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言论自由、台湾独立、公开官员财产

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言论自由、台湾独立、公开官员财产


言论自由、台湾独立、公开官员财产

我叫彭硕,是中国民主党党员,我的政治主张是:言论自由、台湾独立、公开官员财产。

我在洛杉矶的中国领事馆前公开抗议,表达我对中共独裁专制的不满,我的立场清晰而坚定:没有言论自由,就没有真相;不承认台湾主权,就是对民主的践踏;官员不公开财产,不接受人民的监督,腐败就永远无法根除。

我坚信:一个没有言论自由的国家,是扼杀思想的牢笼;一个没有民主选票的政权,是披着合法外衣的暴政;一个既拒绝透明,又妄图吞并台湾、扼杀民主的体制,注定会腐烂到底,终将被历史清算!

自由不是恩赐,是必须争取来的,让我们一起终结中共暴政,把权力还给人民!

作者:彭硕

编辑:赵杰 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:鲁慧文

Freedom of Speech, Taiwan Independence, Public Disclosure of Officials’ Assets

— By Peng Shuo

Author: Peng Shuo | Editor: Zhao Jie | Chief Editor: Luo Zhifei | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

My name is Peng Shuo, and I am a member of the China Democracy Party. My political beliefs are clear and firm: freedom of speech, independence for Taiwan, and mandatory public disclosure of government officials’ assets.

I have publicly protested in front of the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles to express my dissatisfaction with the CCP’s dictatorial and authoritarian regime. My stance is unequivocal:

• Without freedom of speech, there is no truth.

• Refusing to recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty is an assault on democracy.

• If officials are not required to disclose their assets and accept public scrutiny, corruption will never be eradicated.

I firmly believe:

A country without freedom of speech is a prison that strangles thought.

A regime without democratic elections is tyranny disguised in a cloak of legality.

A system that rejects transparency while attempting to annex Taiwan and crush democracy is destined to rot from within—and will inevitably be judged by history!

Freedom is not a gift—it must be fought for.

Let us stand together to end CCP tyranny and return power to the people!

实名反对“网络身份证” :一位公民的抗争之路

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实名反对“网络身份证” :一位公民的抗争之路
实名反对“网络身份证” :一位公民的抗争之路

从国内到海外:我持续反抗“网络身份证

From China to Overseas: My Continued Resistance Against the “Internet ID”

作者:刘洋洋

编辑:赵杰 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:鲁慧文

2024年7月25日,中共发布《国家网络身份认证公共服务管理办法》征求意见稿,宣称推出“网络身份证”以保护公民隐私。然而,这不过是“以保护隐私之名,行监控隐私之实”的幌子,其真实目的是通过更高效的手段管控言论、剥夺公民权利,巩固其党国统治。

2024年8月2日,那时我还在中国境内,我在中国司法部网站的《国家网络身份认证公共服务管理办法》的征求意见稿中实名逐条反对该管理办法,并且号召多人参与实名反对。尽管如此,正如我所料,中共的“征求意见”从来都是走形式,“网络身份证”终于还是在2025年7月15日施行了。面对中共如此霸道、脚踏人权的行为,来到海外的我不会退缩。

2025年7月27日,我来到中国驻洛杉矶领事馆前,高举标牌,呼吁取消网络身份证,即使我背后的领事馆摄像头冷冷的注视着我,我毫不畏惧,我要让中共知道,他们不得人心的政策,永远有人敢于反抗!

From China to Overseas: My Continued Resistance Against the “Internet ID”

By Liu Yangyang | Edited by Zhao Jie | Chief Editor: Luo Zhifei | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

On July 25, 2024, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released a draft for public comment titled the Administrative Measures for National Internet Identity Authentication Public Services, announcing its plan to implement an “Internet ID” to supposedly protect citizens’ privacy. In reality, this is nothing more than a pretext—a false promise to “protect privacy” used to justify deeper surveillance. Its true purpose is to strengthen the regime’s control over speech, strip citizens of their rights, and further entrench Party-state rule.

On August 2, 2024, while I was still in China, I submitted a line-by-line objection to the draft on the Ministry of Justice website, using my real name. I also called on others to join in publicly opposing the proposal. As expected, however, the CCP’s so-called “public consultation” was merely a formality. The Internet ID policy was ultimately enforced on July 15, 2025.

Facing such authoritarian and rights-trampling policies, I will not back down—even now, living in exile.

On July 27, 2025, I stood in front of the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles, holding a protest sign high, calling for the abolition of the Internet ID. Even as the surveillance cameras behind me watched coldly from the consulate wall, I stood firm and unafraid. I want the CCP to know: no matter how unpopular their policies are, there will always be people with the courage to resist!

释永信与少林寺:一场权力与信仰的长期博弈

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Shi Yongxin and Shaolin Temple: A Prolonged Struggle Between Power and Faith

作者:陀先润

编辑:gloria Wang 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:鲁慧文

关键词:释永信,少林寺,中国佛教,信仰

在中国佛教界,少林寺是一个独特的存在。它既是佛教禅宗祖庭,又是商业与文化的输出地,同时又为体制服务。在过去二十多年里,少林寺的权力中心无疑是释永信。

从1980年代末起,释永信便试图进入少林寺核心领导层。在他尚未年满三十时,便多次争夺“住持”一职。当时虽未得逞,但他并未退缩。90年代初,他通过种种方式排挤原方丈速喜和尚,最终将其软禁,进而谋求上位。这一举动引发佛教界不满,佛教协会主席赵朴初生前始终拒绝批复他的住持资格,直到赵朴初去世多年,释永信才于1999年被顺利“扶正”。

他的上位,并非善行结果,而是玩弄权术与人脉的业力所致。然而,释永信上位后,争议与质疑并未停歇。

2008年与2015年,曾先后爆发两次针对他的实名举报,内容涉及财务不清、违背戒律、涉及女性关系等严重问题。举报者大多来自寺内、知情深入,细节清晰,但调查皆无果。公众一再质疑,释永信却步步高升,不仅担任全国政协常委、佛教协会副会长,还享有准副国级的生活与医疗待遇。

这一切无疑反映出一个问题:释永信不仅是一位宗教人物,更是体制中被制度性保护的“特殊身份者”。尤其在对外活动方面,释永信常年持公务护照出国访问,行程及比利时、阿布扎比、梵蒂冈等地,频频出席多边宗教会议。部分活动由名为“欧洲亚洲中心”的组织协调,该组织虽名为NGO,实则为中国对外形象工程的一环。这类“宗教外交”,往往游走于信仰与国家任务之间,其实质是政治角色的延伸。

甚至在一些敏感场合,如访问梵蒂冈的过程中,也有网络言论质疑他是否越权接触海外宗教人士。然而这正是中共的安排,中梵没有正式外交关系,中国政府不便公开派员,释永信的角色正好承担了那种“亦官亦僧”的模糊职能。

他代表的是体制中一种非常典型的“融合型人物”:宗教领袖、文化符号、政府代言人,三者集于一身。而其背后的少林寺,也早已不只是“禅宗祖庭”,更是一个跨界运作的经济体、舆论话题场与政商利益圈。

然而在这种“庙堂—庙门—庙市”三位一体化的发展下,那些曾坚守修行传统、试图揭露真相的大和尚们逐渐被边缘。他们或隐退山林,或被驱出寺门,或沉默不语。整个佛教体系在权力结构的裹挟下,越来越像是一套精密的“庙产管理系统”,而非一方净土。

结语

释永信并非孤例。他只是当代中国宗教—权力交界地带中,一个恰好被看见的人。他身上的争议,照出的是整个体制对信仰的工具化、对监督的空转、对僧人身份的政治塑形。

当一个方丈不再被问“是否持戒”,而被评价“是否得体、能出镜、擅公关”,我们是否该追问:如果信仰都可以被操控,那身在这片土地,还有何物不能被当局控制?

