作者：周小星  

1989年6月4日，北京。

一群渴望自由、反腐败、追求民主与法治的学生和市民，最终等来的不是对话，而是坦克、子弹和镇压。

那一年，来自全国各地的大学生走上街头，他们并非暴徒，也不是所谓“动乱分子”。很多人只是单纯地希望国家变得更好，希望结束腐败，希望拥有更多言论自由，希望中国能够走向更加开放和文明的未来。

他们聚集在天安门广场，静坐、绝食、演讲，用和平方式表达诉求。广场上有年轻人的理想，也有普通市民对未来的期待。

但中共最终选择了最残酷的方式回应。

军队开进北京，坦克驶入街道，枪口对准自己的人民。长安街上的枪声、履带声和哭喊声，成为那个时代最沉重的记忆。许多年轻生命永远停留在1989年的夏天，很多家庭从此支离破碎。

真正令人愤怒和悲哀的，不仅仅是那一夜发生的流血事件，更是37年来中共对这段历史持续不断的封锁和掩盖。

在中国，“六·四”成了禁词，相关书籍被删除，网络内容被屏蔽，讨论被压制。无数年轻人甚至从未听说过这段历史。一个政权如果真的问心无愧，就不会如此恐惧人民记住过去。

中共害怕的从来不是纪念本身，而是真相被更多人知道。

因为一旦人们开始了解历史，就会明白：当一个政权把维稳置于人民生命之上，把不同声音视为威胁，把遗忘当作统治工具，它最惧怕的永远是独立思考和自由意志。

37年过去，很多事情已经改变，但有些伤口仍未愈合。

纪念“六·四”，不是为了沉浸在仇恨中，而是拒绝遗忘，拒绝让谎言改写历史。

历史不会因为删帖、封号和沉默而消失。

那些逝去的生命，值得被记住；那段被掩盖的历史，值得被讲述。

铭记1989，勿忘“六·四”。

自由从来不是免费的。

编辑：钟然 校对：熊辩 翻译：周敏

History Will Not Vanish Through Silence

Author: Zhou Xiaoxing

Abstract: During the June 4th Incident in 1989, students and citizens pursuing democracy and freedom were met with military suppression by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). For 37 years, the authorities have continuously blocked the truth of history, but history and the deceased should not be forgotten.

June 4, 1989, Beijing. A group of students and citizens longing for freedom, opposing corruption, and pursuing democracy and the rule of law ultimately did not receive dialogue, but rather tanks, bullets, and suppression.

That year, university students from all over the country took to the streets. They were not thugs, nor were they so-called “rioters.” Many simply hoped for the country to become better, hoped for an end to corruption, hoped for more freedom of speech, and hoped that China could move toward a more open and civilized future.

They gathered in Tiananmen Square—sitting in, fasting, and giving speeches—expressing their demands through peaceful means. In the square, there were the ideals of the youth and the expectations of ordinary citizens for the future.

However, the CCP ultimately chose the most brutal way to respond. The military marched into Beijing, tanks drove into the streets, and muzzles were aimed at their own people. The sound of gunfire, the roar of treads, and the cries on Chang’an Avenue became the heaviest memories of that era. Many young lives remained forever in the summer of 1989, and many families were shattered from that moment on.

What is truly infuriating and sorrowful is not only the bloodshed that occurred that night, but also the continuous blockade and cover-up of this history by the CCP for 37 years.

In China, “June 4th” has become a forbidden term. Relevant books are deleted, internet content is blocked, and discussions are suppressed. Countless young people have never even heard of this history. If a regime truly had a clear conscience, it would not fear the people remembering the past so much.

What the CCP fears has never been the act of commemoration itself, but rather the truth being known by more people. Because once people begin to understand history, they will realize: when a regime places “stability maintenance” above human life, regards different voices as threats, and uses forgetting as a tool of governance, what it fears most will always be independent thinking and free will.

Thirty-seven years have passed, and many things have changed, but some wounds have yet to heal. To commemorate “June 4th” is not to immerse oneself in hatred, but to refuse to forget and to refuse to let lies rewrite history.

History will not vanish because of deleted posts, banned accounts, or silence. Those lost lives deserve to be remembered; that covered-up history deserves to be told.

Remember 1989; do not forget “June 4th.” Freedom is never free.

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Zhou Min

——中国银行管控的系统性不对称

作者：周敏

编辑：胡丽莉 校对：王滨 翻译：戈冰

银行，在世人常识中是储户资金最安全的去处。存入，取出，天经地义。但是你发现没有？近年来，一个奇异的景象在中国银行体系中反复上演：骗子和内部人员能以惊人的效率将储户的钱转走，而储户自己要取回这笔钱，却要面对预约、盘问、证明、审查，乃至被拒之门外。

而这番景象，究根结底，是1949年后中国一切为党服务的制度设计之必然结果。

一、两个场景，两种速度

2025年10月，吉林省扶余市。储户陈冰将1000万元企业备用金存入扶余惠民村镇银行，业务由该行员工赵某丽经办。同月，另一储户王女士也将800万元积蓄存入同一银行，同样由赵某丽负责。赵某丽此前以完成存款指标为由，向储户承诺高于公开利率的回报，多次准时兑付，储户逐渐放松警惕。

2025年12月，陈冰发现手机银行无法登录，前往营业厅查询，被告知银行卡已挂失，账户内仅余一万余元——1000万元几近转空。王女士的800万元同样不翼而飞，银行拒绝提供资金流水凭证，隐瞒资金去向。事后查明，赵某丽通过伪造签名、冒名挂失补办银行卡等手段，将两人合计1800万元非法转走。赵某丽事发后服药轻生，被救回后已被批捕。

两笔共计1800万元的资金，从存入到被转空，整个过程银行系统没有触发任何有效预警，没有任何人主动通知储户。

现在再把镜头切换到另一个场景。

2024年，邢台，一名女子因丈夫病重急需现金支付医疗费用，前往银行取款。她被柜员以”大额取现”为由长时间盘查，反复追问资金用途，取款受阻。同年，沈阳一女子欲取5000元，被要求其丈夫必须到场。青岛一男子因无法当场提供”资金来源证明”，无法取出自己账户里的钱。吉林省某银行更一度要求取款超过2万元，须持辖区派出所出具的证明。

同一金融系统，同类账户里的钱。内部人员转走1800万，无声无息；储户自己取几万，困难重重。

二、管控的方向

要理解这种不对称，就得先理解这套管控机制究竟是为谁设计的。

中国银行体系在名义上服务储户，在结构上却是向上负责——对党政体系、监管机构、中共维稳负责。储户在法律意义上对银行拥有债权，而非对自己资金的直接所有权。这个区别在正常时期几乎感知不到，在危机时刻则暴露无遗。

大额现金管理制度要求5万元以上取现须提前预约，取款时须说明用途。这套机制的官方理由是反洗钱和反电信诈骗，但其实际功能远不止于此：这是让国家实时掌握大额资金流向，防范资本外逃，监控政治敏感资金异动。换言之，它首先是一套资本管控工具，其次才是反诈工具，保护储户则排在更后面。

柜员层面还存在一个自我加强的机制：若柜员放行了一笔事后被认定为涉诈的资金，将被个人处罚扣薪。这意味着柜员的理性选择必然是尽可能设置障碍，因为柜员清楚地看到，误伤普通储户的代价，远远低于放行涉诈资金的代价。于是每一个急需用钱的病人家属，每一个临时周转的商户，都成了这套风控机制的潜在嫌疑人。

与此形成鲜明对比的是，内部人员作案时走的则是监控之外的路径。系统级权限、职务便利、伪造票证——这些手段绕过柜台风控流程与前端审查。看见了吗？监控最严密的地方，恰恰是普通人取自己钱的窗口；漏洞最多的地方，恰恰是内部人员施展空间的后台。

三、爆雷之后的维权困境

内部人员作案尚属个案，但是，当机构本身成为掠夺者，这套不对称就会以更大的规模呈现。

2022年，河南四家村镇银行毫无预警地同时关闭线上取款渠道，约40万储户发现自己的存款无法提取。事后查明，银行股东以河南新财富集团为核心，通过内外勾结，将储户资金系统性转移，涉案金额据估计逾百亿元人民币。在这里，作恶的是谁？正是银行本身。

