作者：李聪玲 编辑：张致君  校对：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

        新冠疫情在中国爆发至今已数年，但那段时间所发生的一切，并未随着封控解除而真正过去。相反，它像一道尚未愈合的社会创伤，潜伏在无数家庭的记忆之中，也刻在这个民族的历史深处。对这场灾难的回顾，不应止于“疫情防控”的技术讨论，更无法简单归结为“不可抗力”。因为在这场瘟疫之中，造成大规模死亡、社会撕裂与长期心理创伤的，并不仅是病毒本身，而是一个长期依赖信息控制、行政强制与政治优先逻辑运转的统治体制。

        2020年初，在疫情尚未全面爆发之前，风险信号事实上已经出现。武汉多名一线医生在临床中发现异常病例，并尝试以专业判断向同行示警。然而，这些出于职业责任的提醒，并未被视为公共卫生预警，而是迅速被定性为“扰乱秩序”。多名医生遭到约谈和训诫，其中最为人所知的，便是李文亮医生。李文亮并非政治异议人士，也未试图挑战权威。他只是履行了医生在正常社会中最基本的义务——基于事实提醒风险。然而，在高度集权的政治环境中，真相本身往往被视为不稳定因素。2020年2月7日，李文亮因感染新冠病毒去世。他的死亡，使这场疫情首次以一个具体而清晰的个人悲剧，呈现在公众面前。

        疫情早期的信息延误与压制，后来被证明对防控窗口期造成了严重影响。多项研究与回顾性分析指出，如果在早期阶段采取更透明的信息披露与公共卫生应对措施，疫情的扩散规模与社会代价本可以显著降低。然而，在现实中，地方政府的首要反应并非风险沟通，而是舆情管控；并非医疗准备，而是维稳优先。这种反应模式，并非偶然失误，而是长期政治激励结构下的必然选择。

        2020年1月23日，武汉宣布“封城”。这是一项在全球范围内都极为罕见的极端行政措施。封城本身是否具有公共卫生合理性，学界至今仍存在讨论，但可以确认的是，在实施过程中，相关配套准备严重不足。交通骤停、医疗资源调配失序、普通病患就医受阻，导致大量非新冠患者在封控期间陷入无医可治的境地。在官方统计中，这部分“次生死亡”长期缺乏系统呈现。与此同时，殡仪系统超负荷运转、骨灰集中发放等情况，被大量市民以影像与文字记录下来。多种迹象显示，官方公布的数据难以全面反映疫情对社会造成的真实生命损失。然而，这些问题并未得到公开、独立的调查，相关讨论也很快被纳入严格的信息管控之中。

        疫情在武汉的失控并未促成制度反思，反而推动了一套更具政治化特征的防疫模式在全国铺开。“动态清零”最初被描述为临时应对策略，但在实践中逐渐演变为一条不可质疑的政治路线。病例数字、封控力度与官员问责机制直接挂钩，使公共卫生决策日益脱离专业判断，而更多服务于政治安全逻辑。在这一背景下，各地封控措施不断加码。一些社区被长期封闭，居民行动自由受到严格限制；核酸检测从风险筛查演变为日常行政要求；健康码成为影响出行、就医与基本生活的关键工具。多起经由媒体与民间记录披露的事件显示，孕产妇、老人及重症患者在封控环境中因就医受阻而遭遇严重后果，甚至失去生命。

        这些悲剧往往被解释为“执行偏差”或“个别问题”，但从制度角度看，它们并非偶发。缺乏问责机制的权力结构，使得基层在压力传导下倾向于采取最严厉、最保守的手段，以规避政治风险。在这种逻辑中，个体生命的价值被不断边缘化，服从成为生存前提。

        2022年11月，乌鲁木齐发生的一场居民楼火灾，使长期积累的不满与疑问集中爆发。火灾发生时，该小区处于持续封控状态。事后流出的现场影像与多方证词显示，逃生受阻、通道受限等因素，对人员伤亡产生了重要影响。尽管官方最初试图将事件与防疫政策切割，但随后相关部门也承认管理和应急处置存在严重问题。这场火灾之所以引发全国范围的情绪震荡，并不仅因为伤亡本身，而在于它以极其直观的方式揭示了封控政策可能带来的极端后果。当行政秩序被置于生命之上，当“按规定办事”压倒基本人道原则，防疫便不再是保护，而可能转化为风险本身。

        随后在多地出现的白纸抗议，正是这种社会心理变化的集中体现。参与者并未提出复杂诉求，只是以最简单的方式表达对长期封控、信息不透明以及权力失责的不满。这一现象本身，已说明恐惧并非牢不可破，沉默也并非永久。然而，政策转向同样缺乏审慎准备。在2022年底，防疫措施迅速全面放开，但并未同步建立分级医疗、药物储备与重点人群保护机制。长期封控已削弱基层医疗承受能力，而突然放开则使医疗系统在短时间内承受巨大冲击。多地医院出现挤兑现象，药品供应紧张，殡葬系统承压。由于统计与信息发布的不透明，社会至今仍难以了解这一阶段的真实伤亡情况。

        从极端封控到无序放开，这种政策急转弯并非科学调整的结果，而更像是在政治路线难以为继后的被动收场。在整个过程中，公众始终缺乏参与权与知情权，也缺乏对决策者进行问责的制度渠道。正是在这样的背景下，李文亮医生的象征意义愈发凸显。他并未制造危机，而是试图阻止危机；他并未挑战秩序，而是尊重事实。他的遭遇表明，在一个不允许说真话的体制中，专业良知本身就可能成为被打压的对象。

