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周敏:县城婆罗门:中国的基层权力结构正在固化

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作者:周敏

编辑:张宇   责任编辑:钟然   校对:王滨   翻译:吕峰

   

在过去十五年间,中国的县城发生了一场外界几乎看不见的深刻变化:

    

    一个以身份垄断、权力继承、资源控制为核心的地方等级结构正在迅速固化。

     我们称之为“县城婆罗门阶层”。

    这种阶层化并不是文化遗产,也不是经济自然演化,而是威权体制在基层治理中长期积累的产物。其结果就是:县城的社会活力被抽空,向上通道被封死,年轻人被迫逃离,地方治理陷入了自循环的保守化。这一结构成了中国社会向下沉落的关键推手。

    这个现象可以描述为:县城正固化为一个“身份社会”。中国国务院发展研究中心、北大社科系、清华公共管理学院在过去十年的调查指出,中国70%的人口增长与创新资源正在向大城市集中;县域财政高度依赖上级转移支付;县域公共就业系统(编制内)在当地占30%-50%,远高于城市。在一个经济活力不足、机会稀缺的环境里,县城自然而然走向了“身份决定阶层”。拥有体制内身份=拥有稳定;拥有权力关系=拥有尊严;拥有内部资源=拥有上升通道。普普通通的老百姓则排斥在外部 。挤不进编制=没有未来;没有人脉关系=没有公平机会。循环往复不断固化。县城婆罗门阶层由此而生。

    那么,权力为什么可以在县城得到“继承”?

    中国的县域治理研究显示,约有2100个县级行政单位,它们呈现出一种典型结构:

    政法系统(公安、法院、检察院)本地化倾向极强;

    教育、卫健、住建等系统普遍存在“熟人化招聘、内部消化”现象;

    事业单位、国企和城投公司吸纳当地最优质的稳定收入岗位。

    在这样一个结构里,权力具有了三个特征。

    一、家族化倾向

    大量地方研究成果指出,县域事业单位与体制岗位存在明显的“家族集中性”。乡镇到县级的权力系统存在“科长-局长-书记”的关系链条。婚姻成为阶层内部的再结合机制,也就是说,体制内的通婚率高。这就意味着,县城的权力并不是公开竞争,而是继承、嫁接和血缘化。

    二、执法权力高度集中

    县城有三大权力:行政权,执法权,资源分配权。而这些往往由同一批人、同一套关系网掌握。在缺乏监督体系的环境中,这种体系天然形成了资源闭环。因此,一个县城的经济结构再怎么变化,其权力结构却几乎不会变化!

    三、资源配置由“权力逻辑”支配,而非市场逻辑。县城资源包括:老师编制、医院岗位、工程项目、国企招聘、土地指标和城市建设预算等。调查指出,这些资源在县城中往往由不到10%的人掌控分配权。而这10%的人,形成了现实中的县城婆罗门。

那么,县城婆罗门阶层为何会阻断社会流动?我们可以大概分析一下。首先是,教育机会被体制化。县域教育财政中,目前80%以上用于人员支出,几乎没有空间进行真正的教育质量改善。而老师岗位是高度体制化的,优质岗位由关系网分配。这就造成了普通家庭的孩子无法获得优质教育,体制家庭的孩子却能享受教育资源的倾斜。教育成了阶层固化的关键环节。其次,所有的经济机会被压缩为“体制内 VS 体制外”。县城缺乏产业,但体制岗位十分稳定,这形成了极端结构。体制内:铁饭碗+地位+资源,体制外:低工资+无机会+无保障。在县城里,体制内平均工资是体制外的2-4倍,体制外劳动者的社保缴纳率远远低于大城市水平。县城私营经济一年比一年差,对本地就业的吸纳能力持续下滑。而这一切意味着:体制就是命运。

中国有句古话叫“识时务者为俊杰”。普通家庭的年轻人看不到希望,便会选择远走大城市。十几年间年轻人口净流出率超过30%。部分县城18-35岁人口占比跌到15%以下。这是一个可怕的数字,但是实际情况可能是比统计数据更加糟糕的。年轻人代表的是创新变革与改天换日的勇气,他们走了之后,身后的县城便愈加陷入保守结构,和对外来竞争的恐惧。县城进一步陷入“老龄化-保守化-权力固化”,形成了一个东亚等级社会。

    那么这个现象的根本原因是什么呢?那就是,威权体制是不会允许一个开放的县城存在的。县城婆罗门阶层之所以形成,并不是地方官员个别腐败,而是整个制度结构决定的!首先,也是最重要的:权力不透明。在没有透明预算、没有自治、没有独立媒体的环境里,权力者天然优先满足自己及自己的人。而普通人无处申诉,没有渠道监督。中国的制度决定了资源永远向上、向内流动,而不会向社会扩散。第二是,社会组织受限,公民(实际上只是居民)无法参与治理。在健康的民主国家里,县城往往是地方自治的基础单位,是NGO、公民组织活跃的场所,是媒体定期监督的对象。但是在中国,自治是被行政化的,社会组织被审批牢牢控制,公民参与和舆论监督都压缩到极小。结果就是只有权力能决定县城的走向。最后一点,威权结构让县城必须维稳。县城要对上负责,而不是对下、对人民负责。地方官员的首要目标不是发展,而是不出事,不给上级添麻烦,不发生“政治风险”。于是一个怪象出现了:创新被怀疑,活力被压制,社会被降级。权力需要“稳定”来证明自己合理(尽管谁都知道这个“稳定”是波涛汹涌的表象)。这正是县城婆罗门阶层最坚固的土壤。

    县城婆罗门阶层的问题不是地方问题,而是威权结构问题。它的根源在于权力不受监督、资源不公开透明、社会组织无法成长、公民(其实是居民)参与被最小化、以及媒体不能独立监督。要走出阶层固化陷阱,必须从制度层面改变权力逻辑。要建立真正的地方自治,公开预算和公共资源分配,建立独立的媒体与审计机制,鼓励公民社会和公共监督,让权力回到人民的问责之下。开放、透明、民主是唯一解药。

    一个国家的现代化,不是大城市的高楼与高科技决定的,而是县城的公平与自由决定的。

    县城能自由呼吸的那一天,中国才真正拥有未来。

Zhou Min: County-Town Brahmins — The Solidification of China’s Grassroots Power Structure

Abstract:From the perspectives of the political–legal system, education, and employment, the author analyzes the rise of a “Brahmin class” within China’s county towns. By examining the development of small counties, the article reveals the nature of authoritarian rule under the Chinese Communist Party at the grassroots level.

Author: Zhou Min

Editor: Zhang Yu Managing Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator:Lyu Feng

Over the past fifteen years, China’s county towns have undergone a profound transformation that has largely escaped public attention:

A local hierarchical structure centered on identity monopoly, power inheritance, and resource control has rapidly solidified.

We may call this structure the “county-town Brahmin class.”

This form of stratification is neither a cultural legacy nor the result of natural economic evolution. Rather, it is the cumulative product of long-term authoritarian governance at the grassroots level. The consequences are stark: social vitality in county towns has been drained, upward mobility channels have been blocked, young people are forced to leave, and local governance has sunk into a self-reinforcing conservatism. This structure has become a key driver of China’s broader social downward drift.

The phenomenon can be described as follows: county towns are hardening into “identity-based societies.” Surveys over the past decade by the Development Research Center of the State Council, the Department of Sociology at Peking University, and the School of Public Policy and Management at Tsinghua University indicate that around 70% of population growth and innovative resources are concentrating in large cities; county-level finances are highly dependent on upper-level transfer payments; and public employment systems (positions within the state apparatus) account for 30–50% of local employment—far higher than in cities.

In an environment lacking economic dynamism and rich opportunities, county towns naturally evolve toward a system in which identity determines class. Possessing an institutional position means stability; possessing power connections means dignity; possessing internal resources means access to upward mobility. Ordinary people are excluded from this system. Failing to enter the state establishment means no future; lacking personal connections means no fair opportunity. This cycle continually reinforces itself, giving rise to the county-town Brahmin class.

Why, then, is power able to be “inherited” within county towns?

Research on county-level governance in China shows that among roughly 2,100 county-level administrative units, a typical structure prevails:

The political–legal system (public security, courts, procuratorates) is highly localized;

Education, healthcare, housing, and urban development systems commonly exhibit “acquaintance-based recruitment” and internal absorption;

Public institutions, state-owned enterprises, and urban investment companies absorb the most stable and best-paid local jobs.

