作者：司空先让

责任编辑：罗志飞 翻译：吴可正

我出生的年月（1957年），恰逢以打断知识分子精神脊梁为目的的反右运动如汹涌潮水般掀起，紧接着几年便是“三分天灾，七分人祸”的艰难岁月的开始，饥饿如影随形，笼罩着每一个家庭。我是家中最小的一个孩子，上面有一个正处于长身体关键期的哥哥和一个姐姐。父母每日辛勤劳作，然而全家依旧处于半饥半饱的困顿之中。无奈之下，在我三岁的时候，父母将我送到了桐庐芦茨湾的外婆家寄养。其实外婆家的粮食也是不够吃的，时常要吃麸糠野菜糊糊。好在芦茨湾山野溪沟里有时也能捉到一些鱼虾和小动物补充一下动物蛋白质。

芦茨湾，那是一个被青山绿水环绕的宁静小村落，村里的村民大多姓方。据族谱记载，唐代处士方干（‌方干，836年-888年，字雄飞，号玄英，唐代著名诗人）曾在芦茨湾隐居。外婆和舅舅住在一起，那时的舅舅大约十九岁光景，年轻且充满朝气。由于他是方家这一代唯一的男孩，属于单传，从小便多受点宠爱，得以读书识字。在那个教育资源匮乏的年代，舅舅凭借着自己的努力和家族的资助，成为了乡里少有的读书人。他平日里喜欢舞文弄墨，对诗词文章有着浓厚的兴趣，总能在闲暇时光沉浸在书的世界里，书写下自己对生活的感悟。

我来到外婆家后，便常常喜欢跟着舅舅。舅舅会带着我穿梭在芦茨湾的山间小道，采一些野果子和芦苇的嫩芽根给我吃，有时还会讲鬼故事给我听，吓得我有时晚上会做噩梦惊叫……这时我外婆会拿一只小酒盅放满米，再放一枚银戒指在米里然后包上一块手帕，在我胸前一边上下左右舞动，一边嘴上念念有词似乎在驱赶邪魅。一套流程下来，然后打开手帕，发现之前一整酒盅的米凹下去了一小半，这时外婆的整个脸都舒展开了，兴奋地说，菩萨显灵了！菩萨显灵了！小鬼被赶走了……等懂事后的我每每想起外婆的“法术”有点好笑，但我知道外婆对我的爱是深切无比的。

就这样，我在外婆的芦茨湾快乐的生活了3年。

我6岁那年被父母亲接回到了杭州。在我读初三的时候我从父亲那里得知舅舅死了（母亲有意不让我们知道这事，因为在那个年代家族里出了一个”反革命“是非常非常忌讳的事）。

若干年后，我大致了解到了我舅舅在文革中被打成“反革命”和惨死的大致经过——

那场史无前例“文革运动”如狂风暴雨般席卷而来，将人们卷入了无尽的漩涡之中。舅舅，这个平日里只知埋头读书，在乡办小学里做做代课老师什么的，不知在“文革”中何时何地触犯了“文革运动”的大忌，或许是他在与友人交谈时，不经意间流露出了对某些政策的不满；又或许是他写的某篇文章中，一些观点被误解为是对“文革”的攻击。总之，在那个荒唐的年代，舅舅一夜间成了批斗对象，他们给舅舅扣上了一顶沉重的帽子——“现行反革命分子”。

那一刻，外婆惊呆了，如同天塌下来了，她无法相信眼前发生的一切。

舅舅被带走后，外婆家陷入了无尽的黑暗之中…………

舅舅被关押在县监狱接受所谓的“审查”和“改造”。在那段日子里，他不时遭到殴打、羞辱等惨无人道的非人折磨……最后，我舅舅实在受不了这种屈辱和痛苦，决心以一死来抗争！那天在监狱放风时舅舅不知从什么角落里搞到了一条尺巴长的铁条，突然大叫着冲出监狱牢门前的警戒线作出了要行凶越狱的样子（其实是只求一死）结果随着几声枪响，我的舅舅方志刚倒在了血泊中……

在这片罪孽深重的土地上空又多了一个飘荡的冤魂！

当得知舅舅惨死后，外婆每天以泪洗面不久也因悲伤过度随舅舅而去了……

得知舅舅是这样的惨死的，如同一场沉重的噩梦，永远地刻在了我的心中。舅舅原本可以在乡野平淡无奇的过完一生，却因为那个荒唐暴政的年代，一条年轻的生命就这样被无情残忍地剥夺了。

如今，舅舅的离世已过去半个多世纪了，但每当我回到芦茨湾，看到那熟悉的山水，听到那亲切的乡音，我的脑海中就会浮现出舅舅的身影。

2001年初，我被当局以“煽颠罪”而坐牢，冥冥之中似乎与我舅舅有着某种命运的交织。

选自《我所经历的人和事碎片（一）》

司空先让 杭州

2025年9月11日

My Uncle — Fang Zhigang

Author: Sikong Xianrang

Responsible Editor: Luo Zhifei Translator: Wu Kezheng

The year I was born (1957) coincided with the Anti-Rightist Campaign, a movement aimed at breaking the spiritual backbone of intellectuals, which surged like a tidal wave. Shortly afterward came the beginning of the difficult years of “30% natural disaster, 70% man-made calamity.” Hunger followed like a shadow, casting its gloom over every family. I was the youngest child in my family, with an older brother in a crucial stage of physical growth and an older sister above me. My parents worked hard every day, yet the entire family remained trapped in a state of semi-starvation. Helpless, when I was three years old, my parents sent me to my grandmother’s home in Luci Bay, Tonglu, to be fostered. In truth, my grandmother’s household also did not have enough food, often subsisting on gruel made of bran and wild vegetables. Fortunately, in the mountains and streams around Luci Bay, one could sometimes catch fish, shrimp, or small animals to supplement animal protein.

Luci Bay was a quiet village surrounded by green mountains and clear waters, where most of the villagers bore the surname Fang. According to family genealogy, Fang Gan (836–888), a recluse scholar of the Tang Dynasty and a renowned poet, once lived in seclusion at Luci Bay. My grandmother lived with my uncle, who was about nineteen at the time, young and full of vigor. As the only male of his generation in the Fang family—the sole heir—he was given extra care and allowed to study and become literate. In that era of scarce educational resources, my uncle, through his own effort and family support, became one of the few scholars in the village. He enjoyed practicing writing, was deeply interested in poetry and prose, and would often immerse himself in books during his free time, recording his reflections on life.

After I came to my grandmother’s home, I often liked to follow my uncle. He would take me along the mountain paths of Luci Bay, picking wild fruits and tender reed shoots for me to eat. Sometimes he would tell me ghost stories, which frightened me so much that I occasionally woke up screaming from nightmares at night…At such times, my grandmother would fill a small wine cup with rice, place a silver ring inside, then wrap it with a handkerchief. She would move it back and forth, up and down across my chest while muttering incantations, as if to drive away evil spirits. After completing the ritual, she would open the handkerchief and find that nearly half of the rice had sunk down. At that moment her face would brighten, and she would exclaim excitedly, “The Bodhisattva has shown his power! The little ghost has been driven away!” When I grew older, I always found my grandmother’s “magic” a little amusing, but I knew that her love for me was immeasurable.