Shi Yongxin and Shaolin Temple: A Prolonged Struggle Between Power and Faith

By Tuo Xianrun | Edited by Gloria Wang | Chief Editor: Luo Zhifei | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

Keywords: Shi Yongxin, Shaolin Temple, Chinese Buddhism, Faith

In the landscape of Chinese Buddhism, the Shaolin Temple holds a unique position. It is not only the ancestral seat of Chan (Zen) Buddhism, but also a commercial and cultural brand—and at the same time, an institution that serves the political system. Over the past two decades, the power center of Shaolin has indisputably been Shi Yongxin.

Since the late 1980s, Shi Yongxin had been striving to enter the temple’s leadership circle. Before even turning thirty, he repeatedly competed for the position of abbot. Though unsuccessful at the time, he did not back down. In the early 1990s, through various means, he sidelined the then-abbot Master Suxi, eventually placing him under soft house arrest, paving his own path to the top. This move stirred discontent within the Buddhist community. The then-President of the Buddhist Association of China, Zhao Puchu, persistently refused to approve Shi’s abbotship during his lifetime. It was only years after Zhao’s passing that Shi Yongxin was officially “promoted” in 1999.

His rise to power was not the result of virtue but a consequence of wielding political tactics and personal connections. However, Shi Yongxin’s ascent did not put an end to controversy and public skepticism.

In both 2008 and 2015, whistleblowers filed real-name complaints against him, involving financial opacity, violations of monastic discipline, and alleged improper relations with women. These accusations mostly came from insiders, with detailed and credible information. Yet no investigations yielded results. Despite the persistent questions from the public, Shi Yongxin continued to climb the political ladder, serving as a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and as Vice President of the Buddhist Association of China. He also enjoys vice-ministerial-level perks in lifestyle and medical care.

All of this points to one conclusion: Shi Yongxin is not merely a religious figure, but a “special-status individual” institutionally protected within the system. Especially in the international arena, Shi Yongxin has long held a diplomatic passport and frequently travels abroad to attend multilateral religious forums in places like Belgium, Abu Dhabi, and the Vatican. Many of these trips are coordinated by the so-called “Europe-Asia Center,” an organization that claims NGO status but in reality functions as part of China’s global image-building initiatives. These instances of “religious diplomacy” often blur the line between faith and national duty, essentially extending the political apparatus.

In sensitive contexts—such as his visits to the Vatican—netizens have questioned whether Shi Yongxin overstepped in engaging with foreign religious figures. Yet this, too, is part of the CCP’s plan. Since China and the Vatican have no formal diplomatic ties, the government cannot dispatch official envoys openly. Shi’s role fills that vacuum—he is a monk, yes, but also a quasi-official emissary.

He embodies a very typical “hybrid identity” within the Chinese system: religious leader, cultural icon, and government spokesperson rolled into one. And behind him, the Shaolin Temple has long ceased to be a pure religious sanctuary; it is now a multi-industry enterprise, a media spectacle, and a hub for political and business interests.

However, under this “temple-court-market” trinity model, the elder monks who once upheld traditional spiritual discipline—and who dared to speak the truth—have been gradually sidelined. Some have retreated into seclusion, others have been expelled from the temple, and many have been silenced. The entire Buddhist structure, wrapped in layers of power dynamics, now resembles an elaborate “temple property management system” rather than a spiritual sanctuary.

Conclusion

Shi Yongxin is not an isolated case. He is simply one figure caught in the spotlight at the intersection of religion and power in today’s China. The controversies surrounding him reflect the broader reality: the instrumentalization of faith, the hollowing out of accountability, and the political redefinition of monastic roles under the current regime.

When an abbot is no longer asked, “Do you observe the precepts?” but instead judged by whether he “looks appropriate on camera, can handle public relations, and fits the Party’s image,” we must ask: If even faith can be manipulated, what in this land is beyond the reach of state control?

八一建军节感言:我为何不再相信这支军队

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八一建军节感言:我为何不再相信这支军队

August 1st Reflections on Army Day: Why I No Longer Believe in This Military

攥稿人:赵雪峰 编辑:冯仍 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:鲁慧文

关键词:建军节,八一,老兵,暴力机器,军营,习近平,极权

8月1日,面对这个被中共标榜为 “建军节” 的日子,我心情沉重、愤怒难平、深感耻辱。作为一名曾经在中共军队服役的老兵,我曾真心相信 “人民军队” 的荣耀,曾为穿上军装感到无比自豪。但今天,我必须站出来说真话:这支军队早已背叛 “人民”的立场,彻底沦为中共的党卫军、独裁政权的打手,成为维护暴政、压迫人民的暴力机器。

我亲身经历过军中的种种腐败与黑暗。在军营里,晋升靠关系、靠金钱,“跑官要官”屡见不鲜;口头上说“听党指挥、能打胜仗”,实际却是拍马屁、搞人脉。一位位将军、上将在台上高喊“忠诚、干净、担当”,转身却在后台大肆敛财,贪腐成风。所谓的“军队整顿”“反腐打虎”,不过是习近平清洗异己、强化个人独裁的权谋操作,而非真正的制度改革。

八一建军节感言:我为何不再相信这支军队

图为攥稿人:赵雪峰

更令人无法接受的是,这支军队的枪口,早已不再对准外敌,而是一次次对准中国人民。从1989年天安门广场血腥镇压学生,到近年来对新疆维吾尔族的种族清洗与严密监控,从香港“反送中”运动中对港人的武力威胁,到在全国各地日常执行“维稳”任务,这支军队已经彻底异化。所谓的“人民解放军”,实际上是“镇压人民的军队”,是保卫一党专政、维护极权统治的暴力支柱。

在习近平的极权统治下,军队全面“姓党”、“姓习”,已不再是国家的军队、人民的军队,而是一个人、一党私有的工具。军人的忠诚不再是对国家、对宪法,而是对“最高统帅”的个人效忠。在“习核心”体制下,个人崇拜、军队奴化日益严重,整个军队沦为习政权的“家丁武装”。

军队国家化,是现代文明国家的基本原则与底线。然而在中国,中共始终拒绝军队国家化,正是因为它深知,只有牢牢掌握军权,才能维系其政权的安全。因此,“党指挥枪”成为它的核心执政逻辑。但这也注定,这支军队永远无法代表全民利益,而只能代表少数掌权者的私利。

今天,我以一名曾在这支军队服役的退伍军人身份发出呼吁:军队必须回归国家,必须属于人民,而非党派与独裁者。军人的责任是捍卫人民的安全、维护国家的主权,而不是镇压异议、胁迫民众。只有实现军队国家化,中国才有可能走向真正的法治与民主。

八一建军节,本应是向保家卫国军人致敬的日子。然而如今,它不过是一场掩盖暴力与专制的政治秀。我无法再沉默,无法再为这支已经异化的军队献上祝福。

我曾是这支军队的一员,也因此更有责任揭露它的堕落与腐败。我希望更多军人能觉醒,更多人民能看清真相。唯有如此,中国才有希望摆脱军权崇拜结束一党专政,迎来一个自由、公正的未来。

August 1st Reflections on Army Day: Why I No Longer Believe in This Military

By Zhao Xuefeng | Edited by Feng Reng | Chief Editors: Luo Zhifei, Lu Huiwen | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

Keywords: Army Day, August 1st, Veterans, Violent Machinery, Military, Xi Jinping, Totalitarianism

August 1st—the day the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrates as “Army Day”—leaves me feeling heavy-hearted, filled with anger, and overwhelmed by a deep sense of shame. As a veteran who once served in the CCP’s military, I once genuinely believed in the honor of the “People’s Army.” I was proud to wear the uniform. But today, I must speak the truth: this military has long since betrayed the people. It has completely degenerated into the CCP’s Party Guard, the enforcer of a dictatorship, and a brutal instrument of violence used to maintain tyranny and suppress the people.

