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勇斗歹徒险丧命反被中国公安定自残

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寄信近万封维权遭长期监控关押威胁

作者:张致君

勇斗歹徒险丧命反被中国公安定自残

张记者,你好!我是下面事件当事人,如可以请帮助我曝光。

当事人姓名:张卫波(曾用名:张洪波)年龄46岁

当事人户籍:中国山东省菏泽市

电子邮箱:[email protected]

案件背景

1996年至2000年,我在中国农业银行山东省郓城县支行黄安营业所工作。

2000年4月9日凌晨我在银行综合楼与潜入的蒙面歹徒搏斗被刺七刀险些丧命,根据2000年郓城县人民医院病例记载:第八、第十一肋骨骨折、脾破裂、大网膜脱出、面部、唇部、颈部外伤。

根据齐鲁晚报2000年8月18日《自残还是见义勇为》的报道中记者采访郓城县公安局刑警队中队长郝学存时郝介绍:现场发现搏斗痕迹、墨绿色肩章、两枚黄色纽扣、一溜头发、BP机腰卡、等大量物证。在现场发现大量物证和严重的伤情下2000年4月9日菏泽公安、检察、法院及2001年1月18日山东省公安厅刑事技术鉴定中心先后作出了《造作伤》即自残的鉴定结论。办案人员将伤情鉴定书称为:机密文件”不予出具。

勇斗蒙面歹徒制止犯罪本是英雄之举,没想却落此冤名。20年后伤情复发做了开胸膈肌修补手术,膈肌麻痹、呼吸障碍终身落残。当年该营业综合楼设有金库,原郓城县公安局刑警队教导员孙德贞在一次通话中介绍:当年是一起严重的银行抢劫案,以“自残”结案是“上级的意思”(有通话录音为证)。

此后26年间,我依法通过行政信访、投诉举报、司法程序申诉,累计寄出申诉信近万封、多次赴北京国家信访局、公安部信访反映诉求。

山东官媒《齐鲁晚报》2000年8月18日以《是自残还是见义勇为》2021年湖北九派新闻以《银行员工与歹徒搏斗被刀捅伤,公安认定自残,当事人:一年寄信五六千封申诉材料,21年的追寻想要个答案》进行报道,红星新闻、猛犸新闻等媒体也进行了报道和转载。

2021年中央政法整顿督导组也曾关注过此案。2021年菏泽市副市长公安局局长刘连栋也曾接访,答应成立调查组,但案件始终未得到公正处理,郓城县公安局至今拒绝出具伤情鉴定报告。

因长期申诉维权,我和家人被中国政府长期列为重点维稳对象,并长期遭到中国公安监控,经常在生活、工作途中因是信访人员被公安留置。在信访维权过程中遭威胁、跟踪、强制遣返、训诫、拘留并被多次非法关押。

2022年5月,我在北京新京报附近以和平方式维权,被北京市公安局东城分局作出了行政拘留5日处罚。但连夜被郓城县公安局刑警队孔繁品带回郓城,以“寻衅滋事罪”立案,并被采取《监视居住措施》秘密关押。期间遭受威胁、强迫劳动,被关押29天后,被迫在郓城县拘留所医务室,在郓城县公安局刑警队孔繁品说我写的情况下按照孔要求写下了自己捅自己七刀不再因此案申诉的《息访息诉保证书》才允许取保。

虽然写了保证书中国公安仍没有放松对我和家人的监控 ,2025年 2月 16日 工作路过山东省会济南市几个小时后户籍地派出所民警便打电话过来询问去济南有何诉求,现在在什么位置等信息。

希望国际社会关注此案件协助联系他国法医鉴定机构出具专家法医意见。

附:中国公安信访答复书、训诫、拘留等文书、

伤情病例

媒体报告 等

张洪波

2025年8月4日

新闻报道链接

红星新闻:https://v.douyin.com/EpNETurS984/

时代邮刊: https://v.douyin.com/H7xhAETysVQ/

九派新闻:https://v.douyin.com/lLVNyEBk6zM/

新闻胖哥:https://v.douyin.com/apF-A09ZFVI/

新都融媒:https://v.douyin.com/sgbItq9H3uc/

猛犸调查:

https://view.inews.qq.com/a/20210824A0722M00?module_name=Android_tt_url&share_token=1bda0c7f-5f07-4487-ae30-e197825094c2&tt_from=copy_link&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=toutiao_android&ut

河南商报https://view.inews.qq.com/k/20210824A0A5H000?module_name=Android_tt_url&share_token=67040e87-d13a-4230-8d09-db787d3b7b15&tt_from=copy_link&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=toutiao_android&utm_source=copy_link

正观新闻

https://view.inews.qq.com/k/20210827A07CFJ00?module_name=Android_tt_url&share_token=b9f88e2f-386b-443c-befc-d54f3fe7dad7&tt_from=copy_link&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=toutiao_android&utm_source=copy_link

周兆成律师

【银行员工在宿舍被蒙面男捅7刀,警方鉴定其系“自残”不予立案】https://mr.baidu.com/r/1Kc9fKkf5DO?f=cp&rs=782463299&ruk=xKJSnR-7dPgTNvkxV-ADGg&u=12ac3347d2066fac

https://v.kuaishou.com/n71whNen

编辑:钟然 校对 :程筱筱 翻译:戈冰

Nearly Lost Life Fighting Armed Robber, Deemed “Self-Mutilation” by Chinese Public Security; Sent Nearly 10,000 Petition Letters Facing Prolonged Surveillance, Detention, and Threats

Author: Zhang Zhijun

Abstract: Zhang Weibo, a bank employee from Shandong, reports that after being gravely injured while fighting a masked robber in 2000, his injuries were ruled as “self-mutilation.” Following long-term appeals, he states he has been subjected to surveillance, detention, and threats, and calls on the international community to pay attention to his plight.

勇斗歹徒险丧命反被中国公安定自残

Hello, Journalist Zhang! I am the party involved in the following incident. If possible, please help me expose this matter.

Name of the Party Involved: Zhang Weibo (former name: Zhang Hongbo), 46 years old

Household Registration (Hukou): Heze City, Shandong Province, China

Email: [email protected]

Case Background

From 1996 to 2000, I worked at the Huang’an Sub-office of the Agricultural Bank of China, Yuncheng County Branch, Shandong Province.

In the early morning of April 9, 2000, I fought with a masked intruder inside the bank’s complex building and was stabbed seven times, nearly losing my life. According to the medical records of Yuncheng County People’s Hospital from 2000, I sustained fractures to the 8th and 11th ribs, a ruptured spleen, omental evisceration, and trauma to the face, lips, and neck.

According to an August 18, 2000 report by Qilu Evening News titled “Self-Mutilation or Act of Courage?”, when interviewed by the journalist, Hao Xuecun, Squadron Leader of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Yuncheng County Public Security Bureau, stated: Signs of a struggle, a dark green shoulder mark, two yellow buttons, a lock of hair, and a pager belt clip, among a vast amount of physical evidence, were discovered at the scene. Despite the abundant physical evidence found at the scene and the severity of the injuries, the Heze Public Security, Procuratorate, and Court on April 9, 2000, followed by the Forensic Science Identification Center of the Shandong Provincial Department of Public Security on January 18, 2001, successively issued forensic conclusions of “factitious injury”—that is, self-mutilation. The investigators referred to the injury assessment report as a “classified document” and refused to issue it.

Bravely fighting a masked robber to stop a crime was originally an act of heroism, yet unexpectedly, I was falsely accused. Twenty years later, the injury recurred, requiring a thoracotomy for diaphragmatic repair, leaving me permanently disabled with diaphragmatic paralysis and respiratory distress. At the time, the complex building housed a vault. Sun Dezhen, former instructor of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Yuncheng County Public Security Bureau, stated during a phone call that it was a severe bank robbery back then, and closing the case as “self-mutilation” was “the intention of higher authorities” (supported by an audio recording of the phone call).

Over the following 26 years, I lawfully appealed through administrative petitioning (Xinfang), complaints, reports, and judicial procedures, sending nearly 10,000 petition letters in total and traveling multiple times to Beijing to lodge appeals at the National Public Complaints and Proposals Administration and the Public Security Ministry’s petitioning office.

Shandong state media Qilu Evening News reported the story on August 18, 2000, titled “Is It Self-Mutilation or an Act of Courage?”, and in 2021, Hubei’s Jiupai News reported it titled “Bank Employee Stabbed While Fighting Robber, Public Security Determines Self-Mutilation; Party Involved: Sent 5,000 to 6,000 Petition Letters a Year Seeking an Answer in 21-Year Pursuit.” Outlets such as Red Star News and Mammoth News also reported and republished the story.

In 2021, the Supervision Team of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Rectification Education also paid attention to this case. In 2021, Liu Liandong, Vice Mayor of Heze City and Director of the Public Security Bureau, received me during a petition session and promised to establish an investigation team, but the case was never handled impartially, and the Yuncheng County Public Security Bureau still refuses to issue the injury assessment report to this day.

Due to my long-term petitioning and rights defense, my family and I have been classified by the Chinese government as key targets for “stability maintenance” (Weiwen) and placed under prolonged surveillance by Chinese public security. We are frequently detained by public security while in transit during daily life or work simply because of our status as petitioners. In the process of petitioning for rights defense, I have faced threats, tracking, forced repatriation, admonition, detention, and repeated illegal incarceration.

In May 2022, while peacefully defending my rights near The Beijing News offices in Beijing, I was issued a 5-day administrative detention penalty by the Dongcheng Branch of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau. However, overnight, Kong Fanpin from the Criminal Investigation Division of the Yuncheng County Public Security Bureau brought me back to Yuncheng, opened a case under the charge of “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” and placed me under “residential surveillance” in secret detention. During this period, I suffered threats and forced labor. After 29 days of confinement, inside the clinic of the Yuncheng County Detention Center, under the direction of Kong Fanpin from the Criminal Investigation Division of the Yuncheng County Public Security Bureau—who dictated what I should write—I was forced to write a “Guarantee Letter to Cease Petitioning and Litigation” stating that I had stabbed myself seven times and would no longer appeal regarding this case, only after which was I permitted release on bail.

Although I wrote the guarantee letter, Chinese public security still did not relax their surveillance over me and my family. On February 16, 2025, a few hours after I passed through Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province, for work, police officers from the local police station of my registered residence called to inquire about what demands I had in Jinan, my current location, and other information.

I hope the international community will pay attention to this case and assist in contacting forensic identification institutions in other countries to issue an expert forensic opinion.

Attached: Official response documents from Chinese Public Security regarding petitioning, admonition, detention notices, medical records of injuries, media reports, etc.