        纪念李文亮，并不只是对个人命运的哀悼，更是对制度性失责的追问。如果没有新闻自由、司法独立与权力制衡，类似的灾难就无法被真正总结，只会以不同形式反复出现。疫情终将过去，但它所暴露的问题不会自动消失。一个将稳定置于生命之上的统治逻辑，一个将忠诚凌驾于专业之上的治理体系，本身就是对公共安全的持续威胁。记住李文亮，记住武汉，记住乌鲁木齐，不是为了延续仇恨，而是为了拒绝遗忘；不是为了情绪宣泄，而是为了防止历史重演。

Disaster Caused by Human Factors in the COVID-19 Pandemic and the Liquidation of Xi Jinping’s Autocratic Rule

Abstract: The enormous damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in China originated from information suppression and autocratic governance that prioritized politics. The death of Li Wenliang, extreme lockdowns, and the hasty reopening reveal a systemic failure of responsibility that urgently needs to be questioned and liquidated.

Author: Li Congling Editor: Zhang Zhijun Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translator: Zhou Min

The COVID-19 pandemic has broken out in China for several years now, but what happened during that time has not truly passed with the lifting of lockdowns. On the contrary, it is like an unhealed social wound, lurking deep within the memories of countless families and etched into the history of this nation. A review of this disaster should not stop at technical discussions of “epidemic prevention and control,” nor can it be simply attributed to “force majeure.” Because in this plague, what caused mass deaths, social tearing, and long-term psychological trauma was not just the virus itself, but a ruling system that has long relied on information control, administrative coercion, and the logic of political priority.

At the beginning of 2020, before the pandemic had fully erupted, warning signals of risk had in fact already appeared. Many doctors in Wuhan discovered abnormal cases in clinical practice and attempted to warn their colleagues based on professional judgment. However, these reminders, issued out of professional responsibility, were not regarded as public health warnings but were quickly characterized as “disturbing the order.” Several doctors were summoned for talks and reprimanded; the most well-known among them was Dr. Li Wenliang. Li Wenliang was not a political dissident, nor did he attempt to challenge authority. He merely fulfilled the most basic obligation of a doctor in a normal society—warning of risks based on facts. However, in a highly centralized political environment, the truth itself is often regarded as an unstable factor. On February 7, 2020, Li Wenliang died of a COVID-19 infection. His death caused this pandemic to be presented before the public for the first time as a specific and clear personal tragedy.

The delay and suppression of information in the early stages of the pandemic were later proven to have had a severe impact on the window of opportunity for prevention and control. Multiple studies and retrospective analyses have pointed out that if transparent information disclosure and public health response measures had been taken in the early stages, the scale of the pandemic’s spread and the social cost could have been significantly reduced. However, in reality, the primary response of local governments was not risk communication, but public opinion management; not medical preparation, but maintaining stability as the priority. This response pattern was not an accidental mistake, but an inevitable choice under a long-term political incentive structure.

On January 23, 2020, Wuhan announced a “city lockdown.” This was an extreme administrative measure extremely rare even on a global scale. Whether the lockdown itself possessed public health rationality is still being discussed in academia, but what can be confirmed is that during the implementation process, relevant supporting preparations were seriously insufficient. The sudden halt of transportation, the disorder in medical resource allocation, and the obstruction of medical treatment for ordinary patients caused a large number of non-COVID patients to fall into a state of having no medical care during the lockdown. In official statistics, this part of “secondary deaths” has long lacked a systematic presentation. Meanwhile, the funeral system operating beyond capacity and the centralized distribution of ashes were recorded by a large number of citizens through images and text. Various signs indicate that the data released by the authorities find it difficult to fully reflect the true loss of life caused by the pandemic to society. However, these issues have not been subjected to open and independent investigation, and related discussions were quickly incorporated into strict information control.

The loss of control over the pandemic in Wuhan did not lead to institutional reflection, but instead promoted a set of epidemic prevention models with more political characteristics to spread across the country. “Dynamic Zero-COVID” was initially described as a temporary response strategy, but in practice, it gradually evolved into an unquestionable political line. Case numbers, lockdown intensity, and official accountability mechanisms were directly linked, causing public health decision-making to increasingly deviate from professional judgment and serve more the logic of political security. In this context, lockdown measures in various places were continuously escalated. Some communities were closed for long periods, and the freedom of movement for residents was strictly restricted; PCR testing evolved from risk screening into a daily administrative requirement; the Health Code became a key tool affecting travel, medical treatment, and basic life. Multiple incidents disclosed through media and folk records showed that pregnant women, the elderly, and critically ill patients encountered severe consequences—even losing their lives—due to the obstruction of medical treatment in the lockdown environment.

These tragedies are often explained as “execution deviations” or “individual problems,” but from an institutional perspective, they are not accidental. A power structure lacking an accountability mechanism makes the grassroots, under the transmission of pressure, inclined to adopt the most severe and conservative means to evade political risks. In this logic, the value of individual lives is continuously marginalized, and obedience becomes the prerequisite for survival.

In November 2022, a fire in a residential building in Urumqi caused long-accumulated dissatisfaction and questions to erupt collectively. When the fire occurred, the compound was under continuous lockdown. Field images and testimonies from multiple parties that leaked afterward showed that factors such as blocked escape routes and restricted passages had a major impact on the casualties. Although the authorities initially tried to decouple the incident from epidemic prevention policies, relevant departments subsequently admitted that there were serious problems in management and emergency handling. The reason this fire triggered a nationwide emotional shock was not just because of the casualties themselves, but because it revealed in an extremely direct way the extreme consequences that lockdown policies could bring. When administrative order is placed above life, and when “acting according to regulations” overrides basic humanitarian principles, epidemic prevention is no longer protection but may transform into risk itself.