I have personally witnessed the corruption and darkness within the military ranks. Promotions rely on connections and bribes. The practice of “buying ranks” is widespread. Though official slogans boast about “following the Party’s command” and “winning battles,” the reality is dominated by flattery and cronyism. Generals and top commanders shout about “loyalty, integrity, and responsibility” on stage, yet behind the scenes, they engage in rampant embezzlement and corruption. The so-called “military reforms” and “anti-corruption campaigns” under Xi Jinping are nothing more than political purges used to eliminate dissent and consolidate his personal dictatorship—not genuine systemic reforms.

八一建军节感言:我为何不再相信这支军队

Photo: Author Zhao Xuefeng

Even more intolerable is that this military’s guns are no longer aimed at external enemies, but repeatedly turned against the Chinese people. From the bloody crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square in 1989, to the ethnic cleansing and surveillance of Uyghurs in Xinjiang in recent years, from the military threats used to suppress Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement, to the daily “stability maintenance” operations carried out across the country—this army has been completely perverted. The so-called “People’s Liberation Army” has in fact become an army for suppressing the people, a violent pillar defending one-party rule and totalitarian control.

Under Xi Jinping’s autocratic rule, the military has been entirely reduced to serving the “Party” and “Xi.” It is no longer the army of the state, nor the people, but the private tool of a man and a party. Soldiers are no longer loyal to the nation or its constitution—but to the “Supreme Commander.” Under the “Core Xi” system, personality cult and militarized subjugation have become rampant. The entire military has been transformed into a personal bodyguard force for Xi’s regime.

Nationalization of the military is a fundamental principle and baseline of any modern civilized country. But in China, the CCP has always rejected the idea of a national army, because it knows all too well: only by tightly gripping military power can it ensure the survival of its regime. That’s why “the Party commands the gun” remains its core governing logic. But this also means the military can never represent the interests of the entire population—only the selfish interests of a handful of power holders.

Today, as a retired soldier who once served in this military, I issue a heartfelt call: the military must return to the state. It must belong to the people—not to a political party or a dictator. The soldier’s duty is to safeguard the people’s security and protect the sovereignty of the nation—not to suppress dissent or threaten the public. Only when the military is nationalized can China truly move toward the rule of law and democracy.

Army Day, August 1st, should be a day to honor those who defend the nation. But now, it is merely a political performance that conceals violence and authoritarianism. I can no longer stay silent. I can no longer offer blessings to a military that has lost its way.

I was once part of this army—and that makes me even more responsible for exposing its corruption and moral decay. I hope more soldiers will wake up. I hope more people will see the truth. Only then can China escape its obsession with military power, end one-party dictatorship, and move toward a future of freedom and justice.

马克思主义为什么不行之一

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Why Marxism Fails, Part I: A Flawed Guiding Theory

作者:华言

编辑:周志刚 责任编辑:罗志飞 鲁慧文 翻译:鲁慧文

关键词:马克思主义,马克思哲学,马克思政治经济学,科学社会主义,唯物主义

马克思主义由三部分组成:马克思哲学、马克思政治经济学和科学社会主义。马克思哲学和马克思政治经济学是工具,科学社会主义才是目的,这是我们所要论证的。

一、唯物主义是丑陋的哲学

唯物主义,在哲学基本问题上坚持物质第一性,精神第二性;世界的统一性在于物质性;意识是物质世界发展到一定阶段的产物;人的认识是对客观存在的反映。

唯物主义强调“物质第一性,意识第二性”,极力否定意识的价值,特别否定精神的意义。唯物主义的历史观,即所谓“历史唯物主义”,运用“生产力决定生产关系,经济基础觉定上层建筑”的“公式”,而否定个人的道德因素和精神意志作用。唯物主义的辩证法,“与万物普遍联系”和“按自身规律永恒发展”,唯物辩证法变成了诡辩论,消弭了对与错、是与非、善与恶的界限,变成了一种聪明但有欺骗性的、似是而非的推理和论证。唯物辩证法有时承认事物的永久运动,而否定事物的相对静止,否定概念的确定性,有时又以事物的相对静止否定事物的永久变动,把灵活性视作原则性。在解释命题时,崇尚玩弄概念、故弄玄虚,用华而不实的辞藻美化相对主义的说教。

唯物主义对意识的极度贬抑,乃至根本否定,使社会的精神支柱轰然倒塌,加速了社会道德沦丧。一是金钱崇拜。对物质的绝对肯定,自然导致对物质财富的推崇,也就是金钱崇拜,形成了“金钱万能”的畸形社会观念。二是精神空虚。物质财富不必然带来精神的充实,对物质财富的狂热贪求,所追求的是只有物质,导致精神世界空虚。

生命的意义在精神的意境中实现,精神之花一旦凋落,生命中将只剩下物欲本能,而没有精神的本能是丑陋的。哲学的价值在于,并且只在于摘取生命意义王冠上的明珠。精神之火熄灭了,生命就物化了,丑化了——唯物主义是丑陋的哲学。

二、剩余价值理论没有任何理论价值

马克思的剩余价值学说是马克思主义政治经济学的基石,是使社会主义从空想变为“科学”的奠基石。马克思的剩余价值理论是非常荒谬的,把马克思的荒谬学说作为指导世界无产阶级革命运动的理论基础,更是荒谬绝伦的。

马克思的剩余价值理论体系中有一个结论,创造价值的唯一要素是劳动,其他任何生产要素都不是价值的源泉,进而进一步提示资本“剥削”的本质。一颗钻石两千年前毫无价值,因为人们都不认识。今天价值连城,这中间没有任何“劳动”,产生价值的原因是人们都“想要”钻石。没有劳动而产生巨大的价值,如何解释?所以,创造价值的唯一要素是劳动根本上是错误的。

商品的价值只有在交换时才得到体现。没有交换,就没有商品的价值。因此,市场才是商品价值赖以存在的基础,没有市场也就没有商品的价值。什么是商品的价值?它是在充分而广泛的竞价基础上产生的,由供求关系决定的。生产了没有人要的东西,花费再多的时间也不产生价值;灵光一现的创意,花费少量时间,也可以产生巨大的价值。所以,价值与劳动无必然的关系,与社会必要劳动时间无必然联系,劳动价值论从根本上是错误的。奥地利学派认为,在生产过程中,资本家在提供其它生产要素的时候需要承担风险,而工人不需要承担这种风险。所以资本家获取利润是对于他们承担风险的一种补偿。制度经济学反驳马克思的剩余价值理论:如果其他生产要素毫无价值,那为什么工人要甘心接受资本家的剥削呢?他们完全可以单凭自己那唯一有价值的“劳动”去完成生产过程,去占据所有的“剩余价值”,不让资本家占便宜。

现代分配理论认为:按生产要素分配是按照生产要素的数量和质量以及生产要素贡献的大小。生产要素主要包括:劳动、技术、资本、管理等。各生产要素在国民收入中所占的份额大小,取决于它们各自的均衡价格。因此,工资、利息、地租和利润就是各生产要素的需求价格和供给价格相均衡的价格。工资是劳动的需求和供给均衡时的价格。利息是资本的需求和供给均衡时的价格。地租是由土地的需求状况和供给决定的。利润是资本家组织和管理企业以及冒风险的报酬。