Zhang Hongbo

August 4, 2025

News Report Links:

Red Star News: https://v.douyin.com/EpNETurS984/

Times Post: https://v.douyin.com/H7xhAETysVQ/

Jiupai News: https://v.douyin.com/lLVNyEBk6zM/

News Pangge: https://v.douyin.com/apF-A09ZFVI/

Xindu Media: https://v.douyin.com/sgbItq9H3uc/

Mammoth Investigation:

https://view.inews.qq.com/a/20210824A0722M00?module_name=Android_tt_url&share_token=1bda0c7f-5f07-4487-ae30-e197825094c2&tt_from=copy_link&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=toutiao_android&ut

Henan Business Daily: https://view.inews.qq.com/k/20210824A0A5H000?module_name=Android_tt_url&share_token=67040e87-d13a-4230-8d09-db787d3b7b15&tt_from=copy_link&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=toutiao_android&utm_source=copy_link

Zhengguan News:

https://view.inews.qq.com/k/20210827A07CFJ00?module_name=Android_tt_url&share_token=b9f88e2f-386b-443c-befc-d54f3fe7dad7&tt_from=copy_link&utm_campaign=client_share&utm_medium=toutiao_android&utm_source=copy_link

Lawyer Zhou Zhaocheng

[Bank employee stabbed 7 times by masked man in dormitory, police determine “self-mutilation” and refuse to file a case]: https://mr.baidu.com/r/1Kc9fKkf5DO?f=cp&rs=782463299&ruk=xKJSnR-7dPgTNvkxV-ADGg&u=12ac3347d2066fac

https://v.kuaishou.com/n71whNen

Editor: Zhong Ran Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

自由雕塑公园:高智晟被迫失踪九周年

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妻子耿和与民主人士齐聚歌声守望

作者:张致君

2026年8月8日,在中国著名维权律师高智晟被迫失踪九周年之际,高智晟的妻子耿和与多位民主人士及关注中国人权状况的人士来到美国加州自由雕塑公园,在高智晟雕塑《仰望星空——高智晟》前举行纪念活动。

当天,众人聚集在雕塑下,共同唱起为高智晟而作的歌曲《深渊中的守望者》。歌声回荡在南加州广袤的荒漠之中,人们以这样的方式纪念高智晟多年来为弱势群体、人权与法治所作出的努力,同时再次呼吁外界关注他的下落。

人群中,高智晟的妻子耿和站在丈夫的雕塑前,与众人一同歌唱。对于其他参加者而言,这是一场纪念活动;而对于耿和而言,眼前的雕塑所呈现的,是她已经九年无法自由相见的丈夫。雕像近在咫尺,现实中的亲人却远隔重重阻碍,这一幕也让当天的纪念多了一份沉重。

自由雕塑公园:高智晟被迫失踪九周年

(高智晟律师妻子耿和在活动上发言)

(来自旧金山中国民主党的成员为纪念高智晟律师献唱)

高智晟是中国著名维权律师,长期关注弱势群体、公民权利和宗教信仰自由等问题,并曾代理多起维权案件。由于长期从事维权工作,他此后遭到持续打压,并经历拘押、监控以及自由受到限制等处境。

2017年8月,高智晟从被软禁的陕西住所失踪,此后长期与外界隔绝,其下落持续受到国际人权组织及海外社会关注。

从2017年8月到2026年8月,整整九年。对于高智晟的家人而言,这意味着漫长的分离、等待与未知。这些年来,耿和也一直没有停止为丈夫发声。

当天举行纪念活动的高智晟雕塑名为《仰望星空——高智晟》,由自由雕塑公园创办人、雕塑家陈维明先生创作。2026年4月4日,这座大型雕塑在加州自由雕塑公园正式揭幕。

雕塑采用塔形结构。塔基以石块构成,中层正面浮雕呈现高智晟的著作以及手持利剑与天平的正义女神;两侧浮雕则表现了与高智晟维权经历相关的人物与群体。雕塑顶部,是仰头凝望天空的高智晟头像。

陈维明将作品命名为《仰望星空》,其中寄托着特殊的寓意。当一个人与外界隔绝,人们不知道他身处何方,他也无法知道远方的人正在如何思念和守望他时,天空或许成为彼此仍然共同拥有的事物。

无论身处高墙之内,还是身在自由世界,人们仰望的仍是同一片星空。《仰望星空》不仅塑造了高智晟的个人形象,也寄托着一种跨越高墙与距离的守望。

今年4月雕塑落成时,耿和也曾来到现场。四个月后,在丈夫被迫失踪九周年之际,她再次来到《仰望星空》前。雕塑所表达的“仰望”,与当天《深渊中的守望者》所表达的“守望”,在这一刻形成了特殊的呼应。

8月8日,荒漠、天空和远山构成了纪念活动的背景。没有宏大的舞台,矗立在荒漠中的《仰望星空》就是当天最醒目的纪念碑。

当《深渊中的守望者》的歌声响起,人们面对的不仅是一座雕塑,更是一位已经九年无法自由出现在公众视野中的真实人物。

九年的时间,足以让许多新闻淡出公众视野,也足以让一个名字逐渐被新的事件覆盖。然而,对当天来到自由雕塑公园的人们而言,纪念本身就是一种拒绝遗忘。

只要还有人记得,还有人追问,还有人公开呼唤他的名字,高智晟就不会从公共记忆中消失。

高智晟曾以律师身份为弱势群体和权利受到侵害者提供法律帮助。在面对巨大压力的情况下,他仍然选择公开表达自己的立场,并因此付出了沉重代价。

当这位曾经替别人发声的律师自己失去自由之后,他的家人、朋友以及海外人权和民主人士开始持续为他发声。

从这个意义上说,高智晟的经历早已不只是一个律师个人的命运。他的遭遇,也成为观察中国维权律师和人权捍卫者处境的一个重要案例。

九年过去,一个问题始终没有消失:

高智晟在哪里?

当天的纪念活动结束后,人群终将散去,荒漠也重新归于寂静,但《仰望星空》仍将矗立在那里。

雕塑中的高智晟依旧抬头望向天空。

九年前,他从公众视野中消失;九年后,他的妻子和一群仍然记得他的人来到这里,用歌声继续守望。

九年失踪,不应成为九年遗忘。

而那个持续了九年的问题,依然等待着答案:

高智晟,你在哪里?

(仰望星空 高智晟纪念雕塑 图片来源 自由雕塑公园官网)

附歌词全文:

《深渊中的守望者》

一盏微光,穿透黑暗
冷墙后的呼喊,在回荡
绝望中,他信念如钢
守护正义,是心中辉煌
铁窗锁不住灵魂的飞翔
烈火淬炼初心的刚强
沉默中,他的呐喊滚烫
穿越岁月,写下正义篇章
深渊无尽,他站成山岗
孤寂中燃烧的希望
信念如火,驱散寒霜
为真理他捍卫信仰
即使孤身,亦如明灯
点燃黑夜,点燃黎明晨光
为真理用生命回响


摄影 :陀先润 编辑 :胡丽莉
校对 :程筱筱 翻译 :戈 冰

Liberty Sculpture Park: Nine Years Since Gao Zhisheng’s Enforced Disappearance — Wife Geng He and Pro-Democracy Activists Gather in Song and Vigil

Author: Zhang Zhijun

Abstract: On August 8, 2026, marking the ninth anniversary of Gao Zhisheng’s disappearance, his wife Geng He joined pro-democracy activists at Liberty Sculpture Park in California to sing together, commemorating Gao Zhisheng and calling for international attention to his whereabouts.

On August 8, 2026, marking the ninth anniversary of the enforced disappearance of the renowned Chinese human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, his wife Geng He, alongside numerous pro-democracy activists and individuals concerned with human rights in China, gathered at Liberty Sculpture Park in California, USA, to hold a commemoration event before the statue dedicated to him, Gazing at the Starry Sky — Gao Zhisheng.

That day, the crowd assembled beneath the sculpture and sang in unison Watchman in the Abyss, a song composed for Gao Zhisheng. As the singing echoed across the vast desert of Southern California, attendees paid tribute to Gao’s long-standing efforts on behalf of vulnerable groups, human rights, and the rule of law, while renewing their appeal for global attention regarding his whereabouts.

Amidst the crowd stood Gao Zhisheng’s wife, Geng He, singing together with everyone before her husband’s statue. While this was a commemorative event for other participants, the sculpture represented a husband whom Geng He has been unable to freely see for nine years. With the statue so close yet her actual kin separated by insurmountable obstacles, the scene cast a heavy sorrow over the day’s vigil.

自由雕塑公园:高智晟被迫失踪九周年

(Geng He, wife of human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng, speaking at the event)

(Members of the Democratic Party of China from San Francisco singing in commemoration of human rights lawyer Gao Zhisheng)

Gao Zhisheng is a prominent Chinese human rights lawyer who has long focused on issues surrounding vulnerable groups, civil rights, and freedom of religious belief, having represented numerous rights defense cases. Due to his sustained rights defense work, he subsequently faced persistent suppression, experiencing detention, surveillance, and severe restrictions on his personal freedom.

In August 2017, Gao Zhisheng vanished from his residence in Shaanxi where he was under house arrest. Since then, he has been held in prolonged isolation from the outside world, and his whereabouts continue to draw sustained concern from international human rights organizations and the overseas community.

From August 2017 to August 2026, a full nine years have passed. For Gao Zhisheng’s family, this has meant an agonizing period of separation, waiting, and uncertainty. Throughout these years, Geng He has never ceased advocating for her husband.

The statue of Gao Zhisheng featured in the day’s commemoration is titled Gazing at the Starry Sky — Gao Zhisheng, created by the founder of Liberty Sculpture Park, the sculptor Mr. Chen Weiming. On April 4, 2026, this large-scale sculpture was officially unveiled at Liberty Sculpture Park in California.

The sculpture utilizes a tower structure. The base of the tower is constructed from stone blocks; the front of the middle tier features high-relief carvings depicting Gao Zhisheng’s writings alongside the Goddess of Justice holding a sword and scales, while the reliefs on both sides depict figures and groups associated with Gao Zhisheng’s rights-defense journey. At the top of the sculpture rests the bust of Gao Zhisheng, looking up and gazing at the sky.

Chen Weiming named the work Gazing at the Starry Sky, bestowing it with a special meaning. When a person is cut off from the outside world—when people do not know where he is, and he cannot know how those far away miss him and keep vigil for him—the sky perhaps becomes the one thing they still share together.

Whether confined within high walls or residing in the free world, people still look up at the very same starry sky. Gazing at the Starry Sky not only sculpts Gao Zhisheng’s individual image, but also embodies a spirit of vigil that transcends distance and high walls.

When the sculpture was completed this past April, Geng He was also present at the site. Four months later, on the ninth anniversary of her husband’s enforced disappearance, she once again stood before Gazing at the Starry Sky. The act of “gazing up” expressed by the sculpture and the act of “keeping vigil” expressed by Watchman in the Abyss formed a profound echo at that moment.

On August 8, the desert, sky, and distant mountains formed the backdrop for the commemoration. Lacking a grand stage, Gazing at the Starry Sky standing tall in the desert served as the day’s most prominent monument.

As the song Watchman in the Abyss sounded, what people faced was not merely a sculpture, but a real-life human being who has been unable to freely appear in the public eye for nine years.

Nine years is enough time for many news stories to fade from public attention, and long enough for a name to gradually be overshadowed by new events. However, for those who came to Liberty Sculpture Park that day, commemoration itself is a refusal to forget.

As long as there are still people who remember, people who inquire, and people who publicly call his name, Gao Zhisheng will not disappear from public memory.

Gao Zhisheng once provided legal assistance as a lawyer to vulnerable groups and those whose rights were violated. Facing immense pressure, he nevertheless chose to publicly express his position, paying a heavy price for doing so.

