钱辰昌，或许是最名不见经传的民运人士，却是一个最为纯粹的人，为了中国的民族自由的理想，放弃了自己优渥的生活，走路来到美国，他不求身份，不求利益，只想推广自己的民主理想，出版书籍，宣传自己的政治主张。他明明知道再回国是九死一生，给好友留下绝笔，依然毅然决然的踏上从东南亚回国的路，要回去实现自己的政治理想。或许，正是钱先生这样的人才给了我们最多的感动，纯粹的如同寒夜的星光，点滴汇聚，耀我星河。如今，他已经失联超过一个月了，在大洋彼岸的我们，怎可忘记！
活动主题：声援钱辰昌，中共立刻放人
活动组织： 中国民主人权联盟旧金山分部
活动策划：李海风 关永杰 周志刚
活动联络：张勇 6265816991
美术支持：马相平
活动时间：2026年3月22日 周日 2-4 pm
活动地点：圣何塞市政厅
导航地址：200 E Santa Clara St San Jose, CA 95113
《全球覺醒》第六十四期
自由之鐘 時刻敲響 全球覺醒 民主聯盟 消滅獨裁 推翻暴政
活動主題：反击跨国镇压：从秘密警察站到街头暴力，中共黑手必须清除！
2026年3月，意大利以国家安全理由对8名涉嫌跨国镇压的中国公民发出驱逐令。随着美国与意大利司法部门相继采取雷霆行动，中共跨国镇压的邪恶网络已在全世界面前彻底暴露。就在今年一月，我们在洛杉矶抗议现场遭遇了卑劣的辣椒水袭击。这绝非偶然的治安冲突，而是中共在全球范围内实施恐怖治理、试图让异见者失声的典型罪证！这种下作的流氓手段，恰恰证明了独裁政权对真相的极度恐惧。
我们要正告那些躲在领馆阴影下的幕后黑手：你们以为辣椒水能喷灭自由的火种吗？你们以为雇佣几个蒙面暴徒就能阻挡民主的潮流吗？错！美意两国的司法进展清晰地表明，全球法治社会绝不容许独裁者的长臂横行。每一滴喷向我们的辣椒水，都是中共跨国犯罪的铁证。这些所谓的“侨领”和代理人，拿着独裁者的赏钱，在自由的土地上践踏法律，其行径与恐怖分子无异，终将面临法律的严惩与历史的审判。
我们坚决支持国际社会深入彻查中共的渗透势力。从秘密警察站的跨国管辖到洛杉矶街头的肉体伤害，中共的暴力黑手必须被彻底斩断！我们呼吁所有追求自由的同胞，不要被这种流氓行径所吓倒。我们不仅要揭露中共这个“政治假货”，更要让世界看清它是一个跨国犯罪集团。我们将持续站在中领馆前，直到正义得到伸张，直到暴力威胁被根除，直到自由的光芒照亮整个中国！
我們的口號：
正义必胜，暴政必亡！
严惩海外暴徒，清除中共爪牙！
反对跨国镇压，捍卫美国法治！
時間：2026年3月22日（星期日）3:30PM (下午)
地點：中共駐洛杉磯總領館
地址：443 Shatto Pl, Los Angeles, CA 90020
活動召集人：廖军/孔德翠
活動規劃： 孫曄/劉廣賢
活動主持：易勇
組織者：
胡月明4806536918/張健3236122777
胡君9098330598 / 穆偉6265670518
黄思博6262345396 / 范强 6268616043
活動義工：于海龍 /李錦華/陳健 /李琦/劉紹陽/苏毅/陳勝/張星
攝影：Ji Luo /王永 /劉樂園
主辦單位：
中國民主黨聯合總部美西黨部
中國民主黨聯合總部美南黨部
自由鐘民主基金會
闻道读书会特别场
奥运冠军背后的父亲：一个关于成长与选择的真实故事
最近，一位年轻的华裔奥运冠军 Alysa Liu，正在成为新的美国偶像。
她的成功不仅属于体育，更关乎家庭、教育与价值选择。
而在她背后，有一位引人关注的人物——她的父亲，刘俊律师。
作为“六四”一代的亲历者，他不仅培养出一位世界级运动员，
更在人生关键时刻，做出了坚定选择：
拒绝来自中共的金钱诱惑，坚持自己的价值立场
这一故事，已在海外华人圈广泛传播，引发深度讨论。
订座链接，凭二维码入场：https://www.eventbrite.com/e/1985394544528?aff=oddtdtcreator
闻道读书会特别场
闻道读书会特别场，来和书友们现场畅聊好书，分享阅读的乐趣吧！
地址：2077 Gold St ，San Jose，CA
时间：Friday,Mar 20th From 7 pm – 9 pm
作者：张宇
编辑：李聪玲 校对：熊辩 翻译：戈冰
今天，是李文亮医生去世六周年的日子。
六年前的那个夜晚，一个34岁的武汉医生在隔离病房里停止了呼吸。官方通报说，他死于新冠肺炎。但所有清醒的人都知道，真正夺走他生命的，并不只是病毒，而是一个把“说真话”视为威胁的政治体制。李文亮不是疫情的制造者，却成了体制失控的牺牲品；他不是公共安全的破坏者，却被当作“造谣者”按在地上训诫。
李文亮究竟做错了什么？
他没有召开记者会，没有煽动恐慌，没有对抗政府。他只是以一个医生的本能，在同行之间提醒一句：“注意防护”。这在任何一个正常社会，都是值得尊重的职业操守。但在中国，这却触碰了中国共产党最敏感、也最致命的神经——权力对信息的垄断。
正是在那一刻，李文亮被选中了。不是因为他多么出名，而是因为他足够普通。一个普通医生的声音，竟然能够动摇体制的“维护稳定”，这本身就暴露了中共政权的脆弱与恐惧。于是，训诫代替讨论，封口取代了防控，政治维稳凌驾于专业判断之上。
六年过去，中国共产党试图用“烈士”称号为李文亮盖棺定论，用时间冲淡责任，用遗忘完成洗白。但有些问题，注定无法被掩埋：如果当初没有封口，会死这么多人吗？如果真话不是罪，李文亮还会死吗？
纪念李文亮，不是为了怀旧，而是为了拒绝被再次欺骗。因为当一个政权必须靠压制真相才能维持运转时，李文亮的死亡，就不是一场悲剧的终点，而是无数悲剧的起点。
如果必须追究李文亮的“错误”，那我们首先得弄清楚：他到底做了什么。
2019年12月底，李文亮在一个仅限医生的微信群中，提醒同行注意一种“类似SARS的不明肺炎”，建议大家加强防护。这不是公开发声，不是媒体爆料，更不是政治表态，而是一名医生在面对异常病例时，最本能、最职业、也是负责任的反应。
在任何一个正常社会，这种行为只有一个名字：专业预警。
但在中国，它被定性为“散布谣言”。
这个定性本身，就已经荒谬到近乎残酷。因为如果连医生之间的专业提醒都必须等待官方允许，那么医学就不再是科学，而是政治的附庸；防疫也不再是公共卫生行为，而是一场服从测试。
问题从来不在于李文亮“说错了什么”，而在于他不该在没有得到政治许可的情况下说任何话。中国共产党无法容忍的，并不是真假问题，而是控制权问题。真相如果不是从官方口中说出，即便完全正确，也被视为威胁；专业判断如果不服务于政治，即便挽救生命，也会被视为“不稳定因素”。
于是，一个再普通不过的医生，被拉进派出所；一张无需法庭、无需证据、无需辩护的训诫书，被强行按在他面前。那不是法律文书，而是权力向个体发出的赤裸警告：你可以是医生，但你不能先于党说话。
更讽刺的是，李文亮后来感染病毒，并最终去世，恰恰证明了他当时的判断是完全正确的。所谓“谣言”，成了现实；所谓“维稳”，成了灾难的前奏。但在中共的体系中，正确与否从来不是评判标准，服从与否才是。
因此，李文亮真正的“罪名”只有一个：他在一个以谎言维持秩序的体制里，说了一句实话。而当一个社会把“说实话”定义为原罪时，任何专业、任何良知、任何普通人，都会随时成为下一个李文亮。
李文亮的遭遇，迅速完成了一次高效的社会教育——它不需要文件下发，不需要会议传达，却精准地让每一个人学会了同一件事：沉默，是最安全的专业选择。
这正是中国共产党统治最可怕的地方。它并不需要对每一个人施暴，只需要让暴力被看见一次。恐惧就会像病毒一样扩散，进入制度、进入组织、进入每一个普通人的判断中。久而久之，封口不再需要命令，自我审查会自动运转。
在这样的环境中，疫情失控并不是意外，而是结果。
当早期预警被压制，当专业判断被噤声，当所有人都在等待“上面的态度”，病毒却不需要态度。它不理解维稳，不尊重权威，也不在乎政治正确。它只遵循生物学规律，而恰恰是这些规律，被中国的政治系统忽视。
更讽刺的是，当灾难已经无法掩盖，舆论开始反噬，中共并没有反思体制本身，而是迅速切换叙事：从“没有人传人”到“人民战争”；从“造谣者依法处理”到“感动中国英雄”。责任被稀释，错误被模糊，真正需要被追问的制度问题，再一次被推入沉默。
李文亮并没有等到一个真正的道歉 ，社会也没有等到一次真正的反省。相反，这种“以恐惧换稳定、以沉默换秩序”的治理逻辑被证明是可行的，于是被继续沿用。
从疫情到后来的一切，我们看到的是同一套模式的不断复制：
先封口，再失控；先否认，再宣传；先牺牲个人，再歌颂集体。
李文亮之所以重要，不只是因为他死了，而是因为他的遭遇，清楚地展示了一个事实：在一个惩罚诚实、奖励服从的体制里，灾难不是偶发事件，而是制度必然。
当整个社会被训练成“不要第一个说话的人”，当所有专业都学会向权力低头，下一次悲剧的种子其实已经种下。而它是否爆发，只取决于时间。
在李文亮去世后不久，中国共产党迅速完成了一次熟练而冷酷的叙事转换。
他被“平反”了。他被追授“烈士”称号。他被纳入官方纪念体系，成为可控的符号。
表面看，这是对一个逝去医生的肯定；但本质上，这是一场权力对责任的系统性逃避。
真正的问题，从来没有被回答：是谁下令训诫？依据是什么？程序在哪里？如果李文亮没有“被造谣”，为什么当初要他签字认错？如果他说的是真话，那当时惩罚他的权力，是否构成对公共安全的严重伤害？这些问题，没有调查，没有问责，也没有结果。
所谓“平反”，并不是为李文亮讨回公道，而是为了体制止血。它的目的不是厘清责任，而是尽快终结讨论；不是修正制度，而是恢复权威。通过赋予他“烈士”的身份，中共成功地把一个制度性问题包装成了一场个人悲剧，再把悲剧纳入可被管理的叙事之中。而真正需要被审视的制度，却因此逃过了清算。
更具讽刺意味的是，李文亮事件之后，同样的封口机制并没有停止。相反，它被证明是“有效的”，于是继续被复制、被常态化。对不同领域的专业人士、不同阶段的公共事件，权力依旧优先选择控制信息，而不是尊重事实。
这恰恰说明，所谓“平反”并没有带来任何制度性改变，它只是一次精心设计的情绪安抚，是对公众愤怒的临时止痛药。真正的责任人没有付出代价，真正的机制没有被拆除，真正的问题仍然完好无损。
在一个健康的社会中，纪念意味着反思，意味着改革，意味着不再重演同样的错误。而在中国，纪念往往意味着盖棺定论——不仅为逝者盖棺，也为问题盖棺。
因此，“烈士”这个称号，与其说是荣誉，不如说是一道封条。它告诉人们：故事已经结束，不必再追问；错误已经翻篇，不必再讨论；体制已经自省，不必再质疑。
但事实恰恰相反。一个拒绝追责、拒绝反思、拒绝改变的体制，不可能从悲剧中学习。它唯一学会的，只是如何更高效地掩盖、更熟练地转移、更冷静地等待人们遗忘。
而对李文亮而言，这样的“平反”，不是安慰，而是第二次伤害。
李文亮的存在，戳破了中共长期维持的一个核心谎言——它宣称自己代表人民、保护人民、依靠专业治理国家。但当一个真正站在公共安全一线的医生被当作威胁处理时，这个谎言就瞬间破产。体制所展现的，不是自信，而是恐惧；不是能力，而是脆弱。
更致命的是，李文亮让无数普通人意识到：问题不在于你是不是“反对党”，而在于你是否说了不该由你说的真话。
这意味着，在中国，没有“安全的诚实”。只要你的事实先于官方口径出现，只要你的判断不受政治控制，你就可能成为下一个被训诫、被噤声、被牺牲的人。这种不确定性，正是极权维持统治的关键工具。
李文亮真正留下的，并不是一句口号，而是一道无法回避的问题：如果一个社会需要靠压制医生、恐吓专业人士、封锁预警信息来维持秩序，那它到底在害怕什么？答案并不复杂。它害怕的，是事实本身；是无法被指挥、无法被统一口径、无法被“正确引导”的现实。它害怕普通人意识到：权力并非无所不知，官方叙事并非天然正确，真相并不一定掌握在权力手上。
李文亮不需要被神化。他的危险性，恰恰在于他的普通。他证明了一件让中国共产党极度不安的事实：不需要反抗者，只要还有人坚持不说谎，谎言体制就永远无法真正安全。
六年过去了，李文亮的名字仍然被允许出现，但他说过的话，却依然危险。
如果一个政权真心尊重真相，那么说出真相的人不需要以死亡换取清白；
如果一个制度真正以人民生命为先，那么预警者不会先被训诫，再被追授；
如果所谓“平反”不是谎言，那么同样的封口、同样的恐惧，就不该在六年后依然存在。
但现实是，中国共产党什么都没有改变。
李文亮的悲剧，没有终结在他的死亡那一天，而是被制度完整地继承了下来。继承的不只是训诫书这种具体手段，而是一整套以控制代替治理、以封口代替责任、以遗忘代替清算的统治逻辑。
李文亮不是体制的例外，而是体制的必然产物。
六年过去，我们真正要纪念的，不是一个已经无法说话的人，而是那个仍然悬而未决的问题：在一个惩罚诚实的国家里，我们是否已经习惯了不再开口？如果答案是肯定的，那么李文亮的死亡，就不仅是他的悲剧，也是整个社会的失败；如果答案是否定的，那么至少有一点可以确认——即使在谎言构筑的高墙之内，真相仍然在敲门。
纪念李文亮，不是为了过去，而是为了拒绝成为一个明知真相却选择沉默的人。
Abstract: Li Wenliang’s death is not only a personal tragedy, but also reveals how a system that suppresses the truth can create disasters. The article restores events, criticizes the gag mechanism, and points out that the system of punishing honesty must constantly replicate tragedy.
