作者：杨绍政
一、注水文凭是怎样产生的？
文凭是通过一定时间的学习，学生的专业技能和综合素质达到一定质量标准以上的证明文件。专业水平和综合素质达到一定质量标准是指以下几个方面：1、课程的学习。每一个专业都有一定数量的课程学习。每一门课程都有学时数规定。通过一定的学时数的学习，考试合格。2、实践学习。通过一定时间的实践教学，经评定合格及以上。3、毕业论文设计。在老师的指导下，运用所学知识或理论，综合分析和研究问题的能力培养和训练。研究成果经评审，达到合格。4、达到学校对专业学习的其他规定要求。如果一个学生在以上4个培养环节都达到了学校认可的标准及以上的水平，那就说明这个学生的专业技能和综合素质达到了规定的质量标准以上。这个学生获得的毕业文凭就是这个学生的专业技能和综合素质达到规定标准以上的证明书。
如果上述4个环节的至少一个环节没有达标，说明学生的专业技能和综合素质没有达标，将不能获得证明专业技能和综合素质达标的毕业文凭。如果学生的专业技能和综合素质没有达标，学校却颁发了证明学生专业技能和综合素质达标的毕业文凭，那么这份毕业文凭就是注水文凭。注水文凭实质是以不合格产品冒充合格产品。
注水文凭是以隐蔽的形式将文凭颁发给专业技能和综合素质没有达标的学生。上述4个培养环节实质上没有达标，在形式上、成绩上可以达标。比如说课程的学习，学生的学习时数没有达到规定要求，当然原因可能是老师违规，也可能是学生违规。学生的考试成绩不达标，这也可能是老师的授课质量有问题，也可能是学生学习投入性不够。这些问题最终反映到学生的学习成绩上的真实状况就是这门课程没有使这个学生达到规定的质量标准。如果这个学生在这门课上本该不合格，最后在成绩评定上却合格，那么这个学生在这门课上就是以不合格冒充合格，其他课程和培养环节以此类推。这样表面上看似合格的成绩，本质上却是不合格。最终从各培养环节这个表象和形式上看这个学生达到了规定的质量标准而获得相应的毕业证书，但实质上却是不合格产品，因而他获得的文凭本质上是注水文凭。
注水文凭的提供方可以获得额外收益。如果注水文凭是学校主动生产的，那是因为生产注水文凭的各类投入要素的质量和数量可以比合格文凭低和少。在各种投入要素价格给定的条件下，低质量的投入要素和投入数量不足可以降低学校的投入成本，从而获得比生产合格品更多的额外收益。如果注水文凭不是学校追求的生产目标，在各种投入要素收益给定的情况下，各种投入要素的生产时间越少，投入的强度越低，那么单位时间、单位投入的收益就越高，因此各种要素所有者从自身利益出发，有有主动偷工减料的动力。
要生产合格的产品，各种投入要素的时间投入要保证，投入强度要保证。也就是说各种投入要素足够的生产时间和工作强度才会产出更大比例的合格及以上的产出，相反，各种投入要素的较少时间投入和较低的工作强度将产出更大比例的不合格品。在各种投入要素追求较低时间和质量投入而可能导致更大比例的不合格产品时，学校如果要追求降低注水文凭的比例，那么就必须加强管理，以提高各种投入要素的足额时间和质量的投入。加强管理可以是加强管理和改善管理，以使各投入要素的投入数量和质量得到更准确的计量，也可以是确定激励各投入要素努力提高投入时间和努力的薪酬制度和激励约束机制。这些强化管理的各项投入都会引起成本的增加，当然也会使注水文凭的比例大幅度降低。如果整个社会对注水文凭和真实文凭的偏好是一样的，甚至社会更偏好注水文凭，那么学校以降低注水文凭比例为目标的强化管理既是逆社会的大系统、大环境行事，又会增加学校的成本投入。如果是这样，那么学校就极不理智。在这样的条件下，学校的理智选择就是减少管理投入，甚至是主动追求注水文凭的生产，以降低学校的生产和管理成本。