In this way, I happily lived at my grandmother’s home in Luci Bay for three years.

When I was six, my parents brought me back to Hangzhou. While I was in the third year of middle school, I learned from my father that my uncle had died (my mother deliberately concealed this from us, because in those times, having a “counterrevolutionary” in the family was considered extremely disgraceful).

Many years later, I came to roughly understand how my uncle had been branded a “counterrevolutionary” during the Cultural Revolution and met his tragic death—That unprecedented “Cultural Revolution” swept through like a violent storm, dragging people into an endless whirlpool. My uncle, who usually only buried himself in reading and worked as a substitute teacher in the village school, somehow became guilty of violating the taboos of the movement. Perhaps in conversation with friends he carelessly revealed dissatisfaction with certain policies, or perhaps in one of his writings, some ideas were misinterpreted as attacks on the Cultural Revolution. In any case, in that absurd era, my uncle overnight became a target of struggle sessions, branded with the heavy label of a “current counterrevolutionary.” At that moment, my grandmother was stunned—it was as if the sky had collapsed. She could not believe what was happening before her eyes.

After my uncle was taken away, my grandmother’s household fell into endless darkness…

My uncle was imprisoned in the county jail to undergo so-called “investigation” and “reform.” During that time, he was subjected to repeated beatings, humiliation, and other inhuman tortures…In the end, my uncle could no longer endure such humiliation and suffering, and resolved to resist with his life!

One day during exercise time in prison, my uncle somehow obtained a foot-long iron bar. Suddenly, shouting loudly, he dashed across the guard line in front of the prison gate, pretending as if he were attempting violence and escape (in fact, only seeking death). A few gunshots rang out, and my uncle, Fang Zhigang, fell into a pool of blood…

Over this land, heavy with sin, another wronged soul began to wander!

Upon learning of my uncle’s tragic death, my grandmother wept day after day, and soon, overcome with grief, followed him into death…

Knowing that my uncle died in such a manner was like a heavy nightmare, etched forever in my heart.

My uncle could have lived out an ordinary life in the countryside, yet because of that absurd era of tyrannical rule, a young life was mercilessly stripped away.

Now, more than half a century has passed since my uncle’s death, but whenever I return to Luci Bay, see those familiar mountains and waters, and hear that familiar local accent, my uncle’s image always resurfaces in my mind.

In early 2001, I myself was imprisoned by the authorities for the crime of “inciting subversion.” In the unseen workings of fate, it seemed my destiny was somehow intertwined with my uncle’s.

Excerpted from Fragments of People and Events I Experienced (Part One)

Hangzhou — Sikong Xianrang

September 11, 2025

作者/编辑：李聪玲

责任编辑：胡丽莉 翻译：吴可正

2025年9月10日，罗永浩在微博上公开吐槽：“好久没吃西贝了，今天下飞机跟同事吃了一顿，发现几乎全都是预制菜，还那么贵，实在是太恶心了。”他同时呼吁国家立法，强制餐厅标注菜品是否为预制菜。随后，他在直播中进一步强调，自己并不是单纯反对预制菜的工艺，而是反对餐厅在不告知消费者的情况下使用预制菜。他提出了两个核心诉求：一是消费者的知情权必须得到保障；二是国家应尽快出台预制菜的明确定义和标准。

为了证明说法，他还在社交媒体中展示了部分媒体探访西贝门店的影像，指出冷冻鱼、袋装汤料等现象，并公开悬赏10万元征集“西贝使用预制菜的真凭实据”。在9月12日的直播中，他明确表示自己并无“针对西贝”或“针对贾国龙”的个人敌意，而是希望通过这次事件推动行业透明化与制度完善。罗永浩的直言很快引爆了舆论，网络上数以百万计的消费者留言支持，表达了自己对“预制菜进餐馆却不标识”的愤怒。显然，这不是一次个人的口水战，而是公众对食品安全长期焦虑的集中爆发。

面对汹涌的舆论，西贝创始人贾国龙和企业方面迅速作出回应。首先，贾国龙在公开采访中坚决否认“西贝菜品属于预制菜”。他解释称，西贝部分食材确实经过中央厨房的统一加工处理，但这与“预制菜”不同。按照他理解的定义，预制菜是“工厂生产、冷冻包装、加热即食”的模式，而西贝依然保持现场烹饪、调味，只是通过中央厨房切配、分份以保持标准化。为了挽回声誉，西贝采取了一系列措施：发布《致顾客的一封信》，并公开罗永浩所点13道菜的完整制作指导书，试图证明“非预制菜”；宣布全国门店后厨对顾客开放，只要符合防护规范，就可随时参观。推出所谓“罗永浩菜单”，即把争议菜品单独列出，并打出口号：“不好吃，不要钱”。计划开放原产地、中央厨房、工厂等参观路线，增加透明度。

与此同时，贾国龙宣布将起诉罗永浩，称对方的不实言论已给西贝带来巨大损失。他透露，9月10日至12日短短三天，西贝日均营业额下滑100至300万元，这已是公司成立以来遭遇的最大外部危机。可以说，西贝在这场舆论风暴中被迫从强硬反驳转向“自证清白”，而危机背后的核心，依旧是社会信任的严重缺失。

然而，当西贝公开后厨实际操作后，诸如不用鸡肉熬制的“鸡汤”、存放一年的冻羊腿、保质期长达两年的儿童餐专用西兰花等画面迅速在网络走红，令公众“大开眼界”。这种“中央厨房加工”与“预制菜”几乎难以区分，而多数餐饮企业为了营造专业餐厅的形象，并不会主动向消费者说明出品背后的真实情况。

中国餐饮业规模庞大、竞争激烈，预制菜近年迅速崛起，背后有三大驱动力：一是成本压力——原料上涨、房租高企、用工紧缺，迫使餐企寻求低成本模式；二是规模复制——连锁扩张需要口味统一、流程可控，预制菜成为最佳“标准化”方案；三是资本推动——被包装成“千亿赛道”，产业链迅速成型。然而，追求效率和利润，并不等于食品健康与安全。

而公众对预制菜的反感，并不仅仅因为口味，而是出于深层的不信任感。中国食品安全问题频发，从“三聚氰胺奶粉”“地沟油”到“毒生姜”“苏丹红鸭蛋”，公众一次次经历“舌尖上的灾难”，信任早已脆弱。背后折射的是制度性问题：监管缺位，地方政府往往顾及税收和就业，不愿严格执法；官商勾结，违规成本极低；信息不对称，消费者缺乏监督渠道；逐利至上，资本逻辑压倒公共健康。在这样的背景下，任何新兴食品模式都容易被怀疑为潜在隐患。

