选择结婚或者形式婚姻，而性别暴力隐藏在这些不真实的关系中，许多犯罪在婚姻框架下变成“合法”。

这些现象的背后，其实还有一个更深层的政治背景：人口政策。

中国长期实行严格的计划生育政策。从1980年代的一胎政策，到后来逐步放宽为二孩，再到2021年的三孩政策。

当人口出生率持续下降时，国家的政策叙事开始发生转变。女性被越来越多地视为“人口生产者”。

官方媒体不断强调婚育责任，地方政府推出各种鼓励生育的政策——从现金补贴到住房优惠。与此同时，离婚冷静期被写入法律，一些地方开始限制单身女性冷冻卵子。

这种政策逻辑下，女性的身体再次被纳入国家治理的框架，处处彰显了中共统治下威权国家的性别政治。而在国际上中国也并不是唯一一个把性别问题纳入政治叙事的国家。伊朗的女性必须遵守严格的着装规定，2022年年轻女性马赫萨·阿米尼因“头巾佩戴不当”被道德警察拘捕并死亡，引发全国抗议。俄罗斯政府近年来强调传统家庭价值，并通过法律限制“同性恋宣传”。匈牙利总理欧尔班政府也不断强调“家庭主义”，反对性别多元政策。

这些国家的政治制度不同，但在性别议题上却呈现出相似趋势：国家试图重新定义女性角色，将其纳入民族、人口或传统价值的叙事之中。

而在这种政治逻辑下，女性与性少数群体的空间往往最先受到压缩。

从政治学的角度来看，女性运动之所以常常成为威权政府警惕的对象，并不仅仅因为性别议题本身，而是因为女性运动往往具有跨阶层、跨群体的社会动员能力。

在许多国家的历史中，女性运动往往是社会变革的重要推动力量。

女性问题几乎涉及每一个家庭。无论是婚姻、教育、就业还是生育，这些议题都与日常生活密切相关。当女性开始组织、发声和行动时，她们往往能够迅速触及广泛的社会群体。

这种广泛的社会联系使得女性运动具有一种特殊的政治潜力。

在威权体制中，政府通常通过控制媒体、压制反对党和限制公民社会来维持权力。然而，女性议题往往从日常生活出发，很难完全被政治化，也很难完全被压制。

当一个关于家庭暴力、性骚扰或拐卖人口的事件引发讨论时，它就不仅限于一个个案，也可能迅速演变为对制度的反思。

正是如此，许多威权政府往往对女性运动保持高度警惕。

在中国，“女权五姐妹”因反对性骚扰活动而被拘留，弦子的#MeToo 案件遭遇重重阻碍，铁链女事件的讨论被迅速压制，这些现象在一定程度上都反映出中共政府对社会动员的恐惧。

在中共的威权政治的逻辑中，任何能够跨越社会阶层、激发公众共鸣的议题，都被视为潜在的政治风险。

而女性运动，恰恰具备这样的力量。

当中国的女性开始讲述自己的经历、讨论自己的身体和权利时，这些看似私人和日常的议题，往往会被中共置于高度敏感的位置。

在这样的环境中，中国女性的声音就不单纯是一种社会表达，也可以被理解为一种政治行为。

历史也一再证明，极权可以压制声音，却很难彻底消灭记忆。

每一次被删除的帖子、每一个被封禁的账号、每一段被消失的讨论，都不会真正消失。它们会在人们的记忆里留下痕迹，在私人聊天、海外媒体和零散的叙述中继续流传。

铁链女的影像曾震动整个中国互联网；女权五姐妹的拘押让许多年轻人第一次意识到：性别平等也可能成为一种“敏感议题”；弦子的控诉、彭帅的失声、李翘楚的判刑，也让更多人看见权力与沉默之间的关系。