The “White Paper Protests” that subsequently appeared in many places were a concentrated manifestation of this change in social psychology. The participants did not put forward complex demands but merely expressed dissatisfaction with the long-term lockdowns, lack of information transparency, and failure of power in the simplest way. This phenomenon itself has already shown that fear is not unbreakable, and silence is not permanent. However, the policy turn similarly lacked prudent preparation. At the end of 2022, epidemic prevention measures were quickly and fully lifted, but a tiered medical system, drug reserves, and protection mechanisms for key populations were not established simultaneously. Long-term lockdowns had already weakened the capacity of grassroots medical care, while the sudden reopening caused the medical system to endure a huge shock in a short period. Medical runs occurred in many hospitals, drug supplies were tight, and the funeral system was under pressure. Due to the opacity of statistics and information release, society still finds it difficult to understand the true casualty situation of this stage.

From extreme lockdown to disorderly reopening, this policy U-turn was not the result of scientific adjustment, but more like a passive withdrawal after the political line became unsustainable. Throughout the process, the public consistently lacked the right to participate and the right to know, and also lacked institutional channels to hold decision-makers accountable. It is in this context that the symbolic significance of Dr. Li Wenliang has become increasingly prominent. He did not create a crisis but tried to prevent one; he did not challenge order but respected the facts. His encounter showed that in a system where telling the truth is not allowed, professional conscience itself may become an object of suppression.

Commemorating Li Wenliang is not just mourning a personal fate, but questioning systemic failure of responsibility. Without freedom of the press, judicial independence, and checks and balances of power, similar disasters cannot be truly summarized and will only reappear repeatedly in different forms. The pandemic will eventually pass, but the problems it exposed will not disappear automatically. A ruling logic that places stability above life, and a governance system that elevates loyalty above professionalism, is in itself a continuous threat to public safety. Remembering Li Wenliang, remembering Wuhan, and remembering Urumqi is not for the sake of continuing hatred, but for refusing to forget; it is not for emotional venting, but for preventing history from repeating itself.

编辑：冯仍 校对：王滨 翻译：吕峰

浙江的响雷，山东的曙光，使国内公开层面的民运活动提升到一个新的高度，即筹组公开反对党的高度。一个公开的反对党，正在孕育之中。

在专制制度下，催生一个公开的反对党（注意：不是秘密层面的反对党，此问题以后讨论），需要客观和主观的很多条件。这里，我只想谈谈主观因素，即我们民运自身可以掌控的因素。主观因素，包括勇气和策略等。

上一篇文章中，我主要谈的是勇气。我始终坚持，勇气为第一要素，勇气为开路先锋。在当前，勇敢是最大的道德体现。试想，当人们通通勇敢地走向牢房的时候，再专制的牢房都会被踏平，牢房的存在就失去了意义。问题是，有勇气的人，并不是很多。这就涉及到避免或减少镇压损失、让胆量不是那么大的人士也能参与，争取中间人士的同情、争取舆论的支持等一系列的问题，也就是策略问题。

只有勇，没用谋，是政治上的冒险主义；只会谋，缺少勇，是政治上的保守主义。两种倾向都要避免。

策略是桥和船，是抵达彼岸不可或缺的工具。毛泽东讲过：“政策和策略是党的生命” 。这句话有道理，不可因人废言。讲起毛，可能大家还记得四六年的重庆谈判。毛到了重庆，高呼蒋委员长万岁，三民主义万岁，俯首称臣，做了一场漂亮的 “政治秀” 。这是什么？这是策略。毛泽东打江山的一些策略，是成功的。舍之，到不了彼岸，达不成政治目标。

策略之所以运用，乃为绕过礁石，达到彼岸；策略的原则，是削弱对手，壮大自己，争取群众；策略的生命，在于其灵活性。船为绕过礁石，有时必须采取迂回；为了避开浪头，甚至走段回头路。关键是灵活二字。

我们的口号是，让勇气与道义使魔鬼退却；让战略与策略使魔鬼迷惑。

这次，浙江和山东的民运朋友们，在组党过程中的策略表现如何呢？我说，很好。我从天时、地利、人和等角度分析一下。

天时：时间是可以基本由自己掌握的。浙江选在美国总统克林顿访华期间举事；山东选在联合国人权委员会高级专员罗宾森夫人访华前夕响应。两个时间都不错。此时，中共一时不好抓，要给客人一个面子。几天之后，舆论已经造大，也难以下手。下了手，克林顿、罗宾森肯定要表态，中共后患无穷。

地利：浙江和山东都是民运力量比较雄厚的地方。

人和：浙江、山东的民运人士比较团结，心齐。除此之外，人员的分线安排也很有策略，第一线冲出来公开注册，第二线预备，第三、四线人员做后援和后勤。

提法：浙江明确表示尊重中国宪法，用“和平、理性、非暴力”的原则，推动中国大陆的民主化。山东的组党申请提出，尊重江泽民的国家元首地位，承认中共为执政党。这是毛泽东教出来的招术：“打着红旗反红旗” 。中共心知肚明，但是又不好说。棋下到这个地步，可说是出自高手。

做法：完全公开、合法、合中共的法。注册人员公开、纲领公开、做法公开。除了注册外，浙江朱康大还上街公开散发了上千份的“宣言”。王有才和王东海等人被抓后，二线人员通过合法手段申请示威抗议，明知得不到批准，但造成舆论，争取了同情。合法斗争还有一着：法律抗争。你不是有法吗？我就来个以法抗争。为此，各地民运人士组成了法律后援会，二、三线人员给被捕者聘请了律师。如果中共审判王有才，一场法律大战不可避免。其它的做法，如声援灾区、谴责印尼屠华等，不仅合法，而且得分。