中国要走出食品安全困境，需要强化监管执行，确保标准统一、执法严格；提高信息透明度，让食材来源、加工方式和添加剂使用可被公众查询；加大违法成本，遏制官商勾结和违规行为；引导产业健康发展，减少过度加工和添加剂依赖，同时保持食品营养与口感；并加强公众教育与社会监督，形成全社会共同保障食品安全的机制。

今天的预制菜风波不仅是餐桌上的问题，更是一个社会隐喻：它像极了中国社会的“快速复制”模式——追求规模与效率，却牺牲了品质与安全。它揭示了公共治理的软肋——信息不透明，监管缺位，资本绑架政策。它让人们直面一个现实——普通人对制度的依赖比想象中更深，而制度却往往让人失望。

中国人常说：“民以食为天。”一顿饭看似琐碎，却连着生命健康、社会信任与制度公正。罗永浩和西贝，只是一次舆论的契机。更深层的问题是：我们是否能够建立起真正保障食品安全的制度，是否能让孩子们在学校里吃到安心的饭，是否能让普通人在餐桌前不必怀疑自己是不是“实验品”。预制菜不是洪水猛兽，但若任由资本裹挟、监管缺位，它就可能成为新的“毒药”。守护餐桌，其实就是守护未来。

The Predicament of China’s Food Safety Seen Through the Xibei “Pre-prepared Dishes” Controversy

Abstract: Luo Yonghao exposed Xibei’s use of pre-prepared dishes, sparking public concern about food safety and the right to know. The issue of pre-prepared dishes revealed regulatory gaps and a lack of transparency, highlighting the urgent need to improve China’s food safety system and rebuild social trust.

Author/Editor: Li Congling

Responsible Editor: Hu Lili Translator: Wu Kezheng

On September 10, 2025, Luo Yonghao publicly complained on Weibo: “I haven’t eaten at Xibei for a long time. Today I got off the plane and had a meal with colleagues, and I found that almost everything was pre-prepared dishes, and so expensive—it was absolutely disgusting.”He also called for national legislation to require restaurants to label whether dishes are pre-prepared. Later, in a livestream, he further emphasized that he was not simply opposed to the technique of pre-prepared dishes, but rather opposed to restaurants using them without informing consumers.He raised two core demands: first, that consumers’ right to know must be guaranteed; and second, that the state should quickly issue a clear definition and standards for pre-prepared dishes.

To support his claim, he also posted footage on social media from media visits to Xibei outlets, pointing out frozen fish and bagged soup ingredients, and publicly offered a reward of 100,000 yuan for “conclusive evidence of Xibei’s use of pre-prepared dishes.” In a livestream on September 12, he made it clear that he held no personal hostility “against Xibei” or “against Jia Guolong,” but hoped to use this incident to promote industry transparency and institutional improvement. Luo Yonghao’s blunt remarks quickly ignited public opinion, with millions of consumers leaving comments online in support and expressing anger at “pre-prepared dishes being served in restaurants without labeling.” Clearly, this was not a personal spat, but rather a concentrated outbreak of the public’s long-standing anxiety about food safety.

In the face of surging public opinion, Xibei’s founder Jia Guolong and the company quickly responded. First, in a public interview, Jia firmly denied that “Xibei’s dishes are pre-prepared.” He explained that while some of Xibei’s ingredients are indeed uniformly processed in a central kitchen, this is different from “pre-prepared dishes.” By his definition, pre-prepared dishes are “factory-produced, frozen and packaged, ready-to-heat-and-eat,” whereas Xibei still maintains on-site cooking and seasoning, using the central kitchen only for cutting and portioning to ensure standardization. To restore its reputation, Xibei adopted a series of measures: it issued “A Letter to Customers” and released the complete preparation manuals for the 13 dishes ordered by Luo Yonghao in an attempt to prove they were “not pre-prepared”; announced that kitchens at all outlets would be open for customer visits at any time, as long as protective rules were followed; introduced a so-called “Luo Yonghao Menu,” listing the disputed dishes separately with the slogan, “If it doesn’t taste good, it’s free”; and planned to open visits to places of origin, central kitchens, and factories to increase transparency.

Meanwhile, Jia announced that he would sue Luo Yonghao, stating that the latter’s false statements had caused Xibei huge losses. He revealed that from September 10 to 12, in just three days, Xibei’s daily revenue dropped by 1 to 3 million yuan, marking the biggest external crisis since the company’s founding. It can be said that in this storm of public opinion, Xibei was forced to shift from a strong rebuttal to “proving its innocence,” while the core behind the crisis remained a severe lack of social trust.

However, once Xibei made its kitchen operations public, images such as “chicken soup” not made with chicken, lamb legs frozen for a year, and broccoli for children’s meals with a two-year shelf life quickly went viral online, leaving the public “shocked.” This kind of “central kitchen processing” is almost indistinguishable from “pre-prepared dishes,” and most restaurant businesses, in order to present the image of a professional restaurant, will not voluntarily inform consumers of the true situation behind their products.

China’s catering industry is vast and highly competitive, and pre-prepared dishes have risen rapidly in recent years, driven by three main forces: First, cost pressure—rising raw material prices, soaring rents, and labor shortages have forced restaurants to seek lower-cost models; Second, replication at scale—chain expansion requires consistent taste and controllable processes, making pre-prepared dishes the best “standardization” solution; Third, capital promotion—packaged as a “trillion-yuan track,” the industry chain has quickly taken shape. However, pursuing efficiency and profit does not equate to food health and safety.

The public’s dislike of pre-prepared dishes is not merely due to taste, but stems from a deep sense of distrust. China has seen frequent food safety issues, from “melamine milk powder” and “gutter oil” to “toxic ginger” and “Sudan Red eggs,” with the public repeatedly experiencing “disasters on the tip of the tongue,” leaving trust already fragile. Behind this lies systemic problems: regulatory absence, with local governments often prioritizing tax revenue and employment over strict law enforcement; collusion between officials and businesses, with extremely low costs for violations; information asymmetry, leaving consumers without supervisory channels; and profit-seeking above all, where capital logic overwhelms public health. Against this backdrop, any new food model is easily suspected of being a potential hazard.

For China to overcome its food safety predicament, it must strengthen regulatory enforcement, ensure uniform standards, and enforce the law strictly; increase information transparency so that the sources of ingredients, processing methods, and use of additives can be checked by the public; raise the cost of violations to curb collusion between officials and businesses as well as illegal practices; guide the industry toward healthy development, reducing excessive processing and reliance on additives while maintaining nutrition and taste; and strengthen public education and social supervision to form a mechanism for the whole society to jointly safeguard food safety.