因此,按照马克思定义,剩余价值=劳动价值-工资,劳动价值论是错误的,故而剩余价值论必定错误。

三、科学社会主义的不科学

社会主义就是通过不断革命,实行无产阶级的阶级专政,通过专政达到消灭一切阶级差别和由这些阶级差别产生的一切生产关系,从而进入共产主义。这一论述明确指出了社会主义本身是“过渡阶段”,是由资本主义社会向共产主义社会过渡的历史时期,直至最终实现共产主义。实现共产主义由三个阶段来完成:一是无产阶级暴力革命;二是无产阶级专政和社会主义社会;三是共产主义。

科学社会主义的基本原理和原则:政治上实行无产阶级政党的领导,无产阶级在共产党领导下进行革命和建设;经济上社会化大生产,公有制是社会化大生产的基础,推动社会化大生产的实现和发展的条件;文化上保持文化领导权,坚持文艺为社会主义主义服务,为政治服务,为共产党服务。

各国实施科学社会主义的共同结果是:如前苏共政治局委员、苏联解体后任俄共主席的久加诺夫所反思的那样,形成了苏共在苏联的“三个垄断”:政治垄断、经济垄断、思想垄断。无产阶级政党的领导成为了政治垄断,权力即资源和地位,当党天下成为了现实,党为了一直“为人民(币)服务”,就再也不愿意让他人染指权力,对一切意图获取权力者进行打压,乃至肉体消灭。经济上社会化大生产成为了经济垄断,将一切资源国有化,实质是官僚化,进而领导个人化,通过“二步走”,先是化私为共、再化公为私,让领导率先实现共产主义,让工人、农民成为领导进军共产主义车轮下的尘土,在公有制下,共产党政府对资源的垄断是全面彻底集中的,通过严格的生活资料票证供应制度,排除了任何个人对任何生活资源占有的可能性,人们的衣、食、住、行,每一项物质需求无不仰求于那个垄断者–共产党和无产阶级专政国家。在这种条件下,人们除了对垄断者–共产党彻底的人身依附外,已经没有任何存活的可能性。托洛茨基说:在一个政府是唯一的雇主的国家里,反抗就等于慢慢地饿死。‘不劳动者不得食’这个旧的原则,已由‘不服从者不得食’这个新的原则所代替。保持文化领导权成为了思想垄断,为了保持意识形态的统一性,必须从儿童抓起,不断塑造共产主义的新人,消灭一切异见,从而舆论一律、文艺一律。这“三个垄断”是反人道主义,是对人民的生存状态,对每一个人的社会、经济、政治、文化的价值观的根本控制与操纵,对人性尊严的侮辱和伤害。最后,人民丧失了民主自由,丧失了思想自由,造成新的奴隶制度,工厂成了集中营,农民成了农奴。

马克思高估了无产阶级领导的人性和人品,忘记了他们也是人,有人的一切缺点和不足。马克思高估了无产阶级制度的科学性,为了未来天堂的美好,在人间建设了一个惨无人道、最野蛮、最暴虐的恐怖的人间地狱,美其名曰:科学社会主义社会。

Why Marxism Fails, Part I: A Flawed Guiding Theory

By Hua Yan | Edited by Zhou Zhigang | Chief Editors: Luo Zhifei, Lu Huiwen | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

Keywords: Marxism, Marxist Philosophy, Marxist Political Economy, Scientific Socialism, Materialism

Marxism is composed of three parts: Marxist philosophy, Marxist political economy, and scientific socialism. The first two serve as tools, while scientific socialism is the intended goal. This article aims to demonstrate precisely that.

I. Materialism — An Ugly Philosophy

Materialism holds that matter is primary and consciousness is secondary; that the unity of the world lies in its materiality; that consciousness is a product of matter developed to a certain stage; and that human understanding is merely a reflection of objective existence.

Materialism emphasizes “matter over mind,” aggressively denying the value of consciousness and especially the importance of the spirit. Its historical view—historical materialism—uses a rigid formula of “productive forces determine relations of production; economic base determines the superstructure” to deny the role of individual morality and spiritual will.

Marx’s dialectical materialism, which claims “universal interconnectedness” and “eternal development according to internal laws,” degenerates into sophistry. It blurs the line between right and wrong, good and evil, becoming a deceptive form of pseudo-reasoning. Sometimes it affirms perpetual motion while denying relative stability and the definability of concepts; other times it uses stability to deny change—treating flexibility as a principle.

In interpreting propositions, it delights in conceptual tricks and empty jargon, beautifying relativist doctrines with flowery but hollow language.

This extreme devaluation—and even outright denial—of consciousness by materialism causes the spiritual pillars of society to collapse, accelerating the decay of social morality.

1. Worship of Money: Absolute affirmation of the material inevitably leads to the worship of material wealth, breeding a distorted worldview of “money is everything.”

2. Spiritual Emptiness: Material wealth does not necessarily lead to spiritual fulfillment. The blind pursuit of material gain leads to spiritual hollowness.

The meaning of life is found in spiritual realms. When the flower of the spirit withers, life becomes reduced to material instinct alone—and instinct without spirit is grotesque. The value of philosophy lies in uncovering the pearl that crowns life’s meaning. When the flame of the spirit is extinguished, life becomes commodified and debased—materialism is, therefore, an ugly philosophy.

II. The Surplus Value Theory Has No Theoretical Value

Marx’s surplus value theory is the cornerstone of Marxist political economy—the foundation upon which socialism claims to transform from “utopia” into “science.” But this theory is riddled with absurdities.

According to Marx, labor is the only source of value, and all other production factors contribute nothing to value creation. This underpins the idea of capital’s “exploitation.”

But consider: a diamond 2,000 years ago had no value because people didn’t recognize it. Today, it’s worth a fortune—without any additional labor. Its value arises because people want it. How does one explain the immense value generated without corresponding labor? Clearly, labor as the sole source of value is fundamentally wrong.

The value of a commodity is only realized in exchange. Without exchange, there is no value. Value arises from broad market-based pricing, dictated by supply and demand. A product no one wants has no value regardless of the labor poured into it; a flash of creative inspiration, produced with little labor, may carry immense value.

Thus, value is not inherently tied to labor, nor to so-called “socially necessary labor time.” The labor theory of value is inherently flawed.

Austrian economists argue that in production, capitalists contribute capital and assume risk—something workers do not. Profit, therefore, is compensation for risk. Institutional economists refute Marx’s surplus value theory: If other production factors are truly worthless, why would workers tolerate capitalist “exploitation”? They could use their valuable labor alone to control production and reap all the surplus value themselves.

Modern distribution theory holds that income is allocated according to the quantity, quality, and contribution of production factors—labor, capital, technology, and management. Their share of national income is determined by their equilibrium prices:

• Wages = equilibrium price of labor

• Interest = equilibrium price of capital

• Rent = price based on land supply and demand

• Profit = compensation for organizing, managing, and risking capital

Therefore, by Marx’s logic, surplus value = labor value − wages. But if the labor theory of value is false, then surplus value theory is necessarily false too.

III. The Pseudoscience of Scientific Socialism

Marxist socialism is defined by perpetual revolution, implementing the dictatorship of the proletariat to eliminate all class distinctions and their associated production relations—ultimately reaching communism.

This vision involves three stages:

1. Violent revolution led by the proletariat

2. Proletarian dictatorship and socialist society

3. Realization of communism

The fundamental principles of scientific socialism are:

• Political: Leadership by the proletarian party (i.e., the Communist Party)

• Economic: Public ownership and large-scale socialized production

• Cultural: Cultural control, with art and literature serving socialism, politics, and the Communist Party

But wherever scientific socialism was implemented, the result has been the same. As former Politburo member and post-Soviet Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov admitted, it resulted in three monopolies in the Soviet Union:

1. Political monopoly: One-party rule meant power became resource and status. Once the Party held all power “for the people,” it refused to let go, crushing all challengers—even physically eliminating them.