储户前往郑州维权，健康码被莫名赋红，无法进入郑州。大规模抗议现场出现身份不明的白衣人强行驱散人群，部分储户遭到殴打。随后，当局以”先垫付5万元以下”的方式分化维权队伍——拿到钱的人不再闹，剩下大额储户人数越来越少，声音越来越小。时至今日，仍有逾千名储户未获任何赔偿。

这套处置方式表明了一件事：当储户利益与维稳目标发生冲突，优先被保护的并不是储户利益。

四、制度性不对称的本质

上述案例放在一起通盘观察，可以看见一个清晰的脉络：

这套系统对资金流动的管控方向是倒置的。它对内部人员盗转、股东掏空几乎无效，对普通储户取回自己的钱反倒层层设防、令人崩溃。反洗钱反电诈的说法，为机构失职提供了合规掩护，同时还把监控资本流动的成本，以审查程序的名义转嫁给了储户。

工行南宁分行原高管梁建红，以伪造存单、替换票证的方式，历时数月转走11名储户约2.5亿元存款，银行系统全程未能有效识别。判决后，银行的第一个动作就是把责任归咎于员工个人行为；储户的民事赔偿诉求则被要求”先刑后民”，等待刑事追赃程序走完——而那个程序，可以漫长得以年来计算。

当储户被要求向银行证明自己有权取回自己的钱，这个关系已经不是存款关系，而是实质上的管控关系。银行不是服务方，而是施压方、管理方、控制方。

在一个法治健全的金融体系里，举证责任天然地落在银行一侧：银行须证明有法定理由才能拒绝支付。而在今天的中国，这个举证责任已经悄然倒置。储户不再是委托人，而更像是需要持续自证清白的被审查者。

面对这样的结构，储户究竟还能做什么来保护自己？这个问题，恐怕没有在现行体制内寻找答案的空间。

The People’s Money, the Party’s Decision

—Systemic Asymmetry in China’s Banking Oversight

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Hu Lili Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: In many regions, banks have failed to issue timely warnings when internal staff embezzle funds, while depositors face strict scrutiny and restrictions when attempting to withdraw their money. This article highlights the asymmetry within the financial system regarding the treatment of ordinary depositors versus internal risk management.

In the common understanding, banks are the safest place for depositors’ funds. Depositing and withdrawing money is a matter of course. But have you noticed? In recent years, a bizarre phenomenon has repeatedly unfolded within China’s banking system: fraudsters and insiders can transfer depositors’ money away with astonishing efficiency, while depositors themselves face appointments, interrogations, proof requirements, and scrutiny—and are even turned away—when trying to retrieve their own funds.

Ultimately, this phenomenon is the inevitable result of China’s post-1949 institutional design, which prioritizes serving the Party above all else.

I. Two Scenarios, Two Speeds

October 2025, Fuyu City, Jilin Province. Depositor Chen Bing deposited 10 million yuan in corporate contingency funds into Fuyu Huimin Rural Commercial Bank, with the transaction handled by bank employee Zhao Mouli. That same month, another depositor, Ms. Wang, also deposited 8 million yuan in savings into the same bank, again under Zhao Mouli’s supervision. Zhao Mouli had previously promised depositors returns higher than the published interest rates, citing the need to meet deposit quotas, and made timely payments on multiple occasions, causing the depositors to gradually let down their guard.

In December 2025, Chen Bing discovered he could not log into the mobile banking app. Upon visiting the branch to inquire, he was informed that his bank card had been reported lost, and only about 10,000 yuan remained in his account—the 10 million yuan had nearly vanished. Ms. Wang’s 8 million yuan had also disappeared without a trace, and the bank refused to provide transaction records, concealing the funds’ whereabouts. Subsequent investigations revealed that Zhao Mouli had illegally transferred a total of 18 million yuan from the two women by forging signatures and fraudulently reporting their cards lost to obtain replacements. After the incident, Zhao attempted suicide by overdosing on medication; she was rescued and has since been arrested.

Throughout the entire process—from the deposit of the two sums totaling 18 million yuan to their complete depletion—the bank’s system failed to trigger any effective alerts, and no one proactively notified the depositors.

Now let’s shift our focus to another scenario.

In 2024, in Xingtai, a woman went to a bank to withdraw cash urgently needed to cover her husband’s medical expenses. She was subjected to a lengthy interrogation by a teller on the grounds of a “large cash withdrawal,” repeatedly questioned about the funds’ intended use, and ultimately prevented from withdrawing the money. That same year, in Shenyang, a woman attempting to withdraw 5,000 yuan was told her husband must be present. In Qingdao, a man was unable to withdraw money from his own account because he could not provide “proof of funds” on the spot. A bank in Jilin Province even went so far as to require a certificate issued by the local police station for withdrawals exceeding 20,000 yuan.

The same financial system, money in similar accounts. When an insider transfers 18 million yuan, it goes unnoticed; when a depositor tries to withdraw a few tens of thousands, they face immense difficulties.

II. The Direction of Control

To understand this asymmetry, one must first understand for whom this control mechanism was actually designed.

China’s banking system nominally serves depositors, but structurally, it is accountable upward—to the Party and government system, regulatory bodies, and the CCP’s stability maintenance apparatus. Legally speaking, depositors hold claims against the bank, rather than direct ownership of their funds. This distinction is barely perceptible in normal times but becomes glaringly obvious in times of crisis.

The large-cash management system requires advance reservations for cash withdrawals exceeding 50,000 yuan, with the purpose of the withdrawal to be stated at the time of withdrawal. The official justification for this mechanism is anti-money laundering and anti-telecom fraud, but its actual functions go far beyond that: it allows the state to track the flow of large sums of money in real time, prevent capital flight, and monitor politically sensitive financial movements. In other words, it is first and foremost a tool for capital control, secondarily an anti-fraud tool, with the protection of depositors ranking even lower on the list of priorities.

At the teller level, there is a self-reinforcing mechanism: if a teller approves a transaction that is later identified as fraud-related, they face personal penalties, including salary deductions. This means that the rational choice for a teller is inevitably to create as many obstacles as possible, because they clearly see that the cost of mistakenly inconveniencing ordinary depositors is far lower than the cost of allowing fraud-related funds to pass through. Consequently, every family member of a patient in urgent need of funds and every merchant seeking temporary liquidity becomes a potential suspect under this risk control mechanism.

In stark contrast, when internal personnel commit fraud, they take paths outside the scope of surveillance. System-level permissions, the convenience of their positions, and forged documents—these methods bypass counter-level risk control processes and front-end reviews. Do you see? The most heavily monitored areas are precisely the windows where ordinary people withdraw their own money; the areas with the most vulnerabilities are precisely the back offices where internal personnel have room to operate.

III. The Dilemma of Seeking Redress After a Financial Scandal

While insider fraud is typically an isolated incident, when the institution itself becomes the predator, this asymmetry manifests on a much larger scale.

In 2022, four village banks in Henan simultaneously shut down their online withdrawal channels without warning, leaving approximately 400,000 depositors unable to access their funds. Subsequent investigations revealed that bank shareholders, led by the Henan New Fortune Group, had systematically diverted depositors’ funds through collusion with both internal and external parties, with the total amount involved estimated to exceed 10 billion yuan. Who was responsible for this wrongdoing? It was the banks themselves.

When depositors traveled to Zhengzhou to demand their rights, their health codes were inexplicably marked red, preventing them from entering the city. At the site of large-scale protests, unidentified individuals in white clothing forcibly dispersed the crowd, and some depositors were beaten. Subsequently, the authorities sought to divide the protest group by offering “advance payments of up to 50,000 yuan”—those who received the money stopped protesting, while the number of depositors with larger balances dwindled, and their voices grew fainter. To this day, over a thousand depositors have yet to receive any compensation.

This approach reveals one thing: when the interests of depositors conflict with the goal of maintaining social stability, it is not the depositors’ interests that are prioritized.

IV. The Essence of Institutional Asymmetry

When viewed holistically, the cases described above reveal a clear pattern:

This system’s approach to controlling capital flows is inverted. It is virtually ineffective against embezzlement by insiders or asset stripping by shareholders, yet it erects layer upon layer of barriers—often to the point of frustration—to prevent ordinary depositors from retrieving their own money. The rhetoric of anti-money laundering and anti-telecom fraud provides a compliance cover for institutional dereliction of duty, while simultaneously shifting the cost of monitoring capital flows onto depositors under the guise of review procedures.