When this lawyer, who once spoke up for others, lost his own freedom, his family, friends, and overseas human rights and pro-democracy activists began to continuously speak up for him.

In this sense, Gao Zhisheng’s experience has long ceased to be merely the personal fate of an individual lawyer. What he has endured has also become an important case study for observing the plight of Chinese rights-defense lawyers and human rights defenders.

Nine years have passed, and one question has never gone away:

Where is Gao Zhisheng?

After the day’s commemoration concludes, the crowd will eventually disperse, and the desert will return to silence once more, yet Gazing at the Starry Sky will remain standing there.

Gao Zhisheng in the sculpture continues to look up toward the sky.

Nine years ago, he vanished from the public eye; nine years later, his wife and a group of people who still remember him came here, continuing their vigil through song.

Nine years of disappearance must not become nine years of oblivion.

And that question, which has persisted for nine years, still awaits an answer:

Gao Zhisheng, where are you?

(Gazing at the Starry Sky — Gao Zhisheng Commemorative Sculpture. Photo source: Liberty Sculpture Park official website)

Appendix: Full Song Lyrics

Watchman in the Abyss

A faint light pierces through the darkness,

The cries behind cold walls echo on.

Amidst despair, his conviction is steel;

Guarding justice is the glory in his heart.

Iron bars cannot shackle the flying soul,

Fierce fires temper the strength of original resolve.

In silence, his outcry burns scalding hot,

Traversing the years to write a chapter of justice.

The abyss is endless, yet he stands as a mountain peak,

A hope burning in solitude.

Conviction like fire, driving away the frost;

For truth, he defends his faith.

Though alone, he stands as a beacon,

Igniting the dark night, igniting the dawn’s first light;

For truth, echoing with his very life.

Photography: Tuo Xianrun Editor: Hu Lili
Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Ge Bing

旧金山 8月23日 把光照进高墙 为良心犯发声

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【活动公告】把光照进高墙,为良心犯发声为了让我们的声援行动更有实效、形成更大的国际与社会影响,本次活动特别推出两大核心特色与具体的行动指引,欢迎大家积极参与!

一:两地联动 · 双轨并行(中国与美国)国内关怀:给家乡的良心犯写信,让他们知道自己未被遗忘;通过电话、信件或生活资助向家属表达问候,为承受巨大压力的家属提供温暖支持。美国集会抗议:前往中共驻美大使馆参加现场声援抗议活动,凝聚海外力量,形成强有力的舆论声浪。

二:认领责任 · 一对一守护(“一人一犯”声援计划)每位参与者根据自己的籍贯,选择一个或多个自己家乡的良心犯,作为声援对象:现场抗议:在大使馆集会现场,大家可以手持自己认领的家乡良心犯照片进行举牌抗议。社媒传播:统一使用社交媒体标签 #认领家乡良心犯 ,在 X(Twitter)、Facebook 等平台分享写信照片或集会现场,扩大网络传播力度。

【特别提醒:关怀与安全注意事项】

尊重家属意愿:部分良心犯家属不希望被打扰,对此请切勿主动拨打电话或邮寄信件。真正的声援以尊重为本。

联系不上家属时:建议在自己的社交媒体上撰写、转发该良心犯的事迹与近况,保持公开关注度。

狱中寄信与明信片:若家属不便接收信息,可在遵守监狱寄信规则的前提下,直接寄送纯祝福性质的明信片至监狱(请注意内容简短、避开敏感词,仅表达节日或日常问候)。

三:认领报名与行动接龙 

(若不清楚家乡良心犯名单,请私信我获取整理好的参考名录。 )

为了方便统计人数与安排现场活动,欢迎大家在群里接龙或私信发给我,格式为:自己姓名+省份+良心犯名字

把关注化为行动,用陪伴击碎孤立!期待你的加入!

主办:中共民主党(旧金山党部)、中国民主教育基金会

时间:2026年8月23日周日 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM

地点:旧金山中共大使馆

召集人:方政 郑云

发起人:吴志创 郭志军

组织者:李 凯 刘静涛 李树青 赵明

联系人:郭志军 #@Zhijun_Guo

旧金山 8月13日 紧急召集 高智晟在哪里?

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【紧急召集|8月13日旧金山中领馆前】

高智晟在哪里?

高智晟,中国著名维权律师,长期为弱势群体、宗教信仰者以及遭受迫害的人士提供法律帮助。多年来,他因坚持为受迫害者发声,持续遭到中共当局打压、监控、拘禁与迫害。

2017年8月13日,高智晟先生再次被强迫失踪。

从那一天起,他的真实下落、生活状况和人身安全,始终没有得到公开、可信的说明。

2026年8月13日,是高智晟先生被强迫失踪整整九周年。

九年,已经太久。

对于一个家庭来说,这是漫长的等待;

对于一个社会来说,这是不能被遗忘的失踪;

对于一个政权来说,这是必须回答的问题。

8月13日星期四下午3:30,我们将在旧金山中国总领事馆前举行和平抗议,公开向中共当局追问高智晟先生的下落,并要求立即恢复他的自由。

我们要求中共当局:

立即公布高智晟先生真实下落!

立即说明其人身与健康状况!

立即停止对高智晟及其家人的迫害!

立即恢复高智晟先生人身自由!

九年过去,我们不仅要问:

高智晟在哪里?

我们更要明确要求:

释放高智晟律师!

WHERE IS GAO ZHISHENG?

9 YEARS MISSING. CHINA MUST ANSWER.

FREE GAO ZHISHENG NOW.

TELL THE TRUTH!

我们紧急召集所有关心高智晟先生、关心中国人权、自由与法治的朋友来到现场,共同发声。

一个人的声音也许微弱,但当更多人站在一起,沉默就无法掩盖事实。

8月13日,请来到现场。

让我们一起追问他的下落,也一起要求他的自由。

时间:2026年8月13日(星期四)下午3:30

地点:旧金山中国总领事馆前 1450 Laguna St, San Francisco, CA

发起:中国民主党旧金山党部|中国民主教育基金会

召集人:方政|郑云

行动策划:李小林

特别参与:耿和|高智晟先生妻子

高智晟在哪里?

立即释放高智晟!

旧金山 8月16日 纪念周怀林先生逝世28周年暨谴责中共暴政集会

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旧金山 8月16日 纪念周怀林先生逝世28周年暨谴责中共暴政集会

功勋不容抹杀,暴政必须终结” 铭记历史,守护公义!

——纪念周怀林先生逝世28周年暨谴责中共暴政集会

活动时间:2026年8月16日 3:00pm-5:00pm

活动地点:中国驻旧金山总领事馆 1450 Laguna St San Francisco CA 94115

举办单位:中国民主党旧金山党部、中国民主教育基金会

活动召集:方政、胡丕政

活动组织:周小俊、康嘉铭

主持人:周小俊、康嘉铭

活动联系人:周小俊(626)6946407 康嘉铭:(702)2905007

历史的丰碑:

致敬周怀林与亿万农民的抗争二十八年前,在江西丰城,一场因农村税费问题引发的悲剧,成为许多人心中无法抹去的记忆。那个年代,无数中国农民承受着沉重的税费负担,基层乱收费、乱摊派等问题引发了广泛的不满。周怀林希望为乡亲们发声,后来不幸离世。关于事件的许多细节,至今仍存在不同记载和争议,但可以确定的是,那段历史真实反映了当时农村基层治理所面临的严重矛盾。

周怀林先生以及无数无名农民的抗争,是用血泪把统治者逼到了墙角,逼得中共暴政不得不吐出了一部分非法所得。这根本就不是什么善心,而是在危机面前的权衡与妥协。把人民抗争的成果,粉饰成皇帝的恩赐,是独裁政权最无耻的叙事。

为抗争得自由,清除中共暴政!

拒绝专制独裁,还我自由中国!

停止迫害异见人士,保障基本人权自由!

“严打”叒出江湖。严打什么?谁在恐慌?

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作者:漠北孤狭

中共官宣“2025年全年命案、治安案件发生数是建国以来最低”话音未落,旋即庄严公告开展为期一年的“严打”运动。用尽世上所有的词汇也无法形容这种暌违和荒诞。

中共一惯的宏大叙事“扫黑除恶,维护社会公共秩序、保障人民群众的生命财产安全、创造良好的生产和营商环境”,你要真信了,你的智商就活在“斩杀线”以下了。这一套的口吐莲花,与当年中共骗农民“农村包围城市”暴力抢夺政权,政权成立之初开展“公社化”“三大改造,公私合私”,发动“文化大革命”斗牛鬼蛇神,实施“计划生育”百年大计,把住房、教育、医疗原本民生基本项目推向社会化,推出养老保险制度庞氏骗局,三年新冠疫情封控是民众自愿、注射未经任何临床试验的疫苗耗尽国库,到眼下的限制人员、资金、生产要素的市场化流动,一路朝鲜化,都是同一个话术套路“为了你好”;与北朝鲜金家三代人,拼尽全力争取实现“让老百姓喝上碗大米粥”的宏伟目标,颇有异曲同工之妙。

言归正传。当年最为声势浩大的、导致无数冤魂的“83严打”,真相已经太多揭露其荒诞和血腥自不必重述;1996年至1998年的广东“严打”相信你也有所耳闻?因为权威官媒重磅报道铺天盖地:因东莞市茶山镇塘角村金星酒店斗殴死2人,引发了波及全广东的严打。事件始末:东莞茶山“6.26金星酒店案”。

1996年6月26日,凌晨2:00左右 ,东莞市茶山镇塘角村金星酒店歌舞厅门前 ,两伙人因争夺“看场费、拉客、桑拿小姐”发生火拼,持刀 、土枪械斗 ,致2死7伤。死者含外省务工人员。 案发时场内有港商、台商、外来工,影响极其恶劣。

广东省委定性“东莞问题就是全省问题”,1996年7月 省公安厅工作组驻扎东莞 。1996.7-9月抓获违法犯罪人员1.2万余人,刑拘4000余人,摧毁黑恶团伙数十个 ,金星酒店被查封,老板被抓(后失踪)。此案直接导致1996-1998年广东全省“严打” 。(上述数据引自:`东莞市志` 广东省公安厅90年代严打工作总结 `南方日报1996年7月报道’)

你以为这就是真相全部?你要信了你就输了。

先抛个引子,某大名鼎鼎、风流倜傥君,君临时年(90年代初)深圳统建楼最左边的酒店(名字忘了,准三星,统建楼在深南路上海宾馆斜对面,统建楼后面是当年亦大名鼎鼎、斐声国际的风月街巴登街)。福星上门,酒店老总大喜过望:酒店左侧有一块空地,老总一再呈报告至市领导请求购买用作酒店配套停车场,长时间无果,成为心病。老总精心安排接待,恰我一友人任职酒店,老总降大任于脑子活络的该友。该友精心挑选一上海、一北京两女,彻夜服务莅临福星。第二天老总陪福星用膳,福星对昨晚安排十二份满意,期间老总似不经意提及该配套地块。未几,市政府函复,此地块无偿划拨给酒店配套停车场。