2. Economic monopoly: State ownership evolved into bureaucratic control, then into personal control by leaders. This “two-step” privatization turned “shared property” into tools of personal privilege. While leaders got rich first, workers and peasants were ground into dust under the wheels of this fake communism. All resources were monopolized by the Party through strict rationing systems—leaving individuals no access to basic needs without submission to the Party.

3. Ideological monopoly: Cultural control meant total domination of thought. From childhood, citizens were molded into “new communist men,” while all dissenting thought was erased. Media and art served only one voice—the Party.

These “three monopolies” were anti-humanitarian. They enslaved people spiritually, economically, politically, and culturally—stripping them of dignity and turning society into a new form of slavery. Factories became concentration camps, peasants became serfs.

As Leon Trotsky once said:

“In a country where the government is the sole employer, resistance means starvation. The old slogan ‘He who does not work shall not eat’ has been replaced by a new one: ‘He who does not obey shall not eat.’”

Conclusion

Marx overestimated the moral integrity and character of proletarian leaders—forgetting they are still human, with human flaws. He also overestimated the scientific nature of the proletarian system. In pursuit of a utopian paradise, scientific socialism created a horrifying earthly hell—brutal, inhumane, and tyrannical. And it had the audacity to call itself “scientific.”

8月2日 洛杉矶中国民主平台负责人(2025)换届

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Notice of the 2025 Leadership Election of the Los Angeles China Democracy Platform

洛杉矶中国民主平台负责人(2025)换届大会通知

根据本平台章程, 2023届本平台负责人今年7月到期并组织总结及选举大会,相关事宜通知如下:

一、投票资格: 已缴纳2025年度会费的洛杉矶中国民主平台成员

二、投票时间: 2025年8月2日 (星期六 )18:00

三、投票方式及目标:现场投票、唱票、计票,并公布投票结果(新一届的五位平台负责人)

四、顾问: 林劲鹏 王丹;场地控制:金岩

五、主持人:王栋良 史庆梅

六、投票公证人:童木、周鹤;投票见证人:朱虞夫

七、唱票人:耿冠军、王应国

八、选举结果宣布人:陈维明

九、场地摄影师:黄杰瑞

十、平台财务:吴立新,会计:刘国建

十一、投票地点: 六四纪念馆 3024 Peck Rd, El Monte, CA 91732

Notice of the 2025 Leadership Election of the Los Angeles China Democracy Platform

Date: August 2, 2025

In accordance with the platform’s charter, the current leadership team (elected in 2023) will conclude its term this July. The platform will hold a leadership election and summary meeting. Details are as follows:

1. Voting Eligibility:

Members of the Los Angeles China Democracy Platform who have paid the 2025 annual membership fee.

2. Voting Time:

Saturday, August 2, 2025, at 6:00 PM

3. Voting Method & Objective:

On-site voting, vote counting and announcement of results. Five new platform leaders will be elected.

4. Advisors:

Lin Jinping, Wang Dan

Venue Control: Jin Yan

5. Hosts:

Wang Dongliang, Shi Qingmei

6. Voting Notaries:

Tong Mu, Zhou He

Voting Witness: Zhu Yufu

7. Vote Counters:

Geng Guanjun, Wang Yingguo

8. Election Result Announcer:

Chen Weiming

9. Venue Photographer:

Huang Jierui

10. Platform Treasurer:

Wu Lixin

Accountant: Liu Guojian

11. Voting Venue:

June 4th Memorial Hall

3024 Peck Rd, El Monte, CA 91732

论中国民主的未来之《五民宪法》详解 第5篇

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(宪法第三条:国家名称的意义与愿景)

On the Future of Democracy in China: A Detailed Interpretation of the “Five-People Constitution”

Part V — Article 3 of the Constitution: The Meaning and Vision Behind the Nation’s Name

作者:何清风 编辑:冯仍 责任编辑:鲁慧文 翻译:鲁慧文

关键词:五民主义,宪法,中华联邦共和国,历史

中华民族联邦共和国宪法第三条是一条载深厚历史底蕴与前瞻愿景的条款它不仅明确了国家的名称与简称,还通过“五民主义”的核心理念,勾勒出一个致力于民族团结、民主治理与文化复兴的联邦制共和国的蓝图。本文将从历史背景、条款内容、设计理念及其现实意义四个方面,深入剖析这一条款的内涵。力求以通俗清晰的方式让读者理解其精神与价值。

一、历史与文化的根基:国家名称的意义

宪法第三条开篇即明确国家的全称为“中华民族联邦共和国”,简称“中华联邦”或“中国”及“中华民国”。这一名称的选择并非随意,而是对中华民族悠久历史与多元文化的深刻总结与致敬。“中华民族”这一概念,承载了中国数千年文明中多民族融合的独特历史。从黄河流域的华夏文明,到草原、西南、西域等地的多民族交融中国形成了以汉族为主体、多民族共同繁荣的文化格局。宪法以“中华民族”作为国家名称的核心,彰显了对多元族群共存共荣的尊重,强调各民族在国家建设中的平等地位。且中华民族联邦共和国的简称能更好地兼顾“中国”、“中华民国”这两个现有政体,为未来可能实现的统一提供法理依据。

“联邦共和国”的定性则进一步明确了国家的政治架构。联邦制意味着在统一的国家框架下,各地区、各民族拥有明确的自治权,这既是对中国历史“郡县制”与“藩属制”传统的现代演绎,也是对当代多民族国家治理挑战的回应。简称“中华联邦”或“中国”,既保留了历史上的国家认同符号,又以“中华民国”呼应了近代以来追求共和的理想。体现了历史传承与现代性的融合。

二、五民主义的理念:国家治理的灵魂

宪法第三条的核心在于提出了“五民主义”作为国家治理的指导原则。 即“五民主义”——民治、民主、民权、民生、民族。是对国家治理的系统思考,更是对中国传统政治哲学与现代民主理念的融合。

民治:公民治理国家

民治强调国家权力来源于公民,公民不仅是国家的主体,也是治理的参与者。这一理念承接了西方民主理论中的“民有、民治、民享”精神,同时与中国传统“民本”思想相呼应。民治意味着政府必须对公民负责,确保决策过程公开透明,并通过选举、听证等方式推动公民直接参与公共事务。在中华民族联邦共和国的框架下,民治不仅是理想,更是通过联邦制赋予地方更大自治权,让各族群、各地区的声音都能在国家治理中得到体现。即国家源于公民,权力源于公民。

民主:实现民主共和

民主是五民主义的核心支柱之一。宪法明确国家为“联邦制共和国”、表明追求的是权力分立、依法治国的民主共和制度。与单一制国家不同,联邦制通过中央与地方的权力分配,保障了治理的灵活性与多样性。民主共和不仅体现在选举制度上,还包括对多元意见的包容、对弱势群体的保护以及对权力滥用的制约。这种制度设计旨在避免集权带来的弊端,确保国家在统一中保持活力。

民权:保障公民权利

民权是五民主义中对个体尊严的承诺。宪法通过“保障公民权利”强调了每个公民在法律面前的平等地位,无论其民族、性别、宗教或社会背景。民权不仅包括基本的自由权(如言论、宗教、结社自由),还涵盖经济、社会、文化权利,如受教育权、劳动权等。在一个多民族国家中,民权的保障尤为重要,它是化解族群矛盾、促进社会和谐的基石。宪法通过联邦制赋予地方明确的立法权,使得民权保障能够因地制宜,更好地适应各地实际情况。