总之，这次浙江和山东民运在策略上的操作，可圈可点，给后继者提供了不少借鉴。当策略灵活得使魔鬼迷惑时，我们算是相当地成功了。

前面还有很多弯路，还有很多浪头，还要设计一系列的策略。勇气带动下的策略运用，仍须我们仔细探讨。

（作者为中国之春创办人，现任民主正义党发言人）（1998, 9, 9）

Wang Bingzhang: Let Flexibility in Tactics Confound the Devil— Reflections No. 2 from the Zhejiang and Shandong pro-democracy Party-building groups(September 9, 1998)

Editor: Feng Reng Proofreader: Wang Bin Translator: Lyu Feng

The thunder in Zhejiang and the dawn in Shandong have elevated open pro-democracy activities inside the country to a new level—the level of organizing an open opposition party. A public opposition party is now in gestation.

Under an authoritarian system, the birth of an open opposition party (note: not one operating underground; that issue can be discussed later) requires many objective and subjective conditions. Here I want to speak only about the subjective factors, those that we in the pro-democracy movement can control. These include courage and tactics.

In my previous article, I focused mainly on courage. I have always maintained that courage is the primary element, the pioneer that clears the way. At present, bravery is the greatest moral expression. Imagine: if people were to walk toward prison cells with courage, even the most repressive prisons would be trampled flat, and their existence would lose meaning. The problem is that there are not many people with such courage. This brings up how to avoid or reduce the costs of repression, how to enable those with less boldness to participate, how to win the sympathy of the middle ground, and how to gain support from public opinion—in other words, questions of tactics.

Courage without strategy becomes political adventurism; strategy without courage becomes political conservatism. Both tendencies must be avoided.

Tactics are the bridges and boats—indispensable tools for reaching the other shore. Mao Zedong once said, “Policy and tactics are the life of the Party.” There is truth in that statement; one should not reject words simply because of who said them. Speaking of Mao, many may remember the Chongqing negotiations in 1946. When Mao arrived in Chongqing, he shouted, “Long live Chairman Chiang! Long live the Three Principles of the People!” bowing his head in submission and putting on a splendid political show. What was that? It was tactics. Some of Mao Zedong’s strategies in seizing power were successful. Without them, he could not have reached the other shore or achieved his political objectives.

Tactics are employed to bypass reefs and arrive at the destination. Their principle is to weaken the opponent, strengthen oneself, and win over the masses. The vitality of tactics lies in flexibility. To steer around reefs, a boat sometimes must take a detour; to avoid high waves, it may even have to retrace part of its path. The key word is flexibility.

Our slogan is: let courage and moral righteousness force the devil to retreat; let strategy and tactics confound the devil.

So how did our friends in Zhejiang and Shandong perform tactically during their party-building efforts? I would say: very well. Let me analyze this from the perspectives of timing, geographic advantage, and unity among people.

Timing: The moment can largely be chosen by oneself. Zhejiang acted during U.S. President Clinton’s visit to China; Shandong responded on the eve of the visit by U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. Both moments were excellent. At such times, the authorities would find it inconvenient to make arrests—they must give face to their guests. A few days later, public opinion had already grown, making action more difficult. If arrests were made, Clinton and Robinson would surely have to respond, leaving the authorities with endless troubles.

Geographic advantage: Both Zhejiang and Shandong are places where the pro-democracy movement is relatively strong.

Unity: Activists in Zhejiang and Shandong are relatively united and of one mind. In addition, the arrangement of personnel into different lines was also strategic: the first line stepped forward to register publicly; the second line stood ready; the third and fourth lines provided support and logistics.

Formulation of demands: Zhejiang clearly expressed respect for China’s Constitution and advocated promoting democratization on the mainland through the principles of “peace, rationality, and non-violence.” Shandong’s application for party formation stated respect for Jiang Zemin’s position as head of state and recognized the Communist Party as the ruling party. This is a tactic taught by Mao Zedong: “opposing the red flag while carrying the red flag.” The authorities understand perfectly well, yet they find it hard to object. To reach this stage in the game can truly be called the work of masters.

Methods: Completely open, legal, and in accordance with the authorities’ own laws. The registrants were public, the platform was public, and the methods were public. Beyond registration, Zhu Kangda in Zhejiang even went into the streets and distributed thousands of copies of a “Declaration.” After Wang Youcai and Wang Donghai were arrested, second-line personnel applied through legal channels for demonstrations and protests. They knew approval would not be granted, but they created public opinion and gained sympathy. There is another move in lawful struggle: legal resistance. Don’t you have laws? Then we will use the law to resist. To this end, activists in various places formed legal support groups, and second- and third-line personnel hired lawyers for those arrested. If the authorities put Wang Youcai on trial, a major legal battle would be unavoidable. Other actions, such as supporting disaster areas and condemning anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia, were not only legal but also earned moral credit.

In sum, the tactical operations of the Zhejiang and Shandong activists this time were highly commendable and provide many lessons for those who follow. When tactics are flexible enough to confound the devil, we can say we are considerably successful.

There are still many bends ahead, many waves, and many more strategies to design. Under the impetus of courage, the application of tactics remains something we must continue to explore carefully.