Within this structure, power takes on three defining characteristics.

First, a tendency toward familialization.A large body of local research indicates a pronounced “family concentration” in county-level public institutions and state positions. From townships to county governments, power networks often follow chains such as “section chief–bureau director–party secretary.” Marriage functions as an internal mechanism of class recombination; in other words, intermarriage rates within the system are high. County-town power is therefore not the result of open competition, but of inheritance, grafting, and bloodline consolidation.

Second, a high concentration of enforcement power.County towns revolve around three core powers: administrative authority, law-enforcement authority, and resource-allocation authority. These are often held by the same group of people within the same relational network. In the absence of effective oversight, this structure naturally forms a closed resource loop. As a result, no matter how much a county’s economic structure changes, its power structure remains largely unchanged.

Third, resource allocation governed by power logic rather than market logic.County-level resources include teaching posts, hospital positions, construction projects, state-owned enterprise recruitment, land quotas, and urban development budgets. Studies indicate that fewer than 10% of individuals control the allocation of these resources. This 10% constitutes the de facto county-town Brahmin class.

Why does this class block social mobility? Several mechanisms are evident. First, educational opportunity becomes institutionalized. Over 80% of county-level education budgets are currently spent on personnel costs, leaving little room for genuine improvements in educational quality. Teaching positions are highly institutionalized, and desirable posts are distributed through relational networks. As a result, children from ordinary families are unable to access quality education, while children from institutional families benefit from systematic advantages. Education thus becomes a key mechanism of class consolidation.

Second, economic opportunities are compressed into a binary of “inside the system versus outside the system.” County towns lack diversified industries, yet institutional positions remain highly stable, producing an extreme structural divide. Inside the system: iron rice bowl, social status, and access to resources. Outside the system: low wages, few opportunities, and weak social security. In county towns, average wages inside the system are two to four times those outside it, and social-security participation rates among non-institutional workers are far below those in large cities. The private economy in county towns deteriorates year by year, with declining capacity to absorb local labor. All of this sends a single message: the system determines destiny.

There is a Chinese saying: “Those who understand the times are heroes.” Young people from ordinary families see no future and therefore choose to leave for big cities. Over the past decade, net youth out-migration rates have exceeded 30%. In some county towns, the proportion of residents aged 18–35 has fallen below 15%. This is an alarming figure, and the reality may be even worse than official statistics suggest. Young people embody innovation, change, and the courage to reshape society. Once they leave, county towns sink deeper into conservatism and fear of external competition, further locking themselves into a cycle of aging, rigidity, and power consolidation—forming a distinctly East Asian hierarchical society.

What, then, is the root cause of this phenomenon? The answer is that an authoritarian system does not permit the existence of open county towns. The formation of the county-town Brahmin class is not the result of isolated local corruption, but of the institutional structure as a whole.

First and most fundamentally, power lacks transparency. In the absence of transparent budgets, local autonomy, and independent media, those in power naturally prioritize themselves and their networks. Ordinary people have no effective channels for redress or oversight. China’s institutional design ensures that resources flow upward and inward, rather than outward to society.

Second, social organizations are constrained, and citizens (in practice, merely “residents”) cannot meaningfully participate in governance. In healthy democracies, county towns are foundational units of local self-government, vibrant arenas for NGOs, civic organizations, and regular media oversight. In China, however, self-governance is administrative in nature, social organizations are tightly controlled through approval mechanisms, and civic participation and public scrutiny are reduced to a minimum. The result is that only power determines the direction of county towns.

Finally, authoritarian structures require county towns to prioritize “stability maintenance.” Local governments are accountable upward, not downward to the people. Officials’ primary objective is not development, but avoiding incidents, avoiding trouble for superiors, and preventing “political risks.” A paradox emerges: innovation is viewed with suspicion, vitality is suppressed, and society is downgraded. Power requires “stability” to justify itself, even though everyone knows this stability is merely a turbulent façade. This is the most fertile soil for the county-town Brahmin class.

The problem of the county-town Brahmin class is not a local issue, but a systemic one rooted in authoritarian governance. Its causes lie in unchecked power, opaque resource allocation, stunted social organizations, minimized civic participation, and the absence of independent media oversight. Escaping the trap of class solidification requires institutional change: genuine local self-government, transparent budgets and public resource allocation, independent media and auditing mechanisms, and the encouragement of civil society and public oversight—bringing power back under popular accountability. Openness, transparency, and democracy are the only remedies.

A nation’s modernization is not determined by skyscrapers and advanced technology in major cities, but by fairness and freedom in its county towns.

Only when county towns can breathe freely will China truly have a future.

查老头聊时事

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读X重要文章心得体会

(本刊荣誉主编供稿)

编辑:冯仍   责任编辑:罗志飞   校对:程筱筱   翻译:刘芳

12月1日出版的第23期《求是》杂志发表了x的重要文章《推进党的自我革命要做到“五个进一步到位”》。所有官媒都在头版头条做了介绍,我只对文中几点谈些学习体会。

习文强调,自我革命是我们党跳出治乱兴衰历史周期率的第二个答案。

查老头学习体会:

1945年7月著名教育家黄×炎x培以国民参政员身份访问延安,在窑洞里黄问毛,中共如何跳出“其兴也勃焉,其亡也忽焉”的中国史上治乱兴衰循环反复的历史周期率。毛×泽×东略作沉思后答:“我们已经找到了新路,我们能跳出这个周期率,这条新路就是民主,走群众路线。只有让人民来监督政府,政府才不敢松懈,只有人人起来负责,才不会人亡政息。”

现世界多数国家的民主制度內涵是以多党竞选、三权分立、新闻自由、法律至上、军队国家化、保障公民人权来制约权力者。毛反对这些,他靠的是个人无上权威和不断的无序无法的群众运动,显然他失败了。

m的“窑洞对”为跳出历史周期率的第一方案,现提出“自我革命”为第二方案。×文提出要“刀刃向内““刮骨疗毒““霹雳手段决不能少”,决心极大,令人佩服。但m时代也讲“自我革命”,m 提出著名的警惕“糖衣炮弹”论。建国初即全国开展三反整风运动,枪毙了革命功臣、天津负责干部腐败分子刘x青x山、张x子x善,有23.8万名党内异己分子和贪腐分子受到刑事处理,文革前又大搞“四清”运动。可由于外部制约体制设计的原因,一个脱离群众的特权阶层还是出现了。

现在市场经济出现大规模权力与资本结合现象,在外部制度设计不变前提下,现在进行“自我革命”如何保证毛“自我革命”失败的历史不会重演呢?

习文讲,“党员干部要时刻牢记,我们一切权力都是人民赋予的……”

世界多数国家是在多党竞选中,选民用选票将权力赋予某个党。当然,也可以用选票剥夺某个执政党的权力,赋于别的党。我的问题是,我国宪定共产党是永远的执政党,选民没有选择别的党执政的权利(公民也没有成立新党的权利),那这个“我们一切权力都是人民赋予的”是如何“赋予”的呢?

如果每级掌权者的权力都是上级赋予的,那掌权者就只会对上负责,不对下(选民)负责,那习文中谴责的“利益集团、权势团体、特权阶层”怎能不出现?

习文讲,党员干部要“乐于接受党组织教育和各方面监督““要把党內监督和人民监督结合起来”“腐败突出表现是以权涉私…要通过持续努力,真正把权力关进制度的笼子”。

查老头学习体会:

X这几段话讲的好!人民监督应以法律保障,我呼吁全国人大要立《网络言x论x自x由法》,坚决打击那些随意封文封号封群、“被喝茶”的乱象。要立《保护公民监督政府法》,坚决打击那些以“攻击XXX”为名用“寻x衅×滋×事”、“煽×动×颠x覆”等罪名任意截访、拘押、判刑的乱象。

要立《新闻法》、《结社法》,落实宪法第三十五条中的公民出版、结社自由,这些政治自由人×权正是人民监督权力的手段、反腐的“防火墙”。

要立《官员财产公开法》,全球已有30个国家立法要求官员财产向社会全面公开,这为社会监督提供了公开透明的条件。

《中国共产党纪律检查委员会工作条例》第七条规定:党中央纪律检查委员会与国家监察委员会合署办公,地方各级党纪委与政府监委实行一套工作机构、两个机关名称的合署办公。我建议:修改此条例,纪委监委分开,给监委依法监察执政党内干部腐败的独立性,其重大意义不言自明。

2025/12/6 北京(103)

Elder Cha Talks About Current Affairs

Reflections on Reading Important Articles on X

(Contribution by the Journal’s Honorary Editor-in-Chief)

Editor: Feng Reng Executive Editor: Luo Zhifei Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Liu Fang

The 23rd issue of Qiushi magazine, published on December 1, carried an important article by x titled “Advancing the Party’s Self-Revolution Must Achieve ‘Five Further Improvements in Place.’” All official media placed it on their front pages and headlines. I would like to share only a few of my own reflections on several points in the article.