Author: Zhang Yu
Editor: Li Congling Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Ge Bing
Today marks the sixth anniversary of Dr. Li Wenliang’s death.
That night six years ago, a 34-year-old Wuhan doctor stopped breathing in an isolation ward. Officials reported that he died of COVID-19. But all sober people know that it wasn’t just the virus that really took his life, but a political system that viewed “telling the truth” as a threat. Li Wenliang was not the creator of the epidemic, but he became a victim of the system’s loss of control; he was not a destroyer of public safety, but he was held on the ground as a “rumormonger” and admonished.
What did Li Wenliang do wrong?
He did not hold press conferences, incite panic, or confront the government. He simply used a doctor’s instinct to remind his peers: “Watch out for protection”. This is professional ethics that should be respected in any normal society. But in China, this touches the Chinese Communist Party’s most sensitive and deadly nerve —— the monopoly of power over information.
It was at that moment that Li Wenliang was selected. Not because he’s famous, but because he’s ordinary enough. The fact that the voice of an ordinary doctor can shake the system “maintain stability” itself exposes the fragility and fear of the Chinese Communist regime. Thus, admonitions replaced discussion, silencing replaced prevention and control, and political stability took precedence over professional judgment.
Six years have passed, and the Communist Party of China has tried to use the title of “martyr” to cover Li Wenliang’s coffin and make a final conclusion, using time to dilute responsibility and forgetting to complete the whitewashing. But there are some questions that are destined not to be buried: If the seal had not been made, would so many people have died? If truth is not a sin, will Li Wenliang still die?
Remembering Li Wenliang is not for nostalgia, but to refuse to be deceived again. Because when a regime must rely on suppressing the truth to maintain its operation, Li Wenliang’s death is not the end of a tragedy, but the starting point of countless tragedies.
If Li Wenliang must be held accountable for his “mistakes”, then we must first understand: what exactly he did.
At the end of December 2019, Li Wenliang reminded his colleagues in a WeChat group for doctors only to pay attention to an unidentified pneumonia “similar to SARS” and suggested that everyone strengthen protection. This is not a public statement, a media revelation, or a political statement, but a doctor’s most instinctive, professional, and responsible response to an abnormal case.
In any normal society, this behavior has only one name: professional warning.
But in China, it is characterized as “spreading rumors”.
This characterization itself is absurd to the point of being almost cruel. Because if even professional reminders between doctors must wait for official permission, then medicine will no longer be science, but a vassal of politics; epidemic prevention will no longer be an act of public health, but a test of obedience.
The problem was never Li Wenliang “what he said wrong”, but that he shouldn’t have said anything without political permission. What the Chinese Communist Party cannot tolerate is not a question of truth or falsehood, but a question of control. The truth, if not spoken from the official mouth, is considered a threat even if it is completely correct; professional judgment, if not in the service of politics, is considered a “instability factor” even if it saves lives.
So a doctor, who was no more ordinary than himself, was pulled into the police station; a letter of admonition, which required no court, no evidence, and no defense, was forcibly pressed before him. That is not a legal instrument, but a naked warning from power to the individual: you can be a doctor, but you cannot speak before the party.
Even more ironically, Li Wenliang later contracted the virus and eventually died, which just proved that his judgment at the time was completely correct. The so-called “rumors” have become reality; the so-called “stability maintenance” have become the prelude to disaster. But in the CCP system, right or wrong is never the standard of judgment, obedience or not is.
Therefore, Li Wenliang has only one real “crime”: he told the truth in a system that maintains order through lies. And when a society defines “telling the truth” as original sin, any professional, any conscience, any ordinary person will become the next Li Wenliang at any time.
Li Wenliang’s experience quickly completed an efficient social education ——it did not require the issuance of documents or the communication of meetings, but accurately taught everyone the same thing: silence is the safest professional choice.
This is exactly where the Chinese Communist Party’s rule is most terrifying. It doesn’t need to be violent towards everyone, it just needs to be seen once. Fear will spread like a virus, into institutions, into organizations, into the judgment of every ordinary person. Over time, the gag no longer requires commands and self-censorship will automatically operate.
In such an environment, the outbreak’s loss of control was not an accident, but a result.
When early warnings are suppressed, when professional judgment is silenced, when everyone is waiting “attitude above”, the virus does not need attitude. It does not understand stability maintenance, does not respect authority, and does not care about political correctness. It only follows biological laws, and it is precisely these laws that are ignored by China’s political system.