时间推进至1996年。彼时广东东莞的娱乐业声振海内外。初心不改的该福星莅临东莞,未曾料到的是一场血雨腥风不期而至。福星(带二悍将保镳)自是葡萄美酒、佐以佳肴美女不必说;该酒店老板也是命中有此一劫。移步至K歌包间笙歌美酒不绝间,福星携二保镳如厕与另一路同样酩酊大醉团伙相撞摩擦。一惯骄横的保镳加上护主心切,本就武功高强再超水准发挥,将对方打得哭爹叫娘。事大了,对方亦是当地一霸,岂容外人撒野,看场黑帮一拥而上棍棒侍候,结果致保镳一死一重伤;浑身酒秽及血污的福星被抓捕进了公安局。警员审,此时酒气未褪的福星被严刑挎打至半醒,怒吼自己是某某公子。警员回:你爸要是某某,我爸就是总书记。打得更狠。福星痛醒,苦苦哀求警员找市局局长核实自己身份。局长无奈凌晨赶至,到跟前近看,大惊失色,扑通跪下:事太大了,此君真乃正国级中堂公子LXY!急传酒店老板前来。酒店老板一路鞠躬下跪,一口提出赔偿方案:一条人命2000万元,重伤保镳1000万元,余事再由福星发话即可。于是便有了流传甚广的名言,福星说:2000万是钱嘛!此事汇报至市领导再到省领导,那还得了,堂堂公子莅临广东,广东人民应觉幸甚,蔫能遭此“招待”?!定性“东莞问题即是广东问题”给首长以交代,又于是“广东严打”堂而皇之登场,冤魂无数再天空飞翔。

回遡往事,“83严打”与“广东严打”冠冕堂皇“为了你好”的背后,无非是为了给官家权贵看家护院而已,普通百姓看个热闹都要小心伤着。

此次“严打”出台的时机与背景更加怪诞!堂堂皇皇、广而告之的白纸黑字下的真相是什么?号称“全世界最安全的国家”,在”命案数量、治安案数历史最低”的条件下,却触发了一场冷雨冰刀般的冷酷运动,究竟是谁在恐慌?恐慌的是什么?请听下回分解。

(作者:漠北独侠 漠北孤侠)

@baodiantimes

编辑:赵杰 校对:程筱筱 翻译:沈美花

“Strike Hard” Strikes Again. What Is Being Struck? Who Is Panicking?

Author: Mobei Guxia (漠北孤狭)

Hardly had the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announcement—claiming that “the number of homicides and public security cases in 2025 reached a historic low since the founding of the People’s Republic”—faded from the air, when it immediately and solemnly announced a year-long “Strike Hard” (Yanda) campaign. No words in the world can fully capture the sheer dissonance and absurdity of this contradiction.

The CCP’s perpetual grand narrative—”sweeping away black-market crime and eliminating evil, maintaining public order, safeguarding the lives and property of the masses, and creating a favorable production and business environment”—if you actually believe it, your IQ sits well below the “execution threshold.” This torrent of sugary lies follows the exact same rhetorical pattern as when the CCP deceived peasants into “encircling the cities from the countryside” to violently seize power; when, shortly after establishing its regime, it launched “communalization,” the “Three Great Transformations,” and “joint public-private ownership”; when it unleashed the “Cultural Revolution” to denounce all “cow-demons and snake-spirits”; when it implemented the “Planned Birth” policy as a century-long grand design; when it marketized housing, education, and healthcare—originally basic public welfare items; when it introduced a Ponzi-scheme pension system; when it claimed the three-year COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns were voluntary by the public and emptied the national treasury on unproven vaccines without clinical trials; and all the way to its current restrictions on the market-based movement of people, capital, and factors of production, driving the country toward total North Koreanization. It is all the same manipulative formula: “It’s for your own good.” This shares a striking, uncanny similarity with the Kim family’s three-generation effort in North Korea, where they spent every ounce of strength striving toward the grand goal of “letting the ordinary people drink a bowl of white rice soup.”

Returning to the main topic. The truth behind the most massive “1983 Strike Hard” campaign—which claimed countless innocent souls—has long been exposed for its absurdity and bloodiness, so there is no need to repeat it here. But you have probably also heard of the Guangdong “Strike Hard” campaign from 1996 to 1998? It was blanketed in overwhelming coverage by authoritative state media: a brawl at the Jinxing Hotel in Tangjiao Village, Chashan Town, Dongguan City, which left two dead, triggered a province-wide “Strike Hard” campaign across all of Guangdong. The full story of the event: The Dongguan Chashan “June 26 Jinxing Hotel Case.”

At around 2:00 AM on June 26, 1996, in front of the dance hall at the Jinxing Hotel in Tangjiao Village, Chashan Town, Dongguan City, two rival gangs clashed over “protection fees, soliciting customers, and sauna hostesses.” They engaged in a armed brawl using knives and homemade firearms, resulting in 2 deaths and 7 injuries. The deceased included migrant workers from other provinces. At the time of the incident, Hong Kong businessmen, Taiwanese businessmen, and migrant workers were present inside the venue, creating an extremely severe negative social impact.

The Guangdong Provincial Party Committee categorized this as “the Dongguan problem is a province-wide problem.” In July 1996, a provincial Public Security Department working team stationed itself in Dongguan. From July to September 1996, over 12,000 illegal criminals were detained, more than 4,000 were criminally detained, and dozens of organized crime syndicates were dismantled. The Jinxing Hotel was sealed off, and its owner was arrested (and subsequently went missing). This case directly triggered the province-wide “Strike Hard” campaign in Guangdong from 1996 to 1998. (The above data is cited from: “Dongguan City Gazetteer,” Guangdong Provincial Public Security Department’s 1990s Strike Hard Work Summary, and “Nanjing Daily/Nanfang Daily July 1996 Reports.”)

Do you think this is the whole truth? If you believe that, you’ve already lost.

Let me throw in a prelude. A certain famous, dashing, and romantic gentleman—a “Lucky Star” (Fuxing)—arrived at a hotel located on the far left of the Tongjian Building in Shenzhen in the early 1990s (I forgot the name, a quasi-three-star hotel; the Tongjian Building was diagonally across from the Shanghai Hotel on Shennan Road, and behind it was Baden Street, an internationally notorious red-light district back then). Upon the Lucky Star’s arrival, the hotel’s general manager was overjoyed: there was a vacant plot of land on the left side of the hotel. The manager had repeatedly submitted applications to city leaders asking to buy it as an auxiliary parking lot for the hotel, but to no avail, making it a persistent headache. The manager carefully arranged the reception and entrusted this big responsibility to a quick-witted friend of mine who worked at the hotel. My friend meticulously selected two women—one from Shanghai and one from Beijing—to serve the visiting Lucky Star overnight. The next day, the manager accompanied the Lucky Star for a meal. The Lucky Star was beyond satisfied with the previous night’s arrangements. During the meal, the manager seemingly casually mentioned the vacant plot of land. Before long, the municipal government issued an official reply: the plot was transferred to the hotel free of charge as an auxiliary parking lot.

Fast-forward to 1996. At that time, the entertainment industry in Dongguan, Guangdong, was famous both at home and abroad. True to his nature, this Lucky Star arrived in Dongguan, never expecting that a bloody storm was brewing. The Lucky Star (accompanied by two fierce bodyguards) naturally enjoyed fine wine, gourmet food, and beautiful women—it goes without saying. The hotel owner was simply destined for this catastrophe. As they moved to a KTV private room, enjoying endless singing and wine, the Lucky Star and his two bodyguards went to the restroom, where they bumped into and got into a dispute with another heavily intoxicated group. The naturally arrogant bodyguards, eager to protect their master, used their superior martial arts skills beyond their normal standard, beating the opposing party so badly they cried for help. But things escalated—the other group was also a local boss and refused to let outsiders bully them. The local gang bouncers swarmed in with wooden clubs. The result: one bodyguard was killed and another critically injured. Covered in vomit and bloodstains, the Lucky Star was arrested and taken to the police station. During interrogation, as the alcohol had not yet worn off, the Lucky Star was beaten while handcuffed until he became half-sober, roaring that he was the son of a certain top leader. The police officer replied: “If your dad is so-and-so, then my dad is the General Secretary!” and beat him even harder.

Awakened by the pain, the Lucky Star begged the police officer to contact the director of the Municipal Public Security Bureau to verify his identity. Left with no choice, the bureau chief rushed to the station in the early hours of the morning. Looking closely at him, he turned pale with shock and fell to his knees: “This is a huge disaster!” This man was indeed LXY, the son of the national-level Premier! The hotel owner was urgently summoned. The hotel owner bowed and knelt the entire way, immediately offering a compensation plan: 20 million RMB for the lost life, 10 million RMB for the severely injured bodyguard, and whatever else the Lucky Star demanded. Thus emerged the widely circulated famous quote—the Lucky Star said: “Is 20 million even money?!” The matter was reported to city leaders and then to provincial leaders. How could this be tolerated? A dignified princeling’s arrival in Guangdong should have been seen as a blessing by the people of Guangdong—how could he be “entertained” like this?! They designated “the Dongguan problem is a Guangdong problem” to give an account to the top chief, and thus the “Guangdong Strike Hard” grandly took the stage under a high-sounding pretext, leaving countless innocent souls flying through the sky once again.

Looking back at history, behind the high-sounding pretexts of “for your own good” in both the “1983 Strike Hard” and the “Guangdong Strike Hard,” the true purpose was nothing more than guarding the courtyards and homes of the ruling elite and royalty. Ordinary citizens watching the drama had to be careful not to get hurt themselves.

The timing and background of this current “Strike Hard” campaign are even more bizarre! Under the dignified, widely publicized official statements, what is the truth behind the black text on white paper? In a country claiming to be “the safest in the world,” under conditions where “the number of homicides and public security cases are at a historic low,” a cold, ruthless movement like freezing rain and ice blades has been triggered. Who, exactly, is panicking? And what are they panicking about? Please listen to the next episode for the analysis.