由此看来，在整个社会对注水文凭和真实文凭的需求没有区别，甚至更偏好注水文凭的条件下，生产注水文凭将是文凭提供者满足社会需要的理智行为和常见现象，而提供真实文凭将是逆社会大环境而动，费力却不讨好的事情，注定是要被这个所谓的大环境淘汰掉的。因此，真实文凭稀缺，甚至是绝种，注水文凭盛行猖獗是特定社会规则下个体理性选择的必然产物。
二、注水文凭的性质
要从需求的角度分析注水文凭，首先需要了解什么是注水文凭？什么是真实文凭？我们可以借用注水猪肉来透视注水文凭。我记得以前电视上经常播放注水猪肉的新闻。你们知道注水猪肉是怎么产生和生产的吗？猪肉销售商在新鲜猪肉里面注上水。注水以后，猪肉就增加了重量。假如新鲜猪肉重量为二百斤，注了二十斤水后，整个注水猪肉的重量就是二百二十斤，其中的二十斤水按猪肉价格进行出售，可是水的价格非常低。因此，注水猪肉的本质是通过猪肉的形式，这种表象，把水当作肉来出售，猪肉销售者可以获得高额的利润，同时猪肉的购买者支付更多的货币，蒙受了损失。销售注水猪肉的行为在经济学上被称为欺诈行为。与注水猪肉类似的地沟油、毒奶粉等都是商业欺骗、商业欺诈。
那么注文凭是什么呢？我曾经看到一个报道，说西南大学大约在2009年入学的博士，50%以上都是政府官员。我也曾经看过以前党校滥发文凭的新闻。后来发现党校文凭的含金量很低，和同类其他全日制大学相比，差距很大。据说由于这样的原因，党校文凭在很多单位不被承认。现在估计中央党校是个例外，中央党校在招博士、硕士研究生。但是许多省级、市级、县级党校文凭据说存在质量问题。我自己读硕士研究生时，我们全校一个年级一百零八个硕士研究生，没有一个是在职的。都是全脱产来读书。当我读博士的时候，我所在年级的同学中许多是政府部门官员、企业老总，但是基本都很少来上课。没有上课最后如何评定成绩，当时我不是老师，不敢妄加评论。但是他们很多还是获得了博士学位却是真实事实。
官员、特别是厅级及以上的官员据说非常忙，日理万机，这么忙，读博士、硕士，或者函授能保证基本的学习时间吗？各培养环节能得到质量保证吗？如果不能得到保证，那么官员获得的文凭是不是能够证明他们是合格产品？如果不是，那么他们就是假冒伪劣的不合格产品。这就是我们所讲的注水文凭。
文凭就是一张纸。这一张纸证明你，假如是本科生的话，在大学学习了四年，各个培养环节都合格了。根据大学的规定，你被准予毕业，授予学士学位。同理，如果你是硕士或博士研究生，那么可以被授予硕士或博士学位。准予你毕业，本质意思就是你至少达到了学校认定的各个培养环节的基本质量要求。这些要求达到以后，至少说明你是一个综合素质和专业技能达到了至少合格的水平，你是一个合格产品，准予出厂，准予出校。
这就相当于企业生产的产品，通过各个环节的生产和检测，被准予出厂，至少说明产品是合格及的等级。相反，如果是不合格或者次品，一般厂家会怎么做？在一个竞争性很强的市场环境下，不合格品不准予出厂。不合格产品出厂销售给消费者后，会影响生产厂家的声誉。在一个竞争性很强的市场中，企业的产品需求会大幅度减少，客户会被吸引到它的竞争对手那边去。因此，产品是合格品还是不合格品对企业的生存至关重要。
同理，文凭的本质是个人通过一定年限的学习和培养环节，人力资本达到一个规定标准之上的证明书。也就是说，你的文凭证明你是合格品——你的人力资本至少达到了认定的合格的标准。
注水文凭本质是什么呢？我们说货真价实的文凭本质意义上证明你的人力资本达到合格品至上。注水文凭本质上是讲，你的人力资本没有达到最低质量标准，但还是给你颁发了你的人力资本达到最低质量标准的文凭。因此，你真实的人力资本远远低于文凭要求的人力资本水平。给你发了一个文凭，这个文凭从表面上看，和其他的文凭没有差异。但是这一纸证明书它本质上想证明你的能力已经达到了合格标准之上，但是实际上你没有达到要求。