这些事件被压下了热度，但它们改变了许多人的认知。

在中共的威权社会中，权力往往试图让历史变得短暂，让公众忘记昨天发生过什么。

但社会记忆并不会完全消失。它会在新的代际之间缓慢传递，在新的语言和新的叙述中重新出现。

女性和性少数群体的声音，也许会被迫沉默一段时间，但它们不会真正消失。

因为这些声音所表达的，并不仅仅是个体的不满，而是关于尊严、身体与自由的基本问题。

三月的风仍然在城市之间吹过。

梧桐叶一片一片落下，是时间留下的痕迹。

哪怕红线不断收紧，哪怕沉默再次降临，那些微弱却真实的光点仍然存在——在记忆里，在语言里，在那些仍然愿意讲述的人心中。

Women’s Voices in an Authoritarian Era—Written on the Occasion of International Women’s Day 2026

Author: Zhang Zhijun
Editor: Hu Lili Proofreading: Xiong BianTranslator: Lyu Feng

Abstract: In China, the space for public expression by women and sexual minority groups is increasingly restricted. Feminist activism and related events are frequently suppressed, and online discussions are often deleted. State policies and governance logic surrounding population and social management politicize women’s roles, turning private issues into sensitive public topics.

The winds of March sweep into the city, carrying dampness and a lingering chill in the air. At the street corner, the plane trees sway gently in the wind, their branches and leaves rubbing together and producing faint rustling sounds—like whispers deliberately lowered.

The city still appears normal. Subways run as usual, lines form outside coffee shops, and giant screens in shopping malls roll through advertisements and holiday greetings.

Yet within China’s online space, certain voices are quietly disappearing.

The accounts of female bloggers have vanished. Discussion forums for sexual minorities have disappeared. The social media account of stand-up comedian Xiao Pa has also been banned. The words they once wrote, the laughter they shared, the anger and confusion they expressed—like fallen leaves swept away by the wind—can no longer find a place to settle on the surface of the internet.

Many people once believed that the internet would make expression freer. But in China, this ocean is filled with invisible fishing nets. People cannot see them, yet they may be trapped at any moment. People believe they are swimming freely, but in reality every step is being monitored, recorded, and calculated.

The public space for expression by Chinese women and sexual minorities is rapidly shrinking. Topics that were once openly discussed—bodies, marriage, gender equality, sexual orientation, domestic violence—are gradually being reclassified as dangerous territory.

The red lines are shifting. They are tightening. And none of this has happened suddenly.

In contemporary Chinese political narratives, women’s issues have never been merely social issues; they are also political issues.

For a long time, official Chinese ideology has emphasized a nationalist narrative centered on national development and social stability. Within this narrative, individual rights are often placed after state goals, and social roles are endowed with explicit political meaning.

Women are typically defined within this narrative in three roles: mother, wife, and family caregiver.

This role definition is not accidental. As China’s population structure rapidly ages and the birth rate continues to decline, demographic issues have increasingly been framed as matters of national security and economic development. In recent years, the Chinese government has continuously encouraged childbirth—from the two-child policy to the three-child policy, and through various local policies offering birth subsidies and housing incentives. The state is attempting to reshape a social value system centered on family and reproduction.

Under this policy logic, women’s bodies are gradually incorporated into the framework of state governance.

Official media frequently emphasize the importance of marriage and childbirth. Some local governments have even used administrative measures to encourage women to marry and have children earlier. At the same time, discussions about female independence, gender equality, or reproductive choice are sometimes labeled as “Western ideas” or “extreme feminism.”

This ideological conflict has gradually created tension between feminism and nationalism.

Feminism focuses on individual rights, bodily autonomy, and social equality, while nationalism emphasizes demographic structure, social order, and family stability. When women begin publicly discussing remaining unmarried, choosing not to have children, domestic violence, or gender discrimination in the workplace, such discussions are often viewed as challenges to traditional family structures and social order.

As a result, many feminist issues in China’s public sphere have gradually been marginalized or even suppressed.

This conflict does not occur only in cases of internet censorship or isolated incidents. It reflects a deeper ideological contradiction: when the state attempts to shape social structures through family and population policies, women’s autonomy often becomes one of the first areas to be restricted.