(Author: Mobei Duxia / Mobei Guxia) @baodiantimes

Editor: Zhao Jie

Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao

Translator: Shen Meihua

从武汉城管暴力执法事件看:

0

当底层人被逼到街头,社会不该只剩驱赶与封口

作者:冯仍

据网友投稿及网络流传视频显示,2026年8月9日晚至8月10日前后,武汉司马口一带疑似发生一起城管及协管人员与市民、摊贩冲突事件。网传画面显示,现场人员发生激烈肢体冲突,有协管人员疑似手持硬物、石块攻击他人。相关视频文字称,事件涉及武汉城管暴力殴打小贩,公安机关随后通报称“摊贩先出手”,并称涉事城管或协管人员已被刑事拘留。

从武汉城管暴力执法事件看:

图片来源由网络

如果这些画面和通报属实,这起事件已经不只是普通的街头冲突,而是一次对基层执法边界、底层生存困境和信息公开机制的集中拷问。

城市管理当然需要秩序,公共空间也需要规则。但是,秩序不能建立在对弱势者的羞辱和暴力之上。无论对方是小贩、无业青年,还是无处可去的底层市民,执法人员都没有权力使用明显超出必要限度的暴力。手铐、石块、围殴、辱骂,都不应成为城市管理的一部分。

更值得追问的是,为什么越来越多普通人会被逼到街头?为什么年轻人、小贩、低收入者只能在城市缝隙中求生?当经济下行、就业困难、房租高企、社会救助不足时,街头摊贩和无处可去的人,并不是城市的脏乱差,而是社会压力最直接的外露。

真正的问题,不是他们出现在街头,而是他们为什么只能出现在街头。

一个社会面对底层困境,不能只靠驱赶;面对执法争议,不能只靠通报;面对公众质疑,更不能只靠删帖封号。视频可以被删除,账号可以被封禁,但现实不会因此消失。被砸伤的人、被驱赶的人、无钱租房的人、靠摆摊谋生的人,仍然真实存在。

如果执法人员涉嫌故意伤害,就必须依法公开调查、追责到底;如果现场确有冲突,也应公布完整执法记录,而不是让公众只能从被剪碎的视频和被删除的帖子中拼凑真相。一个政府若真有公信力,就不应害怕事实;一个城市若真讲文明,就不应把最弱势的人当成清理对象。

经济再难,也不能失去对人的基本尊重;城市再需要管理,也不能让暴力成为规则之外的“潜规则”。这起武汉事件最刺痛人的地方,不只是有人被打,而是底层人在生存已经艰难的时候,仍然可能被更强大的权力进一步碾压。一个国家如何对待最弱势的人,最能看出它真实的文明程度。

暴力执法要不得,遮掩真相更要不得。真正的稳定,不是把问题压下去,而是把人当人看,把规则当规则用,把权力关进法律的笼子里。

编辑:胡丽莉

校对:毛一炜 翻译:沈美花

Reflections on the Wuhan Chengguan Violent Law Enforcement Incident: When the Grassroots Are Driven to the Streets, Society Should Offer More Than Just Expulsion and Silencing

Author: Feng Reng

Abstract: A suspected conflict between urban management officers (Chengguan) and street vendors in Wuhan’s Simakou area has raised public doubts regarding violent law enforcement, the living plights of those at the bottom of society, and official information disclosure. The article calls for a lawful investigation, disclosure of the truth, respect for vulnerable groups, and the maintenance of social stability through the rule of law.

According to submissions from netizens and videos circulating online, a violent conflict allegedly broke out around the night of August 9 to August 10, 2026, in the Simakou area of Wuhan, involving municipal law enforcement officers (Chengguan), auxiliary staff (Xieguan), local citizens, and street vendors.Footage shared online shows individuals at the scene engaged in fierce physical altercations, with auxiliary enforcement personnel allegedly wielding hard objects and stones to attack others.Accompanying text in the relevant videos claimed that the incident involved Wuhan Chengguan violently beating street vendors. The public security organ subsequently issued an official announcement stating that “the street vendors struck first,” while adding that the involved Chengguan or auxiliary personnel had been placed under criminal detention.

从武汉城管暴力执法事件看:

Image source: Internet

If these video clips and official reports are verified as true, this incident is no longer merely a routine street brawl. Rather, it stands as a concentrated interrogation of the boundaries of primary-level law enforcement, the living plights of those at the bottom of society, and the mechanisms of public information disclosure.

Urban management undeniably requires order, and public spaces demand rules. However, order must not be built upon the humiliation and violence inflicted upon the vulnerable. Regardless of whether the individuals involved are street vendors, unemployed youth, or marginalized citizens with nowhere else to go, law enforcement personnel possess no right to employ violence that blatantly exceeds necessary limits. Handcuffs, stones, gang assaults, and verbal abuse should never be part of urban management.

What warrants deeper questioning is: why are an increasing number of ordinary people being driven to the streets? Why can young people, vendors, and low-income earners only survive within the cracks of the city? When facing economic downturns, employment difficulties, high rents, and inadequate social assistance, street vendors and the displaced are not the “dirt, disorder, and blight” of a city; they are the most direct manifestation of societal strain.

The real problem is not that they appear on the streets, but why the streets have become their only option.

When confronting the hardships of the grassroots, a society cannot rely solely on expulsion; when facing law enforcement disputes, it cannot rely solely on brief official notices; and when meeting public skepticism, it certainly cannot rely merely on deleting posts and banning accounts. Videos can be deleted, and accounts can be suspended, but reality does not disappear as a result. Those who were injured, those who were driven away, those who cannot afford rent, and those who make a living by running street stalls still exist in reality.

If law enforcement officers are suspected of intentional assault, an open investigation must be conducted in accordance with the law, and accountability must be pursued to the end. If conflicts indeed occurred at the scene, full enforcement body-cam recordings should be released, rather than leaving the public to piece together the truth from fragmented videos and deleted posts. If a government truly possesses credibility, it should not fear facts; if a city truly claims to be civilized, it should not treat its most vulnerable residents as objects to be “cleared away.”

No matter how difficult the economy gets, basic respect for human beings must not be lost. No matter how much a city requires management, violence must not become an unspoken rule beyond the law. What pierces the heart most about this Wuhan incident is not just that individuals were beaten, but that people at the bottom—already struggling for basic survival—can still be further crushed by greater power. How a nation treats its most vulnerable speaks volumes about its true level of civilization.

Violent law enforcement must not be tolerated, and concealing the truth is even more unacceptable. Genuine stability does not come from suppressing problems, but from treating human beings with human dignity, applying rules as rules should be applied, and confining power within the cage of the law.

Editor: Hu Lili

Proofreader: Mao Yiwei

Translator: Shen Meihua

当推文成为“罪证”

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——从李维忠案看中共对言论自由的恐惧

作者/冯仍

近日,我看到湖南省益阳市人民检察院对李维忠提起公诉的一份《起诉书》。读完以后,我最震惊的,并不是其中出现了“煽动颠覆国家政权罪”这几个字,而是检察机关列出的那些所谓“犯罪事实”:写文章、发推文、转发政治观点、印刷和传播文章。这些原本属于公民表达思想和政治观点的行为,竟然被一项一项写进了刑事起诉书。

当推文成为“罪证”

更值得注意的是,检方不仅记录李维忠在Twitter,也就是现在的X平台上发表、转发了多少条内容,甚至连这些推文获得多少评论、多少转发、多少点赞,都进行了统计。看到这里,我感受到的已经不只是一个人的案件,而是一套非常具体的政治监控和追责方式。它说明,中共不仅在意一个人说了什么,也在意这些话传播了多远、影响了多少人。

根据起诉书记载,李维忠长期在境外网站发表批评中国共产党领导和社会主义制度的文章,也曾在Twitter平台发布、转发相关政治内容。如果这些事实属实,我首先想到的问题却是:批评一个执政党,为什么可以被认定为颠覆一个国家?

中国共产党不是中国,中华人民共和国也不应该等同于中国共产党。一个公民批评执政党,反对现行政治制度,甚至公开主张民主化改革,本质上都属于政治意见。一个现代国家如果连这些声音都无法容纳,那么问题恐怕不在说话的人,而在这个制度本身。

可是,在中共建立的政治逻辑中,“党”“政府”和“国家”长期被有意混为一体。批评共产党,可以被解释成攻击国家;反对一党专政,可以被解释成颠覆政权;呼吁民主宪政,也可能被扣上“危害国家安全”的帽子。于是,一个人没有枪,没有组织武装,没有实施暴力,仅仅写了文章、发了推文,就可能面对“颠覆国家政权”的刑事指控。

这究竟说明言论有多危险,还是说明这个政权对言论有多恐惧?我认为,李维忠案中最值得关注的,恰恰不是这些文章和推文本身,而是司法机关如何把思想表达一步一步转化为刑事证据。

起诉书中还有一个细节尤其值得注意。检察机关专门统计了其Twitter账号相关内容的评论数、转发数和点赞数。为什么要统计这些数字?在我看来,这恰恰暴露了中共处理政治言论的一种基本逻辑:它不仅要判断一个人“说了什么”,还要评估这些话究竟传播了多少人。

换句话说,一个观点影响越大,在所谓“维稳”体系眼中可能就越危险。这也让我们更加理解,中国为什么投入如此庞大的资源进行网络封锁、删帖、封号、关键词过滤和舆论控制。真正令专制制度害怕的,从来不只是一个人说一句话,而是这句话被第二个人听见,再被第三个人转发,最后让越来越多的人开始提出同样的问题。

所以,一条推文的点赞、评论和转发,最终都可以变成司法文书中的数字。这已经不只是普通意义上的案件侦查,更像是在计算一种思想传播的范围。

这份起诉书对身在海外的中国人尤其值得警醒。很多人离开中国以后会认为,到了美国、欧洲,只要使用Twitter、YouTube、Facebook这些境外平台,中共就看不到,也管不到。现在看来,这是一种过于乐观的判断。

李维忠案至少说明,中国公安机关不仅会搜集境外网站发表的文章,也可能长期保存境外社交媒体账号的发言、转发和传播数据。一个人在海外说过什么、写过什么、与谁联系过,这些内容都有可能被记录下来,并在某一天成为政治案件中的材料。

这件事情对我有特别直接的触动。来到美国以后,我公开加入中国民主党,参加中国领事馆前的抗议活动,纪念六四,声援政治犯,也通过实名社交媒体持续批评中共的一党专政以及对宗教自由、人权和言论自由的打压。我还参与《在野党》的编辑和校对工作。按照李维忠案中呈现出来的办案逻辑,这些事情中的很多内容,完全可能成为公安机关记录的对象。

而这种担忧对我来说并不是抽象的。在我参加海外政治活动、发表政治言论之后,国内公安人员曾多次到我父母住所,也曾通过家人传递对我海外言论的警告;后来,我在国内的商业关系也受到政治因素影响。正因为经历过这些事情,当我看到李维忠起诉书中那些“境外网站”“Twitter账号”“境外机构”这样的文字时,我感到格外刺眼。

我看到的不是一个遥远的案件,而是一套非常现实的追责机制。它真正产生的作用,也许并不仅仅是把一个人送进监狱,更重要的是警告其他人不要说话。

一个政府不需要把所有批评者全部抓起来。只需要抓几个,只需要让几份起诉书流出来,只需要让大家知道:“你在国外网站写的文章我们也能看到,你发过多少条推文我们也能查到,甚至有多少人点赞,我们都记录着。”恐惧自然就会产生。

接下来,人们开始自我审查。这一句是不是不能发,这个名字是不是不能提,这篇文章是不是最好删除,回中国会不会出事,家人会不会受到牵连。当一个人开始主动删除自己的思想时,审查制度就已经完成了最重要的一步。

因为最高效的审查,从来不是警察每天站在每个人身后,而是让每个人心里都住进一个警察。

我始终认为,无论一个人的政治观点多么尖锐,只要他没有鼓动和实施针对他人的暴力,就应该允许他表达。你不同意一篇文章,可以写另一篇文章反驳;你不同意一种政治主张,可以公开辩论;你甚至可以认为一个人的观点完全错误,但不能因为一个人批评执政党,就把他关进监狱。

更不能因为一个人发表几十篇文章、几十条推文,就说他“颠覆国家”。如果几十条推文真的能够颠覆一个拥有庞大军队、警察、国安系统、宣传机器和互联网防火墙的政权,那么真正应该被质疑的,也许并不是那几十条推文,而是这个政权为什么如此缺乏安全感。