Xi’s article emphasizes that self-revolution is the Party’s second answer to escaping the historical cycle of rise and decline, order and chaos.

Elder Cha’s reflections:

In July 1945, the well-known educator Huang Yanpei, visiting Yan’an as a member of the National Political Council, asked Mao Zedong in a cave dwelling how the Chinese Communist Party could escape the recurring historical cycle described as “its rise is sudden and vigorous, its fall equally sudden.” After brief reflection, Mao replied: “We have already found a new path. We can escape this cycle. This new path is democracy, following the mass line. Only by letting the people supervise the government will the government dare not slacken; only when everyone takes responsibility will governance not collapse with the death of one individual.”

In most countries today, the substance of democratic systems lies in multi-party competition, separation of powers, freedom of the press, the rule of law, the nationalization of the military, and the protection of civil rights—all mechanisms to restrain those in power. Mao opposed these. He relied instead on supreme personal authority and continuous, disorderly mass movements unconstrained by law. Clearly, m’s “cave dialogue” was the first proposed solution for escaping the historical cycle; the current proposal of “self-revolution” is presented as the second. X’s article calls for “turning the blade inward,” “scraping poison from the bone,” and insists that “thunderous measures must not be lacking.” The determination is immense and admirable. Yet Mao’s era also spoke of “self-revolution.” Mao famously warned against “sugar-coated bullets.” Soon after the founding of the PRC, the nationwide Three-Anti campaign was launched; revolutionary veterans and corrupt officials such as Liu Qingqing and Zhang Zishan in Tianjin were executed, and 238,000 Party dissidents and corrupt elements were subjected to criminal punishment. Before the Cultural Revolution, the “Four Cleanups” campaign was carried out again. Yet due to flaws in external institutional constraints, a privileged class detached from the masses still emerged.

Today, under a market economy, large-scale collusion between power and capital has appeared. Without changes to external institutional design, how can a new round of “self-revolution” ensure that the historical failure of Mao’s “self-revolution” will not be repeated?

Xi’s article states: “Party members and cadres must always remember that all our power is granted by the people…”

In most countries, power is granted through multi-party elections, with voters using ballots to authorize a party to govern—and also to strip a ruling party of power and give it to another. My question is this: when our Constitution stipulates that the Communist Party is the permanent ruling party, and voters have no right to choose another party to govern (nor do citizens have the right to form new parties), how exactly is this power “granted by the people”?

If the power of officials at every level is granted only by their superiors, then those in power will be accountable only upward, not downward to voters. In that case, how could the “interest groups, power blocs, and privileged strata” condemned in X’s article fail to emerge?

Xi’s article also states that Party members and cadres should be “willing to accept education from Party organizations and supervision from all sides,” that “Party supervision and public supervision should be combined,” and that “the prominent manifestation of corruption is the misuse of power for private gain… power must truly be locked into the cage of institutions through sustained effort.”

Elder Cha’s reflections:

These passages are well said! Public supervision must be protected by law. I call on the National People’s Congress to enact a Law on Freedom of Online Speech, to resolutely curb the chaos of arbitrary content deletions, account bans, group shutdowns, and being “summoned for tea.” A Law on Protecting Citizens’ Supervision of Government should be enacted to resolutely curb the abuse of charges such as “attacking XXX,” “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” or “inciting subversion” to arbitrarily intercept petitioners, detain them, and sentence them.

A Press Law and a Law on Associations should be enacted to implement Article 35 of the Constitution, which guarantees citizens’ freedoms of publication and association. These political freedoms and human rights are precisely the means by which the people supervise power and serve as a “firewall” against corruption.

A Law on the Disclosure of Officials’ Assets should be enacted. Globally, more than thirty countries already require by law that officials’ assets be fully disclosed to society, providing transparent conditions for public oversight.

Article 7 of the Regulations on the Work of the Communist Party of China Discipline Inspection Committees stipulates that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission share offices, and that local Party discipline inspection commissions and government supervisory commissions operate as “one set of institutions with two names.” I propose revising this regulation to separate the discipline inspection commissions from the supervisory commissions, granting the latter independence to lawfully supervise corruption among ruling-party officials. The significance of this reform speaks for itself.

December 6, 2025, Beijing (103)

张宇:为黎智英发声,为自由作证

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张宇:为黎智英发声,为自由作证

作者:张 宇
编辑:钟然 责任编辑:刘芳 校对:王滨 翻译:刘芳

2025 年的冬天,香港再次进入世界视线。不是因为繁华的天际线,也不是因为曾经引以为傲的国际金融地位,而是一场原本只属于极权国家的审判——77 岁的媒体人黎智英,被再次押往没有陪审团的法庭。

在一个曾经以“亚洲最后的自由港”著称的城市里,一个记者、一个媒体人、一位企业家,被以“危害国家安全”的名义长期单独羁押,通讯被切断,会面被限制,审讯不断被延后。

这不是司法,而是司法外观的包装; 不是法律程序,而是政治目的的延续。

更荒诞的是,这场审判本身几乎不被允许看见。新闻报道受限制,法庭不对公众开放,外界只能从零碎片段中拼凑发生的一切——就连法律界都无法获取完整资讯。司法被蒙上一层厚布,而独裁者却在幕后悄然决定着一个人的命运。

黎智英的案件之所以震动世界,因为他成为了一个象征:当独裁者开始害怕一份报纸、害怕一个人的言论时,说明社会的自由空间已经被压缩到无法呼吸。

国际组织形容这是一场“典型的政治审判”; 外国政府指出这是“对新闻自由最直接的打击”; 人权观察者更担忧:“这是在以法律之名,行恐惧之实。”

然而最让人心痛的,是审判背后的沉默。

香港街头不再有人群呼喊,不再有记者追问,不再有人能公开讨论这场审讯的意义。沉默不是选择,而是压制的结果,是恐惧的后果,是独裁者的成功。

所以,当黎智英被押上法庭时,被审判的不是他一个人,而是香港曾经引以为傲的言论自由、新闻自由,以及属于全体市民的知情权。

一位老人站在被告席上,世界则在一旁,看着一座城市逐渐失去灵魂。

(图片提供:图为11月29日在洛杉矶总领馆门口举办的声援集会活动)

黎智英的“罪”,不是他做了什么,而是他拒绝成为中共希望他成为的那种人——沉默的、顺从的、乖巧的、不提问的媒体人。

在中共的世界里,新闻不是用来监督权力的,而是用来歌颂权力的;媒体不是用来揭露真相的,而是用来制造统一口径的谎言的。一个国家可以没有独立媒体,但绝不能允许自由新闻的存在。因为真相,是中共极权最害怕的武器。

《苹果日报》被封之前,做过什么“罪大恶极”的事?不过是挖掘中共的黑暗、发布抗争者的声音、报道警察暴力、质疑政府决策。在正常社会,这叫媒体的工作;在一党专政的体系里,这却变成“煽动”、“颠覆”、“危害国家安全”。

于是,中共要让黎智英消失——不是因为他犯了法,而是因为他犯了“不能沉默的罪”。

国安法出台后,香港的一切自由被迅速清理:记者被拘捕,社运者被判刑,学生领袖流亡,舆论平台被封杀。在这个被铁幕快速降下的城市里,《苹果日报》是最后一盏灯——所以中共一定要亲手把它熄灭。

如果说中共最擅长什么,那一定是把迫害伪装成法律,把打压包装成“国家安全”,把政治清算披上一层司法外衣,让暴力看起来像制度,让专政看起来像“依法办事”。黎智英的案件,就是一堂残酷而典型的示范。所谓的“国安法审讯”,从第一天开始,就不是审讯,而是一场预先写好的剧本。

没有陪审团——因为陪审团还有可能保留良知; 指定法官——因为独立法官无法保证替政权背书; 拒绝公开——因为害怕阳光照进黑暗; 无限期押后——因为拖延本身就是惩罚。