本质是不合格产品，却给你颁了合格证，让你出校。这就是注水文凭的本质。注水文凭本质就是不合格的人力资本，冒充合格人力资本的现象，也是一种欺骗、欺诈行为。
注水文凭和真实文凭有没有差异？注水文凭和真实文凭的区别非常大，是合格品和不合格品的区别。这是本来意义上的区别。
注水猪肉和注水文凭之间还有区别吗？如果买猪肉人知道猪肉被注了水，他会不会买？他绝对不会买。但是注水文凭呢？你们知道谁需要注水文凭？你们到这里来读书，是你们需要文凭。你爸爸妈妈花了钱要你们到这里来读书，也希望你们获得文凭。但是，你们会发现在注水文凭的生产环节中，文凭的需求方是直接参与其中的。文凭的需求方完全知道文凭注了水，而且还主动参与注水。这说明文凭的需求方愿意要注水文凭，有这个需求。
注水猪肉和注水文凭的区别就是注水猪肉的生产是由于存在信息不对称——在信息不对称条件下买猪肉的人被卖猪肉的人欺骗了，但是文凭需求者明明知道是注水文凭，却还是会付费获取，而且还会与文凭生产者合谋制造注水文凭。
注水猪肉的销售过程是销售方单方面在作假。但是注水文凭的需求方，就是你们，包括你们的父母，知道文凭被注水了，却还是想要这个注水文凭。请问，文凭需求方受骗了吗？没有。文凭需求方本身就在与注水文凭生产者一起合谋制造注水文凭。
我曾经听说这样一个案例。我有一个朋友，给研究生上课。用的是与哈佛大学博士生课程同等难度的全英语教材，用英文讲课，全英文板书，习题的讲解和证明都是全英文，而且是全英文考试。上满54个学时。但是另外一个人，54个课时，只是上4或者5次课，而且这4——5次课还是让学生自己课后去读《高级微观经济学》的内容，上课学生上来讲，老师来点评。在座的各位，请去读一读《高级微观经济学》，看看能不能看懂？老师没有一点真功夫，能把《高级微观经济学》讲下来吗？但是很奇怪，参与课程学习的同学，没有一个对这位老师的行为有质疑或者异议。请问这些学生和这个老师在《高级微观经济学》这门课上是不是合谋制造了注水文凭？这个例子说明文凭需求者获得注水文凭不是受蒙蔽，他们知道这个注水环节，还和生产方一起共谋制造注水文凭。硕士论文的撰写是为了让研究生研究能力达到一定水准，研究水平提高到一定的质量标准。我带的两名研究生居然致谢部分可以一模一样。其中一位居然可以把贵州大学学校简介完整地搬进硕士论文中去。他肯定知道，这是注水文凭的制造，可是他愿意这么做。他知道把指导老师这一关蒙混过关，评审、答辩老师通过、认可，其他条件满足，他就能获得硕士文凭。请问这样的学生是不是自己就有愿意生产注水文凭的强烈动机？ 由上可知，注水文凭从本质意义上讲是不合格产品冒充合格产品的现象。它的实质是文凭需求者没有达到规定的最低质量要求的人力资本水平，却冒充达到了最低人力资本质量要求及以上的水平。如果对这种没有达到最低规定的人力资本标准的这些学生提供了达到最低人力资本质量要求的证明书，那么这个证明书就是注水文凭。这个概念的界定比较重要。你把这个事情要认识清楚。这个问题没有认识清楚，我们下面无法讨论。 注水文凭的生产流程学生在注水文凭生产流程中的作用这里我大致地讲一下。在讲案例分析时还会详细讲。学生是文凭的需求方，在生产注水文凭的过程中，充当了注水文凭生产的合作者。没有学生的参与，注水文凭是生产不出来的。或者说是不会轻易生产出来的。这是一类学生。