看到这样的案件,有人可能会说,既然说话有风险,那就少说一点。这当然是每个人自己的选择,我也完全理解这种恐惧。当公安找到我的家人,当国内的人因为我的政治活动受到询问时,我不可能毫无压力。

但这些经历也让我越来越明白,我今天之所以珍惜在美国可以公开表达政治观点的自由,正是因为我曾经生活在一个不能自由说话的社会。如果来到自由社会之后,我们仍然因为中共的恐惧而自我审查,那么人在地理上虽然离开了中国,思想上却仍然没有真正走出那堵墙。

李维忠案真正值得我们关注的,也正在这里。今天进入起诉书的是李维忠的32篇文章、36条推文;明天也可能是另一个人的YouTube视频、Facebook文章或者X平台帖子。所以,对这样的案件保持关注,不仅仅是在声援一个具体的人,也是在维护一个最基本的原则:批评政府不是犯罪,反对一个政党不是犯罪,要求民主不是犯罪,思想更不应该成为犯罪。

一个政权可以删除文章,可以封锁网站,可以把一个人投入监狱,但它很难永远封锁一个社会对真相和自由的追问。而我们能够做的,就是不要因为恐惧而主动沉默。

当一条推文都能够成为“颠覆国家”的罪证时,真正值得担忧的,从来不是那条推文,而是那个害怕人民说话的政权。

编辑:钟然

校对:毛一炜 翻译:沈美花

When Tweets Become “Criminal Evidence”: Looking at the CCP’s Fear of Free Speech Through the Case of Li Weizhong

Author: Feng Reng

Abstract: Li Weizhong was indicted by the procuratorate on charges of “inciting subversion of state power” for publishing and retweeting political articles and tweets. The author thereby questions the Chinese Communist Party’s suppression of political speech, calling on the public to cherish freedom of speech and remain vigilant against self-censorship induced by fear.

Recently, I saw an Indictment issued by the People’s Procuratorate of Yiyang City, Hunan Province, against Li Weizhong.

After reading it, what shocked me the most was not the appearance of the words “inciting subversion of state power,” but rather the so-called “facts of the crime” listed by the procuratorial organ: writing articles, posting tweets, reposting political views, as well as printing and disseminating articles.

These acts, which originally belonged to citizens expressing their thoughts and political views, were actually written into a criminal indictment, item by item.

当推文成为“罪证”

What is even more worthy of attention is that the procuratorate not only recorded how many pieces of content Li Weizhong posted and retweeted on Twitter—now known as X—but even compiled statistics on how many comments, retweets, and likes these tweets received.

Reading up to this point, what I felt was no longer just a case involving a single individual, but a highly specific method of political surveillance and accountability. It demonstrates that the CCP not only cares about what a person says, but also cares about how far those words spread and how many people they influence.

According to the records in the indictment, Li Weizhong had long published articles criticizing the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the socialist system on overseas websites, and had also posted and retweeted relevant political content on the Twitter platform.

If these facts are true, the first question that comes to my mind is: Why can criticizing a ruling party be identified as subverting a state?

The Chinese Communist Party is not China, nor should the People’s Republic of China be equated with the Chinese Communist Party. A citizen criticizing the ruling party, opposing the current political system, or even publicly advocating for democratic reform essentially holds political opinions. If a modern country cannot tolerate even these voices, then the problem likely lies not with the speakers, but with the system itself.

However, within the political logic established by the CCP, “the Party,” “the government,” and “the state” have long been intentionally conflated. Criticizing the Communist Party can be interpreted as attacking the state; opposing one-party dictatorship can be interpreted as subverting state power; and calling for constitutional democracy can also be labeled as “endangering national security.” Thus, without owning a gun, organizing armed forces, or committing acts of violence, a person—simply by writing articles and posting tweets—can face criminal charges of “inciting subversion of state power.”

Does this ultimately show how dangerous speech is, or how terrified this regime is of speech? I believe that what deserves the most attention in the Li Weizhong case is precisely not these articles and tweets themselves, but how judicial organs transform the expression of thought step by step into criminal evidence.

There is another detail in the indictment that is particularly noteworthy. The procuratorial organ specifically compiled statistics on the number of comments, retweets, and likes on his Twitter account’s relevant content. Why count these numbers? In my view, this precisely exposes a fundamental logic of how the CCP handles political speech: It not only judges what a person “said,” but also evaluates how many people those words actually reached.

In other words, the greater the influence of an opinion, the more dangerous it may appear in the eyes of the so-called “stability maintenance” system. This also allows us to better understand why China invests such vast resources into internet blockades, post deletions, account bans, keyword filtering, and public opinion control. What truly frightens an authoritarian system is never just one person saying a word, but that word being heard by a second person, retweeted by a third person, and ultimately leading more and more people to start asking the same questions.

Therefore, the likes, comments, and retweets on a tweet can ultimately turn into numbers in legal documents. This is no longer just a case investigation in the ordinary sense, but feels more like calculating the reach of an idea’s dissemination.

This indictment serves as a particular wake-up call for Chinese people living overseas. Many people believe that after leaving China and arriving in the United States or Europe, as long as they use overseas platforms like Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook, the CCP cannot see them and cannot reach them. Looking at it now, this is an overly optimistic judgment.

The case of Li Weizhong shows, at the very least, that Chinese public security organs not only collect articles published on overseas websites, but may also preserve post, retweet, and dissemination data from overseas social media accounts over a long period. What a person has said, written, or who they have contacted overseas could all be recorded and become material in a political case one day.

This matter touches me in a particularly direct way. Since coming to the United States, I publicly joined the China Democracy Party, participated in protests in front of the Chinese Consulate, commemorated June 4th, voiced support for political prisoners, and continuously criticized the CCP’s one-party dictatorship and its suppression of religious freedom, human rights, and freedom of speech through real-name social media. I have also been involved in the editing and proofreading of the publication The Opposition Party. According to the case-handling logic demonstrated in Li Weizhong’s case, much of what I do in these matters could very well become targets of recording by public security organs.

And this concern is not abstract to me. After I participated in overseas political activities and published political speech, domestic public security officers visited my parents’ home multiple times and passed along warnings through my family regarding my overseas speech. Later, my commercial relationships in China were also affected by political factors. Precisely because I have experienced these things, when I saw words like “overseas websites,” “Twitter account,” and “overseas institutions” in Li Weizhong’s indictment, I found them extraordinarily piercing to the eye.

What I see is not a distant case, but a very real mechanism of accountability. The effect it truly produces may not merely be sending one person to prison, but more importantly, warning others not to speak.

A government does not need to arrest all its critics. It only needs to arrest a few, allow a few indictments to leak out, and let everyone know: “We can see the articles you write on foreign websites, we can trace how many tweets you have posted, and we even keep records of how many people liked them.” Fear then arises naturally.

Next, people begin to self-censor. Is this sentence off-limits? Can this name not be mentioned? Is it best to delete this article? Will I run into trouble if I return to China? Will my family be implicated? When a person begins to proactively delete their own thoughts, the censorship system has already completed its most crucial step.

Because the most efficient censorship is never a police officer standing behind everyone every day, but making everyone harbor a policeman inside their own heart.

I have always believed that no matter how sharp a person’s political views are, as long as they do not incite or carry out violence against others, they should be allowed to express them. If you disagree with an article, you can write another article to refute it; if you disagree with a political stance, you can debate it publicly; you may even believe a person’s view is completely wrong, but you cannot lock someone in prison just because they criticized the ruling party.

Even less should someone be accused of “subverting the state” simply for publishing dozens of articles and tweets. If a few dozen tweets can truly subvert a regime that possesses a massive military, police, national security system, propaganda machine, and internet firewall, then what should truly be questioned is perhaps not those few dozen tweets, but why this regime lacks a sense of security to such an extent.

Seeing such a case, some might say that since speaking out carries risks, it is better to say less. This is, of course, everyone’s individual choice, and I fully understand this fear. When the public security officers approached my family, and when people in China were questioned because of my political activities, it was impossible for me to feel no pressure.

However, these experiences have also made me understand more and more clearly that the reason I cherish the freedom to publicly express political views in the United States today is precisely because I once lived in a society where one could not speak freely. If, after arriving in a free society, we still self-censor out of fear of the CCP, then while we may have physically left China, our minds have still not truly walked out from behind that wall.

This is precisely where the Li Weizhong case truly deserves our attention. Today, what entered the indictment were Li Weizhong’s 32 articles and 36 tweets; tomorrow, it could be another person’s YouTube video, Facebook post, or X platform thread. Therefore, maintaining attention on such cases is not only standing in solidarity with a specific individual, but also upholding the most fundamental principle: Criticizing the government is not a crime, opposing a political party is not a crime, demanding democracy is not a crime, and thought itself should never become a crime.

A regime can delete articles, block websites, and throw a person into prison, but it can hardly forever block a society’s pursuit of truth and freedom. What we can do is refuse to actively stay silent out of fear.

When a single tweet can become criminal evidence of “subverting the state,” what is truly worth worrying about is never that tweet, but the regime that fears its people speaking out.

Editor: Zhong Ran

Proofreader: Mao Yiwei

Translator: Shen Meihua

都是母亲,谁的爱更光辉?

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兼论——当“旺旺的哀鸣”撞上“维稳的铁幕”:揭阳虐狗案是一面照妖镜

作者:漠北孤侠

6月28日,广东揭阳:4个孩子,4条命。

2026年6月28日下午,在揭阳市揭东区新亨镇坪埔村,4名约12岁男童,用铁丝勒颈、带钉木棍殴打流浪母狗“旺旺”和她3只半个月大的幼犬。

最后泼汽油点火焚烧。火中旺旺挣扎哀鸣,他们却嬉笑高喊“好香”、“烤狗,好香啊”。

旺旺是村民看着长大的,刚生下3个孩子,为护子寸步不离。临死前她还在舔舐幼犬。

视频流出后,全网崩溃。这不是“孩子犯错”,这是预谋的折磨和杀戮 。

这些天不少爱心人士的泪水未干过;一名涉事男童的母亲肖丽萍的“护犊信”,再次点燃全网怒火。她轻描淡写地把恶说成“无知”,把公义说成“网暴”,却从未反省小孩恶行的源头。这种行为若不及时矫治,可能演变为严重的社会安全隐患。

事发近1个月后,7月23日据媒体报道,其中一名男童母亲“肖丽萍”在网上发文。核心3句话:

1. “少年价值观未成形,做错事乃一时冲动和无知,本性并非歹毒”。

2. “没必要曝光隐私,铺天盖地进行网暴,把年少孩子逼到无路可退” 。

3. “指责自媒体为博流量不停将矛盾激化”。

我们必须严厉批判这封信,因为它完成了4重作恶:

道德降级:把“虐杀+焚烧+嬉笑”的反人类行为,降级成“小孩子不懂事”。FBI、WHO、联合国早已将“虐待动物”列为暴力犯罪一级预警。这不是“无知”,是“冷血”。

受害者偷换:全文0字道歉,0字忏悔,0字提旺旺。受害的4条命被彻底抹去。反而把施暴者塑造成“被网暴的可怜孩子”。是谁在逼谁无路可退?