Even more ironic is that when the disaster could no longer be covered up and public opinion began to backfire, the CCP did not reflect on the system itself, but quickly switched narratives: from “no one passed down the line” to “people’s war”; from “rumormongers dealt with according to law” to “moved Chinese heroes”. Responsibilities are diluted, mistakes are blurred, and institutional questions that really need to be asked are once again pushed into silence.
Li Wenliang did not wait for a real apology, and society did not wait for a real reflection. Instead, this logic of governance “fear for stability, silence for order” proved feasible and was continued.
From the pandemic to everything that followed, we saw the same pattern being replicated over and over again:
Seal the mouth first, then lose control;
Deny first, then promote;
Sacrifice the individual first, then sing the collective’s praises.
Li Wenliang is important not just because he died, but because of what happened to him, which clearly shows a fact: in a system that punishes honesty and rewards obedience, disasters are not occasional events, but institutional inevitability.
When society as a whole is trained “don’t be the first to speak”, when all professions learn to bow to power, the seeds of the next tragedy have actually been planted. And whether it breaks out depends only on time.
Shortly after Li Wenliang’s death, the Chinese Communist Party quickly completed a skilled and cold narrative shift.
He was “rehabilitated”.
He was posthumously awarded the title “Martyr”.
He was included in the official system of commemoration, becoming a controllable symbol.
On the surface, it appears to affirm a deceased doctor; at its core, however, it represents a systematic evasion of power and responsibility.The real questions remain unanswered: Who ordered the admonition? On what basis? What procedures were followed?If Li Wenliang had not “spread rumors,” why was he forced to sign a confession admitting wrongdoing in the first place? If he was telling the truth, did the authorities’ decision to punish him constitute a serious threat to public safety?None of these issues have been investigated. There has been no accountability, and no conclusions. The so-called “rehabilitation” was not about seeking justice for Li Wenliang, but about containing the damage to the system. It was not about clarifying responsibility, but about shutting down discussion as quickly as possible; not about reforming the system, but about restoring authority.By designating him a “martyr,” the CCP effectively repackaged a systemic issue as a personal tragedy, and then absorbed that tragedy into a controllable narrative. Meanwhile, the system that truly warranted scrutiny escaped accountability.Even more ironically, after the Li Wenliang incident, the same silencing mechanisms did not cease. On the contrary, they proved “effective” and became increasingly normalized. Across different professions and at various stages of public events, those in power continue to prioritize information control over factual truth.
In a healthy society, remembrance means reflection, reform, and not repeating the same mistakes. In China, commemoration often means covering the coffin and making a final decision ——covering the coffin not only for the deceased, but also for the problem.
Therefore, the title “martyr” is more of a seal than an honor. It tells people: the story is over, there is no need to ask any more questions; the mistakes have been turned over, there is no need to discuss them; the system has introspected itself, there is no need to question them.
But the opposite is true.
A system that refuses accountability, reflection, and change cannot learn from tragedy. The only thing it learns is how to cover up more efficiently, transfer more skillfully, and wait for people to forget more calmly.
For Li Wenliang, such “rehabilitation” is not comfort, but a second injury.
Li Wenliang’s existence exposes a core lie that the CCP has long maintained ——it claims to represent the people, protect the people, and rely on professional governance to govern the country. But when a doctor who was truly on the front lines of public safety was treated as a threat, the lie went bankrupt in an instant. What the system shows is not confidence, but fear; it is not ability, but vulnerability.
Even more deadly, Li Wenliang made countless ordinary people realize: the question is not whether you are “the opposition party”, but whether you have told the truth that should not be told by you.
This means that in China, there is no “safe honesty”. As long as your facts come before official calibre, as long as your judgments are not controlled by politics, you may be the next to be admonished, silenced, and sacrificed. This uncertainty is the key tool for totalitarian rule.
What Li Wenliang really left behind is not a slogan, but an unavoidable question: If a society needs to maintain order by suppressing doctors, intimidating professionals, and blocking early warning information, then what is it afraid of? The answer is not complicated. What it fears is the fact itself; a reality that cannot be commanded, cannot be unified, cannot be “correctly guided”. It fears ordinary people realizing that power is not omniscient, that official narratives are not naturally correct, and that truth does not necessarily rest in the hands of power.
Li Wenliang does not need to be deified. His danger lies precisely in his ordinary. He proved a fact that makes the Chinese Communist Party extremely uneasy: there is no need for rebels, and as long as there are people who insist on not lying, the lying system will never be truly safe.
Six years later, Li Wenliang’s name is still allowed to appear, but what he said is still dangerous.
If a regime truly respects the truth, then those who tell it do not need to trade death for innocence;
If a system truly puts people’s lives first, then early warning personnel will not be admonished first and then posthumously awarded;
If the so-called “rehabilitation” is not a lie, then the same gag and the same fear should not still exist six years later.
But the reality is that nothing has changed in the Chinese Communist Party.
Li Wenliang’s tragedy did not end on the day of his death, but was completely inherited by the system. Inheritance is not just a specific means such as the Book of Admonitions, but a complete logic of rule with control instead of governance, sealing instead of responsibility, and forgetting instead of reckoning.
Li Wenliang is not an exception to the system, but an inevitable product of the system.
Six years later, what we really want to remember is not a person who is no longer able to speak, but the question that remains unanswered: In a country that punishes honesty, have we become accustomed to not speaking anymore? If the answer is yes, then Li Wenliang’s death is not only a tragedy for him, but also a failure for the entire society; if the answer is no, then at least one thing can be confirmed ——even within the high walls built by lies, the truth is still knocking on the door.
Remembering Li Wenliang is not about the past, but about refusing to be a person who chose to remain silent despite knowing the truth.
——为人权，为自由
作者：何兴强
2026年2月1日，由中国民主人权联盟和全能基督灭共阵线联合举办的“声援邹巍，反抗中共邪教组织”活动，在中共驻洛杉矶领事馆门前如期举行。
活动现场，中国民主党创始人朱虞夫先生作为活动发起人及特邀嘉宾，回顾了邹魏的民主运动历程，介绍了他长期参与国内民主活动的重要经历，以及他遭受中共当局迫害的情况。中国民主人权联盟南加州主席房兰峰也做了分享，在国内曾遭中共迫害的中国民主党党员、中国民主人权联盟成员胡景，以及人权联盟成员卜青松等也积极参与发言，林昌武亦参加活动并表达声援。
邹巍入狱时间线:
2024年7月13日，正值诺贝尔和平奖得主刘晓波逝世七周年忌日。当天，邹巍与独立中文笔会会员昝爱宗、庄道鹤、毛庆祥等人一起，在浙江海宁钱塘江入海口举行海祭，悼念刘晓波先生。活动结束后，相关照片被发布到网络，很快，当地警方便介入该事件，并于当晚对七名参与者中的六人进行了抓捕，其中邹巍与昝爱宗被刑事拘留。
2024年7月20日，邹巍、昝爱宗被杭州市公安局拱墅分局以涉嫌“寻衅滋事罪”刑事拘留，羁押于杭州市拱墅区看守所。
2024年8月26日，两人被正式批准逮捕，并继续羁押。
2025年3月，案件进入检察院公诉阶段。据律师会见后报示，邹巍精神状态良好，仍被羁押中等待下一步程序。
2025年7月，案件被正式起诉至法院。
2025年9月19日，该案在杭州市拱墅区法院开庭审理（庭审未当庭宣判）。庭审现场外戒备森严，准备进行旁听的公民被拒绝旁听，有些人员甚至遭到短暂拘留。邹巍及其律师在庭审中作出无罪辩护，并抗议院方未保障其辩护权和公众的旁听权。
作为邹巍的老朋友，并受到活动方的邀请，朱虞夫先生在活动现场讲述了他与邹魏多年以来的交往经历：邹巍是一个有着强烈正义感和坚定追求民主、自由的人士。朱虞夫先生说，海祭那天，邹巍举着牌子，上面写着：“长江黄河不会倒流，共产党倒行逆施，残暴专横，疯狂打压异见人士，天理不容。”朱虞夫先生提到，当他被批准保外就医的时候，中共国安特意要求他，出国就医期间不要对外说他是因为什么被判刑的，对于这样的事共产党羞于启齿。不让说出来，正暴露了他们对民主与自由的恐惧。他们也知道，打压民主人士是见不得光的。中共做的反人性，反人民的事情，让国保们觉得脸上无光。打压民主人士，把他们投入监狱，出来了还要压制他们的声音，这就更揭露了共产党是个彻头彻尾的邪教组织。
面对中共对基督徒的疯狂打压和迫害，大多数中国大陆人民不敢大胆表达自己的信仰和观点，不能公开追求自己的信仰！但凡有真正信仰的人，就会被定义为参与邪教。害怕追求真理和正义的宗教，正恰恰说明了共产党就是一个邪教组织，而且是全世界最大的邪教组织。
作为一名基督徒我认为共产党害怕耶稣，从耶稣的死可以看到共产主义的灭亡！当年罗马专制政权也曾迫害基督徒，迫害耶稣，它们把耶稣钉在十字架上，钉死了耶稣！但最后，它们停止了迫害，并承认了基督教的合法地位，后来还立基督教为国教。历史的演进一再证明，专制不会长久，压制信仰和钳制思想并不能巩固专制政权，无法带了长久统治，反而会使政权更快地步入灭亡。
最后，参与者们呼吁国际社会关注邹魏，关注中国人权，解救受困于狱中的政治犯、良心犯，解放中国人民。
在这里，我想说，同胞们，让我们团结起来，为了我们的民主与自由，一起推翻中共。
共产主义必将失败，中国共产党必将灭亡！
**In Support of Democracy Advocate Zou Wei
— For Human Rights, For Freedom**
By: He Xingqiang
On February 1, 2026, a rally was held in front of the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles to support Zou Wei and to oppose the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a cult organization. The event was jointly organized by the China Democracy and Human Rights Alliance and the Almighty Christ Anti-Communist Front.