(The author is the founder of China Spring and currently serves as spokesperson for the Democratic Justice Party.)(September 9, 1998)

作者：杨辰 编辑：冯仍 校对：程筱筱 翻译：周敏

在知乎上，一个热门问题引发了不少讨论：“为什么大多数中国人都是无神论者？”西方人眼中，中国人似乎缺乏信仰，但这其实是中共长期洗脑和操控的结果。中国人的“无神论”不是自然演化，而是被中共强加的意识形态枷锁，根植于几千年的历史文化，却被扭曲成服务于极权统治的工具。这篇文章从中西方差异入手，揭露中共如何通过压制宗教、推广唯物主义来维持控制，或许能撕开一些伪装的面纱。

拿史前大洪水的神话来说明中西方差异吧。西方传说中，上帝看到人间罪恶，便降下洪水惩罚，只怜悯诺亚一家，让他们建造方舟逃过一劫。这反映出西方文化中，神是绝对主宰，一切源于神的意志，强调个人与神明的精神连接。而在中国神话里，大禹带领民众艰苦奋斗，堵塞洪水、疏通河道，最终战胜灾害。这本是“人定胜天”的积极理念，但中共却将其篡改为集体主义神话，宣扬“群众力量”，实则掩盖他们对民众的奴役。中共的教育体系从小学起就灌输这些故事，不是为了启发独立思考，而是为了培养对党的盲从，让人民相信只有在党的领导下才能“战胜天灾”——就像他们宣传的抗疫“胜利”一样，忽略了无数被掩盖的悲剧。

许多人天真地认为中国人不信神是因为共产主义和马克思主义强调无神论，但这正是中共的宣传伎俩。实际上，中共正是利用中国历史文化的土壤，将无神论作为武器，摧毁传统信仰，代之以对党的崇拜。中国神话中神仙众多，道教有玉皇大帝、太上老君，佛教有如来佛祖、观音菩萨，还有财神爷、土地公等，各司其职。但在中共统治下，这些被贬为“封建迷信”，民众与神的关系被扭曲成“交易”：人敬神，神须服务。但中共不允许任何“神”凌驾于党之上，他们摧毁寺庙、迫害信徒，将宗教变成可控的工具。西方人祈祷是“上帝赐我力量，感谢上帝”，成功归功于神，失败自责。中国人求愿后，若实现就还愿，若不成则换庙——但在中共时代，连这点自由都被剥夺，寺庙成了党的宣传阵地，僧侣被迫学习“习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想”。

举些例子就能看出这种扭曲。华北“晒龙王”的习俗，本是民间对神明的“讨说法”，但中共视之为“落后风俗”，在文革中被砸烂。民国军阀张宗昌炮轰龙王求雨的事儿，虽荒唐，却体现了不畏“神权”的民间精神；如今，中共却用“人工降雨”技术自夸“科技兴国”，实则在新疆等地用高科技监控宗教少数民族。乐山大佛因有“实绩”而受维护，但中共在西藏摧毁无数寺庙，强迫喇嘛“爱国爱党”，将宗教遗产变成旅游道具。动画《哪吒》里那句“拜了三年，生不出来，我砸了这破庙”，在今天会被审查为“负面能量”，因为它挑战权威——而中共最怕的就是人民挑战党的“神圣”地位。

中国人拜神多为实用主义，“无事不登三宝殿”，但中共将此妖魔化为“唯物主义胜利”，实则通过“破四旧”运动摧毁了亿万人的精神家园。西方人难懂这种模式，故觉得中国人敬神却不信神。但真相是，中共不允许真信神，因为那会分散对党的忠诚。少数虔诚信徒？他们被监视、关押，如法轮功学员或地下基督徒。汉字象形说有道理，难有统一一神教，但商朝的鬼神崇拜被周灭商后理性化——可惜中共篡改历史，将周易变成“辩证唯物主义”的伪装，废人祭是进步，但中共的“阶级斗争”造成更多死亡。

如今中国人“信仰”祖先，烧纸钱祭祖，但中共连这都控制：清明节被宣传为“文明祭扫”，禁止“迷信活动”。国外烧冥币潮流有趣，但在中国，中共用“无神论”教育从小洗脑，让人民无处寄托，只剩对党的“感恩”。中国人并非无信仰，而是被中共剥夺了自由信仰。王权大于神权的历史，被中共放大成极权大于一切，四次灭佛不过是小巫见大巫——想想新疆的再教育营、基督教会的“三自”控制。相比西方神明，中国人被逼信“伟大领袖”，这不是文化自信，而是极权奴役。在当下，这“无神论”不过是中共维持统治的谎言，唤醒需要真相。

Why Are Most Chinese People Atheists? From the Perspective of the CCP’s Manipulation of Culture and Belief

Author: Yang Chen Editor: Feng Reng Proofreading: Cheng Xiaoxiao Translation: Zhou Min

On Zhihu Q&A platform, a trending question sparked considerable discussion: “Why are most Chinese people atheists?” In the eyes of Westerners, Chinese people seem to lack faith, but this is actually the result of the CCP’s long-term brainwashing and manipulation. The “atheism” of the Chinese people is not a natural evolution, but an ideological shackle imposed by the CCP; it is rooted in thousands of years of history and culture, yet distorted into a tool serving totalitarian rule. This article starts with the differences between the East and the West to reveal how the CCP maintains control by suppressing religion and promoting materialism, perhaps tearing away some of the camouflaged veils.

Let’s use the myth of the Great Flood to illustrate the differences between China and the West. In Western legends, when God saw the wickedness of the world, He sent a flood to punish it, showing mercy only to Noah’s family and allowing them to build an ark to escape. This reflects that in Western culture, God is the absolute master, and everything originates from God’s will, emphasizing the spiritual connection between the individual and the divine. In Chinese mythology, however, Da Yu (Yu the Great) led the people in arduous struggle, blocking the flood and dredging river channels to eventually overcome the disaster. This was originally a positive concept of “man’s determination can conquer heaven,” but the CCP has distorted it into a collectivist myth, promoting “the power of the masses” to actually cover up their enslavement of the people. The CCP’s education system instills these stories from primary school onward, not to inspire independent thinking, but to cultivate blind obedience to the Party, making the people believe that only under the Party’s leadership can they “overcome natural disasters”—just like the “victory” in the anti-epidemic fight they promote, while ignoring the countless covered-up tragedies.