推卸监护责任:作为母亲,不说“我们教育失败了”,不说“我们会赔偿、会矫正、会终身行善赎罪”。反而指责外界“激化矛盾”。这是把家庭教育的耻辱,甩锅给全社会。

为后续打压背书:这封信发出后,官方“拒绝网暴”“不要传播”的口径就有了“家长”挡箭牌。从此所有为旺发声的人,都被扣上“网暴儿童”的帽子。然后,中共政府的《反对网络暴力法》旋即讨论并马上施。

这不是护犊,是护恶。一个连母亲都不愿承认“孩子犯下重罪”的家庭,教不出懂得“敬畏生命”的孩子。

而中共政府的反应与处置,比肖丽萍还护犊心切到令人匪夷所思,令世界瞠目结舌:第一反应是“维稳”,删帖,全网禁声,涉及旺旺的文字、图片、物品皆判定为非法,上门威胁为旺旺发声的爱心人士,甚至派出大批警察暴力对待聚集案发现场的爱心人士…….

6月30日警方立案,镇政府通报:4人未满14岁,送“专门学校矫治教育”,并呼吁“不要传播相关信息,拒绝网暴”。

但接下来一个多月,公众看到的是:

删帖封号,小红书、抖音、微博所有带“旺旺”“揭阳虐狗”的内容被迅速删除、限流、封号;媒体禁声,7月下旬起“旺旺”“动物保护”等词持续被“河蟹”。打压线下,据多地爱心人士反馈,自发去揭阳现场献花、调查的民间人士被盘查、劝返,甚至有被警力强制带离的案例。各地投屏、壁画悼念被勒令下架。

对4个施暴者“教育了事”,对为生命发声的千万普通人“全面管控”。这是对正义的羞辱,对民意的强暴,对人性的杀戮。

但世界没有沉默。就在国内删帖的同时,全球为旺旺亮灯了:台湾台北101外墙、美国纽约时代广场、日本东京涩谷大屏打出“她想活下去。她本该还活着”;民间组织美国LadyFreethinker发起国际联署,要求中国政府最大程度追究监护人责任并制定动物保护法;中国大陆31省241处大屏自费投放;香港、澳门街头悼念;

一些一线艺人也不惧威胁公开发声,杜江、陈乔恩等公开呼吁加强动物保护。

他们在告诉中国:文明世界有底线。虐待生命,必须被法律惩处。

我们高声呼吁:

立即启动《反虐待动物法》。故意虐待、折磨、拍摄传播,入刑。

对杀害旺旺事件问责:监护人承担连带民事+行政责任。施暴未成年人强制心理矫正+生命教育公益服务,公开道歉。

停止打压正义行动:停止删帖、封号、威胁爱心人士。允许悼念、允许讨论、允许立法联署。

生命教育进校园:把“尊重生命、非暴力”写进义务教育课本。

旺旺死了。但她死前护子的眼神,死后全世界的灯,都在问中国一句:

你是要一个“谁都会犯错”所以可以“烧狗”的社会,还是一个“有些错一次都不能犯”的法治社会?

请不要再用“孩子还小”来原谅“恶”。

请不要再用“肖丽萍式的护犊”来侮辱“公道”。

请不要再用“维稳”来堵住“生命”的嘴。

我们会继续签名、写信、悼念,直到正义的灯为旺旺一家、为所有动物、为所有人,点亮。我们不会停。

都是母亲,谁的爱更光辉?

@baodiantimes

编辑:周志刚 校对:毛一炜 翻译:戈冰

Both Are Mothers, Whose Love Shines Brighter?

Also On — When “Wangwang’s Whimpers” Collide with the “Iron Curtain of Stability Maintenance”: The Jieyang Dog Abuse Case as a Revealing Mirror

Author: Mobei Guxia (The Lonely Knight of the Northern Desert)

Abstract: In Jieyang, four young boys tortured and killed a stray mother dog, Wangwang, and her three puppies. The parents downplayed the evil act, while relevant departments were accused of suppressing public discourse. The article calls for the initiation of anti-animal cruelty legislation.

June 28, Jieyang, Guangdong: 4 children, 4 lives.

On the afternoon of June 28, 2026, in Pingpu Village, Xinheng Town, Jiedong District, Jieyang City, four boys around the age of 12 used iron wire to strangle the necks of, and nail-studded wooden sticks to beat, the stray mother dog “Wangwang” and her three half-month-old puppies.

Finally, they poured gasoline and set them ablaze. As Wangwang struggled and whimpered in the fire, they laughed and shouted loudly, “Smells so good!” and “Roast dog, smells so good!”

Wangwang was watched growing up by the villagers. Having just given birth to three puppies, she stayed by their side without stepping away for a moment to protect them. Even right before her death, she was still licking her puppies.

After the video leaked out, the entire internet collapsed. This was not “children making a mistake”; this was premeditated torture and slaughter.

Over these past few days, the tears of many compassionate people have never dried; meanwhile, a “protective mother letter” from Xiao Liping, the mother of one of the boys involved, ignited the anger of the entire internet once again. She understated the evil as “ignorance” and framed public justice as “cyberbullying,” yet never reflected on the source of the children’s evil deeds. If such behavior is not corrected in time, it could evolve into a severe hazard to social security.

Nearly a month after the incident, on July 23, according to media reports, Xiao Liping, the mother of one of the boys, posted online. The core consisted of 3 sentences:

1,”The juveniles’ values have not yet taken shape; doing wrong was a moment of impulse and ignorance, and their nature is not malicious.”

2,”There is no need to expose privacy or carry out overwhelming cyberbullying, driving young children into a corner with no way out.”

3,”Accusing self-media of constantly intensifying contradictions just to gain traffic.”

We must severely criticize this letter, because it accomplished 4 folds of evil:

Moral downgrade: Downgrading the anti-human behavior of “torture, slaughter, burning, and laughing” into “children being young and ignorant.” The FBI, WHO, and the United Nations have long listed “animal abuse” as a primary warning indicator of violent crime. This is not “ignorance”; it is “cold-bloodedness.”

Stealthy substitution of the victim: Zero words of apology throughout the text, zero words of repentance, and zero words mentioning Wangwang. The 4 victimized lives were completely erased. Instead, the perpetrators were framed as “pitiful children suffering from cyberbullying.” Who is driving whom into a corner with no way out?

Shirking guardianship responsibility: As a mother, she did not say “our education failed,” nor did she say “we will compensate, correct, and perform acts of goodness for life to atone for sins.” Instead, she accused the outside world of “intensifying contradictions.” This is shifting the shame of family education onto the whole of society.

Endorsing subsequent suppression: After this letter was issued, the official stance of “refusing cyberbullying” and “do not disseminate” gained the “parents” as a shield. From then on, everyone speaking out for Wang, were all branded with the hat of “cyberbullying children.” Then, the Chinese Communist government’s “Law against Online Violence” was immediately discussed and promptly enforced.

This is not protecting one’s calf; this is protecting evil. A family where even the mother refuses to admit that “the children committed a severe crime” cannot raise children who understand “reverence for life.”

And the Chinese Communist government’s reaction and handling were even more desperately eager to protect the calf than Xiao Liping to an unfathomable degree, leaving the world dumbfounded: The first reaction was “stability maintenance,” deleting posts, imposing a sitewide gag order, classifying all text, images, and items related to Wangwang as illegal, coming to the door to threaten compassionate people speaking out for Wangwang, and even dispatching large groups of police officers to violently treat the compassionate people gathered at the crime scene…….

On June 30, the police opened a case, and the town government reported: The 4 individuals are under 14 years old and are sent to a “specialized school for corrective education,” while appealing to “not disseminate relevant information, and refuse cyberbullying.”

But over the following month and more, what the public witnessed was:

Deleting posts and blocking accounts: All content containing “Wangwang” and “Jieyang dog abuse” on Xiaohongshu, Douyin, and Weibo was rapidly deleted, traffic-throttled, and account-blocked; silencing the media: Starting in late July, terms like “Wangwang” and “animal protection” were continuously “censored and harmonized.” Suppressing offline actions: According to feedback from compassionate individuals in various regions, grassroots people who spontaneously went to the scene in Jieyang to present flowers and conduct investigations were subjected to interrogation and turned back, and there were even cases where they were forcibly removed by police forces. Public screen displays and mural memorials across various regions were ordered to be taken down.

“Handling the matter through education” for the 4 perpetrators, while enforcing “comprehensive control” over tens of millions of ordinary people speaking out for life. This is a humiliation to justice, a violation of public opinion, and a slaughter of human nature.

Yet the world did not stay silent. Just as posts were being deleted domestically, lights were lit for Wangwang across the globe: The exterior walls of Taipei 101 in Taiwan, Times Square in New York, USA, and large screens in Shibuya, Tokyo, Japan displayed “She wanted to live. She should still be alive”; the non-governmental organization Lady Freethinker in the United States initiated an international joint petition, demanding that the Chinese government hold guardians accountable to the maximum extent and enact animal protection laws; 241 large screens across 3 Provincial-Level Administrative Divisions in Mainland China broadcasted at private expense; street memorials took place in Hong Kong and Macao;

A number of A-list celebrities also fearlessly spoke out publicly despite threats, with figures like Du Jiang and Joe Chen publicly calling for the strengthening of animal protection.

They are telling China: The civilized world has bottom lines. Cruelty to life must be punished by law.

We loudly call for:

Immediately initiate the Anti-Animal Cruelty Law. Intentional cruelty, torture, as well as filming and dissemination thereof, must be criminalized.

Hold parties accountable for the killing of Wangwang: Guardians must bear joint civil and administrative liability. The perpetrator minors must undergo mandatory psychological correction and life-education public welfare service, as well as make a public apology.

Stop suppressing righteous actions: Stop deleting posts, blocking accounts, and threatening compassionate people. Allow memorials, allow discussions, and allow joint petitioning for legislation.

Bring life education into campuses: Write “respect for life and non-violence” into compulsory education textbooks.

Wangwang is dead. But the look in her eyes as she protected her pups before dying, and the lights lit across the world after her death, are all asking China a question:

Do you want a society where “everyone makes mistakes” and thus “burning dogs” is allowed, or a rule-of-law society where “some mistakes cannot be committed even once”?

Please stop using “the children are still young” to forgive “evil.”

Please stop using “Xiao Liping-style calf-protecting” to insult “justice.”

Please stop using “stability maintenance” to gag “life.”

We will continue to sign petitions, write letters, and hold memorials, until the light of justice is lit for Wangwang’s family, for all animals, and for all human beings. We will not stop.

都是母亲,谁的爱更光辉?