民生:建设民生社会

民生作为五民主义的实践目标,体现了国家对人民福祉的重视。宪法将“建设民生社会”作为目标,意味着国家政策将优先聚焦于教育、医疗、住房、社会保障等基本民生领域。与传统“以经济为中心”的发展模式不同,民生社会的建设强调的是公平与可持续发展,旨在缩小城乡差距、地区差距、贫富差距与族群差距。这种理念不仅是对中国近代以来“富国强民”理想的延续,也是对全球化时代社会公平诉求的回应。

民族:复兴民族文化

民族文化的复兴是五民主义中最具中国特色的部分。中华民族联邦共和国作为一个多民族国家,拥有丰富的文化遗产,如满族、鄂伦春族的渔猎文化每一种文化都是国家软实力的重要组成部分。宪法通过“复兴民族文化”强调对各民族文化的保护与弘扬,以及去除糟粕革新民族文化,同时促进各民族文化的交流与融合。这种文化政策不仅增强了国民的归属感,也为国家在国际舞台上树立了独特的文化形象。

三、设计理念:平衡统一与多元

宪法第三条的设计理念可以总结为“在多元中求统一,在统一中促发展”。这一理念通过联邦制与五民主义的结合得以实现。首先,联邦制是应对中国多民族、多地域现实的最佳选择。中国幅员辽阔,人口众多,各地在经济、文化、语言等方面差异显著。单一制治理容易造成政策统一而缺乏差异化,难以满足地方实际需求。难以满足地方需求。而联邦制通过赋予地方自治权,允许各地区根据自身特点制定政策,既保证了国家的整体统一,又尊重了地方的独特性。例如,少数民族地区可以在教育、语言、文化保护等方面拥有更大的自主权,从而增强民族认同与国家凝聚力。此外,宪法第三条的设计还体现了“以文化为纽带”的国家构建思路。中华民族作为一个多民族共同体,其凝聚力不仅来自政治与经济,更来自共同的文化认同。通过复兴民族文化,宪法试图在多元族群之间建立情感纽带,从而增强国家认同感。这种以文化认同为纽带的治理理念,在中国历史传统中根基深厚。如“和而不同”的儒家思想,为现代国家建设提供了重要的精神资源。

四、现实意义:面向未来的国家蓝图

宪法第三条不仅是一条法律条款,更是一个面向未来的国家蓝图。它为中华民族联邦共和国的建设提供了清晰的方向,可替换为“在当前环境下尤显关键”以增强语气。首先,它为多民族国家的治理提供了新范式。在全球范围内,多民族国家的治理是一个复杂课题,族群冲突、地区分裂等问题时有发生。中华民族联邦共和国通过联邦制与五民主义的结合,提出了一种既能保障统一又能尊重多元的治理模式。这种模式不仅适用于中国,也为其他多民族国家提供了借鉴。其次,它回应了公民对公平与参与的期待。在现代社会,公民对政治参与、权利保障与生活质量的诉求日益强烈。宪法第三条通过民治、民主、民权、民生等原则,承诺构建一个以公民为中心的社会。这种承诺不仅增强了政府的合法性,也为社会稳定奠定了基础。最后,它为文化复兴与国家软实力提升提供了保障。在全球化的背景下,文化软实力成为国家竞争力的重要组成部分。宪法通过“复兴民族文化”明确了文化建设的重要性,这不仅提升了国民文化自信,也增强了中国的国际文化影响力。

结语:

中华民族联邦共和国宪法第三条以简洁的文字,描绘出一个宏大的国家愿景。它以“中华民族”为核心,凝聚多民族的历史与文化;以“联邦共和国”为框架,平衡统一与多元;以“五民主义”为指导,回应公民对治理、权利与福祉的期待。这一条款不仅是国家治理的纲领,更是中华民族迈向未来的宣言。通过深入理解其内容与设计理念,我们可以看到一个致力于民主、公平与文化复兴的国家的美好前景。这不仅是对中国历史传统的继承,也是对未来治理挑战的积极回应。

“五民主义” 奠基人、《五民宪法》撰写人何清风。

On the Future of Democracy in China: A Detailed Interpretation of the “Five-People Constitution”

Part V — Article 3 of the Constitution: The Meaning and Vision Behind the Nation’s Name

By He Qingfeng | Edited by Feng Reng | Chief Editors: Luo Zhifei, Lu Huiwen | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

Keywords: Five-People Doctrine, Constitution, Federal Republic of China, History

Introduction

Article 3 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Chinese Nation is a clause rich in historical depth and forward-looking vision. It not only clarifies the official name and abbreviation of the nation, but also, through the core principle of the “Five-People Doctrine,” outlines a blueprint for a federal republic committed to national unity, democratic governance, and cultural revival. This article analyzes Article 3 from four perspectives: historical background, content of the clause, design philosophy, and real-world significance. The aim is to help readers understand its spirit and value in a clear and accessible manner.

I. Historical and Cultural Foundations: The Significance of the Nation’s Name

Article 3 begins by stating that the official name of the country is “Federal Republic of the Chinese Nation,” abbreviated as “Zhonghua Federation,” “China,” or “Republic of China.” This name is not arbitrary; it is a tribute to the long history and cultural diversity of the Chinese people. The term “Chinese Nation” (中华民族) embodies the unique historical process of multi-ethnic integration over thousands of years of civilization—from the Huaxia culture of the Yellow River basin to the diverse ethnic mingling across the steppes, the Southwest, and the Western regions. By placing “Chinese Nation” at the heart of the national name, the Constitution affirms equal participation of all ethnicities in nation-building and honors the co-existence of diverse groups.

The abbreviation accommodates both “China” and “Republic of China,” providing a legal basis for potential future unification.

The designation “Federal Republic” defines the political framework of the nation. Federalism implies that within a unified national structure, regions and ethnic groups hold clear autonomous powers. This not only modernizes traditional Chinese systems such as the junxian (prefecture-county) and fanzhou (vassal) systems, but also responds to the contemporary challenges of governing a multi-ethnic state. The use of “Zhonghua Federation” or “China” retains historical identity symbols while resonating with the republican ideals pursued since the early 20th century—showing a harmonious blend of tradition and modernity.

II. The Five-People Doctrine: The Soul of National Governance

At the core of Article 3 lies the introduction of the “Five-People Doctrine” (五民主义) as the guiding principle of state governance. This doctrine—comprising People’s Governance, Democracy, Civil Rights, People’s Livelihood, and National Culture—represents a systemic vision for governance, integrating traditional Chinese political thought with modern democratic ideals.

• People’s Governance (民治): Citizens Governing the State

This concept emphasizes that state power derives from the people, who are not only the foundation of the nation but also active participants in governance. It echoes the democratic spirit of “of the people, by the people, for the people” in the West while aligning with China’s traditional “people-oriented” (民本) philosophy. Under this framework, governance must be accountable, transparent, and participatory, allowing citizens direct involvement through elections, public hearings, and more. Federalism enables broader local autonomy, ensuring that the voices of all ethnicities and regions are heard. The state exists because of its citizens, and its power originates from them.

• Democracy (民主): Realizing a Democratic Republic

Democracy is one of the central pillars of the Five-People Doctrine. Declaring the nation a “federal republic” signals a commitment to power separation and the rule of law. Second, it responds to citizens’ demands for fairness and participation. In modern society, people increasingly expect political involvement, protection of rights, and quality of life. Article 3’s principles—people’s governance, democracy, civil rights, and welfare—commit to building a citizen-centered society. This not only strengthens governmental legitimacy but also lays a foundation for lasting stability.

Finally, it supports cultural revival and the growth of national soft power. In the era of globalization, cultural identity is crucial to national strength. By affirming cultural development in its Constitution, the nation boosts citizens’ cultural confidence and its international image.