The event was coordinated and hosted by He Xingqiang. Zhu Yufu, founder of the China Democracy Party, was invited as the initiator of the event and a special guest and delivered a speech on site. Fang Lanfeng, President of the Southern California chapter of the China Democracy and Human Rights Alliance, also spoke at the event.
Other speakers included Hu Jing, a member of the China Democracy Party and the China Democracy and Human Rights Alliance who has been persecuted by the Communist Party inside China; Pu Qingsong, a member of the China Democracy and Human Rights Alliance; and democracy activist Lin Changwu.
July 13, 2024 marked the seventh anniversary of the death of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Liu Xiaobo. On that day, Zou Wei, together with independent Chinese PEN members Zan Aizong, Zhuang Daohe, Mao Qingxiang, and others, held a sea memorial ceremony at the Qiantang River estuary in Haining, Zhejiang Province.
Shortly after photos of the event were posted online, the police intervened and arrested six participants that very night. Among them, Zou Wei and Zan Aizong were subsequently placed under criminal detention.
July 20, 2024: Zou Wei and Zan Aizong were criminally detained by the Gongshu Branch of the Hangzhou Public Security Bureau on suspicion of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” and were held at the Gongshu Detention Center in Hangzhou.
August 26, 2024: Both individuals were formally arrested (approved for arrest) and remained in custody.
March 2025: The case entered the procuratorate stage. According to lawyers’ meeting reports, Zou Wei was in stable condition and continued to be detained pending further legal procedures.
July 2025: The case was formally prosecuted and transferred to the court, marking the statutory indictment stage.
September 19, 2025: The case was heard at the Gongshu District People’s Court in Hangzhou. No verdict was announced. Security outside the court was extremely tight; citizens seeking to observe the trial were refused entry or briefly detained. Zou Wei and his lawyer entered a not guilty plea and protested the failure to guarantee the right to defense and public observation.
Mr. Zhu Yufu, a longtime friend of Zou Wei, was invited by the organizers to share his personal experiences with Zou Wei. He described Zou Wei as a man of justice who firmly pursues democracy and freedom.
Mr. Zhu recalled that Zou Wei once held a sign reading: “The Yangtze and Yellow Rivers will not flow backward. The Communist Party acts against history, rules brutally, and insanely suppresses dissent—this defies justice and conscience.”
Mr. Zhu also revealed that when he was released on medical parole, China’s state security authorities instructed him not to disclose the reason for his conviction. The Communist Party, he said, is ashamed to admit its persecution of democracy activists—it has no moral legitimacy. What it has done is anti-humanity and anti-people. The Communist Party is, in essence, a thoroughly cult-like organization.
He further stated that the CCP persecutes Christians, and that people in mainland China cannot and dare not openly express their views or pursue their faith. Anyone with genuine belief is labeled a “cult,” while in reality, the Chinese Communist Party itself is the largest cult in the world.
The Communist Party fears Jesus. From the death of Jesus, one can foresee the downfall of communism. The ancient Roman authoritarian regime crucified Jesus; later, it enacted laws to stop persecuting Christians and eventually established Christianity as the state religion—this history itself is clear proof.
Communism will inevitably collapse. The Chinese Communist Party will inevitably collapse.
—— 一年六個“首創”的探索與突破
作者：趙紀森 編輯：王夢夢 翻譯：戈冰
過去一年多來，中國民主黨洛杉磯委員會影視部在條件有限的情況下，積極探索以影像、節目與公共活動推動民主理念傳播的新方式。從節目製作到公共行動，從文化表達到國際聯動，影視部以志願精神和創新方式，為民主運動開闢了新的傳播空間。這不僅是一次技術層面的嘗試，更是一種在限制中尋找突破的實踐。
短短一年多時間裡，影視部在洛杉磯全委會的工作中創造了六項具有開創性的實踐，在組織合作、輿論傳播與公共參與等方面取得突破。
一、以志願協作重塑影像生產方式
影視部率先嘗試以志願方式製作節目，成功推出《瘋人院》與《焦點瘋談》兩檔節目。節目製作過程完全由黨內志願者完成，劇組成員均為黨內人士，並以義務方式參與演出與製作。
在沒有專業資金支持的情況下，這種零成本製作模式充分展現了黨員對民主事業的熱情與投入，也證明了創意與團隊合作可以突破資源限制，讓政治表達以更加生動的方式呈現。
二、跨區域協同：從分散個體到集體行動
影視部發起全球聲援于朦朧的行動，迅速得到中國民主黨全美各地支部的響應。各地支部在同一時間段內共同參與聲援活動，形成了一次跨區域協同的集體行動。
與此同時，全球許多關注中國人權問題的組織與個人也紛紛加入聲援。大量同情于朦朧遭遇、反對中共漠視人權的社會人士在不同國家發聲，使這次行動形成了跨地域、跨群體的國際聯動聲援。
這種跨地域的協同行動，突破了傳統組織的地理限制，使分散的個體形成可見的集體聲音，呈現出一種去中心化卻高度連結的行動模式，也顯示出民主理念在全球語境中的共鳴能力。
三、將公共議題轉化為可感知的影像敘事
影視部在節目內容創作上，嘗試將當前社會熱點事件融入節目議題之中。透過節目討論與評論，對中共政權在相關事件中的責任提出質疑與問責。
這種將公共議題與媒體創作結合的方式，使節目不僅具有娛樂性，也具有公共討論價值，從而擴大了民主運動在輿論場中的影響力。
四、以數位平台連結全球公共意志
在國際公益平台發起的聯署行動，最終獲得超過70萬份簽名。
這一成果的意義，並不僅在於數量本身，而在於它證明：在數位時代，公共意志可以跨越國界被快速聚集，個體的微小行動也能在網絡中形成可見的力量。
五、打破邊界：讓不同立場進入同一空間
在多次線下活動中，影視部突破傳統模式，主動邀請黨外人士甚至非反共人士參與活動。
透過公開交流與事實展示，使更多普通民眾能夠直接了解共產黨體制下的人權問題與歷史事實。這種更加開放的活動形式，為不同立場的人提供了交流與思考的空間。
六、從政治走向文化：公共記憶的重建
影視部還發起了一項具有文化象徵意義的活動——為一位已故娛樂明星建立紀念長椅銘牌。
這一活動以公共紀念的形式，表達對自由精神與公共記憶的尊重，也使民主運動在政治之外，增加了文化與人文層面的表達。
用影像記錄時代，也參與時代
回顧這一年多的探索，影視部的工作規模或許並不龐大，但其創新意義卻值得肯定。從零成本節目製作，到全球聯動聲援；從公共議題討論，到文化紀念活動，每一次嘗試都在拓展民主運動的表達方式。
影像不僅是記錄工具，更是一種傳播力量。
未來，中國民主黨洛杉磯委員會影視部仍將繼續探索新的創作形式，通過光影與公共行動，記錄時代、傳播自由與民主的理念。
— A Year of Exploration and Breakthroughs Marked by Six “Firsts”
Author: Zhao Jisen Editor: Wang Mengmeng Translator: Ge Bing
Abstract: This article reviews the explorations of the Film and Television Department of the Los Angeles Committee of the China Democratic Party over the past year. Through six innovative practices—including zero-cost program production, global solidarity campaigns, and advocacy on public issues—the department has expanded pathways for democratic communication, demonstrating the cohesion and influence of grassroots power in visual media and public action.
Over the past year, the Film and Television Department of the Los Angeles Committee of the China Democratic Party has actively explored new ways to promote democratic ideals through visuals, programming, and public events, despite limited resources. From program production to public action, and from cultural expression to international collaboration, the department has opened up new spaces for the democratic movement through volunteerism and innovative approaches. This is not merely a technical experiment but a practice of finding breakthroughs within constraints.
In just over a year, the Film and Television Department has pioneered six groundbreaking initiatives within the Los Angeles Committee’s work, achieving breakthroughs in organizational collaboration, public discourse, and civic engagement.
I. Reshaping Video Production Through Volunteer Collaboration
The Film and Television Department took the lead in experimenting with volunteer-based program production, successfully launching two shows: *The Madhouse* and *Focus on Madness*. The production process was entirely carried out by Party volunteers; all crew members were Party members who participated in acting and production on a voluntary basis.
Without professional funding, this zero-cost production model fully demonstrated Party members’ passion and dedication to the cause of democracy. It also proved that creativity and teamwork can overcome resource constraints, allowing political expression to be presented in a more vivid manner.
II. Cross-Regional Collaboration: From Dispersed Individuals to Collective Action
The Film and Television Department launched a global campaign in support of Yu Menglong, which quickly garnered a response from Democratic Party of China branches across the United States. Branches in various regions participated in the solidarity campaign simultaneously, forming a collective action through cross-regional collaboration.
At the same time, numerous organizations and individuals worldwide concerned with human rights issues in China joined the solidarity effort. A large number of social activists from various countries, sympathizing with Yu Menglong’s plight and opposing the CCP’s disregard for human rights, raised their voices, transforming this campaign into a transregional, cross-group international solidarity movement.
This cross-regional collaborative action transcended the geographical limitations of traditional organizations, enabling dispersed individuals to form a visible collective voice. It demonstrated a decentralized yet highly interconnected model of action, highlighting the resonance of democratic ideals within a global context.
III. Transforming Public Issues into Tangible Visual Narratives
In its content creation, the Film and Television Department sought to integrate current social hot topics into program themes. Through program discussions and commentary, it questions and holds the Chinese Communist Party regime accountable for its role in these events.