Liang Jianhong, a former senior executive at the Nanning Branch of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), embezzled approximately 250 million yuan in deposits from 11 depositors over several months by forging deposit certificates and swapping physical documents—a scheme the banking system failed to detect throughout the entire process. Following the verdict, the bank’s first move was to attribute the blame to the employee’s individual actions; meanwhile, depositors’ civil compensation claims were met with the requirement to “pursue civil claims after criminal proceedings,” forcing them to wait for the criminal asset recovery process to conclude—a process that can take years.

When depositors are required to prove to the bank that they have the right to retrieve their own money, this relationship is no longer one of depository banking but has effectively become one of control. The bank is not a service provider but rather an entity that exerts pressure, manages, and controls.

In a financial system governed by the rule of law, the burden of proof naturally falls on the bank: the bank must demonstrate that it has legal grounds to refuse payment. In today’s China, however, this burden of proof has quietly been reversed. Depositors are no longer clients but rather subjects under scrutiny who must constantly prove their own innocence.

Faced with such a structure, what can depositors actually do to protect themselves? It seems there is little room to find an answer to this question within the current system.

致：中国共产党总书记习近平

申请人：彭永和，中国公民（前上海律师），76年生，江西籍，无固定住所地。

本人彭永和，希望能像前总理朱镕基那样，怀着“不管前面是地雷阵还是万丈深渊，我都将一往无前，义无反顾，鞠躬尽瘁，死而后已”的为人民服务” 的历史责任感和使命感而申请加入中国共产党。

同时，我正式邀请习近平你作为本人的入党介绍人。

我深知，以我现在可疑的政治立场，上海方面不可能接受我的入党申请，其它省份的又根本不了解我，所以，目光只能投向你！至于理由：“你懂的”！

本人申请加入中国共产党的动机和目的：

1，消除误会：

在长达九年的被维稳过程中，说本人有政治倾向问题；说本人虽然嘴上不说，可心里和所作的事情就是要推翻中国共产党的领导！

为此，前几年我特意给上海市司法局和市政府写了一封公开信，信中说“本人坚决反对专政、反对独裁、接受普世价值”——如果这是政治倾向的话———这可不是我彭永和首先提出来的，早在抗战及国共内战时期，“新华社”就向全体国人公开发表过类似的表态；毛泽东也曾在1945 年的《论联合政府》中提到，中国应实现林肯的“民有、民治、民享”原则和罗斯福的“四大自由”——这能是政治倾向有问题？这能是要推翻中国共产党的领导的意思？

之后，记得还曾经两次给上海市长龚正写公开信明确表示希望“消除误会”然，从未得到回应。

2, 害怕打击报复：

他们曾跟我说：“你我是敌对关系，…….”。

3, 可以自由去北京看升国旗、敬礼：

今年1月底，我到北京的当天就被上海的国宝带到了北京的一个派出所说:“你在公安部的黑名单里，你不能待在北京……….”。北京的那个国宝也对我说:“我是不可能让你待在北京的……”。

4, 恢复律师证：

因涉及政治倾向问题，2021年1月份我的律师证就被上海市司法局注销了，注销前的申辩书的标题是“给中共中央总书记国家主席习近平的公开信”，具体内容你去看看，国保那有。

5, 兑现对上海全体律师的承诺博取名声：

我说过要努力促成《上海市律师协会选举和罢免规则》的尽早颁布，2022年本人就制定了此规则草案发给了上海市律师协会和司法局，就在今年的3月份在给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信（二）中还提及了此事，甚至在总理李强当上海市委书记的时候借助疫情的公开信寻求过他的帮助。

6, 获得巨额赔偿：

在今年3月份给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信（一）中公开进行索赔，我估算了一下大概一百五十万元左右。

你想，如果我入了党，我们之间的关系就是同志了对吧，也就说明之前确实是个误会阿，既然是误会，那么这么多年的不能律师执业的损失就应该赔偿给我对吧？

7,被养老金分配状况刺激、担心自己十年后:

如今，公务员、事业单位退休每月平均六七千，农民和城市居民平均二百多点。而，2025年世界银行修订，联合国统计司 (UNSD)发布的国际绝对贫困标准线是“日均生活消费3美元”。折合人民币约每月630元，也就是说还不到国际贫困线的一半！

如果我今年入了党，那么，我一定会同你一道还有其他同志一起想办法把农民和城市居民的养老金到明年提高到每月一千元，后年继续提高，直至跟公务员和企业职工相当的水平。

哎！要是李克强总理还活着，我想，他一定会全力支持我们的！

8, 被医疗保障制度所刺激，担心自己和孩子看不起病：

网友总结为：不是没有免费医疗，而是免费医疗的名单里没有你！

如果我今年入党了，我就跟你一起不论前面是地雷阵还是万丈深渊，将一往无前，义无反顾，鞠躬尽瘁，死而后已”，目标是在三年内实现全民“平等基础保障的免费医疗”。

9，被（2026）沪7101行初309号行政裁定书所刺激：

一审法院裁定书表述如下：………..实际系对市司法局是否履行了对上海律协的监督管理职责的异议，明显不属于《条例》所调整的范畴，被诉告知对原告的权利义务不产生实际影响，……..故原告的起诉不符合法定起诉条件。

如果真如法院认为的那样，本人为何不去控告、投诉或者以行政不作为为由提起诉讼？又或者如给上海市委书记陈吉宁、市长龚正的公开信（二）中那样明确要求对上海市司法局相关涉案人员渎职的行为进行调查处理？反而是申请信息公开律师协会的财务审计报告和材料———到底是法院脑残还是本人脑残？

另，法院不开庭，就可以避免查明：本人立案时提交的律师执业证证据上面记载的时间和本人的实际执业年份在所申请的上海律师协会第十、十一届期间，从而关系到本人的财产权、知情权、监督权。如此，就可以装糊涂用对原告的权利义务不产生实际影响结案，从而避免上海律协每年“亿”元会费的实际支出情况被公开的可能性，从而影响到上海几万名律师的心情和律师行业的稳定！

10, 被于凯等言论自由权案件的刺激：

我的朋友于凯律师，因在司法部门前举牌反映“律协自治、会费、黑名单等问题被涉嫌寻衅滋事犯罪。

黑名单问题，我是亲历者，被明确告知上了上海市司法局黑名单。

外交部发言人反复说中国公民有言论自由权，没有任何一个公民会“因言获罪”。 我入党之后，我将更有力量与你一起和其他同志促使《新闻法》在一年之内制定和颁布。届时，将明确言论自由权的边界，避免类似如我朋友于凯案的再次发生。

我初步的设想的言论自由的边界是：非因故意制作、编造、发表或明知是虚假旨在攻击、诋毁政府及工作人员履行公职行为或现状的言论、信息而传播的，不得为罪。

前款因故意除已然造成社会功能上的停止或丧失，或已然处于紧迫状态政府不得不通过武力对公共场所和秩序所进行干预、预防和布置外的，也不得为罪。

11,对阳光法案的期盼和被巨额财产来源不明罪金额上调至300万的刺激：

《公职人员财产公示法》已然是被绝大多数国家已验证的最好的反腐败方法之一，只要该法颁布，巨额财产来源不明罪金额根本无需上调，反而可以下调甚至废除此罪。如，新加坡。如有巨额财产来源不明一律按“贪污处理”。

我入党之后，将与你并肩作战，二年内颁布《公职人员财产公示法》，如你曾说的“扎紧制度的篱笆”，自己亲自为自己带上“枷锁”、拴上锁链、筑起笼子。

12,我的兄弟丁家喜和朋友张展案件的刺激：

我的兄弟丁家喜，这次又被判刑12年；朋友张展这次又是4年。

我知道，那些办理他们案件的公检法人员也知道，他们的追求和目标其实跟你跟党是一模一样———民主、宪政、法治中国。

这激起了我强烈的对隐藏在党内的腐败份子清除欲望。届时，你我将并肩作战，对腐败份子0容忍。

13,…….