Today’s pre-prepared dish controversy is not only an issue at the dining table, but also a social metaphor: It closely resembles China’s “rapid replication” model—pursuing scale and efficiency at the expense of quality and safety. It reveals the weak point of public governance—lack of transparency, regulatory absence, and policies hijacked by capital. It forces people to confront a reality—that ordinary people depend on the system far more than they imagine, yet the system often lets them down.

There is a common Chinese saying: “Food is the paramount necessity of the people.” A single meal may seem trivial, but it is connected to life and health, social trust, and institutional justice. Luo Yonghao and Xibei were merely the trigger for public opinion. The deeper issue is: can we establish a system that truly guarantees food safety? Can we ensure that children eat with peace of mind in schools? Can we let ordinary people sit at the dining table without wondering if they are being used as “test subjects”? Pre-prepared dishes are not a monstrous scourge, but if left to be manipulated by capital and absent regulation, they could become a new kind of “poison.” To protect the dining table is, in fact, to protect the future.

第一章 第三节

作者：程铭

编辑：李聪玲   责任编辑：胡丽莉 校对：冯仍

卢沟桥是一座千年古桥，始建于金世宗大定二十九年，已有七百多年的历史。1937年7月7日，一队日本士兵在桥东的宛平城下进行夜间作战演习，与以往不同的是，“不论枪炮都装填了弹药”。带队官清水节郎中尉后来回忆说，这个夜晚，“一点风都没有，天空晴朗，没有月亮。星空中远远地、微微地浮现着卢沟桥城墙，只是隐约可见游动着的士兵。这是一个寂静的黑夜”（《清水节郎手记》）。

大约10点40分，演习行将结束时，众多官兵都听到了几声枪响。

小队长野地伊七以为，这是演习士兵误发的空包弹。但清水节郎以及几名参加过“满洲事变”的老兵却叫喊起来了，“是真子弹”。在片刻的惊愕后，清水节郎吹响了集结号，并让各小队清点人数。

清点的结果，是一名士兵不见了。对此，清水节郎怒不可遏，他命令兵曹岩谷兵治、上等兵内田太郎立即骑马去丰台，向大队长一木清直报告情况。与此同时，他命令部队展开队形，“决心断然膺惩，作了应战的准备”（《步兵17联队第三大队详报》，1937年12月）。

但几乎是两名传令兵刚刚离开，那个失踪的士兵就出现了。原来，这个叫志村菊次郎的新兵在演习时迷路了。“在走上回途时，弄错了方向……没有找到中队，急得到处乱转”。几十年后，他的那些同伴这么追忆他的形貌：小队长野地伊七说，他时年20岁，“是从东京附近入伍的当年兵”；而与他同年入伍的福岛忠义谈道：“他是一位认真老实、不引人注目的男子，大概是由于肥胖的缘故，动作略显迟钝，但脑子不笨……”

清水节郎左右为难。他让两名传令兵送去的消息，既包括“非法射击”，更包括“士兵失踪”。与后者相比，那几声来历不明的枪响不过是区区小事。他不知道该怎么办才好，“对于这之后的中队的行动，虽多方考虑，难下决心……（直到午夜）终于下了决心，撤离现场移动到西五里店”（《清水节郎手记》）。

大约凌晨一时，清水节郎中队抵达西五里店。但这时候，这个貌似阴差阳错的插曲，已在几十里外的北平城引发了轩然大波。

首先是一木清直大队的出动。11时57分，两名传令兵赶到丰台，向大队长一木清直报告了“非法射击”和“士兵失踪”。几乎没有任何犹豫，时年45岁的一木清直少佐当即下令集结部队，开赴卢沟桥边的宛平城。他后来谈道：“虽然我不会因仅仅受到射击就大惊小怪，但我觉得部队少一个人则是大事，于是决心进行警备集合。”与此同时，他也拨通了北平城内联队长牟田口廉也的电话，向他报告了这个消息。牟田口廉也命令说：“速到现场，完成战斗准备后，把（卢沟桥的）营长叫出来进行交涉。”（《步兵17联队第三大队详报》，1937年12月）

这么一来，这个消息就从卢沟桥传到丰台、又从丰台传到北平城了。又何止于此？在接过一木的电话后，牟田口廉也立即知会了驻北平使馆武官、特务机关长松井太久郎，让他与驻北平的29军进行交涉。而松井太久郎提出的要求是，中国方面立即打开毗邻卢沟桥的宛平城门，让日军连夜入城寻找失踪士兵。

但，听到这个要求后，北平市市长秦德纯却顾虑重重、疑窦横生。

作为29军副军长，秦德纯兼任北平市市长，是“华北自治”的产物。1935年12月，在勒逼南京撤销军委会北平分会、行政院北平政务整理委员会等派出机构后，29军军长宋哲元出任新成立的“冀察政务委员会”委员长，秦德纯也成为北平市市长。上任一年多来，他目睹了日本人威逼利诱、分离华北的种种手段，“每日均有日方人员前来接洽，平均每天最少一次，或二次……我虽感觉不胜其扰，但抱定任劳任怨之决心，据理应付，使日方无借口余地”。与此同时，一系列异乎寻常的军事举措，更让他深感警惕。

首先是日本的大举增兵华北。自从《辛丑条约》签订、日本获得在平津铁路沿线的驻兵权以来，三十余年间，华北驻屯军始终维持在一两千人的规模。但1936年4月18日，东京宣布增兵华北，并且事先没有知会中国政府。一个多月后，华北驻屯军升格为“中国驻屯军”，人数从1771人猛增到5774人，“同时变更一年交替制为永驻制”。它引发了中国方面的强烈抗议。

那么，秦德纯能够想到吗？石原莞尔的本意是以此阻止关东军对华北的插手。之所以采取“永驻制”，也为了避免满洲部队被派到华北。他后来谈道：“这件事成了华北事变的原因，痛感当时如不采取这样办法，而以统帅的威力扯住关东军的手可能好些。”

而在增兵华北之后，则是扼守丰台。派驻北平郊外的部队原定驻扎在冀东傀儡政权的首府通州，但在陆军省次官梅津美治郎的坚持下，它改驻丰台。那就是人数七百余人的一木清直大队。据说，梅津的理由是日本只有铁路沿线驻兵权，无权驻屯通州；但在千万中国人看来，此举包含着深不可测的祸心：作为平汉、平绥、北宁三条铁路的交汇处，丰台是北平咽喉；更重要的是，在冀东分离、长城两侧被划为非武装区后，北平已沦为一座孤城，它的唯一出口就是西南方向的丰台、卢沟桥地区。一旦卢沟桥失守，北平将旦夕沦亡。

1936年年底，在视察华北时，石原莞尔也注意到了这个因素。在《调整日华邦交要领》笔记里，他曾经写下，“丰台的兵力要转移到通州，确保通州、天津，明确冀东的防卫态势”。但不知道是什么原因，大半年过去了，这支部队始终没有移防。