This approach of combining public issues with media production ensures that programs are not only entertaining but also contribute to public discourse, thereby expanding the influence of the democratic movement in the public sphere.
IV. Connecting Global Public Will Through Digital Platforms
A petition campaign launched on an international public interest platform ultimately garnered over 700,000 signatures.
The significance of this achievement lies not merely in the numbers themselves, but in the fact that it demonstrates: in the digital age, public will can be rapidly mobilized across national borders, and even the smallest actions by individuals can coalesce into a visible force online.
V. Breaking Down Barriers: Bringing Different Perspectives into the Same Space
In numerous offline events, the Film and Television Department broke with traditional models by proactively inviting non-Party members and even those who are not anti-Communist to participate.
Through open dialogue and the presentation of facts, more ordinary citizens were able to gain direct insight into human rights issues and historical realities under the Communist regime. This more open format of engagement provided a space for people of differing viewpoints to exchange ideas and reflect.
VI. From Politics to Culture: Reconstructing Public Memory
The Film and Television Department also initiated a culturally symbolic project—erecting a commemorative plaque on a park bench in honor of a deceased entertainment star.
As a form of public commemoration, this initiative expresses respect for the spirit of freedom and public memory, while also expanding the democratic movement beyond the political realm to include cultural and humanistic dimensions.
Documenting the Era Through Images, and Participating in It
Looking back on over a year of exploration, the scale of the Film and Television Department’s work may not be vast, but its innovative significance is worthy of recognition. From producing programs at zero cost to organizing global solidarity campaigns; from discussing public issues to hosting cultural commemorative events, every endeavor has expanded the range of expression within the democratic movement.
Visual media is not merely a tool for documentation; it is a force for dissemination.
Moving forward, the Film and Television Department of the Los Angeles Committee of the China Democratic Party will continue to explore new creative forms, using film and public action to document the times and spread the ideals of freedom and democracy.
会 议 提 案
| 提案名称 ： | 恢复政协的正常功能:邀请反对派政党、异议人士参加政治协商会议 |
| 提案人 ： | 中国民主党:朱虞夫、郑存柱 |
| 提案日期 ： | 2026 年 3 月 4 日 |
| 提案类别 ： | 政治体制改革 |
一、案由
中国人民政治协商会议（政协）设立之初，其核心宗旨在于将各党派、各界别、各民族、各团体的代表纳入政治协商框架，实现“长期共存、互相监督、肝胆相照、荣辱与共”的政治协商原则。然而，当前政协的实际运作已严重偏离这一初衷，真正的反对派政党和持不同政见者被全面排斥在外，政治协商名存实亡。本提案旨在呼吁恢复政协作为政治协商机构的正常功能，切实落实《中国人民政治协商会议章程》的相关规定，向包括反对派政党、异议人士在内的各界人士开放政协席位，使政治协商制度回归真实、多元、包容的本来面目。
二、历史依据与现实背景
（一）政协的历史初衷。1949 年第一届中国人民政治协商会议召开时，共有各党派、各界别、各团体代表共 662 人出席，其中包括中国国民党革命委员会、中国民主同盟、中国民主建国会、中国致公党、九三学社、台湾民主自治同盟等多个党派和无党派民主人士。这一制度的设计初衷，是在新中国建立之初统一各方力量、共商国是。彼时的政协具有实质性的政治协商功能，各方可以自由发表不同意见。
（二）1957 年后的转折。反右运动后，政协的政治协商功能逐渐弱化。民主党派中大量敢于直言的人士被打成“右派”，从此以后，政协逐渐从政治协商机构异化为形式上的“统一战线组织”，反对意见被视为禁区，真正的政治协商名存实亡。
（三）当前政协的结构性缺陷。现今政协的委员构成中，各“民主党派”均自认“接受中国共产党领导”，不存在任何真正意义上的反对派或独立声音。异议人士、独立知识分子、民间组织代表、不同政治观点持有者均无法进入政协平台。这使得政协失去了其作为“政治协商”机构的核心意义。
三、提案内容与具体建议
基于上述历史依据与现实分析，本党郑重提出以下建议：
1. 开放政协席位给真正的反对派政党。允许包括中国民主党在内的未注册政党及独立政治团体派出代表参与政协会议，使政协席位真正体现“各党派”的多元性。
2. 邀请异议人士、独立知识分子参加政协。为长期关注公共事务、人权事业、法治建设的独立人士提供政协委员席位，包括但不限于维权律师、公共知识分子、独立媒体人、民间社会组织代表等。
3. 保障政协委员的言论自由与谏正质询权。任何政协委员在政协会议期间的发言、提案、质询不得作为政治追诉的依据，确立政协委员谏正免责权。
4. 建立政协提案的强制回复机制。政府部门对政协委员的提案必须在规定时限内作出书面回复，并向社会公开，接受全体政协委员的质询和监督。
5. 改革政协委员选拔机制。政协委员应通过其所代表界别的民主协商或选举产生，而非单纯由上级指定，以增强政协委员的代表性和合法性。
6. 公开政协会议过程。政协全体会议、小组讨论及提案审议应向媒体和公众开放，实现政治协商的透明化，接受全社会的监督。
四、提案理由
（一）实现《宪法》赋予公民的政治权利。《中华人民共和国宪法》第三十五条规定，公民有言论、出版、集会、结社、游行、示威的自由。将持不同政见者排斥在政治协商体制之外，违背了宪法精神。
（二）增强国家治理的合法性与有效性。当所有政治参与者均持相同立场时，政治协商失去意义。引入真正的反对派和不同声音，能形成有效的政策辩论和监督，提升决策质量，增强国家治理的合法性。
（三）回应社会多元化的现实需求。当今中国社会已高度多元化，不同的利益群体、价值观念、政治诉求广泛存在。政协作为“最广泛的爱国统一战线组织”，应当真正容纳和反映这种多元性，而非将其压制和消弭。
（四）展现制度自信。一个真正自信的政治制度，不应害怕不同声音，而应当通过包容和对话来展现其优越性。开放政协平台给反对派，正是制度自信的体现。
五、结语
政治协商的前提是多元与包容。没有反对派的参与，政治协商便无从谈起。中国民主党作为一个追求宪政民主的政党，愿意在政协的框架内，以和平、理性、建设性的方式参与国家治理，为中国的政治文明进步贡献力量。
我们期望政协能够回归其历史使命，成为真正的多党派政治协商平台，而非形式主义的橡皮图章。这不仅是对政协创立者的告慰，更是对十四亿中国人民政治权利的尊重。
提案人：中国民主党：朱虞夫、郑存柱2026 年3 月4 日
Conference Proposal
| Title of Proposal: | Restoring the Proper Function of the CPPCC: Inviting Opposition Parties and Dissidents to Participate in the Political Consultative Conference |
| Proposers: | China Democracy Party: Zhu Yufu, Zheng Cunzhu |
| Date of Submission: | March 4, 2026 |
| Category: | Political System Reform |
I. Rationale
When the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) was first established, its core purpose was to incorporate representatives from various political parties, sectors of society, ethnic groups, and organizations into the framework of political consultation, thereby realizing the principles of “long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, frank and open communication, and sharing both honor and disgrace.” However, the CPPCC’s current operations have severely deviated from this original intent. Genuine opposition parties and dissidents have been completely excluded, rendering the political consultation system a mere formality. This proposal aims to call for the restoration of the CPPCC’s normal functions as a political consultation body, to effectively implement the relevant provisions of the Charter of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, and to open CPPCC seats to representatives from all sectors of society—including opposition parties and dissidents—so that the political consultation system may return to its true, diverse, and inclusive nature.
II. Historical Basis and Current Context
(1) The Original Intent of the CPPCC. When the First Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was convened in 1949, a total of 662 representatives from various political parties, sectors, and organizations attended, including members of the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang, the China Democratic League, the China Association for Promoting Democracy, the China Zhi Gong Party, the Jiusan Society, the Taiwan Democratic Autonomous League, and other political parties, as well as non-partisan democratic figures. The original design of this system was to unify all forces and jointly deliberate on state affairs at the dawn of the People’s Republic of China. At that time, the CPPCC possessed substantive political consultation functions, and all parties could freely express differing opinions.
(2) The Turning Point After 1957. Following the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the CPPCC’s political consultative function gradually weakened. A large number of outspoken figures within the democratic parties were labeled as “rightists.” From then on, the CPPCC gradually transformed from a political consultative body into a nominal “united front organization.” Dissenting opinions were treated as off-limits, and genuine political consultation became a mere formality.
(3) Structural Deficiencies of the Current CPPCC. In the current composition of CPPCC members, all “democratic parties” acknowledge that they “accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China,” and there are no opposition parties or independent voices in any meaningful sense. Dissenters, independent intellectuals, representatives of civil society organizations, and those holding differing political views are unable to gain access to the CPPCC platform. This has caused the CPPCC to lose its core significance as an institution for “political consultation.”
III. Proposal Content and Specific Recommendations
Based on the historical context and current analysis outlined above, our Party solemnly proposes the following recommendations:
1. Open CPPCC seats to genuine opposition parties. Allow unregistered political parties, including the China Democratic Party, and independent political groups to send representatives to participate in CPPCC sessions, ensuring that CPPCC seats truly reflect the diversity of “all political parties.”
2. Invite dissidents and independent intellectuals to participate in the CPPCC. Provide CPPCC member seats to independent individuals who have long been concerned with public affairs, human rights, and the rule of law, including but not limited to rights defense lawyers, public intellectuals, independent media professionals, and representatives of civil society organizations.
3. Guarantee CPPCC members’ freedom of speech and their right to offer advice and raise inquiries. No remarks, proposals, or inquiries made by any CPPCC member during CPPCC sessions shall be used as grounds for political prosecution; establish immunity for CPPCC members regarding their right to offer advice and criticism.