太多了，待续。

以上，或许有人会说——彭永和，你动机不纯，贪名贪财阿，你这种人怎么能入党呢？

这个问题问得非常好！

我的答复是：我是血肉之身，不是特殊材料制作的，所以，我必须直视人性尊重人性，一切从人性出发，不叫口号，事实求是，不隐瞒不欺骗组织。我想，只有这样才具备申请加入中国共产党的资格吧。你说是吧？

最后，我要说明一下为什么要以公开信的方式。原因就是：既然我决心要为人民服务，那么，本申请书涉及的信息和“服务事项”就自然应当公开接受全民的核实检验和监督，如果在本申请书中你发现或经举报核实有任何故意捏造的事实，本人将永远不再申请加入中国共产党。

习近平主席、 全体中国公民、全体中国共产党员、其他八个党派党员、川普总统、内塔尼亚胡总理、泽联斯基总统、安东尼奥·古特雷斯,联合国秘书长等所有文明的境外势力和追求文明的人们，如果你认为我彭永和更有可能真的会履行共产党的宗旨、践行共产党对十四亿中国人的承诺“全心全意为人民服务”，请支持我加入中国共产党。谢谢！

今日去北京！ 此入党申请书公开前，该不会又被上海或北京的公安控制了吧！

申请人：彭永和

电话微信：13816353773

邮箱：[email protected]

[email protected]

2026年5月10日

2026年5月11日临近中午火车到北京西站，刚走出车厢即被北京警方控制，当天晚上被上海警方带回上海。

Open Letter of Application for Party Membership by Peng Yonghe, a Chinese Citizen (Former Shanghai Lawyer)

To: Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China

Applicant: Peng Yonghe, a Chinese citizen (former Shanghai lawyer), born in 1976, native of Jiangxi Province, with no fixed residence.

I, Peng Yonghe, wish to apply for membership in the Communist Party of China with the same historical sense of responsibility and mission to serve the people as former Premier Zhu Rongji, who declared: “Whether I face a minefield or a bottomless abyss, I will press forward without hesitation, devote myself wholeheartedly, and serve until my dying breath.”

At the same time, I formally invite you, Xi Jinping, to serve as my sponsor for Party membership.

I am well aware that, given my current questionable political stance, the authorities in Shanghai will not accept my application for Party membership, and those in other provinces simply do not know me. Therefore, I have no choice but to turn to you! As for the reason: “You know why!”

My motives and objectives for applying to join the Communist Party of China:

1. To clear up misunderstandings:

During the nine-year-long process of being “maintained for stability,” it was claimed that I had political leanings; that although I did not speak of it openly, my heart and my actions were aimed at overthrowing the leadership of the Communist Party of China!

To address this, a few years ago I specifically wrote an open letter to the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice and the Municipal Government, stating: “I firmly oppose dictatorship and autocracy, and embrace universal values”—if this constitutes a political orientation—this is not something I, Peng Yonghe, first proposed. As early as the War of Resistance and the Chinese Civil War, Xinhua News Agency had publicly issued similar statements to all Chinese citizens; Mao Zedong also mentioned in his 1945 essay “On the United Government” that China should realize Lincoln’s principle of “government of the people, by the people, for the people” and Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms”—how could this be considered a problematic political stance? How could this be interpreted as an intent to overthrow the leadership of the Communist Party of China?

Afterward, I recall writing two open letters to Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng, explicitly expressing my hope to “clear up the misunderstanding,” yet I never received a response.

2. Fear of Retaliation:

They once told me, “We are enemies, ……”.

3. Freedom to go to Beijing to watch the flag-raising ceremony and salute:

In late January of this year, on the very day I arrived in Beijing, I was taken by a Shanghai police officer to a Beijing police station, where I was told: “You’re on the Ministry of Public Security’s blacklist; you cannot stay in Beijing…” The Beijing police officer also told me: “There’s no way I’m going to let you stay in Beijing…”

4. Restoration of my lawyer’s license:

Due to issues involving political leanings, my lawyer’s license was revoked by the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice in January 2021. The title of my defense statement submitted before the revocation was “Open Letter to Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee and President of the People’s Republic of China.” You can review the specific contents—they are on file with the State Security Bureau.

5. Fulfilling a promise to all Shanghai lawyers to gain a reputation:

I have stated that I would strive to facilitate the early promulgation of the “Shanghai Bar Association Rules on Election and Recall.” In 2022, I drafted these rules and submitted them to the Shanghai Bar Association and the Bureau of Justice. As recently as March of this year, I mentioned this matter in my “Open Letter (II) to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng.” I even sought assistance from Premier Li Qiang via an open letter during the pandemic when he was serving as Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary.

6. Securing Substantial Compensation:

In my first open letter to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng this past March, I publicly demanded compensation. I estimate the amount to be approximately 1.5 million yuan.

Just think: if I were to join the Party, our relationship would be that of comrades, right? That would mean what happened before was indeed a misunderstanding. And since it was a misunderstanding, shouldn’t I be compensated for the losses incurred over all these years during which I was unable to practice law?

7. Alarmed by the current state of pension distribution and worried about my situation ten years from now:

Today, retired civil servants and public institution employees receive an average monthly pension of 6,000 to 7,000 yuan, while farmers and urban residents receive an average of just over 200 yuan. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank’s 2025 revision and the international absolute poverty line published by the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD), the threshold is “an average daily living expense of $3.” Converted to RMB, this amounts to approximately 630 yuan per month—meaning it is less than half the international poverty line!

If I join the Party this year, I will certainly work with you and other comrades to find ways to raise the pensions for farmers and urban residents to 1,000 yuan per month by next year, and continue to increase them the year after, until they reach a level comparable to that of civil servants and enterprise employees.

Ah! If Premier Li Keqiang were still alive, I believe he would wholeheartedly support us!

8. Provoked by the healthcare system and worried about being unable to afford medical treatment for myself and my children:

Netizens have summed it up as: “It’s not that there is no free healthcare—it’s just that you aren’t on the list for free healthcare!”

If I join the Party this year, I will stand with you, and no matter whether we face a minefield or a bottomless abyss ahead, we will press forward undaunted, without hesitation, dedicating ourselves wholeheartedly until our dying breath. Our goal is to achieve “free healthcare with equal basic coverage for all” within three years.

9. Provoked by Administrative Ruling No. (2026) Hu 7101 Xing Chu 309:

The first-instance court’s ruling states as follows: ……….. This is in fact an objection to whether the Municipal Bureau of Justice has fulfilled its supervisory and management duties over the Shanghai Bar Association, which clearly falls outside the scope of the Regulations. The contested notice has no actual impact on the plaintiff’s rights and obligations,…. …Therefore, the plaintiff’s lawsuit does not meet the statutory conditions for filing a lawsuit.

If the situation is truly as the court claims, why did I not file a criminal complaint, lodge a formal complaint, or initiate a lawsuit on the grounds of administrative inaction? Or, as explicitly requested in my Open Letter (II) to Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary Chen Jining and Mayor Gong Zheng, why did I not demand an investigation and disciplinary action against the relevant personnel at the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice for their dereliction of duty? Instead, I applied for the disclosure of the Bar Association’s financial audit reports and materials—is it the court that is brain-dead, or am I?

Furthermore, by refusing to hold a hearing, the court can avoid ascertaining that the date recorded on the attorney’s license I submitted upon filing the case corresponds to my actual years of practice during the 10th and 11th terms of the Shanghai Bar Association, which directly relates to my property rights, right to know, and right to oversight. In this way, they can feign ignorance and dismiss the case on the grounds that it has no practical impact on the plaintiff’s rights and obligations, thereby preventing the disclosure of the Shanghai Bar Association’s actual annual expenditure of “hundreds of millions” in membership fees—which would affect the morale of tens of thousands of lawyers in Shanghai and the stability of the legal profession!

10. Stimulated by the case involving Yu Kai and others regarding the right to freedom of speech:

My friend, Attorney Yu Kai, was suspected of committing the crime of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” for holding up a sign in front of the judicial authorities to protest issues such as “bar association autonomy, membership fees, and blacklists.”

Regarding the blacklist issue, I am a firsthand witness; I was explicitly informed that I had been placed on the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Justice’s blacklist.