@baodiantimes

Editor: Zhou Zhigang Proofreader: Mao Yiwei Translator: Ge Bing

如果出境越来越难,真正失去的,可能不仅仅是自由流动

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作者:贾嘉

近年来,“国家安全”逐渐成为中国越来越多法律法规中的关键词。 随着2026年9月15日新的出入境管理规定即将实施,不少人开始讨论一个问题:未来,中国人的出境会不会越来越难?截至目前,公开法规并没有规定普通公民一律不得出境。

但如果未来相关政策在实践中呈现更加严格的审核趋势,我们仍然可以思考一个更深层的问题:一个社会如果不断提高人员流动门槛,最终影响的是什么? 很多人第一反应是旅游。事实上,旅游只是最表面的影响。真正受到影响的,是整个社会与世界之间的联系。

历史上,每一次文明进步,都伴随着人员流动。商人带来了贸易。留学生带来了知识。科学家带来了技术。普通游客带来了文化交流。开放,从来不仅意味着经济利益,更意味着思想的交流。

如果未来越来越多的人因为程序复杂、审核严格或不确定性增加而放弃出境,那么首先减少的,不只是游客数量,而是人与世界直接接触的机会。一个长期缺少外部交流的社会,更容易形成信息孤岛。人们了解世界,不再依赖亲身经历,而更多依赖别人告诉自己世界是什么样子。当一个人没有机会亲眼去看,他更容易相信别人替他描绘的世界。

其次,人才流动也会受到影响。今天世界各国都在争夺人才。优秀的人才希望拥有更多选择。企业也希望能够自由开展国际合作。如果国际往来成本不断提高,长期来看,企业的全球竞争力、科研合作以及国际投资都可能受到一定影响。

再进一步,这还关系到社会心理。自由流动,本身就是现代社会的重要组成部分。一个普通人知道自己可以去看世界,和一个普通人觉得自己随时可能受到更多限制,心理感受是完全不同的。即使最终大多数人仍然能够正常出境,不确定性的增加,也可能改变人们对未来的预期。经济学中有一个概念:预期比现实更重要。当人们开始担心未来,消费会更加谨慎,投资更加保守,创业更加犹豫。政策的影响,往往不仅来自条文本身,也来自公众如何理解和预期它。

当然,也有人认为,加强出入境管理有其现实背景。国际竞争加剧,数据安全、技术安全、国家安全的重要性不断提升,各国都在调整自己的边境管理制度。这是值得讨论的一面。但任何管理都需要在安全与开放之间寻找平衡。安全固然重要。开放同样重要。如果一项制度能够精准识别真正存在风险的对象,同时尽量减少对普通守法公民正常出境的影响,那么安全与开放并非不可兼得。

真正值得关注的,不是管理是否更加严格,而是这种管理是否透明、是否依法进行、是否具有明确标准,以及是否能够让公众形成稳定、可预期的信心。如果一个人想离开自己的国家,需要面对越来越多的审查、越来越复杂的程序、越来越大的不确定性,那么我们应该如何理解这种变化?

有人说,这是国家安全的需要。也有人说,这是国家治理能力的体现。但对于普通人来说,他们更关心的是另一个问题:我的自由,是否正在一点一点缩小?一个社会是否开放,不只是看外国人能不能进来,更要看本国公民能不能自由地走出去。因为走出去,不只是一次旅行。它意味着求学、探亲、创业、工作、合作,也意味着一个人拥有了解世界、比较世界、选择人生的机会。

真正自信的国家,往往不害怕自己的公民看见外面的世界。因为它相信,了解世界的人,不一定会背离自己的国家;相反,他们可能带回新的知识、新的经验和新的机会。相反,当一个社会越来越强调”为什么要出去”“出去做什么”“有没有必要出去”,这种变化本身就值得讨论。

当然,任何国家都有权维护国家安全。问题不在于是否管理,而在于管理是否有清晰边界。如果法律赋予行政机关更大的裁量空间,却没有足够透明的标准和有效的救济机制,那么公众最容易失去的,就是确定性。而一个社会一旦失去确定性,人们就会开始调整自己的行为。企业减少长期投资。年轻人推迟人生规划。国际合作变得更加谨慎。 普通家庭也会开始担心:未来是不是还有更多自己无法预料的变化? 有人认为,这只是个别人的担忧。但历史经验告诉我们,一个社会的发展,从来不仅依赖资源和资本,更依赖信心。信心来自稳定、可预期的规则。当人们相信规则不会轻易变化,他们愿意投入时间、财富和未来。反之,如果公众越来越依赖猜测政策、揣摩尺度,那么社会运行成本也会随之上升。

更值得警惕的是,任何一项权力,在缺乏足够约束和监督时,都可能不断扩张。今天是出入境。明天可能是其他领域。现代法治的意义,不只是赋予政府管理能力,更重要的是明确管理边界,让权力始终受到法律约束,让每一位公民都知道:什么可以做,什么不能做;什么情况下会受到限制,什么情况下能够获得救济。

一个社会真正的安全,不只是边境安全、数据安全或技术安全。还包括制度的可信赖、规则的透明、公民对未来的信心。如果人们因为担心不确定性而不敢规划未来,如果越来越多人觉得自己的选择空间不断缩小,那么这种代价,可能比我们想象的更加深远。对于任何国家来说,安全与自由并不是非此即彼的选择。真正高水平的治理,不是用更多限制来证明管理能力,而是在维护公共利益的同时,最大程度保障普通人的合法权利。只有当权力始终运行在清晰、透明、可监督的规则之下,一个社会才能既安全,也充满活力。

真正值得思考的,不是如何让人留下,而是如何让人愿意留下;不是如何限制离开,而是如何让人相信,这里依然值得托付自己的未来。

编辑:韩立华 校对:王滨 翻译:戈冰

If Leaving the Country Becomes Increasingly Difficult, What Is Truly Lost May Be More Than Just Free Movement

By Jia Jia

In recent years, “national security” has gradually become a key term in an increasing number of China’s laws and regulations. With the new exit-and-entry administration regulations set to take effect on September 15, 2026, many people have begun discussing a question: In the future, will it become increasingly difficult for Chinese citizens to leave the country? As of now, public regulations do not stipulate that ordinary citizens are forbidden from exiting the country across the board.

However, if relevant policies demonstrate a trend toward stricter review in practice in the future, we can still ponder a deeper question: If a society continuously raises the threshold for human mobility, what will ultimately be affected? Many people’s initial reaction is tourism. In fact, tourism is merely the most superficial impact. What is truly affected is the connection between the entire society and the world.

Historically, every advancement in civilization has been accompanied by the movement of people. Merchants brought trade. International students brought knowledge. Scientists brought technology. Ordinary tourists brought cultural exchange. Openness has never meant solely economic benefit; it means, even more so, the exchange of ideas.

If an increasing number of people choose to give up on traveling abroad in the future due to complex procedures, strict reviews, or heightened uncertainty, then what decreases first will not merely be the number of tourists, but the opportunities for people to have direct contact with the world. A society that lacks external exchange for a long time is more prone to becoming an information island. People will no longer rely on personal experience to understand the world, but will rely more on what others tell them the world looks like. When a person lacks the opportunity to see with their own eyes, they are more likely to believe the world as depicted for them by others.

Secondly, the flow of talent will also be affected. Today, countries around the world are competing for talent. Outstanding talents wish to have more choices. Enterprises also wish to freely conduct international cooperation. If the cost of international exchanges continues to rise, in the long run, corporate global competitiveness, scientific research cooperation, and international investment may all be impacted to a certain extent.

Going a step further, this also touches upon societal psychology. Free movement is itself an important component of modern society. For an ordinary person to know that they can go see the world vs. feeling that they could be subjected to more restrictions at any moment produces entirely different psychological feelings. Even if the majority of people can still exit the country normally in the end, the increase in uncertainty may alter people’s expectations for the future. There is a concept in economics: expectations matter more than reality. When people begin to worry about the future, consumption becomes more cautious, investment more conservative, and entrepreneurship more hesitant. The impact of policy often stems not only from the provisions themselves, but also from how the public interprets and anticipates them.

Of course, some also argue that strengthening exit-and-entry administration has its practical context. As international competition intensifies, the importance of data security, technological security, and national security continues to rise, and countries around the world are adjusting their own border control systems. This is an aspect worth discussing. However, any administration needs to strike a balance between security and openness. Security is undeniably important, but openness is equally important. If a system can precisely identify individuals who truly pose risks while minimizing the impact on ordinary, law-abiding citizens’ normal travel abroad, then security and openness are by no means mutually exclusive.

What truly deserves attention is not whether administration has become stricter, but whether such administration is transparent, conducted according to law, backed by clear standards, and capable of fostering stable, predictable confidence among the public. If an individual wishing to leave their own country must face increasingly rigorous screening, increasingly complex procedures, and growing uncertainty, then how should we understand such a change?

Some say this is a necessity for national security; others say it is a reflection of national governance capacity. For ordinary people, however, they care more about another question: Is my freedom shrinking bit by bit? Whether a society is open depends not only on whether foreigners can enter, but even more so on whether its own citizens can freely step out into the world. Because stepping out into the world is not merely a trip. It signifies pursuing education, visiting family, starting businesses, working, and collaborating—it means that an individual possesses the opportunity to understand the world, compare the world, and choose their own life path.

A truly confident nation is rarely afraid of its citizens seeing the outside world. This is because it believes that those who understand the world will not necessarily turn away from their own country; on the contrary, they may bring back new knowledge, new experiences, and new opportunities. Conversely, when a society increasingly emphasizes “Why go abroad?”, “What are you going out to do?”, and “Is it necessary to go out?”, this shift in itself becomes a matter worthy of discussion.

Of course, any country has the right to safeguard national security. The question is not whether to manage, but whether management has clear boundaries. If the law grants administrative organs greater discretionary power without sufficiently transparent standards and effective remedy mechanisms, then what the public is most prone to lose is certainty. Once a society loses certainty, people will begin to adjust their behavior. Enterprises reduce long-term investment. Young people postpone their life plans. International cooperation becomes more cautious. Ordinary families will also begin to worry: Will there be even more unpredictable changes in the future? Some believe these are merely the concerns of a few individuals. However, historical experience tells us that the development of a society never relies solely on resources and capital, but even more so on confidence. Confidence stems from stable, predictable rules. When people believe that rules will not easily change, they are willing to invest their time, wealth, and future. Conversely, if the public increasingly relies on guessing policies and gauging official discretion, the operational costs of society will rise accordingly.

What warrants even greater vigilance is that any power, in the absence of sufficient restraint and oversight, is capable of continuous expansion. Today it is exit and entry. Tomorrow it may be other domains. The significance of the modern rule of law lies not only in empowering governments with management capacity, but more importantly in defining the boundaries of management—ensuring that power remains bound by the law, and that every citizen knows what is permissible and what is forbidden, under what circumstances restrictions will apply, and under what circumstances remedies can be obtained.

The genuine security of a society encompasses more than border security, data security, or technological security. It also includes the trustworthiness of institutions, the transparency of rules, and the confidence of citizens in the future. If people dare not plan for the future out of fear of uncertainty, and if an increasing number of people feel that their space for choice is continuously shrinking, then this cost may be far more profound than we imagine. For any nation, security and freedom are not an either-or choice. Truly high-level governance does not demonstrate management capacity through more restrictions, but rather safeguards the legitimate rights of ordinary people to the maximum extent while maintaining the public interest. Only when power consistently operates under clear, transparent, and supervised rules can a society be both secure and full of vitality.

What is truly worth contemplating is not how to make people stay, but how to make people willing to stay; not how to restrict departure, but how to make people believe that this place remains worthy of entrusting their future.

Editor: Han Lihua Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Ge Bing