4. Establish a mandatory response mechanism for CPPCC proposals. Government departments must provide written responses to CPPCC members’ proposals within the prescribed timeframe, make these responses public, and be subject to inquiry and oversight by all CPPCC members.
5. Reform the selection mechanism for CPPCC members. CPPCC members should be selected through democratic consultation or election within the sectors they represent, rather than simply being appointed by higher authorities, to enhance their representativeness and legitimacy.
6. Make the proceedings of CPPCC meetings public. Plenary sessions, group discussions, and proposal deliberations of the CPPCC should be open to the media and the public to ensure the transparency of political consultation and to accept oversight from society as a whole.
IV. Rationale for the Proposal
(1) Realizing the political rights granted to citizens by the Constitution. Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that citizens have the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession, and demonstration. Excluding dissidents from the political consultation system runs counter to the spirit of the Constitution.
(2) Enhancing the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of National Governance. When all political participants hold identical positions, political consultation loses its meaning. Introducing genuine opposition and dissenting voices can foster effective policy debate and oversight, improve the quality of decision-making, and strengthen the legitimacy of national governance.
(3) Responding to the Real-World Demands of a Diverse Society. Contemporary Chinese society is highly diverse, with a wide range of interest groups, value systems, and political demands. As the “broadest patriotic united front organization,” the CPPCC should genuinely accommodate and reflect this diversity, rather than suppressing or eliminating it.
(4) Demonstrating institutional confidence. A truly confident political system should not fear dissenting voices but should demonstrate its superiority through inclusiveness and dialogue. Opening the CPPCC platform to the opposition is precisely a manifestation of such institutional confidence.
V. Conclusion
The prerequisites for political consultation are pluralism and inclusiveness. Without the participation of the opposition, political consultation is impossible. As a political party committed to constitutional democracy, the China Democratic Party is willing to participate in national governance within the framework of the CPPCC in a peaceful, rational, and constructive manner, contributing to the advancement of China’s political civilization.
We hope that the CPPCC will return to its historical mission and become a genuine multi-party political consultation platform, rather than a rubber-stamp body mired in formalism. This would not only honor the memory of the CPPCC’s founders but also demonstrate respect for the political rights of China’s 1.4 billion people.
Proposers: China Democratic Party: Zhu Yufu, Zheng Cunzhu
March 4, 2026
2026年政府工作报告宣布，城乡居民基础养老金再次提高20元。这个数字被包装为“民生改善”，被当作国家关怀农村老人的证明。然而，当我们把这20元放进真实的生活语境中，就会发现，这更像是一种制度性的敷衍，甚至是一种对底层群体长期忽视后的象征性安抚。
一个最简单的问题是：20元能改变什么？当一碗面接近20元，一次普通就医远超其数额，这种调整几乎不具备实际意义。农村老人每月两三百元的养老金，本就无法覆盖基本生活，更不用说医疗、护理与意外支出。当国家以如此微小的幅度调整养老金，却将其宣传为重大民生进步时，问题就不再只是经济问题，而是政治问题。
真正的矛盾在于，中国的发展模式长期建立在对农民的制度性牺牲之上。土地制度、户籍制度、社会保障制度，都在不同程度上把农民排除在现代福利体系之外。数亿农民在工业化与城市化进程中提供了廉价劳动力，承担了通货膨胀与公共服务不足的风险，却在年老之后只能领取象征性的养老金。这不是偶然的政策失误，而是体制逻辑的必然结果。
更值得警惕的是，在缺乏民主监督与权力制衡的环境下，公共财政的使用优先级往往由少数决策者决定，而非通过社会讨论形成共识。农民既没有真正意义上的政治代表，也缺乏独立组织表达利益诉求的空间。他们的养老困境很难转化为制度压力，只能被动等待自上而下的“施舍式改革”。当权力无需为选票负责时，最弱势群体的利益自然最容易被忽视。
与此同时，大量资源被投入到维稳体系、形象工程以及各种宏大叙事中，而基础民生保障却长期停留在低水平微调。养老金每年象征性上涨几十元，不仅无法解决问题，反而可能强化一种危险的信号：只要社会缺乏反抗能力，再不合理的待遇也可以被合理化。这种“温水煮青蛙式”的政策调整，让不公平逐渐常态化，让底层群体习惯于低预期生存。
有人将这种政策称为“德政”，因为毕竟是增加了。但真正的德政，应当是保障人的尊严，而不是维持最低限度的生存。一个国家如果在拥有巨大财政与发展成就的同时，仍让农村老人依靠两三百元度过晚年，那么问题显然不在于有没有能力，而在于有没有意愿。
因此，农民养老金只涨20元，并不是简单的财政选择，而是一面镜子。它映照出一个高度集权体制在面对底层民生问题时的真实态度：可以缓慢调整，但不愿触动结构；可以象征改善，但避免制度重构。只要权力缺乏来自社会的有效约束，这种局面就很难根本改变。
对于普通人而言，真正值得思考的，不是这20元是否太少，而是为什么在一个强调“人民至上”的政治叙事中，最需要保障的人却始终站在福利体系的边缘。真正的民生改善，应当以人的尊严为尺度，而非以最低生存为底线。当一个社会无法保障最基础的养老尊严，其发展成就也将失去根基。
作者：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰
2026.3.15
Peasants’ Pensions Rise by Only 20 Yuan
Abstract: With peasants’ pensions increasing by a mere 20 yuan, it is difficult to improve their actual living conditions, reflecting systemic neglect and welfare imbalances. In the absence of oversight and representative mechanisms, marginalized groups have long been sidelined, and symbolic adjustments mask structural problems.
The 2026 Government Work Report announced that the basic pension for urban and rural residents would be raised by another 20 yuan. This figure has been packaged as an “improvement in people’s livelihoods” and presented as proof of the state’s care for rural seniors. However, when we place these 20 yuan within the context of real life, we find that it resembles more of a systemic evasion—or even a symbolic appeasement following long-term neglect of the underprivileged.
The simplest question is: What can 20 yuan really change? When a bowl of noodles costs nearly 20 yuan and a routine medical visit far exceeds that amount, such an adjustment is virtually meaningless. The monthly pension of two or three hundred yuan for rural seniors is already insufficient to cover basic living expenses, let alone medical care, nursing, and unexpected costs. When the state adjusts pensions by such a minuscule amount yet promotes it as a major advancement in people’s livelihoods, the issue ceases to be merely an economic one and becomes a political one.
The real contradiction lies in the fact that China’s development model has long been built upon the institutional sacrifice of peasants. Land systems, household registration systems, and social security systems all exclude peasants from modern welfare systems to varying degrees. Hundreds of millions of peasants have provided cheap labor during the processes of industrialization and urbanization, shouldering the risks of inflation and inadequate public services, yet in their old age, they can only receive symbolic pensions. This is not an accidental policy blunder, but the inevitable result of the system’s logic.
What is even more alarming is that, in an environment lacking democratic oversight and checks on power, the priorities for public finance are often determined by a handful of decision-makers rather than through social discussion leading to consensus. Peasants have neither genuine political representation nor the space to organize independently to articulate their interests. Their pension predicament is unlikely to translate into institutional pressure; they can only passively await top-down “charity-style reforms.” When those in power are not accountable to the electorate, the interests of the most vulnerable groups are naturally the easiest to overlook.
Meanwhile, vast resources are poured into stability maintenance systems, vanity projects, and various grand narratives, while basic livelihood protections remain stuck at a low level, subject only to minor adjustments. Annual symbolic pension increases of a few dozen yuan not only fail to solve the problem but may reinforce a dangerous signal: as long as society lacks the capacity to resist, even the most unreasonable treatment can be rationalized. This “the boiling frog phenomenon” approach to policy adjustment gradually normalizes inequality and conditions the underprivileged to survive with low expectations.
Some label such policies as “benevolent governance” simply because they represent an increase. But true benevolent governance should safeguard human dignity, not merely sustain the bare minimum of survival. If a nation, despite possessing immense fiscal resources and development achievements, still leaves rural elders to rely on two or three hundred yuan to get through their twilight years, then the problem clearly lies not in a lack of capability, but in a lack of will.
Therefore, the 20-yuan increase in peasants’ pensions is not merely a fiscal choice, but a mirror. It reflects the true attitude of a highly centralized system when confronting the livelihood issues of the underprivileged: it is willing to make gradual adjustments, but unwilling to touch the underlying structure; it may offer symbolic improvements, but avoids systemic restructuring. As long as power lacks effective constraints from society, this situation will be difficult to fundamentally change.
For ordinary people, what truly merits reflection is not whether 20 yuan is too little, but why, within a political narrative that emphasizes “the people first,” those most in need of protection remain perpetually on the margins of the welfare system. True improvement in people’s livelihoods should be measured by human dignity, not by the bare minimum required for survival. When a society fails to guarantee the most basic dignity in old age, its developmental achievements will also lose their foundation.