Many people naively believe that Chinese people do not believe in God because Communism and Marxism emphasize atheism, but this is precisely the CCP’s propaganda trick. In fact, the CCP utilizes the soil of Chinese history and culture to use atheism as a weapon to destroy traditional beliefs and replace them with worship of the Party. Chinese mythology has numerous deities: Taoism has the Jade Emperor and Taishang Laojun; Buddhism has the Buddha and Guanyin Bodhisattva; and there are also the God of Wealth, the Earth God, and others, each with their own duties. But under CCP rule, these are disparaged as “feudal superstition,” and the relationship between the people and the gods is distorted into a “transaction”: people respect the gods, and the gods must serve. However, the CCP does not allow any “God” to stand above the Party; they destroy temples, persecute believers, and turn religion into a controllable tool. When Westerners pray, it is “God give me strength, thank God”; success is credited to God, and failure results in self-reflection. When Chinese people make a wish, if it comes true, they fulfill their vow; if it does not, they switch temples—but in the CCP era, even this bit of freedom is stripped away. Temples have become the Party’s propaganda fronts, and monks are forced to study “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

A few examples reveal this distortion. The custom of “sunning the Dragon King” in North China was originally a folk way of “demanding an explanation” from the deity, but the CCP regards it as a “backward custom,” and it was smashed during the Cultural Revolution. The story of the Republic-era warlord Zhang Zongchang shelling the Dragon King to pray for rain, though absurd, reflected a folk spirit that did not fear “theocratic power”; today, the CCP uses “artificial rain” technology to boast about “strengthening the country through science and technology,” while in reality using high-tech to monitor religious minorities in places like Xinjiang. The Leshan Giant Buddha is maintained because it has “actual results” (as a tourist attraction), but the CCP has destroyed countless temples in Tibet, forced lamas to be “patriotic and love the Party,” and turned religious heritage into tourism props. The line “I’ve worshipped for three years, yet I can’t give birth; I’ll smash this broken temple” in the animation Nezha would be censored today as “negative energy” because it challenges authority—and what the CCP fears most is the people challenging the “sacred” status of the Party.

The Chinese people’s worship of gods is mostly pragmatic—”one does not visit the temple unless there is a need”—but the CCP demonizes this as a “victory for materialism.” In reality, through the “Four Olds” movement, they destroyed the spiritual home of hundreds of millions. Westerners find it difficult to understand this pattern, so they feel that Chinese people respect gods but do not believe in them. But the truth is, the CCP does not allow true belief in God because that would disperse loyalty to the Party. What about the few devout believers? They are monitored and imprisoned, such as Falun Gong practitioners or underground Christians. There is logic in the theory that the pictographic nature of Chinese characters makes it difficult to have a unified monotheism, and the worship of ghosts and gods in the Shang Dynasty was rationalized after the Zhou defeated the Shang—unfortunately, the CCP falsifies history, turning the I Ching into a disguise for “dialectical materialism.” Abolishing human sacrifice was progress, but the CCP’s “class struggle” has caused even more deaths.

Today, Chinese people “believe” in their ancestors and burn joss paper to pay respects, but the CCP controls even this: the Qingming Festival is promoted as “civilized tomb-sweeping,” and “superstitious activities” are prohibited. The trend of burning “Hell Bank Notes” abroad is interesting, but in China, the CCP uses “atheist” education to brainwash from childhood, leaving the people with nowhere to place their spirit except for “gratitude” toward the Party. It is not that the Chinese people have no faith, but that they have been deprived of the freedom of belief by the CCP. The history of “royal power being greater than divine power” has been magnified by the CCP into “totalitarianism being greater than everything.” The four historical persecutions of Buddhism were small compared to this—consider the re-education camps in Xinjiang and the “Three-Self” control over Christian churches. Compared to Western deities, the Chinese people are forced to believe in the “Great Leader.” This is not cultural confidence; it is totalitarian slavery. At present, this “atheism” is merely a lie used by the CCP to maintain its rule; awakening requires the truth.

——第773次茉莉花行动：关于校园死亡、未成年人生命与被封存的真相

采访 / 整理：胡景 编辑：李聪玲 校对：冯仍 翻译：周敏

在中国驻洛杉矶领事馆前，第773次茉莉花行动如期举行。

这一次，行动的焦点并非某一具体个案，而是一个反复出现、却始终无法被完整回答的问题——中国校园与未成年人“非正常死亡”事件，为何信息总是迅速被封锁？同时公权力机关对家属进行全力打压？

由于事发地在中国大陆，我们无法去现场采访受害者家属或相关学校人员。本次采访对象，均为长期关注中国人权问题的海外民运与异见人士。他们虽不掌握现场证据，却坚持发声，持续追问那些被制度性掩盖的疑点。

“这不是孤立事件，而是一种反复出现的处理模式。”中国民主党党员黄娟指出，校园与青少年“非正常死亡”案件，在处理方式上呈现出高度一致的结构性特征。她表示，从公开案例与长期观察来看，多个事件中都出现了相似情形：结论被迅速定性为“自杀”或“意外”，关键证据无法核查，监控缺失，尸检、调查过程不透明，而家属及群众的合理质疑，却往往被迅速地纳入“维稳”框架。