还有一类学生，比如考试时学生主动作弊，有老师参与吗？老师没有默许你们作弊，你们是主动偷偷作弊。 我是在乱说话吗？我说有些学生主动作弊。你们主动作过弊没有？到现在为止，你们作过弊没有？你们能不能保证在贵州大学三年时间考试不作弊？能保证吗？不一定。我告诉你。 我这里有一篇文章——《杨绍政教授随笔集的读后感》，是我学生写的。我给你们看一看。 “看了你写的文章后，我想有个真相得告诉您。就像你说一个政党打算从良的话，应该敢于面对丑恶的过去。据我所知，2008届经济学院研究生的各学科期末考试中，抄袭的学生比例是百分之百。你教过我们《中级微观经济学》，《高级微观经济学》。通过两次考试，我发现不抄袭成绩肯定低，抄袭了没有任何风险。并且成绩不会很差，不会使得老师失望，也不影响奖学金的评定。如果选择举报，我将得罪大多数同学。我将在同学中变得另类，遭到孤立。从小学开始，我考试都不作弊。但是在这里，权衡利弊后，我只有选择和大家一起作弊。但是我想说，我真的好好听课了。也认真听课了。也认真复习了。假如大家不作弊，我考的成绩肯定比作弊的低，但是和其他同学横向来看，肯定比大多数同学成绩高。在公平考试的条件下，我更有利于获得奖学金。因为可以和他们拉开差距。但是在不正常的制度环境下，人人被逼的考试作弊。” 听了以后你们有什么感想？我以为他们考的很好。英文考试，不是开玩笑的。我教过两届。从后来我了解的情况看，不单是我那科作弊，作弊的学科那太多了。 据我了解，大多数老师上课的时候，36个学时上一半的课就相当不错了。像杨老师这样上课，绝对是蠢蛋。知道吗？蠢蛋。所以你们很讨厌我。蠢蛋给我们上课。我们跟偷工减料的老师上课还可以玩，多轻松呀。 我这么多的学生，最看重这个学生。他说“像杨老师你这样正直的人，一定会跟考生作弊。可是我看你注水文凭的分析，你假如是正直和负责任的心理，在考试时严打作弊。使一部分学生挂科。你这种行为本来是正义的行为，说不定被一些没有良知的学生陷害，他们也许会像您写的有一篇文章提到的那个学生一样举报自己的老师。你挂学生，贵大学生作弊传到外面，学校领导觉得你在惹事。所以你会出力不讨好。而且会像你文章里说的——在整个社会对注水文凭和真实文凭没有区别，甚至更加偏好注水文凭的情况下，生产注水文凭将是文凭生产者满足社会需要的理智行为和正常现象。而提供真实文凭却是在干预社会大环境相背离而费力不讨好的蠢事，注定要被这个所谓的大环境淘汰掉。因此，真实稀缺或者绝种，注水文凭盛行或者猖獗是特定社会规则下，个体理性选择的必然产物。” 这是我刚刚讲的注水文凭生产流程中学生主动作弊的案例及其分析。 老师环节有没有生产注水文凭的可能性？教师这个环节的证据不是我写的。也是我的学生写的。“去年我们刚入学的期末考《政治经济学》，有一个老师在临考前让我们加一下他的系统。而且考试前就有消息。考试题目就是系统里面的原题目。而且附有答案。我不信哪里有这样的事情。那回我踏踏实实坐在慎思楼上复习了一个星期。考试前一个晚上同学拿到试卷在走道上背《政治经济学》。我关掉灯在被窝里背《政治经济学》。考试虽然很轻松，但是我真的信了。原题，一个不差。这下我长见识了。唯一庆幸的是我考得好。不然的话我会气出病来。但可恶的是同学们在泄题的情况下还在抄袭。我以前没有见过这么不自信的学生啊。看一下，如果过程是这样，我们没有必要渴求结果的公正。因为在这样的环境里，任何讲真话，做实事的人是得不到尊重的。那些爱护老师的学生，爱护学生的老师都是另类。” 管理层环节有没有产生注水文凭的可能性？照样是这个学生写的证据。“上学期， 由于第九届民运会，我们班有四名学生是志愿者，没有参加《微观经济学》考试。按照教务处的文件，他们申请免考的科目按75分处理。但最后结果是他们4个缺考。后来这些学生拿着证明找老师修改分数，都是75分。但是这是个很严肃的问题。教务处的公章，或者领导的批示就可以让一个没有参加考试的学生有了75分高分（这一科目75分在我们班是高分，班上四十二个同学有十多个挂科）。他们没有参加考试，怎么就能够有分数呢。教师是有自己权益的，行政命令也不能让老师撒谎。