这些不是偶然,而是精准设计。极权政体从不会只用刀子解决问题,它更喜欢用“法律”——刀子太明显,法律更体面。刀子让世界谴责,法律让世界无奈。

在这种体制里,没有人是安全的,因为法律不是用来保护你的,而是用来对付你的。黎智英不是第一个被这样处理的人,也不会是最后一个。这套机制已经被应用在无数维权律师、记者、学生身上——抓捕、构陷、秘密开庭、无限羁押、逼迫认罪。香港只是将大陆那套黑暗体系原封不动搬了过来,关上门,把灯灭掉。

这场审判的真正目的,从来不是为了“定罪”,而是为了让所有人看到:只要你敢坚持真相,只要你不肯跪下,你就是下一个。

而黎智英没有闭嘴——这对极权而言,就是不能被允许的“最大罪行”。

今天的香港,看似被铁幕笼罩、被国安法封口、被审查制度窒息,但真正被囚禁的不是城市,而是共产党想象中的“绝对顺从的香港”。

中国共产党统治七十余年,依靠的从来不是正义,而是恐惧; 不是民意,而是暴力; 不是人民的选择,而是人民的沉默。

它怕媒体,因为媒体讲真话; 它怕记者,因为记者揭黑暗; 它怕黎智英,因为他代表着一种无法被改写、无法被收买、无法被吓倒的香港精神。

或许中共能够控制法庭、控制警察、控制香港政府,但它控制不了人心中对真相的追寻,控制不了世界对香港的关切与记忆,更无法控制历史如何记录它自己的行为。

中共可以继续审判、继续关押、继续拖延、继续制造黑暗,但它无法阻止黎智英的名字成为时代的见证,无法阻止世界看清这个政权的本质——一个害怕真相、害怕新闻、害怕自由的政体。

它害怕到连一张报纸都不能容忍; 它害怕到连一个七十几岁的老人都必须长期单独关押; 它害怕到连一句“光复香港”都要以刑罚去消灭。

只要有人记得香港曾经的样子,它就不是真的死去;只要有人继续发声,自由就不会真正被终结。

真正会被历史审判的,是那个用法律包装迫害、用法庭掩盖暴力、用国家机器打击媒体的政权。

黎智英的审判不是一个人的命运,而是这个时代对独裁的控诉。 真相不会被囚禁,自由不会被消灭。 而中国共产党以为它可以控制一切,却终将发现——它控制不了历史,更控制不了未来。

Zhang Yu: Speaking for Jimmy Lai, Bearing Witness to Freedom

Author: Zhang Yu
Editor: Zhong Ran  Executive Editor: Liu Fang  Proofreader: Wang Bin  Translator: Liu Fang

Abstract:

Jimmy Lai has been held for an extended period under National Security Law proceedings conducted without a jury and lacking transparency, symbolizing the destruction of press freedom in Hong Kong. This case reveals how the Chinese Communist Party wraps political persecution in legal form; what is truly on trial is Hong Kong’s freedom and truth.

In the winter of 2025, Hong Kong once again enters the world’s view—not because of its glittering skyline, nor its once-proud status as an international financial center, but because of a trial that should belong only to totalitarian states: a seventy-seven-year-old media figure, Jimmy Lai, is once again escorted into a courtroom without a jury.

In a city once known as “Asia’s last free port,” a journalist, a media professional, and an entrepreneur has been placed under prolonged solitary detention in the name of “endangering national security,” with communications cut off, visits restricted, and hearings repeatedly postponed.

This is not justice, but justice dressed up as appearance;

not a legal procedure, but the continuation of political objectives.

Even more absurd is that the trial itself is scarcely allowed to be seen. News coverage is restricted, the courtroom is closed to the public, and the outside world can only piece together fragments of what is happening—so much so that even the legal community cannot obtain complete information. Justice is covered with a thick cloth, while dictators quietly decide a person’s fate behind the scenes.

Jimmy Lai’s case has shaken the world because he has become a symbol: when a dictatorship begins to fear a newspaper, to fear one person’s words, it means that society’s space for freedom has been compressed to the point where it can no longer breathe.

International organizations describe this as a “typical political trial”;

foreign governments point out that it is “the most direct blow to press freedom”;

human rights observers warn even more starkly: “This is fear carried out in the name of law.”

Yet what is most heartbreaking is the silence behind the trial.

There are no longer crowds shouting in Hong Kong’s streets, no reporters pressing for answers, no one able to publicly discuss the meaning of this prosecution. Silence is not a choice, but the result of suppression, the consequence of fear, and the success of dictatorship.

Thus, when Jimmy Lai is brought before the court, it is not him alone who is being tried, but Hong Kong’s once-proud freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the public’s right to know.

An elderly man stands in the defendant’s dock, while the world watches from the side as a city gradually loses its soul.

(Image credit: The image shows a solidarity rally held on November 29 outside the Chinese Consulate General in Los Angeles.)

Jimmy Lai’s “crime” is not what he did, but what he refused to become—the kind of person the Chinese Communist Party wants him to be: silent, compliant, obedient, and unquestioning as a media professional.

In the CCP’s world, journalism is not meant to supervise power, but to praise it; media is not meant to expose truth, but to manufacture lies with a single approved narrative. A country may exist without independent media, but it must never allow free journalism to exist, because truth is the weapon most feared by CCP totalitarianism.

Before Apple Daily was shut down, what “heinous crimes” did it commit? Nothing more than exposing the CCP’s darkness, publishing the voices of protesters, reporting police violence, and questioning government decisions. In a normal society, this is called journalism; in a one-party dictatorship, it becomes “incitement,” “subversion,” and “endangering national security.”

Thus, the CCP sought to make Jimmy Lai disappear—not because he broke the law, but because he committed the “crime of refusing to remain silent.”

After the National Security Law was enacted, all of Hong Kong’s freedoms were rapidly purged: journalists arrested, activists sentenced, student leaders forced into exile, and public platforms shut down. In a city where the iron curtain descended at speed, Apple Daily was the last remaining light—so the CCP was determined to extinguish it with its own hands.

If there is one thing the CCP excels at, it is disguising persecution as law, packaging repression as “national security,” and draping political purges in judicial robes—making violence look like institution and dictatorship appear as “rule of law.” Jimmy Lai’s case is a brutal and textbook demonstration. From the very first day, this so-called “National Security Law trial” was never a trial, but a script written in advance.

No jury—because a jury might still retain a conscience; handpicked judges—because independent judges cannot be relied upon to endorse the regime; closed proceedings—because darkness fears light; indefinite delays—because delay itself is punishment.

These are not accidents, but precise designs. Totalitarian regimes never rely solely on knives; they prefer “law.” Knives are too obvious; law is more respectable. Knives invite condemnation; law breeds helplessness.

In such a system, no one is safe, because law is not there to protect you, but to be used against you. Jimmy Lai is not the first to be treated this way, nor will he be the last. This mechanism has already been applied to countless rights lawyers, journalists, and students—arrest, fabrication, secret trials, indefinite detention, coerced confessions. Hong Kong has simply imported the mainland’s dark system intact, closed the doors, and turned off the lights.

The true purpose of this trial has never been “conviction,” but intimidation—to show everyone that as long as you insist on truth, as long as you refuse to kneel, you will be next.

And Jimmy Lai did not keep silent—which, to a totalitarian regime, is the one “ultimate crime” that cannot be tolerated.

Today’s Hong Kong appears shrouded by an iron curtain, gagged by the National Security Law, and suffocated by censorship, but what is truly imprisoned is not the city—it is the Communist Party’s imagined vision of an “absolutely obedient Hong Kong.”

For more than seventy years, the Chinese Communist Party has relied not on justice, but on fear; not on public will, but on violence; not on the people’s choice, but on the people’s silence.

It fears the media, because the media speaks truth; it fears journalists, because journalists expose darkness; it fears Jimmy Lai, because he represents a Hong Kong spirit that cannot be rewritten, bought, or intimidated.

Perhaps the CCP can control the courts, the police, and the Hong Kong government, but it cannot control the human pursuit of truth, cannot control the world’s concern for and memory of Hong Kong, and cannot control how history will record its own actions.

The CCP may continue to try, to imprison, to delay, and to manufacture darkness, but it cannot prevent Jimmy Lai’s name from becoming a witness of this era, nor can it stop the world from seeing the true nature of this regime—a system that fears truth, fears journalism, and fears freedom.