“虽然这并不意味着每一个个案背后都有阴谋，但它清楚地说明，真相发现机制存在严重的结构性缺陷。”在黄娟看来，真正的区别不在于“是否发生意外”，而在于事后是否允许对事件进行独立调查、证据是否可复核、结论是否可以被质疑。而在这些案件中，处理目标往往着眼于“降温”和“风险控制”，而非最大限度地还原事实。

“为什么信息被封锁，而且几乎成了常态？”针对信息封锁与对家属的打压，黄娟直言，这并非个别失误，而是一种制度性结果。

未成年人死亡问题高度敏感，不只是因为未成年人处于生命最健康的时期，更因为未成年人是一个家庭的未来，一个家庭的希望。一旦信息公开，极可能引发舆情扩散乃至公众问责。在权力与程序严重不对等的情况下，证据掌握在校方或官方手中，家属却缺乏最基本的调查渠道。当“控制后果”被置于“查明真相”之前，封锁与压制便成了惯性选择。也正因如此，这类事件不断引发公众对“活摘器官”的持续质疑。

“当遗体处理高度封闭、证据无法核查时，客观上已经无法排除最严重的可能性。”“体制拒绝透明，不但无法自证清白，反而不断强化了最严重的指控。”

“如果我们不说话，这个社会就只剩下恐惧。”站在领事馆前的中国民主党党员朱晓娜，从个人经历与一个母亲的视角给出了另一种回答。她说，自己之所以参加这次茉莉花行动，是因为“真的忍不住了”。“一次、两次、三次……太多生命就这样被‘处理掉’，连一个说清楚的机会都没有。”在她看来，校园本应是最安全的地方，而现实却恰恰相反。当孩子在校园里出事，却一次次在沉默中“结案”，当真相被迅速封存、讨论被迅速压制，那种冷漠本身，就是对社会良知的摧毁。她坦言，站出来并非因为不害怕。但更让人害怕的，是未来有一天，当我们回头看时，明明知道不对，却选择了躲开、装作没看见，那是对一个人良心的摧残。但她拒绝被贴上“激进”的标签，因为“真正激进的，是一个连孩子都保护不了的制度。如果在中国，说一句真话是安全的，那么谁还会站在这里？又有谁愿意跨越千山万水，选择背井离乡？”

“我曾经也是那个‘什么都不知道的人’”，中国民主党党员刘芳的发言，则从“无知”开始。她说，在自己还生活在中国时，自己和绝大多数普通人一样，几乎完全不知道活摘器官的问题。新闻中只会强调“成功移植”、“医学进步”，却从不解释：器官是谁的？它从哪里来？为什么来得这么快？

真正的冲击，发生在她来到美国之后。通过接触法轮功组织、查阅大量公开资料、调查报告、证词与医学数据，她一点一点接近了那个从未被允许知道的现实。“这个过程对我来说是非常可怕的，因为我发现，这些事情不是发生在某个陌生的地方，而是发生在我熟悉的城市、医院，发生在我曾经生活的制度里。”她曾经以为，受害者只是被标签化的“少数人”。但后来意识到一个令人毛骨悚然的事实——中国大陆就是现实版的《一九八四》，在这样的极权体制下，每一个普通人，都可能成为潜在受害者，成为待宰羔羊。

她向我们提出了一连串无法被回避的问题：在中国，一个普通的十字路口都可以布满十几个监控，那么——为什么一个孩子在校园里死亡，真相却可以消失？为什么遗体可以在未经家属同意的情况下被转移？监控去了哪里？记录去了哪里？责任又去了哪里？

刘芳还从医学常识的角度指出：器官离体后的存活时间是以小时计算的，而血液配型、交叉配型、运输与手术准备，并不存在所谓的“科学奇迹”。然而这一切是如何安排的这么“井井有条”的？是谁把这样的链条安排的如此“天衣无缝”？所以“这不是技术问题，而是制度问题。”

面对“海外民运没有一手证据却不断发声”的质疑，黄娟的回答直指要害：在一个证据被系统性控制的环境中，要求“先有铁证再发声”，本身就是不可能完成的任务。

海外民运的意义，不在于替代司法定罪，而在于持续记录被压制的疑点，一起发声要求独立调查，防止沉默成为常态，从而尽最大的可能还原真相。“如果今天不追问，真相就会被永久掩埋，责任也会被消失，而风险则会被不断地复制。”

领事馆前的这场抗议并非为了制造对立，更不意味着对抗，而是一种坚持——在一个连追问都是有罪的社会环境之外，为那些再也无法开口的孩子发声，替那些被迫沉默的家属发声，向世界提出两个我们必须直面的问题：

他们到底是怎么死的？

中共何时会公开相关真相？

Questioning in Front of the Consulate

— The 773rd Jasmine Action: Regarding Campus Deaths, the Lives of Minors, and the Sealed Truth

Abstract: The 773rd Jasmine Action was held in front of the Chinese Consulate in Los Angeles, focusing on the long-standing issues of information blockade, lack of transparency in investigations, and the suppression of family members regarding unnatural deaths of minors and incidents on Chinese campuses. Overseas dissidents called for independent investigations and sought the truth that has been sealed away.

Interview / Compilation: Hu Jing Editor: Li Congling Proofreading: Feng Reng Translation: Zhou Min

The 773rd Jasmine Action was held as scheduled in front of the Consulate General of the People’s Republic of China in Los Angeles.

This time, the focus of the action was not a specific individual case, but a recurring question that has never been fully answered: Why is information regarding “unnatural deaths” on Chinese campuses and involving minors always swiftly blockaded? At the same time, why do public security organs exert full efforts to suppress the families?