The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has repeatedly stated that Chinese citizens have the right to freedom of speech, and that no citizen will be “punished for their words.” After I join the Party, I will have greater strength to work with you and other comrades to ensure that the “Press Law” is drafted and enacted within one year. At that time, the boundaries of the right to freedom of speech will be clearly defined, preventing the recurrence of cases similar to that of my friend Yu Kai.

My preliminary conception of the boundaries of freedom of speech is as follows: it shall not constitute a crime to produce, fabricate, publish, or disseminate speech or information that is not intentionally created, or that is knowingly false, with the intent to attack or defame the government or government officials in the performance of their official duties or regarding the current state of affairs.

Furthermore, the acts described in the preceding paragraph shall not constitute a crime if they are committed intentionally, unless they have already caused a functional halt or loss of social order, or unless the government is already in a state of emergency and is compelled to intervene, prevent, or deploy forces in public spaces and to maintain public order.

11. Expectations for the Sunshine Act and the stimulus of raising the threshold for the crime of unexplained wealth to 3 million:

The “Public Officials’ Asset Disclosure Act” is already one of the best anti-corruption methods proven effective by the vast majority of countries. Once this law is enacted, there will be no need to raise the threshold for the crime of unexplained wealth; on the contrary, it can be lowered or even abolished. For example, in Singapore, any case of unexplained wealth is uniformly treated as “corruption.”

Once I join the Party, I will fight alongside you to enact the “Public Officials’ Asset Disclosure Law” within two years. As you once said, we must “tighten the institutional fence”—personally placing “shackles” on ourselves, fastening chains, and building a cage.

12. The Impact of the Cases Involving My Brother Ding Jiaxi and My Friend Zhang Zhan:

My brother, Ding Jiaxi, has once again been sentenced to 12 years in prison; my friend, Zhang Zhan, has been sentenced to another 4 years.

I know—and the officials from the public security, procuratorial, and judicial authorities handling their cases know as well—that their aspirations and goals are actually identical to yours and those of the Party: democracy, constitutional government, and the rule of law in China.

This has sparked in me a strong desire to root out the corrupt elements hiding within the Party. When that time comes, you and I will fight side by side, with zero tolerance for corrupt officials.

13,…….

There is too much to say; to be continued.

Regarding the above, some might say—Peng Yonghe, your motives are impure; you crave fame and wealth. How could someone like you ever join the Party?

That is an excellent question!

My response is: I am made of flesh and blood, not some special material. Therefore, I must face human nature head-on and respect it. I must approach everything from the perspective of human nature, avoid empty slogans, seek truth from facts, and never conceal or deceive the organization. I believe that only in this way do I qualify to apply for membership in the Communist Party of China. Don’t you agree?

Finally, I would like to explain why I am submitting this as an open letter. The reason is this: since I am determined to serve the people, the information and “matters of service” contained in this application should naturally be made public to be verified, examined, and supervised by the entire nation. If you discover, or if it is verified through a report, that there are any intentionally fabricated facts in this application, I will never again apply to join the Communist Party of China.

President Xi Jinping, all Chinese citizens, all members of the Communist Party of China, members of the other eight political parties, President Trump, Prime Minister Netanyahu, President Zelenskyy, António Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations, and all civilized foreign forces and people who pursue civilization—if you believe that I, Peng Yonghe, am more likely to truly uphold the Communist Party’s principles and fulfill the Party’s commitment to 1.4 billion Chinese people to “serve the people wholeheartedly,” please support my application to join the Communist Party of China. Thank you!

Heading to Beijing today! Before this application for Party membership is made public, I hope I won’t be detained by the Shanghai or Beijing police again!

Applicant: Peng Yonghe

Phone/WeChat: 13816353773

Email: [email protected]

[email protected]

May 10, 2026

On May 11, 2026, shortly before noon, my train arrived at Beijing West Station. As soon as I stepped out of the carriage, I was detained by Beijing police and taken back to Shanghai by Shanghai police that same evening.

本文来源：罗翔-破幕推墙

编辑：钟然 校对：毛一炜 翻译：戈冰

近日，红潮国安部又发了一篇雄文，义正辞严地指出：年轻人躺平，是境外势力渗透！是颜色革命的新花样！是敌对分子在背后搞鬼！读完我差点笑出声——这届国安部怕不是把《西游记》当内部文件学了，天天都能抓出个“境外妖怪”。

躺平有那么可怕吗？年轻人不996了，不内卷了，不想当韭菜了，就成了“国家安全隐患”？这逻辑也太好笑了。古人说“达则兼济天下，穷则独善其身”。可如今呢？达者们早就不兼济天下了，他们只兼济自己和亲戚朋友的账户余额。穷者想独善其身，躺平一下，喘口气，就被扣上“境外势力”的帽子。妙啊，这叫什么？叫只许州官放火，不许百姓点灯；只许权贵躺赢，不许平民躺平。

你们这些“达者”当年是怎么兼济天下的？

房地产大潮里，左手政策右手土地，轻松把几代人的财富收割进腰包；互联网红利期，平台经济野蛮生长，996福报喊得震天响，转头就把程序员当电池用完即弃；疫情期间，一边歌颂“动态清零是人间大爱”，一边让小商贩、打工仔倾家荡产；现在经济下行，又突然发现“躺平是境外势力”，赶紧把锅甩给美帝、日帝、台独、港独、境外NGO……反正只要不是自己无能，天下就没有解决不了的“境外势力”。

年轻人躺平的真正原因，你们心里比谁都清楚：

房价高不可攀，结婚生娃成了奢侈品；996干到35岁就被优化，35岁成了职场死刑；内卷卷到头秃，回报却越来越薄；阶层固化比水泥还硬，拼爹的时代，普通人再努力也只是给别人做嫁衣。

这时候你们不反思自己“兼济天下”干了什么好事，反而怪穷人“独善其身”？这不就是典型的“自己吃肉不给别人喝汤，还怪别人不感恩”吗？

更绝的是，国安部这篇雄文里，估计又要列举一堆“境外网站”“境外博主”“境外App”在教唆躺平。拜托，你们自己把国内互联网管得铁桶一般，连个正常发声的地方都不留，年轻人不翻墙还能去哪儿听真话？结果翻墙听了句“别卷了，保重身体”，就成了境外势力？那请问，当年教我们“知识改变命运”“努力就有未来”的那些鸡汤，又是哪国势力？是不是也该一起抓？

讽刺的是，最该躺平的其实是你们自己。

你们这些既得利益者，早就躺平在权力和垄断红利上几十年了：子女海外留学、资产海外配置、医疗海外就诊，自己躺得舒舒服服，却要求国内年轻人“站起来奋斗”“为民族复兴添砖加瓦”。砖瓦是你们搬吗？瓦刀是你们挥吗？最后累死累活的还是底层，享受成果的还是你们。

这叫什么兼济天下？这叫“达则兼济自家，穷则怪你不卷”。

躺平不是不奋斗，是拒绝被你们定义的“奋斗”当燃料。

年轻人选择低欲望、低消费、低婚育、低期待，本质上是对你们这套游戏规则的消极抵抗。他们不傻，看得比谁都清楚：再怎么卷，也卷不过关系、卷不过平台、卷不过政策风向。既然终点早已内定，那我干嘛还拼了命去跑？躺平，至少不会被你们当燃料烧完。

国安部啊国安部，你们越是急着把“躺平”打成境外势力，越说明这套系统已经病入膏肓。真正的境外势力，从来不是教年轻人躺平的那几个推文，而是把中国年轻人逼到只能躺平的那套制度和既得利益集团。

达者不再兼济天下，却要穷者必须卷到死，这才是真正的“国家安全隐患”。

如果躺平真是境外势力教唆的，那为什么境外势力没教权贵们也躺平呢？他们怎么还卷得那么起劲？

转发、点赞、保存——别让“境外势力”又多了几个！

The True Nature of the Crackdown on “Lying Flat”: The Successful No Longer Seek to Benefit All, Yet Blame the Poor for Looking Out Only for Themselves

Source: Luo Xiang – Breaking the Curtain, Tearing Down the Wall

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

Abstract: The authorities attribute young people’s “lying flat” to foreign forces, ignoring real pressures such as high housing prices, hyper-competition, and class固化; young people’s choice of a low-desire lifestyle is, in essence, a passive response and resistance to an unreasonable competitive system.