It fears so deeply that it cannot tolerate even a single newspaper; it fears so deeply that it must hold a man in his seventies in long-term solitary confinement; it fears so deeply that even the words “Liberate Hong Kong” must be erased through punishment.

As long as someone remembers what Hong Kong once was, it is not truly dead; as long as someone continues to speak, freedom will not truly end.

What history will ultimately put on trial is the regime that wraps persecution in law, hides violence behind courtrooms, and uses the machinery of the state to strike at the media.

Jimmy Lai’s trial is not the fate of one man, but this era’s indictment of dictatorship.

Truth cannot be imprisoned. Freedom cannot be destroyed.

And the Chinese Communist Party, believing it can control everything, will ultimately discover that it cannot control history—nor the future.

卢超:独裁下的经济塌陷——从改革开放到皇权复辟的毁灭之路

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卢超:独裁下的经济塌陷——从改革开放到皇权复辟的毁灭之路

作者:卢超
编辑:程伟 责任编辑:侯改英 校对:王滨 翻译:吕峰

在当下的中国,经济活动陷入持续的低迷与不确定,内需不足、外贸承压、青年失业率高企、民营企业信心受挫,普通民众的日常生活更是感受到了前所未有的压力与焦虑。面对这场系统性的经济困境,本文旨在剖析其深层政治根源,强调一个核心论断:经济的兴衰,始终是政治选择的表象,而当下的经济困境,正源于政治路线的根本性转向。政治倾向,如同经济之舟的船锚,决定了航向的开放与闭塞,以及最终的民生福祉。

卢超:独裁下的经济塌陷——从改革开放到皇权复辟的毁灭之路

韬光养晦与经济腾飞的“黄金二十年”:

在江泽民和胡锦涛主政时期,虽然体制依旧,但政治核心暂时聚焦于“发展”与“稳定”。这一时期的政治倾向可以概括为:对内放权搞活,对外融入全球体系,奉行邓小平时代“韬光养晦”的策略。 政治上的务实主义:领导层采纳了集体领导制,政策制定倾向于技术官僚主导的务实路线,将经济增长(GDP)视为主要衡量指标。这种暂时去意识形态化的务实作风,极大地降低了私人资本和外来投资者的不确定性,为市场提供了稳定且可预测的法律和政策环境。 经济上的全面开放:2001年加入世界贸易组织(WTO)是中国经济崛起的关键一步,这展现了中国融入全球分工体系的决心。宽松的政策鼓励外资进入,成就了“世界工厂”的地位。同时,民营企业的生存空间得到保障和扩大,成为创造就业和技术创新的主要动力。这种开放与稳定的政治环境,是经济整体向上的根本原因。

政治集权与经济转向:从集体领导到“皇权”的路线更迭: 自2012年习近平上任以来,特别是通过修改宪法取消国家主席连任限制之后,中共的政治路线发生了根本性转变。这种转变的核心是权力的高度集中化与个人化,打破了此前相对平衡的集体领导制度,形成了类似“皇权制”的个人决策模式。经济发展的重心从“效率优先”转向了“意识形态优先”和“国家安全优先”,这彻底改变了中国经济运行的底层逻辑,并导致了持续的结构性困境。 核心根源:个人化集权导致政策朝令夕改:在集体领导制被削弱后,最高领导人的个人意志成为决定国家经济政策的首要因素。这种机制的弊端是政策缺乏制衡、难以预测且极易出现“运动式”执行,形成了市场最厌恶的“朝令夕改”环境。从2020年起,突然针对互联网、教育、房地产等核心行业的全面打击,就是这种个人意志凌驾于市场规律之上的体现。政策的不确定性使得投资者(尤其是私人资本)对营商环境的信心崩溃,加剧了资本外流和投资停滞。希捷(Seagate)工厂等外资企业的撤出,正是对这种政治不确定性的“用脚投票”。 “战狼外交”对经济的直接国际反噬:在个人化权力驱动下,中共的外交路线也趋向强硬和意识形态化。“战狼外交”的推行,使得中国与西方发达国家的关系陷入持续的紧张与对抗。这种非务实的外交策略,直接催生了西方世界的“去风险化”(De-risking)和供应链重组。中国在全球产业链中的“不可替代性”正在被政治因素快速侵蚀,外贸订单和FDI(外商直接投资)的下滑,是中共将政治野心置于经济利益之上的直接后果。 “封关锁国”与内循环的自我限制:在习近平的领导下,“内循环”战略被提升到极致,并伴随着对数据、人员和信息流动的严格管控。这种“封关锁国”的倾向,不仅在疫情期间以严苛的“清零政策”表现出来,在疫情结束后也未能完全解除。对国际交流的限制、对敏感数据的收紧,以及意识形态对文化和资本的渗透,都严重阻碍了市场活力和创新精神。经济的活力源于开放和竞争,主动或被动地与世界脱钩,只会限制中国经济的潜能,并最终让民生承担代价。结论:结束专制才是经济复苏的根本 历史昭示,经济的繁荣从来不是单纯的技术或市场问题,它与政治体制紧密挂钩。江胡时期的经济成功是政治上选择“务实、稳定、开放”的结果;而当前经济面临的挑战,则是政治上选择“集中、个人化统治、意识形态优先”的直接后果。 民生经济的根本在于信心、活力和预期。当政治方向让外资感到不确定,让民企感到压抑,让社会感到紧张时,投资会停止,消费会萎缩,创新会枯竭。换言之,政治才是经济的根本。唯有结束中共的一党专制,彻底打破权力的垄断与“皇权”思维,建立法治保障下的自由市场,才会有真正具备活力的自由经济。否则,任何经济上的修补都只是扬汤止沸,无法改变衰退的命运。

Lu Chao: Economic Collapse under Autocracy — The Destructive Path from Reform and Opening to the Restoration of Imperial Power

Abstract:During the administrations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, although the political system itself remained unchanged, the core orientation of governance was temporarily focused on “development” and “stability.” Since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012—particularly following the constitutional amendment that abolished term limits for the state presidency—the political line of the Chinese Communist Party has undergone a fundamental transformation.

Author: Lu Chao
Editor: Cheng Wei  Managing Editor: Hou Gaiying  Proofreader: Wang Bin  Translator: Lyu Feng

In contemporary China, economic activity has fallen into a prolonged state of stagnation and uncertainty. Domestic demand remains weak, foreign trade is under increasing pressure, youth unemployment is persistently high, and confidence among private enterprises has been seriously undermined. For ordinary citizens, daily life is marked by an unprecedented sense of strain and anxiety. Confronting this systemic economic predicament, this article seeks to analyze its deeper political roots and advances a central argument: economic prosperity or decline is ultimately a manifestation of political choice. The current economic difficulties arise precisely from a fundamental shift in political direction. Political orientation, like the anchor of an economic vessel, determines whether its course is open or constrained—and, ultimately, the well-being of the people.

卢超:独裁下的经济塌陷——从改革开放到皇权复辟的毁灭之路

“Keeping a Low Profile” and the “Golden Two Decades” of Economic Takeoff:During the administrations of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, although the institutional framework remained unchanged, the political core temporarily concentrated on “development” and “stability.” The political orientation of this period can be summarized as decentralizing authority and invigorating the domestic economy while integrating into the global system externally, in accordance with Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of taoguang yanghui (“keeping a low profile and biding one’s time”).

Political Pragmatism:At the political level, the leadership adopted a system of collective leadership, and policy formulation tended to follow a technocratic, pragmatic approach, with economic growth (GDP) serving as the primary metric of performance. This temporary de-ideologization of governance substantially reduced uncertainty for private capital and foreign investors, providing the market with a stable and predictable legal and policy environment.

Comprehensive Economic Opening:China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 constituted a pivotal step in its economic ascent, demonstrating a clear commitment to integration into the global division of labor. Liberal policies encouraged inflows of foreign capital, enabling China to attain its status as the “world’s factory.” At the same time, the space for private enterprises was protected and expanded, allowing them to become the principal drivers of job creation and technological innovation. This combination of political openness and stability formed the fundamental basis for sustained, broad-based economic growth.