更让人警惕的，还有1937年夏天以后的卢沟桥动态。从6月份开始，一木清直大队就日复一日地在卢沟桥附近进行夜间作战演习。尽管它的名义是普及几个月前下发的《新步兵操典》，但它的主要内容却是夜袭卢沟桥、封锁北平城。也是这个月份，一个影影绰绰的说法就在北平城内传开了，“七夕的晚上，华北将重演柳条沟一样的事件”。而所谓“柳条沟”就是满洲事变的爆发地。更不必说，这一天正是7月7日，日本采取西历后的“七夕的晚上”。

所有这一切，都让秦德纯不能不认为，所谓“士兵失踪”、“入城搜查”不过是借口，日本人的真正目的，是一举控制卢沟桥，进而占领北平城。为此，这个深夜，他语气决绝、然而多少留下几分余地地表示，“走失士兵我方不能负责，日军更不得进城检查。惟姑念两国友谊，可等天亮后，令该地军警代为寻觅”。在此之外，为解决所谓“非法射击”问题，他派出宛平县县长王冷斋、外交专员林耕宇以及绥靖公署副处长周永业三人，连夜前往东交民巷，与日本人进行紧急交涉。

就在王冷斋等人赶到东交民巷时，松井太久郎、牟田口廉也都已经知道了，那个士兵并没有失踪。

消息来自一木清直。大约2时3分，一木大队与清水中队在西五里店会合了。得知志村菊太郎已经归队后，一木一边派人知会北平，一边命令部队照常行进，并包围宛平县城。他后来谈道：“作为我的想法，既然从部队长那里接受了交涉的命令，却又因志村归队而中止，则中国方面将如何宣传不得而知……所以这回无论如何必须进行严重交涉。”（《朝日座谈会》，1938年7月）

也就是说，一木决定将错就错，趁机扩大事态。他唯一需要的，不过是一个包围宛平、“入城搜查”的新借口。而在他看来，这个借口也是现成的：有人向日本军队“非法射击”，这个人或许躲在宛平城内。

这个蛮横的、令人啼笑皆非的理由，也成为北平城内松井太久郎的依据。在双方的唇枪舌剑中，时间一分一秒地过去了。

大约3时20分，一木大队的几百名官兵逼近了卢沟桥、宛平城。为震慑中国方面，一木命令炮兵中队先占领一文字山，并架起大炮。这个海拔只有几十米的小山丘，距离宛平县城不过一箭之地。从这里射击，炮弹可以直接落入宛平城内。紧接着，又一个值得一提的细节发生了：不等一木发话，通信班班长小岩井就将电话线从丰台一直铺到了西五里店，“经丰台中转可直接与北平通话”；一木清直后来谈道：“安装电话是小岩井的一大功绩……在我向联队长上报这边的情势、促成战斗决心，这电话帮了大忙……”

几乎是电话刚刚架设完毕，牟田口廉也打来了电话。他告诉一木，几分钟前，中日双方已组成联合调查组，前往卢沟桥进行现场交涉。一木再也忍不住了。他告诉牟田口廉也，中国军队正袭击他的部队，“此时交涉根本没用，我认为占领卢沟桥后交涉会更好些”。后来，他这么解释着自己的用意，“我想，不能让战争打不起来，因此向联队长作了夸大的陈述”（《朝日座谈会》，1938年7月）。

对夜袭卢沟桥的要求，一开始，牟田口廉也含糊其辞。他暗示一木，“对于这件事，北京的中国军队不至于全面调动”。对此，一木更加急切地说：“既然尚未全面调动，便是个机会……在此之际，我认为猛打卢沟桥的中国军队是上策。”

在片刻的沉默后，牟田口廉也终于表态了：“可以打。”

一木惊喜不已地问：“真可以干了吗？”

牟田口廉也说：“可以干……我们对一下表，现在是4点20分，没错。”

一年以后，面对众多同僚、记者，一木清直不无得意地谈道：“我万万没有想到联队长会批准可以干，有些意外之感……然后真的干了。7月8日上午4点20分！这是事变开始的时间。”（《朝日座谈会》，1938年7月）

在得到牟田口廉也的批准后，一木当即下令埋锅做饭，准备拂晓攻击。一个多小时后，尽管中日联合调查组已进入宛平城，尽管这一行人中包括他的顶头上司、副联队长森田彻中佐以及特务机关的樱田少佐等，但一木还是以不管不顾的姿态，下令开炮。一时之间，一发发炮弹从一文字山上呼啸而下，落入了宛平城。

卢沟桥的星火，就这样被点燃了。但直到此时，无论中国的秦德纯、张自忠，还是日本的“中国驻屯军”参谋长桥本群少将、驻北平使馆副武官今井武夫少佐，都还试图着将它熄灭下去。此后八年，在几乎任何一次的中日和平交涉中，今井武夫都扮演了重要角色。这个角色，就从他斡旋“卢沟桥事变”开始。

今井武夫，1898年生，日本长野县人。作为中日战争自始至终的参与者，他亲历了那个终生难忘的夜晚：几乎刚刚睡下，卢沟桥的消息就传来了。在一墙之隔的牟田口联队会议室，他看到一个个军装严整的军人纷纷赶来，并亲耳听到牟田口廉也对一木清直行动的许可。而天麻麻亮的时候，他还召集了在北平的各国记者，举行了一个简短的新闻发布会。他后来回忆说：“在勉强只能辨认出面容的晓色朦胧中，天井里放了几条长凳。大家坐在新绿的槐树荫下，听我发表昨夜以来发生的事件的经过情况。”（《今井武夫回忆录》）

十几分钟后，记者们散去了。在参拜招魂社、“为东洋的和平作了祈祷”后，天下起雨来。今井武夫后来写道：“恰巧就是在这一时刻，西南方响起了大炮声，震撼着云低雨蒙的昏暗天空……也许可以说是天意吧，这时候开始下起的雨，竟变成了几年来所未曾有过的霪雨，最后使华北的旷野浸在洪水之中……”

而在这样的狂风暴雨中，今井开始回顾几天来的蹊跷际遇。

6月26日，昭和天皇的姨父、在日本拥有大量信众的西本愿寺住持大谷光瑞，“在没有任何预告的情况下……突然来到北平，下榻于靠近前门火车站的六国饭店”。次日，他邀请今井武夫见面，并旁敲侧击地问起了华北驻屯军的情况。在两个多小时的谈话行将结束时，大谷才透露了他的来意。原来，过去几天，那个“华北将重演柳条沟事件”的消息也传到了东京。对此，刚刚上任二十多天的近卫文麿首相既惊又疑，这才派出大谷光瑞前来调查中国驻屯军的动态。

无独有偶的是，也是这一天，29军宣布北平城实行夜间戒严。紧接着，陆军省军事课的冈本清福中佐也来了，他担负着和大谷同样的使命。不过委派他前来调查的，是预感到中日战争一触即发的石原莞尔。