Conclusion

With concise language, Article 3 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of the Chinese Nation outlines a grand national vision. It centers on the “Chinese Nation,” embracing its historical and cultural diversity. It frames the nation as a “Federal Republic,” balancing unity and pluralism. Guided by the Five-People Doctrine, it answers citizens’ calls for governance, rights, and welfare.

This clause is not just a constitutional principle—it is a declaration of the Chinese Nation’s future. By understanding its content and design, we glimpse a hopeful prospect: a nation devoted to democracy, fairness, and cultural renewal.

He Qingfeng, founder of the Five-People Doctrine and author of the Five-People Constitution.

官场“养蛊”:今天的官,就是今天的匪

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官场“养蛊”:今天的官,就是今天的匪

Breeding Poison in the Bureaucracy: Today’s Officials Are Today’s Bandits

作者:赵杰

编辑:冯仍 责任编辑:罗志飞 鲁慧文 翻译:鲁慧文

关键词:释永信,养蛊,维稳,政绩,佛教

最近看到释永信被查的新闻,说实话,我一点都不惊讶。这和尚到底干了什么,十几年前网络上早就翻过底了,各种举报、实锤一堆堆的,可他不但没事,还越活越滋润, “从‘清修佛门’一路活成‘CEO和尚’,住别墅、坐豪车、出国开发布会,法号都快改叫“释·总裁”了。

官场“养蛊”:今天的官,就是今天的匪

图片来自中新网

我一看到这新闻,脑子里突然闪回十几年前看《今日说法》里讲的一期节目:内蒙古呼和浩特的一个公安局长,居然是当地最大的涉黑势力老大,黄赌毒全包,搞了十几年。堂堂公安局长,白天带警察扫黄打非,晚上自己坐庄收钱。更荒唐的是——这种局面持续了十几年,大家都知道,就是没人动他,直到纸实在包不住火才被查。

那时候我就在想,这种人,到底是怎么活下来的?后来我想通了,其实这不是“没发现”,是“不想查”,更别提什么“正义迟到但不会缺席”那种话,听多了只觉得讽刺。

这就叫“养蛊”——把老百姓当血肉,投进罐里喂毒虫。看过《盗墓笔记》的都懂,“养蛊”是把一堆毒虫封在坛里,互相吞噬,最后活下来的就是“蛊王”。

我现在觉得这不就是我们眼前的现状吗?体制里那些“选拔”,表面上是选贤任能,其实是“养蛊实验”,把一批人放进去,谁贪得狠、搞得稳、镇得住,就一路提拔;谁清白、讲原则,就早早被排挤。

这些“蛊”,不是靠民心上位的,是靠后台和手段。他们吃谁的血?就是我们老百姓的:土地是他们圈的,生意是他们垄断的,教育是他们操控的,医疗是他们分利的,连宗教信仰也成了他们的工具。

但最讽刺的是什么?这些蛊吸了我们几十年的血,最后不是我们拔掉,而是幕后那只“养蛊的手”亲自下场收割。

这些蛊活着的时候,是他们的打手,是他们维稳、搞钱、造政绩的工具;等蛊太大了,不听话了,或者“味太冲”了,就把它剁了,一边收回所有的资源,一边高调宣传:“看,我们动手了,正义来了!”

老百姓呢?前几十年让你吸了血,最后还得鼓掌感谢你“铲除了毒虫”,这叫什么?这叫——双重收割:先收你养蛊的收益,再收你“除蛊”的掌声。

正义若总是姗姗来迟,就是对罪恶的奖励。一个人作恶十几年,最后才查,是不是太晚了?晚到都成笑话了。你给他十几年时间去捞钱、升官、扩张,他早已把系统摸透了,关系打通了,钱送遍了,权稳如山。

结果你最后一刀下去,把他拖上新闻联播,说“法网恢恢、正义不缺”。我只觉得讽刺。说到底,这种迟到的正义,根本不是正义,是表演,是清场,是洗牌。

你以为清理了蛊王,系统就干净了?蛊死了,罐还在,养蛊的人还在,甚至手上已经开始培养下一只。

其实很多人都清楚这一套,只是没人说而已。真话说出来,不是“有见地”,是“给自己找麻烦”。

但我还是想说,就像那句让我印象很深的老话剧《匪于官》里那句台词:

“今天的官兴许是昨天的匪。”

——“错!今天的官,就是今天的匪!”

说到底,有些人不是变坏了,是一直就坏,只是被披上了合法的外衣,被系统“养熟了”,变成了温顺可控的工具。

可工具再顺,也是匪;穿上袈裟,也掩盖不了你是蛊。真正该拔除的,不是蛊王,而是养蛊的那只手。

更深一层的讽刺在于:在中共的体制下,连信仰都无法幸免。无论是佛教、基督教,还是其他宗教,

只要想生存下去,最终都必须“服从党的领导”。信仰的独立、净土的存在,在这样的结构下早就变成了一种奢望。所谓信仰,也不过是统治者手中一张“维稳”的牌。只要还在共产党的统治下,就注定没有真正干净的信仰,也没有真正纯粹的净土。

Breeding Poison in the Bureaucracy: Today’s Officials Are Today’s Bandits

By Zhao Jie

Editor: Feng Reng | Chief Editors: Luo Zhifei, Lu Huiwen | Translated by: Lu Huiwen

Key Words: Shi Yongxin, Breeding Poison (Yang Gu), Stability Maintenance (Weiwen), Political Achievements, Buddhism

Recently, news broke that Shi Yongxin is under investigation. Honestly, I’m not surprised at all. People have been digging up dirt on this so-called monk for over a decade. The internet has been full of allegations and hard evidence—yet not only did nothing happen to him, he actually thrived. He went from a “meditative monk” to a “CEO monk,” living in villas, riding in luxury cars, holding press conferences abroad. At this point, he might as well change his Dharma name to “Shi · Executive.”

官场“养蛊”:今天的官,就是今天的匪

Image from China News

The moment I saw the news, my mind flashed back to a Legal Report episode I saw over ten years ago. It was about a police chief in Hohhot, Inner Mongolia—who turned out to be the biggest mob boss in town, running prostitution, gambling, and drugs for more than a decade. By day, he led the police in cracking down on crime. By night, he ran the rackets himself. What’s more absurd? Everyone knew it, and yet no one touched him—until it became impossible to cover up.

Back then, I wondered how people like that survive. Now I get it. It’s not that no one discovered them. It’s that no one wanted to deal with them. And don’t even mention that tired line, “Justice may be late, but it never misses.” The more I hear it, the more cynical I become.

This is what we call “breeding poison” (养蛊)—treating the people as human fodder to raise a jar of venomous insects. Anyone who’s read The Grave Robbers’ Chronicles knows: you throw a bunch of deadly bugs in a sealed jar and let them devour each other. The last one standing is the king parasite.

Isn’t that exactly what’s happening in our system? The so-called selection of officials isn’t about choosing the virtuous—it’s a poison-breeding experiment. You throw a bunch of people in, and whoever can out-greed, out-scheme, and out-stabilize the others gets promoted. Those who are clean, who stand by their principles? They get pushed out early.

These parasites don’t rise on popular will. They rise on political backing and dirty tactics. And who pays the price? We do. It’s our land they seize, our businesses they monopolize, our schools they control, our healthcare they profit from. Even religion becomes a tool in their hands.

But here’s the cruelest irony: after leeching off us for decades, these parasites don’t get taken down by the people—but by the very hand that raised them.

As long as they’re useful, they’re the regime’s enforcers—used to maintain stability, generate income, fabricate achievements. But once they grow too bold, too independent, or just become too much of a liability, that hand comes down and chops them off. Then the authorities loudly declare: “Look! We’re cracking down! Justice is here!”