Author: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing
March 15, 2026
（一）
索求赔偿、恢复律师执业
赔偿：按照上海市相应年份的律师平均收入的标准赔偿自2020年4月1日起至恢复本人律师执业之日止的收入损失（含两年半期间限制人身自由的损失）。
上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正，你们好！
记得，上次给上海市委、市政府写公开信是四年前上海封城期间，要求当时的书记李强和龚正你鼓气勇气，勇于承担历史责任解封上海。
我是2021年1月29日在李强任中共市委书记、市长龚正、局长陆卫东期间被“合法”注销律师执业证的中国公民彭永和
之所以是合法，那是因为上海是要脸且会“用法“的地方————注销的事实依据是“无律所聘用”。
然，事实是，前后我签订了三家律师事务所。
2020年3月30日签订的第一家在我办完手续离开原所不到十分种就来电了，说：“听律师说你有政治倾向问题，我不能拿律所去赌”。为此，我特意写信给上海市司法局和上海市人民政府还做了一个视频，问：什么样的政治倾向在上海是可以做律师的？什么样的政治倾向在上海是不可以做律师的？强调：本人接受普世价值，坚决反对专政、反对独裁——如果这属于政治倾向。
——你们两位是不是跟我有同样上述的“政治倾向”？我赌你陈吉宁一定是！理由：你在英国的书没有白读！
2020年7月14日第三家律所的主任中午请我吃了午饭，饭后让我帮他完善修改聘用合同条款，下午离开律所一个半小时左右，这家律所主任就打电话过来说：“司法局说你不能转到浦东来，我没想到你情况这么严重（签合同前我对他大致讲了我的情况）。为此，我又做了一个视频说：“在上海有一股神秘的力量在阻止本人律师执业，找律所签合同的事情没有告诉任何人，手续也还没有提交到司法局，怎么就被知道了呢，难道是我被跟踪了或是通信被监控了，这跟踪监控的活司法局能干吗？
后，“厕所革命”领导人季孝龙出狱期间国保来我这“深刻交代”时说………——二位猜猜他们说了什么？
律师证被注销大概就两三天后，国保跟我说，该信访信访，该诉讼诉讼。我回复说：“我是白痴吗？我去向把我律师证干掉的人申冤，我脑子坏掉了”？
向对自己做局的人寻求救济维权，是不是脑子坏掉——书记、市长你们说是不是？
全国的公民、访民你们说是不是？
律师证被合法注销后，我就被24小时，两班倒，每班2人，看守了两年半！
疫情上海封城期间借“ ”公开信，委托李强书记帮我问问龚正你——上海市民会允许你们这样糟踏他们纳税的钱吗？
————借此机会，我要再问一下全体上海市民——你们同意他们这么做吗？
文述到此，请问：书记陈吉宁、市长龚正，我彭永和的律师证是不是被中共上海市委、市政府领导下的某些“滥用职权”的腐败份子搞掉的？我彭永和有没有权利要求赔偿？我彭永和的律师证该不该恢复？
另外，本人制定的《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则草案》已经发给律协和司法局，规则的制定和促进颁布是我对上海全体律师作出的承诺。麻烦二位帮我一个忙、帮上海全体律师一个忙——要求上海市司法局限期上海市律师协会制定颁布《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则》——书记陈吉宁、市长龚正，可以吗？
就以上问题的处理，我期待你们两位的作为。同时，我邀请全体中国公民，尤其是上海的市民和律师跟我一起做这个见证。
最后，2026年1月1日我被11人安全从北京带回上海，带回上海前两天的12月30日晚上在北京发生的我跟上海公安一起“锻炼健身”的故事，哪天兴趣来了我跟你们讲讲。
结尾，看到此文的中国公民、外国友人如果你知道或判断是谁非法阻止我在上海律师执业，麻烦联系我或者有关部门，陈吉宁书记、龚正市长公务繁忙就不要打扰他们了，以便后续本人维权、党和政府打击腐败。
本人微信电话13816353773，住上海市浦东新区航头镇沈庄村15组52号。
公民：彭永和
2026年3月1日
(I)
Seeking Compensation and Restoration of Law Practice
Compensation: Compensation for loss of income from April 1, 2020, until the date my law practice is restored, based on the standard average income for lawyers in Shanghai for the corresponding years (including compensation for the loss of personal freedom during the two-and-a-half-year period).
Shanghai Municipal Party Committee Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng, Hello!
I remember the last time I wrote an open letter to the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee and Municipal Government was four years ago during the Shanghai lockdown. I requested the then-Secretary Li Qiang and you, Gong Zheng, to summon your courage and dare to take historical responsibility to lift the lockdown on Shanghai.
I am Peng Yonghe, a Chinese citizen whose lawyer’s practicing certificate was “legally” revoked on January 29, 2021, during the tenure of Li Qiang as Secretary of the CPC Municipal Committee, Gong Zheng as Mayor, and Lu Weidong as Bureau Director.
The reason it was “legal” is that Shanghai is a place that cares about its “face” and knows how to “use the law”—the factual basis for the revocation was “no law firm employment.”
However, the fact is that I had signed contracts with three law firms one after another.
On March 30, 2020, less than ten minutes after I finished the procedures to leave my original firm, the first firm I signed with called and said: “I heard from other lawyers that you have political orientation issues; I cannot gamble with my law firm.” To this end, I specifically wrote a letter to the Shanghai Municipal Justice Bureau and the Shanghai Municipal People’s Government and made a video, asking: What kind of political orientation allows one to be a lawyer in Shanghai? What kind of political orientation prohibits one from being a lawyer in Shanghai? I emphasized: I accept universal values and resolutely oppose dictatorship and autocracy—if that counts as a political orientation.
—Do you two share the same “political orientation” as mentioned above? I bet you, Chen Jining, definitely do! The reason: Your time studying in the UK was not in vain!
On July 14, 2020, the director of a third law firm treated me to lunch. After the meal, he asked me to help him refine and modify the terms of the employment contract. About an hour and a half after I left the firm that afternoon, the director called and said: “The Justice Bureau said you cannot transfer to Pudong. I didn’t realize your situation was so serious” (I had given him a general overview of my situation before signing the contract). For this, I made another video saying: “There is a mysterious force in Shanghai preventing me from practicing law. I didn’t tell anyone about finding a firm to sign a contract, and the procedures hadn’t even been submitted to the Justice Bureau yet—how did they find out? Could it be that I am being followed or my communications are being monitored? Is following and monitoring something the Justice Bureau can do?”
Later, when Ji Xiaolong, the leader of the “Toilet Revolution,” was released from prison, the domestic security officers (Guobao) came to me for a “profound confession” and said… —Can you two guess what they said?
About two or three days after my lawyer’s certificate was revoked, the domestic security told me I could file petitions (Xinfan) or lawsuits as I saw fit. I replied: “Am I an idiot? Am I out of my mind, going to seek redress from the very people who destroyed my lawyer’s certificate?”
Seeking relief and rights protection from the people who set you up—isn’t that being out of one’s mind? Secretary, Mayor, what do you say?
Citizens and petitioners across the country, what do you say?
After my lawyer’s certificate was “legally” revoked, I was watched 24 hours a day, in two shifts with two people per shift, for two and a half years!
During the Shanghai lockdown, I used a “_____” open letter to entrust Secretary Li Qiang to ask you, Gong Zheng—would the citizens of Shanghai allow you to squander their tax money like this?
—Taking this opportunity, I want to ask all Shanghai citizens again—do you agree to them doing this?
Having written to this point, I ask: Secretary Chen Jining, Mayor Gong Zheng, was my lawyer’s certificate destroyed by certain corrupt elements “abusing their power” under the leadership of the CPC Shanghai Municipal Committee and Municipal Government? Do I, Peng Yonghe, have the right to demand compensation? Should my lawyer’s certificate be restored?
Additionally, the “Draft Rules for the Election and Recall of the Shanghai Bar Association” that I formulated has already been sent to the Bar Association and the Justice Bureau. The formulation and promotion of the promulgation of these rules is my promise to all lawyers in Shanghai. I trouble you two to do me a favor, and do all lawyers in Shanghai a favor—require the Shanghai Municipal Justice Bureau to set a deadline for the Shanghai Bar Association to formulate and promulgate the “Rules for the Election and Recall of the Shanghai Bar Association”—Secretary Chen Jining, Mayor Gong Zheng, is that possible?
Regarding the handling of the above issues, I look forward to your actions. At the same time, I invite all Chinese citizens, especially the citizens and lawyers of Shanghai, to join me as witnesses.
Finally, on January 1, 2026, I was safely brought back to Shanghai from Beijing by 11 people. Regarding the story of me “exercising and keeping fit” together with the Shanghai public security in Beijing on the night of December 30, two days before I was brought back—I will tell you about it when I feel like it.
In closing, to any Chinese citizen or foreign friend seeing this: if you know or can judge who illegally prevented me from practicing law in Shanghai, please contact me or the relevant departments. Since Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng are busy with official duties, do not disturb them, so that I may proceed with protecting my rights and the Party and government can crack down on corruption.
My WeChat and phone number is 13816353773. I live at No. 52, Group 15, Shenzhuang Village, Hangtou Town, Pudong New Area, Shanghai.