更蹊跷的还在后头呢！7月6日也就是事变前一天，今井前往医学博士、原北洋政府秘书长陈子庚的家里赴宴，不等开席，一个不速之客就匆匆赶来了。来者是冀北保安司令、一向与日本人关系密切的石友三。石友三语出惊人地说：“武官，日华两军今天下午在卢沟桥发生冲突，目前正在交战中，你知道这个情况吗？”

今井武夫大吃一惊。他宽慰石友三说：“我不知道这样的事，也不会有这样的事吧？”但石友三却不肯透露消息的来源，他恳求说：“我在北平北郊黄寺的部队，对于日本军队没有作战意图。请你务必转告贵军，不要去攻击他们。”（《今井武夫回忆录》）

凡此种种，都让今井武夫产生了不祥的预感。这个清晨，他打电话给中国驻屯军参谋长桥本群少将，表达了自己对事件“不扩大”的立场。桥本群满口赞成，并授权他予以斡旋。平息事态的第一个转机出现了：当时中国驻屯军司令官田代皖一郎重病在床，桥本群的表态，代表了驻屯军的态度。

紧接着，当晚7时许，又一个转机出现了。这一天，在瓢泼大雨中，今井武夫奔波了一整天，几乎一无所获。他后来谈道：“就在事件发生后不久，冀察政权的要人们似乎是在什么地方开会，（上门拜访时）他们家里的人一律回答说，不知道主人现在何处，（并）避免和日方见面。”但入夜时分，今井武夫依旧不肯死心，他再次前往秦德纯的私宅。

在秦宅外，一队荷枪实弹的警卫拦住了他，“说什么也不允许过去”。正不知所措之际，恰巧他的老熟人、132师师长赵登禹从宅院里出来。今井武夫赶紧叫住了他，请他代为疏通。他后来谈道：“赵师长是个老好人，他略微踌躇了一下，好像是改变了主意似的。尽管刚刚出来，又跑进里面替我斡旋去了。”

就这样，几分钟后，今井武夫见到秦德纯了。在简短的会谈后，双方都认可了“不扩大”、就地解决的方针。至于具体的解决方案，“因为中国方面一言不发，所以未能得到解决”。

而当今井武夫一身疲惫、冒雨赶回北平武官室时，一个更重大的转机在等待着他。这一天，东京陆军省、参谋本部的联席会议也作出了“不扩大”、就地解决的决定。他们发来了参谋本部第400号临时命令，这个命令言简意赅：“为防止事态的扩大，应避免进一步使用武力。”

这个命令，让今井武夫如释重负、喜出望外。

The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Japanese Peace Movement

Chapter One: The Young Prime Minister(Part three)

Author: Ming Cheng

Editor: Congling Li   Responsible Editor: Lili Hu

Translator: Ming Cheng

Lugou Bridge is a thousand-year-old bridge. It was built in the 29th year of Emperor Shizong of Jin and has a history of more than 700 years. On July 7, 1937, a team of Japanese soldiers conducted night combat exercises under Wanping City in Qiaodong. Unlike before, “no matter the guns were loaded with ammunition”. Lieutenant Seishiro Shimizu, the team leader, later recalled that this night, “there was no wind at all, the sky was clear and there was no moon. In the starry sky, the wall of Lugou Bridge appeared far away and faintly, and only the soldiers swimming could be faintly seen. This is a silent night” (Shimizu Setsuro’s Notes).

At about 10:40, when the exercise was about to end, many officers and soldiers heard a few gunshots.

The captain, Yiqi Yeji, thought that this was an empty bomb sent by the soldiers of the exercise by mistake. But Shimizu Setsuro and several veterans who participated in the “Manchurian Incident” shouted, “It’s a real bullet.” After a moment of shock, Setsuro Shimizu blew the rallying horn and asked each team to number the number of people.

As a result of the inventory, a soldier was missing. In this regard, Setsuro Shimizu was furious. He ordered the soldier Cao Iwatani Heiji and the high-class soldier Uchida Taro to ride to Fengtai immediately and report the situation to the captain, Kiyonao Ichiki. At the same time, he ordered the troops to deploy the formation, “determined to be decisively punished and prepared for battle” (Detailed Report of the Third Brigade of the 17th Infantry Wing, December 1937).

But almost as soon as the two messengers left, the missing soldier appeared. It turned out that the recruit named Shimura Kikujiro got lost during the exercise. On the way back, I took the wrong direction… I didn’t find the squadron, and I turned around in a hurry. Decades later, his companions recalled his appearance like this: the captain, Ichi Noji, said that he was 20 years old, “a soldier who joined the army from near Tokyo”; and said to Tadayoshi Fukushima, who joined the army at the same year, “He is a serious, honest and inconspicuous man, probably because of obesity, his movements are slightly Dull, but not stupid…”

Shimizu Setsuro is in a dilemma. The news he asked the two messengers to send included both “illegal shooting” and “disappearance of soldiers”. Compared with the latter, those gunshots of unknown origin are just trivial. He didn’t know what to do. “As for the action of the squadron after this, although he considered it from many sides, it was difficult to make up his mind… (until midnight) he finally made up his mind to evacuate the scene and move to Xiwuli Store” (“Shimizu Setsuro’s Notes”).

At about one o’clock in the morning, the Qingshui Festival Team arrived at the Xiwuli Store. But at this time, this seemingly wrong episode has caused a stir in Beiping City, dozens of miles away.

First of all, Itaki Kiyonao’s brigade was mobilised. At 11:57, two messengers rushed to Fengtai and reported “illegal shooting” and “disappearance of soldiers” to the captain, Kiyonao Ichiki. With almost no hesitation, the 45-year-old Major Ichiki Kiyonao immediately ordered to gather troops and drive to Wanping City by the Lugou Bridge. He later said, “Although I won’t make a fuss just because I was shot, I think it’s a big deal to have one less person in the army, so I’m determined to gather on guard.” At the same time, he also dialed the phone number of Renya Mutaguchi, the captain of Beiping City, and reported the news to him. Ren Mutaguchi also ordered: “Hure to the scene quickly. After completing the preparation for battle, call the battalion commander (of Lugou Bridge) out for negotiation.” (” Detailed Report of the Third Brigade of the 17th Infantry Wing, December 1937)

In this way, the news spread from Lugou Bridge to Fengtai, and from Fengtai to Beiping City. Why does it stop here? After receiving Kazuki’s phone call, Ren Mutaguchi immediately informed Toshiro Matsui, the military officer of the embassy in Beiping and the head of the secret service and asked him to negotiate with the 29th Army stationed in Beiping. Matsui Tailang’s request was that the Chinese side immediately opened the Wanping City Gate adjacent to the Lugou Bridge and let the Japanese enter the city overnight to find the missing soldiers.

However, after hearing this request, Qin Dechun, the mayor of Beiping City, was full of concerns and doubts.