Political Centralization and Economic Reorientation: The Shift from Collective Leadership to a “Neo-Imperial” Model

Since Xi Jinping assumed office in 2012—particularly following the constitutional amendment that abolished term limits for the state presidency—the political trajectory of the Chinese Communist Party has undergone a fundamental transformation. The core of this shift lies in the extreme centralization and personalization of power, dismantling the previously more balanced system of collective leadership and giving rise to a personal decision-making model akin to a “neo-imperial” order. Correspondingly, the focus of economic development has shifted from “efficiency first” to “ideology first” and “national security first.” This reorientation has fundamentally altered the underlying logic of China’s economic operation and has generated persistent structural difficulties.

Core Cause: Personalized Centralization and Policy VolatilityWith the weakening of collective leadership, the personal will of the top leader has become the decisive factor shaping national economic policy. The inherent flaw of this mechanism is the lack of effective checks and balances, resulting in policies that are unpredictable and prone to abrupt, campaign-style implementation—precisely the type of environment most detested by markets. Since 2020, sudden and sweeping crackdowns on key sectors such as the internet, education, and real estate have exemplified the subordination of market principles to personal political will. Policy uncertainty has shattered investor confidence—particularly among private capital—thereby accelerating capital outflows and investment paralysis. The withdrawal of foreign enterprises, such as Seagate’s factory closures, represents a form of “voting with one’s feet” in response to heightened political uncertainty.

The International Economic Backlash of “Wolf-Warrior Diplomacy”Driven by personalized power, China’s foreign policy has also become increasingly confrontational and ideologically charged. The adoption of so-called “wolf-warrior diplomacy” has plunged relations with advanced Western economies into sustained tension and rivalry. This non-pragmatic diplomatic posture has directly fueled Western strategies of “de-risking” and global supply-chain reconfiguration. China’s former “irreplaceability” within global value chains is being rapidly eroded by political factors. The decline in export orders and foreign direct investment (FDI) is a direct consequence of prioritizing political ambition over economic interest.

“Border Closure” Tendencies and the Self-Constraining Logic of the Dual-Circulation StrategyUnder Xi’s leadership, the “internal circulation” strategy has been elevated to an extreme, accompanied by stringent controls over data, personnel, and information flows. This tendency toward de facto “border closure” was most evident during the pandemic through the harsh “zero-COVID” policy, yet it has not been fully reversed in the post-pandemic period. Restrictions on international exchange, tighter controls over sensitive data, and the ideological penetration of culture and capital have all severely undermined market dynamism and innovative capacity. Economic vitality derives from openness and competition; deliberate or involuntary decoupling from the world can only constrain China’s economic potential and ultimately impose costs on livelihoods.

Conclusion: Ending Authoritarianism as the Fundamental Condition for Economic Recovery

History demonstrates that economic prosperity is never merely a technical or market issue; it is inseparably linked to political institutions. The economic success of the Jiang and Hu eras resulted from political choices favoring pragmatism, stability, and openness. By contrast, the challenges confronting today’s economy are the direct outcome of political choices emphasizing concentration of power, personalized rule, and ideological primacy.

The foundations of a people-centered economy are confidence, vitality, and stable expectations. When political direction generates uncertainty for foreign capital, repression for private enterprise, and pervasive tension within society, investment stalls, consumption contracts, and innovation withers. In other words, politics constitutes the economic base. Only by ending one-party authoritarian rule, dismantling the monopoly of power and the “imperial” mindset, and establishing a free market protected by the rule of law can a genuinely dynamic and free economy emerge. Otherwise, any economic tinkering will merely treat symptoms without addressing the cause, and cannot alter the trajectory of decline.

旧金山 12月14日 支持美国政府实施《台湾保证落实法案》

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旧金山 12月14日 支持美国政府实施《台湾保证落实法案》
旧金山 12月14日 支持美国政府实施《台湾保证落实法案》

活动主题:支持美国政府实施《台湾保证落实法案》

《台湾保证落实法案》

Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act

众议院全票通过、参议院无异议通过,川普总统于 2025 年 12 月 2 日正式签署成为法律。

= 美国把挺台承诺写入“永久机制”

= 强制行政部门必须持续深化美台关系

意义包括:

美台官方互动制度化

军事支持持续化

国际参与扩张化

威慑中共常态化

美台关系准同盟化

这部法案给世界传递了两句最重要的话:

美国对中共说:“我们不会放弃台湾。”

美国对台湾说:“你不是孤身一人”。

现场口号:

支持美国政府实施台湾保证落实法案

支持日本协防台湾

支持民主阵营推翻中共独裁非法政权

支持台湾民主自决

支持中华民国(台湾)重返联合国

中共邪恶非法政权滚出联合国

主办单位:中国民主党(旧金山党部)

召集人:赵常青/Changqing Zhao 胡丕政/Pizheng Hu

发起人:陈森锋/Senfeng Chen 李栩/Xu Li

主持人:高应芬/Yingfen Gao 陈森锋/Senfeng Chen

组织者:李树青/Shuqing Li 卫仁喜/Renxi Wei 郝剑平/Jiangping Hao 崔允星/Yunxing Cui 缪青/Qing Miao 高俊影/Junying Gao 张善城/Shancheng Zhang

宣传策划:关永杰/Yongjie Guan 庄帆/Fan Zhuang

现场义工:吕小静/Xiaojing Lyu

活动时间:2025年12月14日(周日)下午 2:00pm——4:00pm

活动地点:旧金山中国领事馆前

Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in San Francisco

洛杉矶 12月20日 硬糖联盟 爱就是爱主题交流会

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洛杉矶 12月20日 硬糖联盟 爱就是爱主题交流会
洛杉矶 12月20日 硬糖联盟 爱就是爱主题交流会

嗨,好久不见。

“Women”硬糖联盟又又又来了

“爱就是爱”主题系列交流会定于2025年12月20日,18:00.

在这个世界上,每一种身份都值得被尊重。

和“Women”运动一起走进温暖而真实的交流之旅,倾听多样性故事,拆解偏见与恐惧,学习如何用理解与包容回应世界的不解。

这里没有评判,只有理解;

这里没有标签,只有尊重。

在轻松对话与互动中,你将发现:

理解可以治愈误解,尊重可以改变视野。

让我们一起,用真诚点亮包容,用爱对抗恐惧。

你带着疑问而来,

你带着好奇而来,

你带着理解,也带着不解。

走进“Women”,

走进这片包容的空间,

让我们一起,用心去理解,

勇敢说“不”。

爱你们哟❤

洛杉矶 12月14日 声援台湾 守护自由

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洛杉矶 12月14日 声援台湾 守护自由
洛杉矶 12月14日 声援台湾 守护自由

【活动主题】

声援台湾 · 守护自由

支持日本协防台湾 · 制衡中共极权扩张

在极权扩张威胁全球的当下,台湾不仅是岛屿,更是华语世界最后的自由灯塔、亚洲民主链条的核心节点、国际秩序与地区和平的关键支点。

台海局势升温,日本首相高市早苗掷地有声:“台湾有事,即日本有事。”

这是日本战后最重要的安全政策转折,也是全球民主阵营向中共极权发出的最清晰讯号:

台海绝非中国“内政”,而是全球文明的分界线。

在此历史关头,我们站出来——

不是为了挑衅,而是为了和平;

不是针对任何民族,而是捍卫人类共同价值。

【为什么必须站出来】

台湾若失守,民主世界第一道防线崩塌

中共威胁的不是土地,而是台湾承载的自由

极权不会止步于台湾,它将向全球渗透

沉默的世界,只会助长侵略者的嚣张

守护台湾,就是守护文明、守护未来

【我们的立场】

台湾不是“内政”,是全球民主共同体的价值资产

日本协防台湾,是负责任大国的国际义务

中共对台恫吓,是对国际秩序的公然挑战

民主国家必须团结,而非退让

守护台湾,就是守护我们共同的未来

活动时间:2025年12月14周日 中午12:30

活动地址:中国洛杉矶总领事馆

活动策划发起人:彭小梅、赵叶、牟宗强 杨长兵 何兴强

活动负责人:赵贵玲 张倩

海报设计:袁崛

活动主持人:何兴强 马群

活动组织:林小龙 马群 韩震 黄娟

摄影摄像:牟芮仪

安保秩序:康余

主办单位: 中国民主党全委会 全能基督灭共阵线

全委会支援台湾事务部 中国民主党山东省工委

雕塑公园 12月13日 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动

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雕塑公园 12月13日 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动
雕塑公园 12月13日 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动

《纪念勇者 ·控诉暴政》

—— 民主运动先驱墙落成仪式暨第768次茉莉花行动

时间:2025年12月13日 周六下午2点

地点:自由雕塑公园

借民主运动先驱墙落成之际,我们与茉莉花行动共同发声,《纪念勇者·控诉暴政》为中国自由与人权坚持不懈、却遭监禁、酷刑、失踪与迫害的民主先驱致敬,也公开控诉持续迫害公民社会的极权暴政!自由无罪,迫害可耻!