In early 2022, a short video from a rural village in Xuzhou, Jiangsu Province spread rapidly across the Chinese internet.

In the video, a woman was chained inside a dilapidated room. A heavy iron chain was locked around her neck and attached to the wall. Most of her teeth were missing. Her hair was disheveled, and her eyes looked hollow and terrified.

According to local villagers, she had given birth to eight children for the man who claimed to be her husband.

This was the case that later shocked Chinese society: the “Chained Woman” incident.

Many women who came across the video late at night felt a shock that was difficult to describe. In a modern nation that speaks daily about technology and prosperity, such a scene still existed: a woman locked in a room like livestock, forced to continuously give birth.

The public began asking questions: Who was she? Where did she come from? Who sold her into this situation?

But as the investigation unfolded, official statements repeatedly changed their explanations. Local authorities initially claimed she was a “mentally ill patient.” Later they said she was a “missing person.” Eventually they admitted she might be a victim of human trafficking.

These statements contradicted one another, yet none offered a clear explanation.

Meanwhile, volunteers and citizen journalists who traveled to Xuzhou to investigate were blocked by police. Some female investigators were even taken away for questioning. Online discussions about the chained woman were quickly deleted.

The body of a woman locked by an iron chain ultimately became a public issue that was also locked away.

Even before the Chained Woman incident, China’s feminist movement had already experienced a major setback.

In March 2015, five women’s rights activists planned to launch an anti-sexual-harassment campaign ahead of International Women’s Day. They intended to distribute anti-harassment stickers on subways and buses.

Before the campaign could even begin, they were simultaneously detained by police on charges of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble.”

They later became known as the “Feminist Five.”

The case drew international attention. The United Nations and several governments called on China to release them. After 37 days in detention, they were released on bail.

However, the incident became an important turning point for China’s feminist movement.

Many feminist organizations were forced to shut down. Some NGOs that had long focused on gender issues gradually disappeared.

Li Qiaochu had long advocated for labor rights and women’s rights. In 2021, she was arrested for publishing articles about human rights and torture. In 2023, she was sentenced to three years and eight months in prison on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.”

In China, women not only struggle to discuss gender issues; they also face obstacles in participating in broader public affairs.

In 2018, Chinese journalist Xianzi publicly accused the well-known television host Zhu Jun of sexually harassing her backstage at China Central Television.

The case quickly sparked a Chinese version of the #MeToo movement.

Many women began publicly sharing their own experiences.

But the legal proceedings were extremely difficult. Related discussions were frequently deleted from social media, and Xianzi herself faced enormous public pressure.

In 2022, a Beijing court ruled against her.

To many observers, the case was not merely a sexual harassment lawsuit—it resembled a social experiment: could women publicly tell their stories?

The answer was discouraging. Meanwhile, Huang Xueqin, a journalist who helped initiate China’s #MeToo movement, remains imprisoned.

In 2021, Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai posted a long message on Weibo accusing a senior official of sexual assault.

The post was deleted within twenty minutes. Shortly afterward, Peng Shuai disappeared from public view.

International organizations called for an investigation, but inside China the topic was nearly impossible to discuss. Later, in a carefully arranged interview with state media, Peng Shuai stated that she had “never made allegations of sexual assault.”

She smiled in front of the camera. The calmness of that smile made many people uneasy.

After Xi Jinping came to power, LGBTQ student organizations at many Chinese universities saw their social media accounts shut down simultaneously, and some universities required such groups to cease activities.

In official media narratives, “gender diversity” has been described as “Western cultural infiltration.” Many young people discovered that the communities they once used to communicate had disappeared overnight.

Silence once again became a way to survive. More women and sexual minorities chose to conceal their sexual orientation, to enter marriages or even sham marriages. Gender-based violence often remained hidden within these relationships, and some forms of abuse became “legal” under the framework of marriage.

Behind these developments lies a deeper political background: population policy.

China long implemented strict birth-control policies—from the one-child policy introduced in the 1980s to the later two-child policy, and eventually the three-child policy announced in 2021.