As the deputy commander of the 29th Army, Qin Dechun is also the mayor of Beiping City, which is the product of “North China Autonomy”. In December 1935, after forcing Nanjing to abolish the Beiping Branch of the Military Commission, the Beiping Government Affairs Committee of the Executive Yuan and other dispatched institutions, Song Zheyuan, the commander of the 29th Army, became the chairman of the newly established “Jicha Government Affairs Committee”, and Qin Dechun also became the mayor of Beiping City. For more than a year in office, he has witnessed all kinds of means by the Japanese to coerce and separate North China. “There are Japanese personnel who come to contact us every day, at least once or twice a day on average… Although I feel that it is disturbing, I am determined to work hard and deal with it according to reason, so that Japan has no excuses.” At the same time, a series of unusual military measures made him more vigilant.

The first is Japan’s major increase in North China. Since the signing of the Treaty of Xinchou and Japan’s acquisition of the right to garrison along the Pingjin Railway, the North China garrison has been maintained at a scale of 12,000 or 2,000 for more than 30 years. However, on April 18, 1936, Tokyo announced the increase in troops in North China without informing the Chinese government in advance. More than a month later, the North China garrison army was upgraded to “Chinese garrison army”, and the number of people increased sharply from 1,771 to 5,774. “At the same time, the one-year rotation system was changed to the permanent station system”. It triggered a strong protest from China.

So, can Qin Dechun think of it? Ishihara Wan’er’s original intention was to prevent the Kwantung Army from interjecting in North China. The reason for adopting the “permanent residence system” is also to avoid the dispatch of Manchurian troops to North China. He later said, “This incident became the cause of the North China Incident. I feel that it would have been better if I had not adopted such a method at that time, but to hold the hand of the Kuntung Army with the power of the commander.”

After increasing the number of troops in North China, Fengtai was guarded. The troops stationed on the outskirts of Beiping were originally scheduled to be stationed in Tongzhou, the capital of the puppet regime in Jidong, but under the insistence of Mijiro Umezu, the deputy governor of the army, it was stationed in Fengtai. That’s the Ichimu Qingzhi Brigade with more than 700 people. It is said that the reason for Umejin is that Japan only has the right to station troops along the railway and has no right to station in Tongzhou; but in the eyes of tens of millions of Chinese people, this move contains an unfathomable evil: as the intersection of the three railways of Pinghan, Pingsui and Beining, Fengtai is the throat of Beiping; more importantly, it is classified as non-armed on both sides of the Great Wall and the separation of East Ji. After the district, Beiping has become a lonely city, and its only exit is the Fengtai and Lugouqiao areas in the southwest. Once the Lugou Bridge is lost, Beiping will fall overnight.

At the end of 1936, Ishihara Wan’er also noticed this factor when inspecting North China. In the notes of “Adjusting the Essits of Foreign Exchanges between Japan and China”, he once wrote that “Fengtai’s troops should be transferred to Tongzhou to ensure that Tongzhou and Tianjin should clarify the defensive posture of eastern Hebei”. But I don’t know why, more than half a year has passed, and the troops have never moved.

What is more alarming is the dynamics of Lugou Bridge after the summer of 1937. Since June, the Ichimu Qingzhi Brigade has been conducting night combat exercises near Lugou Bridge Day after day. Although its name is the “New Infantry Exercises” issued a few months ago, its main content is to attack Lugou Bridge at night and block Beiping City. It was also this month that a shadowy rumor spread in Beiping City, “On the night of Qixi Festival, North China will reproduce events like Willow Gou”. The so-called “Wicker Valley” is the place where the Manchurian Incident broke out. Needless to say, this day is July 7th, and Japan adopts the “Night of Tanabata” after the Western calendar.

All this made Qin Dechun think that the so-called “disappearance of soldiers” and “search into the city” were just excuses. The real purpose of the Japanese was to control the Lugou Bridge and then occupy Beiping City. For this reason, late at night, he said in a decisive tone, but more or less left some room to say, “We can’t be responsible for the lost soldiers, and the Japanese army is not allowed to enter the city for inspection. Only if you think about the friendship between the two countries, you can wait until dawn and let the local military police search for it. In addition, in order to solve the so-called “illegal shooting” problem, he sent Wang Lengzhai, the governor of Wanping County, Lin Gengyu, the foreign affairs commissioner, and Zhou Yongye, deputy director of the Appeasement Office, to Dongjiaomin Lane overnight to negotiate urgently with the Japanese.

Just as Wang Lengzhai and others arrived at Dongjiaomin Lane, Matsui Too Longlang and Mutaguchi Lian had already known that the soldier was not missing.

The news came from Kiyonao Ichiki. At about 2:03, the Yimu Brigade and the Qingshui Squadron met at Xiwuli Store. After learning that Shimura Kikutaro had returned to the team, Kazuki sent someone to inform Beiping, while ordering the troops to marge as usual and surround Wanping County. He later said, “In my opinion, since we have received the order to negotiate from the commander, but it has been suspended because of Shimura’s return to the team, it is unknown how China will publicize… So serious negotiations must be made this time no matter what.” (” Asahi Symposium, July 1938)

That is to say, Yimu decided to make a mistake and take the opportunity to expand the situation. The only thing he needs is a new excuse to surround Wanping and “enter the city to search”. In his opinion, this excuse is also ready-made: someone “shoots illegally” at the Japanese army, and this person may be hiding in Wanping City.

This arrogant and ridiculous reason also became the basis for Matsui Toshiro in Beiping City. In the lips and tongues of both sides, time passed by minute by second.

At about 3:20, hundreds of officers and soldiers of the Yimu Brigade approached Lugou Bridge and Wanping City. In order to deter China, Yimu ordered the artillery squadron to occupy Yiwen Mountain first and set up cannons. This small hill, which is only a few dozen meters above sea level, is only a stone’s throw away from Wanping County. If you shoot from here, the shells can fall directly into Wanping City. Then, another detail worth mentioning happened: without waiting for Yimu to speak, Xiao Yanjing, the monitor of the communication team, spread the telephone line from Fengtai to Xiwuli Store. “You can call Beiping directly through Fengtai transit”; Ichimu Qingzhi later said, “The installation of the telephone is a great achievement of Xiao Yanjing… I reported it to the captain. The situation here has contributed to the determination to fight. This phone call has helped a lot…”

Almost as soon as the phone was set up, Mu Tiankou Lian also called. He told Yimu that a few minutes ago, China and Japan had formed a joint investigation team to go to Lugou Bridge for on-site negotiations. Yimu couldn’t help it anymore. He told Renya Mutaguchi that the Chinese army was attacking his troops. “It’s useless to negotiate at this time. I think it would be better to negotiate after occupying Lugou Bridge.” Later, he explained his intention, “I thought I couldn’t let the war go, so I made an exaggerated statement to the captain of the company” (Asahi Symposium, July 1938).