Recently, the “Red Tide” Ministry of State Security published another bombastic article, sternly declaring: Young people’s “lying flat” is the infiltration of foreign forces! It’s a new tactic of color revolutions! It’s hostile elements pulling strings behind the scenes! After reading it, I almost burst out laughing—this Ministry of State Security must have been studying *Journey to the West* as an internal manual; they seem to catch a “foreign demon” every single day.

Is “lying flat” really that terrifying? Just because young people refuse to work 996, reject the rat race, and refuse to be treated like chives, does that make them a “threat to national security”? That logic is laughable. The ancients said, “When one is successful, one benefits all under heaven; when one is in adversity, one cultivates oneself.” But what about today? The “successful” ones stopped benefiting the world long ago; they only benefit their own bank accounts and those of their relatives and friends. The “poor” want to cultivate themselves, lie back, and catch their breath, yet they’re branded as “foreign forces.” Brilliant! What do you call this? It’s called “officials are allowed to set fires, but the common people aren’t allowed to light lamps”; it’s called “the powerful are allowed to win without lifting a finger, but the common people aren’t allowed to lie back.”

How exactly did you “successful” ones benefit the world back in the day?

During the real estate boom, with policies in one hand and land in the other, you effortlessly raked in the wealth of generations into your own pockets; during the internet boom, as the platform economy grew unchecked, you shouted “996 is a blessing” at the top of your lungs, only to turn around and treat programmers like disposable batteries; during the pandemic, while extolling “dynamic zero-COVID as the greatest love on earth,” you drove small vendors and working-class people into bankruptcy; Now that the economy is slowing down, you’ve suddenly declared that “lying flat” is the work of “foreign forces,” and you’re scrambling to shift the blame onto the U.S., Japan, Taiwanese separatists, Hong Kong separatists, and foreign NGOs… After all, as long as it’s not your own incompetence, there’s no problem in the world that can’t be solved by blaming “foreign forces.”

You know better than anyone else the real reasons why young people are “lying flat”:

Housing prices are sky-high, making marriage and having children a luxury; Working 996 until age 35 only to be “optimized”—35 has become a death sentence in the workplace; the rat race is so intense it makes your hair fall out, yet the returns keep getting thinner; class固化 is harder than concrete; in this era of “connections,” no matter how hard ordinary people work, they’re just working to line someone else’s pockets.

At a time like this, instead of reflecting on what good your “benefiting all under heaven” has actually done, you blame the poor for “looking out only for themselves”? Isn’t this the classic case of “eating the meat yourself while denying others even the broth, then blaming them for being ungrateful”?

What’s even more outrageous is that this “masterpiece” from the Ministry of State Security will likely list a bunch of “foreign websites,” “foreign bloggers,” and “foreign apps” as instigators of the “lying-flat” movement. Come on—you’ve locked down the domestic internet like a fortress, leaving no space for people to speak their minds. Where else can young people go to hear the truth without circumventing the Great Firewall? So if they use a VPN to hear a single phrase like “Stop the rat race, take care of your health,” does that make them foreign agents? Then may I ask: which foreign power was behind all that inspirational fluff back in the day that taught us “knowledge changes destiny” and “hard work leads to a bright future”? Shouldn’t they be rounded up too?

The irony is, the ones who really need to “lie flat” are actually you yourselves.

You vested interests have been coasting on the dividends of power and monopoly for decades: sending your children to study abroad, shifting your assets overseas, and seeking medical treatment abroad. You lie back in comfort while demanding that young people in China “stand up and strive” and “contribute to the nation’s rejuvenation.” Are you the ones carrying the bricks? Are you the ones wielding the trowels? In the end, it’s the working class who toils themselves to death, while you reap the rewards.

What kind of “benefiting all under heaven” is this? This is “when we’re prosperous, we benefit our own families; when we’re poor, we blame you for not competing hard enough.”

Lying flat doesn’t mean not striving; it means refusing to be used as fuel for the “striving” you’ve defined.

When young people choose low desires, low consumption, low marriage and childbirth rates, and low expectations, it is essentially a passive resistance to your set of rules. They aren’t stupid; they see it clearer than anyone else: no matter how hard they compete, they can’t outcompete connections, platforms, or shifting policy winds. Since the finish line has long been predetermined, why should I run myself to death? Lying flat—at least—means I won’t be burned out as fuel by you.

Ministry of State Security, oh Ministry of State Security, the more you rush to label “lying flat” as the work of foreign forces, the more it proves that this system is already beyond salvation. The real foreign forces are never those few tweets teaching young people to lie flat, but rather the system and vested interest groups that have driven China’s youth to the point where lying flat is their only option.

The privileged no longer strive to benefit the world, yet the poor are forced to compete until they die—this is the true “threat to national security.”

If “lying flat” really were instigated by foreign forces, then why didn’t those foreign forces tell the privileged elite to lie flat too? How come they’re still competing so fiercely?

Share, like, save—don’t let the “foreign forces” gain a few more followers!

作者：陀先润

编辑：韩立华 校对：程筱筱 翻译：戈冰

网上很多人看到这条新闻的第一反应是觉得不对劲。37个浙江渔民，集资1.5个亿，造了中国第一艘”民间科考船”。本能上就感觉这事有猫腻，但又说不清楚到底哪里不对。大部分人的质疑停在一个层面：渔民哪来那么多钱，平均每人400万，这不可能。

这个质疑方向是错的。

舟山群岛的离岛渔民，很多人真的有这个钱。那些岛上的渔村，常年在海上搏命，积累下来的财富远超外界想象，住宅、船只、生活方式都说明这一点。所以用”渔民没钱”来否定这件事，否定不了。这件事假，但假在另一个地方，假在这艘船本身。

一艘渔民”买不起、不该懂、也管不着”的船

先说这艘船装了什么。全电推进、薄冰区破冰能力、六级海况下一米精度动力定位、最长一万米水下光缆释放系统、深潜器布放能力。把这串参数摆出来，任何一个懂行的人都能看出来，这不是一艘用来研究鱼群或者海洋气象的科考船，这是一艘专门用来做海底地形勘测和航道绘制的船。

全电推进在科考船上有两个核心用途。第一是降噪，让声呐回波更干净，海底地形图更精确。第二是破冰，允许船体在冰区前后左右机动，甚至原地打转，这是传统螺旋桨推进做不到的。一万米光缆释放系统，加上深潜器布放能力，说明这艘船的主要任务就是把探测设备送到深海，绘制海底地图。六级海况下一米精度定点，是在复杂海况下保证设备下放时缆线不因船体漂移而断裂或扭损。

这每一项能力，在中国都是涉密技术。相关设备的采购，哪怕是个人从海外买回来，进关就要申报详细用途，接受审查。光纤护套、卷放设备、破冰钢板的材料选型，这些东西在中国没有相应批文，根本买不到，更别说装船。

现在问题来了。这37个渔民，作为名义上的投资股东，有权知道船上装了什么、这些设备从哪来、花了多少钱吗？答案是没有，而且绝对不可能有。这些信息本身就是国家机密，让一帮民间股东知道，叫泄密。所以这37个人，不是投资方，是挂名方。他们买的不是股份，是一块招牌。

中国的海洋数据，从1949年就是军事机密

要理解这件事的荒谬程度，必须先说清楚中国对海洋数据的管理逻辑。1949年之后，中国就规定所有海洋资料，包括水温、海浪、海流、海底地形测绘图像，全部属于国家地理机密，由军队管理，具体归属海军。国家海洋局从成立起就是军事化单位，下属的”向阳红”系列科考船是军事编制，船员按军人标准管理，船上佩带武器。后来的“远望”系列，给国防科工委用于航天测控，也是纯军方资产。

中科院有”科学”系列和”实验”系列，同济大学今年刚下水一艘”同济号”。这些大学和研究机构能运营科考船，是因为他们接的是国家项目，有相应资质，每一次出海任务都要向国家海洋局和军队报批。中国没有西方那种模式，就是某个大学教授申请了一个研究鲸鱼的项目，去租一艘船就能出海。你自己弄一个声呐，划着小船去探一探海底地形，第二天就会被请去喝茶，因为这叫间谍行为。

在这个背景下，37个渔民自发集资造了一艘装备远超体制内标准的”民间科考船”，然后要去承接科研院所的”租船任务”。这个逻辑从根本上就站不住脚。科研院所出海，不会去租一艘民间船，他们有自己的船，有资质审批，也没有理由把涉密任务外包给一帮不在体制内的渔民股东。