Because the events take place in Mainland China, we are unable to interview the victims’ families or relevant school personnel on-site. The interviewees for this report are all overseas pro-democracy and dissident figures who have long monitored Chinese human rights issues. Although they do not possess on-site evidence, they persist in speaking out and continuing to question the doubts that are institutionally covered up.

“This is not an isolated incident, but a recurring pattern of handling,” noted Huang Juan, a member of the China Democracy Party. She pointed out that cases of “unnatural deaths” on campuses and among teenagers exhibit highly consistent structural characteristics in how they are handled. She stated that based on public cases and long-term observation, similar situations have appeared in multiple incidents: conclusions are quickly labeled as “suicide” or “accident,” key evidence cannot be verified, surveillance footage goes missing, and the autopsy and investigation processes are opaque. Meanwhile, the reasonable doubts of family members and the public are often swiftly incorporated into a “stability maintenance” framework.

“While this does not mean every individual case has a conspiracy behind it, it clearly illustrates that the truth-discovery mechanism has serious structural flaws,” in Huang Juan’s view. The real difference does not lie in “whether an accident occurred,” but in whether independent investigations are permitted after the fact, whether evidence is reviewable, and whether conclusions can be questioned. In these cases, the handling objectives are often aimed at “cooling down the situation” and “risk control,” rather than maximizing the restoration of facts.

“Why is information blockaded, and why has it become almost a norm?” Regarding the information blockade and the suppression of families, Huang Juan stated directly that this is not an individual error, but an institutional result.

The issue of the death of minors is highly sensitive, not only because minors are in the healthiest period of their lives, but also because they represent the future and hope of a family. Once information is made public, it is extremely likely to trigger the spread of public opinion and even public accountability. In a situation where power and procedures are severely unequal, evidence is held in the hands of the school or officials, while families lack the most basic channels for investigation. When “controlling consequences” is placed ahead of “finding the truth,” blockade and suppression become the habitual choice. It is precisely because of this that such incidents continuously trigger public suspicion regarding “forced organ harvesting.”

“When the handling of remains is highly closed and evidence cannot be verified, it becomes objectively impossible to rule out the most serious possibilities.” “The system’s refusal to be transparent not only fails to prove its innocence but instead continuously strengthens the most serious accusations.”

“If we do not speak, this society will be left with nothing but fear.” Standing in front of the consulate, Zhu Xiaona, a member of the China Democracy Party, provided another answer from her personal experience and the perspective of a mother. She said she participated in this Jasmine Action because she “really couldn’t bear it anymore.” “One, two, three times… too many lives are ‘disposed of’ just like that, without even a chance to explain clearly.” In her view, a campus should be the safest place, yet reality is exactly the opposite. When something happens to a child on campus and the case is “closed” repeatedly in silence, when the truth is quickly sealed and discussion is quickly suppressed, that coldness itself is the destruction of social conscience. She admitted that she did not stand out because she wasn’t afraid. But what is more frightening is that one day in the future, when we look back, knowing something was wrong but choosing to avoid it or pretend not to see it—that is the destruction of a person’s conscience. However, she refuses to be labeled as “radical,” because “what is truly radical is a system that cannot even protect children. If it were safe to tell the truth in China, who would still be standing here? And who would be willing to cross thousands of miles and choose to leave their homeland?”

“I used to be that person who ‘knew nothing,'” began the speech of Liu Fang, a member of the China Democracy Party. She said that while she still lived in China, she, like the vast majority of ordinary people, knew almost nothing about the issue of organ harvesting. The news would only emphasize “successful transplants” and “medical progress,” but never explained: Whose organs were they? Where did they come from? Why did they come so quickly?

The real shock happened after she arrived in the United States. By coming into contact with Falun Gong organizations and reviewing large amounts of public materials, investigation reports, testimonies, and medical data, she bit by bit approached the reality she was never allowed to know. “This process was very terrifying for me because I discovered that these things were not happening in some strange place, but in the cities and hospitals I was familiar with, and within the system I once lived in.” She once thought victims were just a labeled “minority.” But she later realized a hair-raising fact—Mainland China is a real-life version of 1984. Under such a totalitarian system, every ordinary person could become a potential victim, a lamb to be slaughtered.

She posed a series of unavoidable questions to us: In China, an ordinary intersection can be covered with over a dozen surveillance cameras, so—why can the truth disappear when a child dies on campus? Why can remains be transferred without the family’s consent? Where did the surveillance go? Where did the records go? Where did the accountability go?

Liu Fang also pointed out from the perspective of medical common sense: The survival time of an organ after leaving the body is measured in hours, and blood matching, cross-matching, transportation, and surgical preparation do not involve so-called “scientific miracles.” Yet how is all of this arranged so “orderly”? Who arranged such a chain to be so “seamless”? Therefore, “this is not a technical problem, but an institutional problem.”

Facing the skepticism that “overseas pro-democracy movements lack first-hand evidence yet continue to speak out,” Huang Juan’s answer hit the nail on the head: In an environment where evidence is systematically controlled, demanding “ironclad evidence before speaking” is itself an impossible task.

The significance of the overseas pro-democracy movement does not lie in replacing judicial sentencing, but in continuously recording the doubts that are suppressed, speaking out together to demand independent investigations, and preventing silence from becoming the norm, thereby doing the utmost to restore the truth. “If we do not question today, the truth will be permanently buried, responsibility will disappear, and risks will be continuously replicated.”

This protest in front of the consulate is not intended to create confrontation, nor does it signify opposition; rather, it is a form of persistence—to speak for those children who can no longer speak, and for those families who are forced into silence, outside of a social environment where even questioning is a crime, posing two questions to the world that we must face directly:

How exactly did they die?

When will the CCP make the relevant truth public?