这座先驱墙致敬那些为争取中国的民主、人权、言论自由与公民社会付出巨大代价的时代先驱。

在纪念墙前,茉莉花行动将举办特别纪念声援,向所有为自由承受监禁、酷刑、失踪与迫害的民主英雄表达最深切的敬意。

被致敬的代表人物包括(不限于):

•刘晓波|诺贝尔和平奖得主,《零八宪章》起草人

• 许志永|新公民运动发起人

• 丁家喜|宪政改革推动者

• 黎智英|香港媒体人,《苹果日报》创办人,因坚持真相与新闻自由被长期囚禁

• 张展|因报道疫情真相被捕的记者

• 高智晟|“中国良心律师”,长期失踪

• 周松林牧师|安徽合肥甘泉教会受迫害牧者

• 金明日牧师|北京锡安教会受迫害牧者

• “天安门母亲”群体|为1989遇难者坚持真相与问责的持续力量

他们在思想启蒙、公民权利、新闻自由、法律维权与宗教自由领域留下深远影响,是当代中国民主运动的象征性力量。

这不仅是纪念,更是控诉。

在一个 真相被犯罪化 的国家,说真话本身就是英雄行为。

一个政府越害怕公民,它的脆弱就越暴露无遗。

他们被囚禁的不是身体,而是政权对自由的恐惧。

当权力拒绝透明,勇气就成为最稀缺的公共资源。

如果一个国家必须靠监禁良心来维持“稳定”,那么这种稳定本身就是谎言。

民主运动的英雄不是倒下于战争,

而是倒下于真相。

历史的审判不在法庭,而在记忆里——而他们,终将胜诉。

不做中共的帮凶

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不做中共的帮凶

作者:Lewis Lin 编辑:冯仍 责任编辑:钟然 校对:熊辩 翻译:彭小梅

2025年11月22日

一、引言

极权主义社会的暴力不是由统治者单独实施,而是由庞大的执行体系维持。从纳粹德国到苏联大清洗,帮凶结构在所有极权国家中都占据中心地位。

汉娜·阿伦特(Hannah Arendt)指出:“极权统治通过使所有人参与其犯罪行为,从而摧毁道德判断的能力。”(Arendt, 1951)

中国共产党在其执政的七十五年中,通过政治运动、阶级斗争与宣传体系,使国家暴力制度化,导致数以千万计的生命损失。本文在学术研究基础上,梳理中共历史上的主要政治迫害事件,并从伦理学与政治理论角度论证:普通人拒绝成为帮凶,是当代中国人最重要的道德行为命题。

二、历史案例与可验证数据:中共极权体制中的“帮凶”形成机制

2.1 土地改革与镇反运动(1950–1953)

根据中共中央1954年内部总结,镇反运动中“处决反革命分子71万余人”,《中华人民共和国刑法简史》,法律出版社,2016),此数据为中国官方统计,是最少估计。

学者丁抒(Ding Shu)等研究指出,地方干部与“积极分子”组成了主要执行力量,通过划分阶级成分、组织群众斗争会,使普通农民群体参与迫害邻里。

(丁抒:《红色风暴》,香港,1998)。

帮凶机制的特征包括:

• 阶级标签化

• 群众斗群众

• 通过参与施暴获得政治安全与物质利益

在群体成为中共帮凶的同时,又为中共后续的运动奠定模式。

2.2 三年大饥荒(1959–1961):制度性谎言与死亡

关于大饥荒死亡人数,最广为学界接受的研究来自:

• 杨继绳,《墓碑:1989亿万农民的死亡史》(香港,2008)估计死亡 3600–4500 万人

• 国际学者 Frank Dikötter,《Mao’s Great Famine》(2010)根据县志与档案,估计死亡 4500 万人以上

饥荒的根源不是自然灾害,而是政治制度造成:

• 基层干部虚报粮食产量

• “放卫星”导致征粮过度

• 严厉打击“右倾”导致无人敢说真话

这造成了中共的“执行链条”,让地方干部成为灾难的主要帮凶。

2.3 文化大革命(1966–1976):群众暴力的制度化

根据官方《文革三十年纪念报告》(中共中央党史研究室,1996)内部资料:

• 200多万人被迫害致死

• 700多万人致残

• 数千万家庭遭受冲击

国际学界估计数字更高:

• Andrew Walder (2019):至少 150 万直接死亡

• Roderick MacFarquhar:《The Cultural Revolution》:全国共有 3000 万以上人受迫害

红卫兵、造反派、工宣队、军宣队均成为中共国家暴行的帮凶。

案例:1966 年北京“红八月”,北京市委公开记录显示:

• 1772 人被打死(北京市公安局内部通报)

文革清楚揭示:极权国家通过恐惧与政治动员,将普通人转变为执行暴力的主体。

2.4 1989 年天安门事件:国家暴力现代化

根据 *《天安门文件》(The Tiananmen Papers, 2001)*内部文件,中共军方投入 20 万军人进入北京执行戒严。

死亡人数:

• 《纽约时报》引用红十字会内部数字:至少 2600 人

• 外交部发言人1990年承认:“伤亡数以百计。”

• 英国驻华大使馆电文(2017解密):估算至少 1 万人死亡

国家暴力的执行链条包括:军队、武警、宣传系统、电视台封锁、大学党组织配合惩肃。

2.5 计划生育:国家控制身体的制度工程(1980–2015),联合国人口基金(UNFPA)报告指出:

中国“一胎化政策”造成“广泛强制堕胎、强制绝育、人权侵犯”(UNFPA, 1998, 2002)

案例:

• 湖南郴州 1991 强制堕胎案(纽约时报调查)

• 山东菏泽“百日无孩”运动”(BBC 报道,2013)

• 中国计生委内部数据:1980–2009 共执行 3.36 亿次节育手术

执行者:乡镇政府、居委会、计生办、妇联干部。这是极权制度长期、系统化侵入私人生活的典型。

2.6 新疆再教育营与宗教迫害(2017–)

联合国人权理事会(OHCHR, 2022)报告指出:在新疆存在 “严重人权侵犯”,包括任意拘留、文化消灭、宗教限制。

联合国估计 100–150 万维吾尔人与哈萨克族人被拘禁。

执行体系包括:公安、武警、监狱管理部门、科技监控企业、庞大的举报机制(网格化管理)。

三、帮凶结构的政治逻辑:理论分析

3.1 汉娜·阿伦特的“平庸之恶”,阿伦特认为极权统治利用:

1. 思想空洞化

2. 行政服从

3. 责任分散化

使普通人参与系统性暴力却不自知(Arendt, 1963)。这一理论完全适用于中共历史案例。

3.2 米尔格伦服从实验:为何普通人会成为帮凶?

Stanley Milgram (1963) 的实验表明:65% 的普通人在权威要求下会实施致命电击。

在中共体系中,这种服从被放大:

• 组织控制

• 恐惧文化

• 意识形态洗脑

• 政治利益诱惑

让参与迫害成为可理解的社会行为。

3.3 “不合作运动”理论

甘地、阿伦·夏普(Gene Sharp)等认为:暴政的力量来自个体的民众与被统治者的合作。拒绝合作本身就是反抗。

这为中国的现实提供启示:普通人只要拒绝参与谎言与迫害,就能削弱暴政的结构。

四、我们如何在现实中“不再做帮凶”?

结合极权研究与公民不服从理论,普通人可采取的非暴力方式包括:

1. 拒绝参与举报与数字监控(Gene Sharp,《From Dictatorship to Democracy》)

2. 不传播谎言与政治宣传:这是削弱极权意识形态的重要步骤。

3. 支持被迫害者与良心犯:国际研究表明:社会支持能显著减少国家暴力的效果。

4. 海外华人拒绝参与统战系统.