为什么偏偏要”民间”这两个字

这才是整件事最关键的问题。

这艘船真正的用途，指向北极航道。薄冰区破冰能力不是为了去冬季的极地，而是为了夏末秋初，也就是北极冰层融化最多的时段，也是北极航道最可能通航的时段。全电推进加海底勘测能力，对应的任务是对北极航道进行系统性测绘，绘制潜艇可用的航线图。这件事中国一直在做，雪龙号、极地号都去过北极，但那是专项任务，不是全面测绘。

现在的问题是，如果挂着”向阳红”或”科学”号的字样出现在北极航道，北约会怎么看？整个欧美对中国体制内科研机构的警惕已经今非昔比，连大学的合作项目都要审查，何况一艘军方背景的科考船。就算挂着同济大学的牌子，也会被认定为中国国家意志的延伸。

但如果是一艘“37个爱国渔民自发集资、热爱科学、支持国家”的民间船呢？它在舆论上的防御空间就完全不同了。一旦有人质疑，官方可以说这是民营企业行为，政府管不了，他们是自己把船租出去的，租给了某个对北极渔类感兴趣的项目。这套话说不说得通是另一回事，但它提供了一个外交缓冲，一个能让事情不立刻升级的叙事空间。

这就是”民间”两个字存在的唯一理由。

37个渔民什么都不知道，这才是设计的精妙之处

这37个人，不知道船上装了什么，不知道设备从哪里批来，不知道每次出任务去哪、干什么，也没有权利决定把船租给谁。出任务要国家海洋局批，要军队批，他们的”股东”身份在实际运营里等于零。他们是真的爱党、真的出了钱，但他们挂的是名字，买的是故事，而不是一家公司的实控权。

有人猜测这艘船是去切断别国海底光缆的。这个方向想多了，逻辑上也不成立。切光缆不需要这种精密科考船，一艘普通货轮改装一下，船底挂个拖揽装置，贴着海底一拖就行了，成本低、隐蔽性更强。造这么一艘船的成本和复杂度，远超切缆所需。

这艘船的核心价值，在于它能在其他船不该出现的地方做该做的事，而且出现的时候，身上贴着一张说得过去的平民标签。

渔民是真实的，钱可能也是真实的，爱国情感更是真实的。唯独那个”民间科考”的故事，是假的。

Zhejiang Fishermen “Pool Funds” for Research Vessel: A Fig Leaf, and the Truth It Hides

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

Many people online had an immediate sense that something was off when they first saw this news. Thirty-seven Zhejiang fishermen pooled 150 million yuan to build China’s first “private research vessel.” Instinctively, people sense something fishy, yet they can’t quite put their finger on what’s wrong. Most people’s skepticism stops at one question: Where did the fishermen get that much money? An average of 4 million yuan per person—that’s impossible.

This line of questioning is misguided.

Many fishermen on the remote islands of the Zhoushan Archipelago actually do have that kind of money. In those island fishing villages, where people risk their lives at sea year-round, the wealth they’ve accumulated far exceeds what outsiders imagine—their homes, boats, and lifestyle all attest to this. So dismissing the project by claiming “fishermen have no money” simply doesn’t hold water. The story is indeed a hoax, but the deception lies elsewhere—it lies in the ship itself.

A ship that fishermen “can’t afford, shouldn’t understand, and have no say in”

First, let’s look at what this ship is equipped with. All-electric propulsion, icebreaking capability in thin ice zones, dynamic positioning with one-meter accuracy in Sea State 6 conditions, a subsea cable deployment system capable of reaching depths of up to 10,000 meters, and the ability to deploy deep-diving submersibles. Looking at this list of specifications, anyone with expertise in the field can see that this is not a research vessel designed to study fish schools or marine meteorology; it is a vessel specifically built for seabed topography surveys and hydrographic mapping.

All-electric propulsion serves two core purposes on a research vessel. First is noise reduction, which ensures cleaner sonar echoes and more precise seabed topographic maps. Second is icebreaking capability, allowing the hull to maneuver freely in all directions within ice-covered areas—even spinning in place—something traditional propeller propulsion cannot achieve. The 10,000-meter optical cable deployment system, combined with the vessel’s ability to deploy deep-diving submersibles, indicates that its primary mission is to deliver detection equipment to the deep sea and map the seabed. The capability to maintain one-meter positioning accuracy in Sea State 6 ensures that, even in complex sea conditions, the cable does not break or become twisted during equipment deployment due to the vessel’s drift.

Each of these capabilities constitutes classified technology in China. The procurement of related equipment—even if purchased by an individual from overseas—requires a detailed declaration of its intended use upon customs clearance, followed by scrutiny. The material selection for fiber-optic sheaths, cable winches, and ice-breaking steel plates—these items cannot be purchased in China without the appropriate approvals, let alone installed on a vessel.

Now here’s the problem. Do these 37 fishermen, as nominal shareholders, have the right to know what equipment is on board, where it came from, and how much it cost? The answer is no, and it is absolutely impossible for them to know. This information is state-level classified; allowing a group of private shareholders to know it would constitute a breach of security. Therefore, these 37 individuals are not actual investors; they are merely nominal shareholders. What they bought was not equity, but a nameplate.

China’s marine data has been a military secret since 1949

To grasp the absurdity of this situation, we must first clarify China’s logic behind managing marine data. Since 1949, China has stipulated that all marine data—including water temperature, wave conditions, ocean currents, and seabed topographic survey images—constitutes state geographical secrets, managed by the military and specifically under the jurisdiction of the Navy. The State Oceanic Administration has been a militarized entity since its inception. Its “Xiangyanghong” series of research vessels operates under a military organizational structure, with crew members managed according to military standards and armed on board. The later “Yuanwang” series, provided to the State Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense for space tracking and control, is also purely military property.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences operates the “Kexue” and “Shiyan” series, and Tongji University just launched the “Tongji” this year. These universities and research institutions are able to operate research vessels because they are carrying out state-funded projects and possess the necessary qualifications; every voyage must be approved by the State Oceanic Administration and the military. China does not have the Western model where a university professor could simply apply for a whale research project, rent a boat, and set sail. If you were to set up your own sonar and row out in a small boat to survey the seabed, you’d be summoned for a “chat” the very next day, as this would be considered espionage.

Against this backdrop, 37 fishermen spontaneously pooled their funds to build a “civilian research vessel” whose equipment far exceeds the standards of the official system, intending to take on “charter assignments” from research institutes. This logic is fundamentally untenable. Research institutes would not charter a civilian vessel for their expeditions; they have their own ships and the necessary approvals, and there is no reason for them to outsource classified missions to a group of fishermen-shareholders operating outside the official system.

Why the specific use of the term “civilian”?

This is the crux of the entire matter.

The ship’s true purpose points to the Arctic shipping route. Its icebreaking capabilities in thin ice zones are not intended for winter expeditions to the polar regions, but rather for late summer and early fall—the period when Arctic ice melts the most and the Arctic shipping route is most likely to be navigable. All-electric propulsion combined with seabed survey capabilities suggests a mission to systematically map the Arctic shipping route and create navigational charts suitable for submarines. China has been engaged in this work for some time—the Xuelong and Jili have both visited the Arctic—but those were specialized missions, not comprehensive mapping efforts.

The question now is: if a vessel bearing the name “Xiangyanghong” or “Kexue” were to appear in the Arctic shipping lanes, how would NATO view it? The level of wariness toward China’s state-run research institutions across the West has changed dramatically; even university collaboration projects are subject to scrutiny, let alone a research vessel with military ties. Even if it were branded with Tongji University’s name, it would still be perceived as an extension of China’s national will.

But what if it were a “civilian vessel” funded by “37 patriotic fishermen who voluntarily pooled their resources, love science, and support the nation”? Its room for maneuver in the public discourse would be entirely different. Should anyone raise doubts, officials could claim this is a private enterprise initiative beyond government control—that they simply leased the vessel to a project interested in Arctic fisheries. Whether this narrative holds water is another matter, but it provides a diplomatic buffer—a narrative space that prevents the situation from escalating immediately.

This is the sole reason for the existence of the term “civilian.”