Citizen: Peng Yonghe
March 1, 2026
朱虞夫先生：
您好！
近日拜读您与郑存柱先生联名提出的《中国人民政治协商会议提案——恢复政协的正常功能：邀请反对派政党、异议人士参加政治协商会议》。通篇阅读之后，我对您长期以来为中国民主事业所付出的勇气与坚持，依然深怀敬意。您在提案中提出，希望恢复政协设立之初的政治协商精神，让包括反对派政党、异议人士在内的不同政治力量进入协商体系，从而推动中国政治制度向更加开放、多元、包容的方向发展。这种以和平、理性方式推动政治进步的愿望，本身体现了一种建设性的政治理想。
然而，在认真思考之后，我仍有一些不同的看法，愿以坦诚而尊重的方式向您提出讨论。
从历史经验来看，中国共产党执政七十余年以来，其政治结构、权力运行方式以及对社会的控制机制，已经形成了高度封闭且自我保护的体系。在这样的体系之中，真正意义上的政治协商空间极为有限。虽然在某些历史时期曾出现过短暂的“政治协商”的表面景象，但很快便以严厉的政治运动作为收场。1957年的反右运动，正是一个深刻而沉痛的历史例证。许多原本被邀请“帮助共产党整风”的知识分子和民主人士，最终却被打成“右派”，其后数十年的人生命运因此彻底改变。
这一历史事实，使人不得不对“体制内部改良”的可能性产生深刻怀疑。
表面上看，中国人民政治协商会议在制度设计上，本应成为多党派参与公共事务的重要平台。但在现实运作中，所谓“民主党派”早已成为体制内的附属组织，它们在政治上公开承认并接受中国共产党的领导，缺乏真正独立的政治立场与监督能力。在这样的结构下，政协更多呈现为一种象征性的政治仪式，而非真实意义上的政策辩论与制度监督平台。
因此，尽管您提出邀请反对派政党与异议人士进入政协，是一种试图恢复制度本意的努力，但这一设想依然建立在一个前提之上：即中国共产党愿意主动开放权力结构，并允许真正的政治竞争与监督存在。
而这一前提，在现实政治逻辑中却显得极其脆弱，不现实的。
纵观近几十年的政治发展，特别是习上台之后，中国共产党不仅没有逐渐放松对社会与政治空间的控制，反而在多个领域呈现出更加集中化和收紧化的趋势。独立媒体空间不断缩小，民间组织受到严格限制，言论环境日趋紧张。在这样的背景下，邀请真正的反对派进入政协，恐怕不仅难以实现，甚至在现行政治环境中几乎没有现实可能。
更进一步说，中国社会之所以不断出现要求改革的声音，恰恰说明现行体制已经积累了大量深层矛盾。如果一个制度在几十年时间里始终拒绝建立真正的权力制衡机制，拒绝允许社会力量参与政治监督，那么这种制度本身就很难通过局部修补来完成自我更新。
正因如此，我个人逐渐形成一种较为悲观却也更加现实的判断：单纯寄希望于体制内部的改良，是不可能解决中国政治结构中长期积累的问题的。
历史上许多国家的经验表明，当权力长期缺乏监督与制衡时，制度内部往往难以自我纠正。真正的政治转型，往往来自社会力量、历史环境以及制度压力的综合作用，而不是仅仅依靠执政集团的自觉改变。
因此，在我看来，与其期待一个已经高度固化的权力体系主动开放，不如更加清醒地认识历史发展的规律。任何政权，无论其力量多么强大，只要长期背离社会公义与人民权利，终究无法逃避历史的审判。历史长河中曾经不可一世的统治集团，最终大多都成为时代的过客。
当然，这并不意味着我们应当放弃理性、和平与文明的原则。恰恰相反，在面对复杂而漫长的历史进程时，更需要保持理性的思考与道义的坚持。对于过去历史中发生的种种政治迫害与制度性伤害，也终究需要在未来某个阶段通过公开、透明、法治化的方式进行历史清算与责任追究。这既是对受害者的尊重，也是一个国家实现真正和解与重建所必须经历的过程。
先生长期以来以诗人与行动者的身份参与中国民主运动，您的经历本身已经成为中国当代历史的一部分。正因如此，我也十分希望未来中国的政治讨论能够更加坦诚、多元，而不同路径之间也能够彼此理解、相互讨论。
对于中国未来的道路，我们或许有不同的判断与策略。但所有追求自由、法治与尊严的人们，最终的目标应当是一致的——那就是建立一个真正尊重公民权利、拥有制度制衡、能够保障人性尊严的现代国家。
谨以此信表达个人的一点思考，若有不当之处，尚祈海涵。
顺颂
安好。
中国民主党旧金山宣传部副部长
《北京之春》《在野党》旧金山记者站站长 缪青
2026年3月6日
朱虞夫回复缪青：
缪青先生的信写得非常好 ！我完全赞同。中共的本质难道还有人比我更清楚吗？王某的信与我没有任何关系，难道我还不知道其醉翁之意吗？有人对苍蝇说，我给你消消毒，苍蝇不会答应，因为它的本质必须是脏的。但是可以通过苍蝇的讳疾忌医让大家更看清中共是什么货色。我发此文到群里的时候给张致君说，用意一，给中共添堵；用意二，给国内民主党朋友打气。与其空喊口号，不如大家都来为“两会”献计献策。
Mr. Zhu Yufu:
Hello!
Recently, I read the “Proposal for the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—Restoring the Normal Functions of the CPPCC: Inviting Opposition Parties and Dissidents to Participate in the Political Consultative Conference,” jointly proposed by you and Mr. Zheng Cunzhu. After reading it in its entirety, I still harbor deep respect for the courage and persistence you have long dedicated to China’s democratic cause. In your proposal, you suggest restoring the spirit of political consultation as it existed at the founding of the CPPCC, allowing different political forces—including opposition parties and dissidents—to enter the consultative system, thereby promoting the development of China’s political system toward a more open, pluralistic, and inclusive direction. This desire to advance political progress through peaceful and rational means itself embodies a constructive political ideal.
However, after careful reflection, I still hold some differing views and wish to present them for discussion in a candid and respectful manner.
From the perspective of historical experience, in the seventy-plus years since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power, its political structure, the way power operates, and its mechanisms for social control have formed a highly closed and self-protective system. Within such a system, the space for political consultation in any true sense is extremely limited. Although brief “political consultation” facades appeared during certain historical periods, they were quickly concluded with severe political movements. The Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 is a profound and painful historical example. Many intellectuals and democratic figures who were originally invited to “help the Communist Party rectify its style” were ultimately labeled as “Rightists,” and their fates for the following decades were completely transformed as a result.
This historical fact forces one to harbor deep doubts about the possibility of “internal reform within the system.”
On the surface, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was originally intended in its institutional design to be an important platform for multi-party participation in public affairs. But in reality, the so-called “democratic parties” have long since become subordinate organizations within the system; they publicly acknowledge and accept the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party politically, lacking truly independent political stances and supervisory capabilities. Under such a structure, the CPPCC functions more as a symbolic political ritual than a platform for genuine policy debate and institutional oversight.
Therefore, although your proposal to invite opposition parties and dissidents into the CPPCC is an effort to restore the original intent of the institution, this vision is still built upon a premise: that the Chinese Communist Party is willing to actively open its power structure and allow for the existence of true political competition and supervision.
And this premise, in the logic of real-world politics, appears extremely fragile and unrealistic.
Looking at the political developments of recent decades, particularly since Xi took office, the Chinese Communist Party has not only failed to gradually relax its control over social and political spaces but has instead shown a trend toward greater centralization and tightening in multiple fields. The space for independent media continues to shrink, civil organizations are strictly restricted, and the environment for speech is becoming increasingly tense. In this context, inviting true opposition into the CPPCC is likely not only difficult to achieve but almost a physical impossibility in the current political environment.
Furthermore, the fact that calls for reform continue to emerge in Chinese society precisely proves that the current system has accumulated a large number of deep-seated contradictions. If a system has consistently refused to establish true mechanisms for checks and balances and refused to allow social forces to participate in political supervision over several decades, then it is very difficult for such a system to complete self-renewal through partial repairs.
Because of this, I have personally gradually formed a relatively pessimistic yet more realistic judgment: simply pinning hopes on reform from within the system is incapable of solving the problems long accumulated in China’s political structure.
The experiences of many countries in history show that when power lacks supervision and checks and balances for a long time, the interior of the system often finds it difficult to correct itself. True political transition often comes from the combined effects of social forces, the historical environment, and institutional pressure, rather than relying solely on the conscious change of the ruling group.
Therefore, in my view, rather than expecting a highly solidified power system to open up voluntarily, it is better to have a clearer understanding of the laws of historical development. Any regime, no matter how powerful its strength, will ultimately be unable to escape the judgment of history as long as it deviates from social justice and the rights of the people for a long time. Most of the ruling groups that were once insufferably arrogant in the long river of history eventually became mere passersby of the era.
Of course, this does not mean we should abandon the principles of rationality, peace, and civilization. On the contrary, when facing a complex and long historical process, it is even more necessary to maintain rational thinking and moral persistence. Regarding the various political persecutions and institutional injuries that occurred in the past, historical accountability and the pursuit of responsibility through open, transparent, and legalized means will eventually be required at some future stage. This is both a sign of respect for the victims and a process that a country must undergo to achieve true reconciliation and reconstruction.
You have long participated in the Chinese democracy movement as both a poet and an activist; your experience has itself become a part of contemporary Chinese history. Because of this, I also very much hope that China’s future political discussions can be more candid and pluralistic, and that different paths can understand and discuss one another.
Regarding China’s future path, we may have different judgments and strategies. But the ultimate goal of all people who pursue freedom, the rule of law, and dignity should be consistent—that is, to establish a modern country that truly respects civil rights, possesses institutional checks and balances, and can guarantee human dignity.
I offer this letter to express a few of my personal thoughts. If there are any improprieties, I pray for your indulgence.
Wishing you well.
Miao Qing Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the China Democracy Party, San Francisco Station Chief of the San Francisco Press Station for “Beijing Spring” and “The Opposition Party”
March 6, 2026
Zhu Yufu’s Reply to Miao Qing:
Mr. Miao Qing’s letter is written very well! I completely agree. Is there anyone who understands the essence of the CCP better than I do? That letter by a certain Mr. Wang has nothing to do with me; do I not already know his “ulterior motives” (literally: the drunkard’s heart is not in the wine)? If someone says to a fly, “I’ll disinfect you,” the fly won’t agree, because its essence must be dirty. However, through the fly’s “refusal to face its illness,” we can let everyone see more clearly what kind of “goods” the CCP really is. When I sent this text to the group, I told Zhang Zhijun: Intent one, to cause trouble for the CCP; Intent two, to boost the morale of Democracy Party friends inside the country. Instead of shouting empty slogans, it is better for everyone to come and offer “advice and suggestions” for the “Two Sessions.”
© 1998–2026 在野党(Opposition Party).