As birth rates continued to decline, the state’s policy narrative began to shift. Women were increasingly viewed as “producers of population.”

Official media repeatedly emphasize responsibilities related to marriage and childbirth, while local governments introduce incentives ranging from cash subsidies to housing benefits. At the same time, a mandatory “cooling-off period” for divorce was written into law, and some regions began restricting egg-freezing for unmarried women.

Under such policy logic, women’s bodies once again become integrated into the machinery of state governance—reflecting the gender politics of an authoritarian state under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.

Internationally, China is not the only country that incorporates gender issues into political narratives. In Iran, women must follow strict dress codes; in 2022, the death of young woman Mahsa Amini after being detained by morality police for “improper hijab” sparked nationwide protests. In Russia, the government has increasingly emphasized traditional family values and passed laws restricting so-called “homosexual propaganda.” Hungary’s government under Viktor Orbán has also emphasized “familyism” and opposed gender diversity policies.

These countries have different political systems, yet similar trends emerge regarding gender issues: the state attempts to redefine women’s roles and incorporate them into narratives of nationhood, demography, or traditional values.

Under such political logic, the space for women and sexual minorities is often among the first to shrink.

From a political science perspective, women’s movements often attract the attention of authoritarian governments not simply because of gender issues themselves, but because such movements possess the ability to mobilize across social classes and groups.

In the history of many countries, women’s movements have been important drivers of social change.

Women’s issues touch nearly every family. Whether concerning marriage, education, employment, or childbirth, these issues are closely tied to everyday life. When women begin organizing, speaking out, and taking action, they often quickly reach broad segments of society.

This extensive social connection gives women’s movements a particular political potential.

In authoritarian systems, governments typically maintain power by controlling media, suppressing opposition parties, and restricting civil society. Yet women’s issues often originate in everyday life and cannot easily be fully politicized or entirely suppressed.

When an incident involving domestic violence, sexual harassment, or human trafficking sparks public discussion, it may quickly expand beyond a single case and evolve into reflection on institutions themselves.

For this reason, many authoritarian governments remain highly wary of women’s movements.

In China, the detention of the Feminist Five for anti-harassment activism, the obstacles faced by Xianzi’s #MeToo lawsuit, and the rapid suppression of discussion about the Chained Woman incident all reflect, to some degree, the Chinese Communist Party’s fear of social mobilization.

Within the logic of the CCP’s authoritarian politics, any issue capable of crossing social boundaries and generating widespread public resonance is viewed as a potential political risk.

Women’s movements possess precisely such power.

When Chinese women begin telling their stories, discussing their bodies and rights, these issues—seemingly personal and everyday—often become highly sensitive under the CCP’s political system.

In such an environment, women’s voices in China are not merely social expressions; they can also be understood as political acts.

History repeatedly demonstrates that authoritarian power can suppress voices, but it rarely eliminates memory entirely.

Every deleted post, every banned account, and every vanished discussion does not truly disappear. They leave traces in people’s memories, circulating through private conversations, overseas media, and fragmented narratives.

The image of the Chained Woman once shook the entire Chinese internet. The detention of the Feminist Five made many young people realize for the first time that gender equality could itself become a “sensitive issue.” Xianzi’s accusation, Peng Shuai’s disappearance from public speech, and Li Qiaochu’s imprisonment revealed to many the relationship between power and silence.

These events were suppressed, but they changed many people’s understanding.

In the CCP’s authoritarian society, power often attempts to shorten history—to make the public forget what happened yesterday.

Yet social memory does not vanish completely. It passes slowly between generations, reappearing in new languages and new narratives.

The voices of women and sexual minorities may be forced into silence for a time, but they will not truly disappear.

Because what those voices express is not merely individual dissatisfaction, but fundamental questions about dignity, the body, and freedom.

The winds of March continue to blow through the city.

Plane-tree leaves fall one by one, traces left behind by time.

Even as red lines tighten, even as silence returns, those faint yet genuine points of light still exist—in memory, in language, and in the hearts of those who remain willing to tell the story.