The fact that these 37 fishermen know nothing is precisely where the ingenuity of the design lies

These 37 people have no idea what equipment is on board, where the gear came from, where they’re going or what they’re doing on each mission, nor do they have the authority to decide whom to lease the ship to. Missions require approval from the State Oceanic Administration and the military; their “shareholder” status amounts to nothing in actual operations. They genuinely love the Party and have genuinely invested money, but they’re merely lending their names and buying into a narrative—not actual control over the company.

Some speculate that this ship is used to cut other countries’ undersea cables. This line of thinking is far-fetched and logically unsound. Cutting cables doesn’t require such a sophisticated scientific research vessel; a standard cargo ship could be modified with a towing device attached to its hull, skimming along the seabed—a method that’s cheaper and far more covert. The cost and complexity of building a vessel like this far exceed what’s necessary for cable-cutting operations.

The core value of this vessel lies in its ability to carry out necessary operations in areas where other ships should not be present—all while appearing under a plausible civilian guise.

The fishermen are real, the money may be real, and the patriotic sentiment is certainly real. Only the narrative of “civilian scientific research” is a fabrication.

作者：陀先润

编辑：李晶

校对：孔祥庆

翻译：戈冰

三星近日宣布停止在中国大陆销售电视、冰箱等所有家电产品，仅保留手机业务。这则公告在商业媒体上被解读为市场竞争失利，但真正的故事远不止于此。它揭示的，是一个威权政权如何一步步将自己变成全球资本的禁区，以及跨国企业在主权绑架面前如何艰难求生。

三星家电在中国市场占有率不足0.4%，悄悄退出对财务毫无影响。选择公开宣告，唯一的解释是政治需要。三星必须向华盛顿和布鲁塞尔证明一件事：我们与中共市场的切割是真实的，不是表演。这是在中美科技脱钩持续深化的背景下，一家跨国企业为保住核心资产所做的政治投名状。

三星在华真正的战略资产不是家电，而是西安的闪存芯片工厂，这座工厂贡献了三星九成以上利润来源的关键产能。然而它现在处境极为危险——美国已将三星使用美制设备的许可证改为逐年审查，随时可能叫停；欧美市场对中国制造高科技产品的审查也已延伸至供应链深层，”产地中国”正在成为一个致命标签。三星必须向外界证明，西安厂只是全球供应链的一个加工节点，而非与中共市场深度捆绑的本土存在。家电业务的公开切割，本质上是为西安厂的生存买时间。

更值得警惕的是北京的反应。2026年4月，中共相继出台《工业和供应链安全条例》与《反外国不当域外管辖规定》两份行政法规，明确授权当局在外国企业执行美国断供令时，采取资产冻结、查封乃至强制要求工厂维持运转等反制措施。这不是正常法治国家的监管逻辑，而是威权政体将外资工厂视为可随时充公的人质的制度安排。一旦中美冲突进一步升级，三星西安厂面临被强制接管的风险并非危言耸听，而是有法可依的既定选项。

正是为了对冲这一极端情景，三星已在美国德克萨斯州泰勒市加快建设大型晶圆厂，计划年底全面投产。逻辑很清晰：一旦西安厂被强制接收，三星损失的只是固定资产。核心工艺、管理体系、全球协同网络可以随时撤走，没有三星实时技术支持的尖端工厂，良率会迅速崩塌，对接收方而言不过是一堆无法独立运转的机器。

对比日本企业的做法，更能看清三星今日困境的根源。萨德风波之后，日本政府便通过在华商业协会，有计划、低调地推动日企分批撤离，并给予财政补贴。佳能、尼康以及主要芯片与通讯企业，在被迫站队之前已完成战略撤退。而韩国财阀长期抱有在中美之间左右逢源的幻想，三星如今不得不在市值高峰期用一纸公告争取政治缓冲，本质上是一种代价高昂的被动补救。

三星这次公告，外界看到的是商业宣布，深一层是向欧美投资者的政治表态，再往下则是威权主权与跨国资本之间的极限博弈。中共用法律工具将外资变成人质，用行政手段扭曲市场规则，最终只能加速资本的离场。全球化时代资本自由流动的前提，是法治与产权保障，而这恰恰是中共体制结构性缺失的东西。三星今天的困境，不是一家企业的个案，而是所有仍在押注中国市场的跨国资本迟早要面对的共同命运。

The True Implications of Samsung’s Exit from China’s Home Appliance Market: The Dead End for Multinational Capital Under an Authoritarian Regime

Author: Tuo Xianrun

Editor: Li Jing

Proofreader: Kong Xiangqing

Translator: Ge Bing

Samsung recently announced that it would cease sales of all home appliances, including televisions and refrigerators, in mainland China, retaining only its mobile phone business. Business media have interpreted this announcement as a failure in market competition, but the true story goes far beyond that. It reveals how an authoritarian regime is gradually transforming itself into a no-go zone for global capital, and how multinational corporations struggle to survive in the face of sovereign coercion.

Samsung’s market share for home appliances in China is less than 0.4%, so a quiet exit would have no financial impact. The only explanation for choosing to make a public announcement is political necessity. Samsung must prove one thing to Washington and Brussels: our disengagement from the Chinese market is genuine, not a performance. Against the backdrop of deepening technological decoupling between China and the U.S., this is a political pledge made by a multinational corporation to safeguard its core assets.

Samsung’s true strategic asset in China is not its home appliances, but its flash memory chip factory in Xi’an, which provides the critical production capacity responsible for over 90% of Samsung’s profits. However, it now finds itself in an extremely precarious position—the U.S. has changed the licensing terms for Samsung’s use of American-made equipment to an annual review, meaning it could be suspended at any moment; scrutiny of high-tech products made in China in Western markets has also extended deep into the supply chain, and “Made in China” is becoming a fatal label. Samsung must demonstrate to the outside world that the Xi’an plant is merely a processing node in the global supply chain, rather than a local entity deeply tied to the Chinese market. The public spin-off of the home appliance business is, in essence, a move to buy time for the survival of the Xi’an plant.

Even more alarming is Beijing’s response. In April 2026, the Chinese Communist Party successively issued two administrative regulations: the “Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Security” and the “Provisions on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign Entities.” These explicitly authorize authorities to take countermeasures—including asset freezes, seizures, and even forcing factories to remain operational—when foreign companies comply with U.S. supply cut-off orders. This is not the regulatory logic of a normal rule-of-law state, but rather an institutional arrangement under an authoritarian regime that treats foreign-invested factories as hostages subject to confiscation at any time. Should Sino-U.S. tensions escalate further, the risk of Samsung’s Xi’an plant facing forced takeover is not alarmist rhetoric, but a legally established option.

It is precisely to hedge against this extreme scenario that Samsung has accelerated construction of a large-scale wafer fab in Taylor, Texas, with plans to begin full-scale production by the end of the year. The logic is clear: should the Xi’an plant be forcibly taken over, Samsung would lose only its fixed assets. Its core processes, management systems, and global coordination networks can be withdrawn at any time. Without Samsung’s real-time technical support, the yield rate at this cutting-edge facility would rapidly collapse, leaving the recipient with nothing more than a pile of machinery incapable of independent operation.

A comparison with the approach taken by Japanese companies sheds further light on the root cause of Samsung’s current predicament. Following the THAAD controversy, the Japanese government, through its business associations in China, systematically and discreetly facilitated the phased withdrawal of Japanese firms, providing financial subsidies. Canon, Nikon, and major chip and telecommunications companies had already completed their strategic retreats before being forced to take sides. Meanwhile, South Korean conglomerates have long harbored the illusion of being able to play both sides between China and the U.S. Samsung is now forced to issue a public announcement at the peak of its market value to seek political breathing room—essentially a costly, reactive measure.

To the outside world, Samsung’s announcement appears to be a business statement; at a deeper level, it is a political declaration to Western investors; and at the core, it represents an extreme power struggle between authoritarian sovereignty and transnational capital. By using legal tools to hold foreign capital hostage and administrative measures to distort market rules, the Chinese Communist Party can only accelerate the exodus of capital. The free flow of capital in the era of globalization is predicated on the rule of law and the protection of property rights—precisely what is structurally lacking in the CCP’s system. Samsung’s current predicament is not an isolated case but a shared fate that all multinational capital still betting on the Chinese market will eventually face.