And we, the people? After decades of being drained, we’re expected to applaud our own “liberation” from the monster they bred. That’s what I call double exploitation: first, they harvest the fruits of “raising poison,” then they milk applause for “removing poison.”

Justice that always arrives late is no justice—it’s a reward for evil. When someone commits crimes for over a decade and only gets caught at the end, it’s not justice—it’s a farce. You gave them years to accumulate wealth, secure promotions, build influence. By the time you finally “bring the hammer down,” their roots are deep, their network extensive, their power unshakable.

And then you splash it all over the evening news, claiming, “No one escapes the law.” To me, that’s a joke. That final strike isn’t about justice. It’s performance. It’s a reset. A reshuffling of cards.

Think eliminating the king parasite fixes anything? The bug may be dead, but the jar remains. And the hand that bred it is already nurturing the next one.

Many people already know how this works. They just don’t dare speak up. Speaking the truth doesn’t earn praise—it gets you in trouble.

Still, I want to say it. I remember a line from the old play The Bandits in Office:

“Today’s officials may have been yesterday’s bandits.”

—“Wrong! Today’s officials are today’s bandits!”

Some people never “turned bad”—they were always bad. They just got wrapped in legitimacy. They got tamed and trained by the system, turned into obedient tools.

But no matter how obedient a tool is—it’s still a bandit. And no matter how ornate the robe, it cannot hide the stench of poison.

What truly needs to be uprooted is not the parasite—but the hand that breeds them.

And here lies the deeper tragedy: under the CCP’s system, even faith isn’t spared. Whether Buddhism, Christianity, or any other belief—if it wants to survive, it must ultimately “submit to Party leadership.” The independence of faith, the existence of any sacred space—these have become unattainable luxuries.

In such a structure, “faith” is merely another card in the regime’s “stability maintenance” deck. As long as the Communist Party rules, there will be no truly pure faith—and no truly sacred ground.

抗议中共网络暴政,捍卫言论自由

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抗议中共网络暴政,捍卫言论自由

Protest Against the CCP’s Cyber Tyranny, Defend Freedom of Speech

作者:何清风 2025年7月27日

编辑:李聪玲 责任编辑:罗志飞 翻译:鲁慧文

关键词:中共网络暴政,言论自由,数字镣铐,网络实名制,数字暴政

乌干达独裁者阿敏曾冷血地说:“你有言论自由,但我不能保证你说完话之后还有自由。”这句令人不寒而栗的话,早已不再是遥远的非洲故事,而是当今中国网络空间的残酷现实!在中国,所谓的“网络实名制”已沦为一道无形的数字镣铐。它披着“安全”与“秩序”的外衣,却成为中共当局监控思想、压制言论、扼杀真话的工具。实名制让每一次发声都成为冒险:你可能因一篇帖子被删号,因一句真话被“喝茶”,甚至因表达不同意见而被追踪、恐吓、乃至“消失”。这不是自由,而是数字时代的绞索!实名制不是为了安全,而是为了控制!

抗议中共网络暴政,捍卫言论自由

网络实名制并非保护公民,而是将每一个网民变成可追踪的“号码”。你的每一句话、每一个想法,都可能被记录、被审查、被用来对付你。实名制剥夺了匿名表达的权利,扼杀了思想的自由流动,让真话成为禁忌,让批评成为罪行。在这样的网络暴政下,公民的言论自由被无情践踏,公共讨论的空间被压缩到令人窒息。我们不是号码!我们不是奴才!我们是活生生的个体,我们有权匿名表达,有权说出真相,有权不被恐吓、不被追踪!网络应当是自由思想的沃土,而不是威权统治的监狱。我们拒绝被“实名”绑架,拒绝让言论自由成为空洞的口号!今天,我们站出来发声!

我们为每一位因实名制被删帖、被封号、被“喝茶”、被抓走的人而抗议!我们为每一个不敢说出真话、却渴望自由呼吸的灵魂而呐喊!我们呼吁: 

废除网络实名制! 还网络一个自由的呼吸空间! 

捍卫言论自由! 让真话不再是罪,让批评不再是险! 

终结数字暴政! 让每一个人都能在网络上自由表达,而无需担心“说完话之后”的自由被剥夺!

我们的口号响亮而坚定: “我们要说话,更要说完话还能活着!”我们呼吁所有珍视自由、渴望真相的人们加入我们,共同抵制网络暴政,共同捍卫言论自由!这不仅是一场针对实名制的抗争,更是对威权装神弄鬼的彻底否定!让我们用行动告诉世界:言论自由是不可剥夺的权利,真话终将冲破数字牢笼!“我们要说话,更要说完话还能活着!”“废除实名制,捍卫言论自由!”“拒绝数字绞索,守护真话权利!”让我们一起,为自由的网络、为自由的中国而战!

Protest Against the CCP’s Cyber Tyranny, Defend Freedom of Speech

By He Qingfeng | July 27, 2025

Editor: Li Congling | Chief Editor: Luo Zhifei | Translated by: Huiwen Lu

Key Words: CCP Cyber Tyranny / CCP’s Online Tyranny, Freedom of Speech,Digital Shackles / Digital Chains, Real-Name Registration System / Internet Real-Name Policy, Digital Tyranny / Digital Authoritarianism

Ugandan dictator Idi Amin once chillingly declared: “You have freedom of speech, but I can’t guarantee your freedom after speech.” This blood-curdling statement is no longer a distant tale from Africa—it is the harsh reality of cyberspace in China today!

In China, the so-called “real-name registration system” has become an invisible digital shackle. Cloaked in the rhetoric of “safety” and “order,” it serves as a tool for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to monitor thought, suppress speech, and silence the truth. Real-name registration turns every act of speaking out into a dangerous gamble: your account might be deleted for a single post, you might be summoned for “tea” over a true statement, or even tracked, threatened, or “disappeared” for expressing dissent. This is not freedom—it is a noose in the digital age! The real-name system is not about safety; it is about control!

抗议中共网络暴政,捍卫言论自由

Rather than protecting citizens, the real-name system reduces every internet user to a traceable number. Every word you say, every idea you express may be recorded, scrutinized, and used against you. It strips away the right to anonymous speech, chokes the free flow of ideas, turns truth into taboo, and makes criticism a crime. Under this cyber tyranny, citizens’ freedom of speech is mercilessly trampled, and the space for public discourse has shrunk to a suffocating minimum.

We are not numbers! We are not slaves!

We are living individuals, and we have the right to speak anonymously, the right to tell the truth, the right not to be intimidated or tracked! The internet should be fertile ground for free thought, not a prison of authoritarian control. We refuse to be shackled by “real-name” mandates! We refuse to let freedom of speech become an empty slogan!

Today, we raise our voices!

We protest on behalf of everyone who has had posts deleted, accounts banned, been summoned for interrogation, or detained because of the real-name system. We cry out for every soul afraid to speak the truth but yearning to breathe freely. We call for:

• Abolition of the real-name registration system! Return the internet to a space where we can breathe freely!

• Defense of freedom of speech! Let truth no longer be a crime, let criticism no longer be a risk!

• An end to digital tyranny! Let every person speak freely online without fear of losing their freedom after speaking!

Our slogans are loud and resolute:

“We want to speak, and we want to survive after speaking!”

We call on all those who value freedom and seek truth to join us, to resist cyber tyranny together, to defend freedom of expression together!

This is not only a battle against the real-name system—it is a full rejection of authoritarian masquerade!

Let us act and show the world:

Freedom of speech is an inalienable right, and truth will ultimately break through the digital prison!

“We want to speak, and we want to survive after speaking!”

“Abolish the real-name system, defend freedom of speech!”

“Reject the digital noose, protect the right to truth!”

Let us fight together—for a free internet, and for a free China!