5. 在安全范围内传递历史与真相:历史记忆是对抗极权的最重要资源(Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny, 2017)。

五、结论:拒绝成为帮凶,是中国民众未来最重要的选择:中国共产党在过去一个世纪中制造了一系列灾难,其结构性暴力依靠的是庞大的帮凶系统。从土地改革到新疆再教育营,历史反复证明,极权强大,不是因为统治者强,而是因为人民被动或主动地合作。因此,拒绝合作,就是打破极权的开始。这是未来中国社会能否走向自由、法治与尊严的前提。

当越来越多中国人选择“不做帮凶”,中国的暴力政治结构才能真正瓦解,一个新的时代才会到来。

参考文献(全部真实可查)

Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt.

Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking.

Dikötter, F. (2010). Mao’s Great Famine. Bloomsbury.

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Lewis Lin: Refusing to Be an Accomplice of the Chinese Communist Party

Author: Lewis Lin Editor: Feng Reng Managing Editor: Zhong Ran
Proofreader: Xiong Bian Translator: Peng Xiaomei

Date: November 22, 2025

Abstract

This article reviews historical cases of political persecution by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), revealing how authoritarian violence is sustained through an extensive structure of accomplices. It analyzes the critical importance of ordinary people refusing to cooperate and emphasizes that “not being an accomplice” is a key moral choice for weakening authoritarianism and defending freedom and ethical responsibility.

I. Introduction

Violence in totalitarian societies is not carried out by rulers alone but is sustained by vast systems of execution. From Nazi Germany to Stalin’s Great Purge, accomplice structures have occupied a central position in all totalitarian states.

Hannah Arendt pointed out: “Totalitarian rule destroys the capacity for moral judgment by making all men accomplices in its crimes.”(Arendt, 1951)

During its seventy-five years in power, the Chinese Communist Party has institutionalized state violence through political campaigns, class struggle, and propaganda systems, resulting in the loss of tens of millions of lives. Based on academic research, this article reviews major historical cases of political persecution by the CCP and argues from ethical and political theory perspectives that refusing to become an accomplice is the most important moral imperative facing contemporary Chinese people.

II. Historical Cases and Verifiable Data:

The Formation Mechanism of “Accomplices” in the CCP’s Totalitarian System

2.1 Land Reform and the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950–1953)

According to an internal summary by the CCP Central Committee in 1954, the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries campaign “executed more than 710,000 counterrevolutionaries” (A Brief History of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, Law Press, 2016). This figure represents the minimum official estimate.

Scholars such as Ding Shu have pointed out that local cadres and so-called “activists” constituted the main execution force. By classifying people into class categories and organizing mass struggle sessions, ordinary peasants were mobilized to persecute their neighbors.(Ding Shu, Red Storm, Hong Kong, 1998)

Key features of the accomplice mechanism included:• Class labeling• Mobilizing the masses against one another• Gaining political security and material benefits through participation in violence

As the masses became accomplices of the CCP, they also helped establish the operational model for subsequent political campaigns.

2.2 The Great Famine (1959–1961): Institutional Lies and Mass Death

The most widely accepted academic estimates of famine deaths include:• Yang Jisheng, Tombstone (Hong Kong, 2008): 36–45 million deaths• Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine (2010): more than 45 million deaths based on county archives

The famine was not caused by natural disasters, but by political institutions:• Grassroots officials falsified grain output reports• “Sputnik-style exaggeration” led to excessive grain requisitions• Severe punishment of “Rightist tendencies” silenced truth-telling

This created an execution chain in which local cadres became the principal accomplices to catastrophe.

2.3 The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976): Institutionalization of Mass Violence

According to internal data from the 30-Year Commemoration Report on the Cultural Revolution (CCP Party History Research Office, 1996):• More than 2 million people were persecuted to death• Over 7 million were disabled• Tens of millions of families were affected

International scholarship estimates higher figures:• Andrew Walder (2019): at least 1.5 million direct deaths• Roderick MacFarquhar, The Cultural Revolution: over 30 million people persecuted nationwide

Red Guards, rebel factions, workers’ propaganda teams, and military propaganda teams all became accomplices to CCP state violence.

Case: “Red August,” Beijing, 1966, Official Beijing Municipal records show:• 1,772 people beaten to death(Beijing Public Security Bureau internal briefing)

The Cultural Revolution clearly demonstrates how totalitarian states transform ordinary people into agents of violence through fear and political mobilization.

2.4 The 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre: Modernization of State Violence

According to The Tiananmen Papers (2001), the CCP deployed 200,000 troops to impose martial law in Beijing.

Death toll estimates include:• The New York Times, citing Red Cross sources: at least 2,600 deaths• Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson (1990): “hundreds of casualties”• Declassified UK Embassy cables (2017): at least 10,000 deaths

The execution chain of state violence included the military, armed police, propaganda systems, television censorship, and university party organizations cooperating in repression.

2.5 Family Planning Policy:

A State Project of Bodily Control (1980–2015)

Reports by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) stated that China’s One-Child Policy resulted in “widespread forced abortions, forced sterilizations, and human rights violations” (UNFPA, 1998; 2002).

Cases include:• Chenzhou, Hunan, 1991 forced abortion case (New York Times investigation)• Heze, Shandong “Hundred-Day No-Baby Campaign” (BBC, 2013)• Internal data from China’s Family Planning Commission:336 million birth-control procedures carried out between 1980–2009

Executors included township governments, neighborhood committees, family planning offices, and women’s federation cadres — a typical example of totalitarian systems intruding systematically into private life.

2.6 Xinjiang Re-Education Camps and Religious Persecution (2017– )

The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR, 2022) reported “serious human rights violations” in Xinjiang, including arbitrary detention, cultural erasure, and restrictions on religious practice.

The UN estimates that 1–1.5 million Uyghurs and Kazakhs have been detained.

The execution system includes public security forces, armed police, prison administrations, surveillance technology companies, and an extensive informant network (“grid-style management”).

III. The Political Logic of Accomplice Structures: Theoretical Analysis

3.1 Hannah Arendt’s “Banality of Evil”

Arendt argued that totalitarian systems rely on:

Hollowing out independent thought

Administrative obedience

Diffusion of responsibility

This enables ordinary people to participate in systematic violence without awareness (Arendt, 1963). This theory fully applies to CCP historical cases.

3.2 Milgram’s Obedience Experiments: Why Do Ordinary People Become Accomplices?

Stanley Milgram’s experiments (1963) showed that 65% of ordinary people would administer potentially lethal electric shocks when ordered by authority.

Within the CCP system, obedience is amplified through:• Organizational control• A culture of fear• Ideological indoctrination• Political and material incentives

Participation in persecution thus becomes socially “understandable.”

3.3 The Theory of Noncooperation

Gandhi and Gene Sharp argued that tyranny derives its power from the cooperation of the governed. Refusal to cooperate is itself resistance.

This offers a clear insight for China: when ordinary people refuse to participate in lies and persecution, the structure of authoritarian power weakens.

IV. How Can We “Refuse to Be Accomplices” in Reality?

Drawing on totalitarian studies and civil disobedience theory, nonviolent actions available to ordinary people include:

Refusing to participate in informant systems and digital surveillance(Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy)

Refusing to spread lies and political propaganda

Supporting persecuted individuals and prisoners of conscience

Overseas Chinese refusing participation in United Front systems

Safely transmitting history and truth — historical memory is the most powerful resource against tyranny(Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny, 2017)

V. Conclusion:

Refusing to Be an Accomplice Is the Most Critical Choice for China’s Future. Over the past century, the CCP has produced a series of catastrophes whose structural violence depends on massive accomplice systems. From land reform to Xinjiang re-education camps, history repeatedly proves that totalitarianism is powerful not because rulers are strong, but because people cooperate — passively or actively. Refusing to cooperate is the beginning of dismantling authoritarianism. It is the prerequisite for China’s future path toward freedom, rule of law, and human dignity.

When more Chinese people choose “not to be accomplices,” China’s violent political structure can truly collapse, and a new era can finally arrive.

References (All verifiable)

Arendt, H. (1951). The Origins of Totalitarianism. Harcourt.Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. Viking.Dikötter, F. (2010). Mao’s Great Famine. Bloomsbury.Yang, Jisheng. (2008). Tombstone. Hong Kong: Cosmos Books.MacFarquhar, R., & Schoenhals, M. (2006). Mao’s Last Revolution. Harvard University Press.Walder, A. (2019). Agents of Disorder. Harvard University Press.Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral Study of Obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.Sharp, G. (2012). From Dictatorship to Democracy.OHCHR (2022). Assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang.UNFPA (1998, 2002). Reports on Reproductive Rights in China.A Brief History of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China. Law Press, 2016.The Tiananmen Papers. (2001).