At the beginning, Mu Tiankou Lian was also vague about the request of the night attack on Lugou Bridge. He hinted at Kazuki, “For this matter, the Chinese army in Beijing will not be fully mobilized.” In this regard, Yimu said more eagerly, “Since it has not been fully mobilized, it is an opportunity… At this time, I think it is the best policy for the Chinese army to hit the Lugou Bridge.”

After a moment of silence, Mutaguchi Lian also finally took a stand: “You can fight.”

Yimu asked in surprise, “Can you really do it?”

Mutaguchi Ren also said, “You can do it… Let’s check the table. It’s 4:20 now, that’s right.”

A year later, in front of many colleagues and reporters, Ichiki Kiyonao said proudly, “I never thought that the joint captain would approve it. I was a little surprised… Then I really did it. 4:20 a.m. on July 8th! This is the time when the incident began. “(Asahi Symposium, July 1938)

After getting the approval of Renya Mutaguchi, Ichiki immediately ordered to bury the pot to cook and prepare to attack at dawn. More than an hour later, although the Sino-Japanese joint investigation team had entered Wanping City, and the group included his top boss, Lieutenant Colonel Toru Morita, the deputy captain of the joint force, and Major Sakurada of the secret service, Ichiki still ordered the fire with a disregarding attitude. For a moment, a round of cannonballs whizzed down from Yiwen Mountain and fell into Wanping City.

The star fire of Lugou Bridge was ignited in this way. But until now, whether it was Qin Dechun and Zhang Zizhong of China, Major General Hashimoto, Chief of Staff of the “Chinese Garrison Army” of Japan, and Major Takeo Imai, the deputy military officer of the embassy in Beiping, were still trying to extinguish it. In the following eight years, Takeo Imai played an important role in almost any Sino-Japanese peace talks. This role began with his mediation of the “Lugou Bridge Incident”.

Takeo Imai, born in 1898, is from Nagano Prefecture, Japan. As a participant in the Sino-Japanese War from beginning to end, he experienced that unforgettable night: almost as soon as he fell asleep, the news of Lugou Bridge came. In the conference room of the Mutiankou Joint Forces, which was separated by a wall, he saw soldiers in strict military uniforms coming one after another and heard Mutiankou Lianya’s permission to operate Ichimu Kiyoshi. At dawn, he also convened reporters from all over the world in Beiping and held a brief press conference. He later recalled, “In the hazy face that could barely be recognized, there were several benches in the patio. Everyone sat in the shade of the fresh green locust trees and listened to me announce the story of the events that happened last night. “(Memoirs of Takeo Imai)

Ten minutes later, the reporters dispersed. After visiting the Soul Club and “praying for the peace of the East”, it rained all over the world. Takeo Imai later wrote: “It happened to be at this moment that the sound of cannons sounded in the southwest, shaking the dark sky with low clouds and rain… Perhaps it can be said that it was God’s will. The rain that began to rain at this time turned into a rain that had not been seen in several years, and finally immersed the wilderness of North China in the flood…”

In such a storm, Imai began to look back on the strange encounters in the past few days.

On June 26, Emperor Showa’s uncle, Mitsuru Otani, the abbot of Nishi Honganji Temple, who has a large number of believers in Japan, “without any warning… suddenly came to Beiping and stayed at the Rokukoku Hotel near the Qianmen Railway Station”. The next day, he invited Takeo Imai to meet him and asked about the situation of the North China garrison. At the end of the conversation of more than two hours, Otani revealed his intention. It turned out that in the past few days, the news that “North China will repeated the Willow Ditch Incident” has also spread to Tokyo. In this regard, Prime Minister Wenmaro, who had just been in office for more than 20 days, was both shocked and suspicious, so he sent Mitsuru Otani to investigate the dynamics of the Chinese garrison.

Incidentally, it was also on this day that the 29th Army declared martial law at night in Beiping City. Then, Lieutenant Colonel Kiyofuku Okamoto of the Military Department of the Army Department also came, who had the same mission as Otani. However, it was Ishihara Wan’er, who foreseed that the Sino-Japanese War was imminent, who sent him to investigate.

What’s stranger is that it’s still in the future! On July 6, which was the day before the incident, Imai went to the home of Chen Zigeng, a Doctor of Medicine and former secretary-general of the Beiyang Government, for a banquet. Before the banquet, an unintited guest arrived in a hurry. The person who came was Shi Yousan, the security commander of northern Hebei, who has always had a close relationship with the Japanese. Shi You said in an amazing voice, “Military officer, the Japanese and Chinese armies clashed at Lugou Bridge this afternoon and are currently at war. Do you know this situation?”

Takeo Imai was shocked. He comforted Shi Yousan and said, “I don’t know about this kind of thing, and it won’t happen, will it?” However, Shi Yousan refused to reveal the source of the information. He pleaded, “My troops in Huangsi, the northern suburbs of Beiping, have no intention of fighting against the Japanese army. Please be sure to tell your army not to attack them. “(Memoirs of Takeo Imai)

All these things made Takeo Imai have an ominous premonition. This morning, he called Major General Hashimoto, Chief of Staff of the Chinese Garrison Army, and expressed his position on “not expanding” the incident. Hashimoto Qun was in favor and authorized him to mediate. The first turning point to calm down the situation appeared: at that time, Wanichiro Tashiro, the commander of the Chinese garrison army, was seriously ill in bed, and the statement of the Hashimoto group represented the attitude of the garrison army.

Then, at about 7 o’clock that night, another turning machine appeared. On this day, in the pouring rain, Takeo Imai ran around all day and got almost nothing. He later said, “Shortly after the incident, the dignitaries of the Jicha regime seemed to have a meeting somewhere. (When they visited), the people in their family all replied that they didn’t know where the master was now, (and) avoided meeting with the Japanese.” However, at night, Takeo Imai still refused to give up. He went to Qin Dechun’s private house again.

Outside Qin’s house, a team of guards with live ammunition stopped him and said, “No matter what he said, he was not allowed to go there.” When he was at a loss, Zhao Dengyu, his old acquaintance and commander of the 132nd Division, happened to come out of the courtyard. Takeo Imai quickly stopped him and asked him to do the dredging on his behalf. Later, he said, “Master Zhao is a good old man. He hesitated a little, as if he had changed his mind. Although he just came out, he ran in and mediated for me.

In this way, a few minutes later, Takeo Imai saw Qin Dechun. After a brief meeting, both sides agreed to the policy of “no expansion” and local solution. As for the specific solution, “because China didn’t say a word, it could not be solved”.

Now, when Takeo I was tired and rushed back to the Beiping Military Officer’s Office in the rain, a more major turning point was waiting for him. On this day, the joint meeting of the Tokyo Ministry of the Army and the General Staff also made a decision to “not expand” and solve it on the sit. They sent the temporary order No. 400 of the General Staff, which was concise: “In order to prevent the expansion of the situation, further use of force should be avoided.”

This order made Takeo Imai relieved and overjoyed.