而且并没有达到老师的及格标准。后来由于我们班挂科同学数量太多了，院领导就批评这位老师，你怎么不爱护你的学生呢？哈哈，什么叫爱护呢？难道是在临考给学生复习十个题目，考五个就是爱护？你们爱护学生的方式就是不让学生挂科？” 这是这个学生讲的。这个院领导因为这个老师没有按照行政命令打75分，这个领导把老师威胁臭骂一顿，但还是没有得逞，所以到更高级别领导那告恶状。老师不给没有考试的学生评定75分，没有关系，我们行政领导直接下命令让管理人员到教务处系统给这些未参考学生直接填上分数不就行了吗？ 我请问，这个老师在贵州省这个地方工作，是不是愿意和省领导、校领导，包括院领导作对？他知道和这些人作对，他没有什么好下场？他怎么敢和他们作对？他经常说，他的胆子很小。他从来不反对学生在学为主的情况下，多做课外活动。搞好学习是专业技能提高的重要环节。参加课外活动是学生综合素质培养和提高的有效途径。高校既要培养专业技能比较强，又要培养综合素质比较高的学生。所以这位老师从来不反对学生积极参加课外活动，包括民运会。但是有一个前提条件——课外活动不能冲击教学秩序，课外活动包括其他培养学生综合能力的活动必须以保障学生正常的教学秩序为前提。如果这个大前提搞不准，没有保障。那就说明我们学校至少在这个问题上有失偏颇。 志愿者本质意义上讲是热心公益事业的人的自愿行为。贵州省招聘志愿者，既可以在省内招募，也可以向全国招聘志愿者。当然学生也可以自愿成为志愿者。如果以行政命令的方式让学生来做民运会的志愿者，然后承诺学生——参加民运会志愿者，可以不去上课，成绩直接被评定为75分。那如果其他学生也不来上课，教学秩序如何维持？就是这样一个情况。这个事件所涉及的政府部门、校级层面、院领导的行为表明，本质上讲他们并不认为这一门课生产那种合格文凭有重要意义。他们认为这些学生没有达到最低质量标准，我也可以给你最低合格率以上。请问他们作为管理层有没有嫌疑提供注水文凭？ 这个学生还有一个证据。“很有意思的一次，我去教务处办事。在门口遇见C同学，我问他干嘛？他难为情地说，我挂科了，来找洛老师。我都不好意，找了八次了。哈哈，分数不仅可以考出来，而且可以改出来。纵使这样的情况是少数，或者有能力的人。但是对他造成的恶劣影响是不能估计的。那么什么是平均分？什么是综合测定成绩？分数都是这样。综合测评就不需要继续证伪了。” 这个不是我讲的。我从来都是有几分证据说几分话，有几分事实说几分话。我这样讲，有些同学听了很难受。心里把杨老师恨死了。你把我们的秘密都揭露出来了。是不是这样的？写文章的是有良知的学生。 其他我不要多举例子了，你们班上就有。我就举这个例子。你们这里有八个留学生。一直来求我——是不是留学生的考试另行对待？言下之意，我们是留学生就照顾一下，难度低一点。就是不一样。寻求优惠政策。但是优惠政策结果也就是你的含金量比他们低一点。同样80分和其他同学的80分不一样。所以我和你们讲，标准是一样的。你们现在还有那么长的时间。他们在跑，你们可以跑得更快。 本科生也是这样的。国贸的几个本科留学生，从开始一直到最后跟我要求了很多次——希望特殊照顾。那样没有用。那肯定一视同仁。最后他们参加统一的考试，5个留学生，2个一次考过，3个补考也过关了。说明通过自己的努力，留学生也能行的。 注意我的考试，补考就一定能过吗？不一定哦。曾经有一个本科生，直到清考都没有过。毕业以后一年再考，真的打了60分以上。我不知道他是不是通过作弊的方式或者几箱茅台酒给某个管理者，提前获得了考题？不了解的情况，我不能乱说话。在我这里，我看到这个情况。
所以，注水文凭的提供和注水猪肉的提供是不是一回事？不是啊。注水文凭的生产流程是一个很长的过程。需求者照样在里面。注水文凭生产和提供，学生、教师和管理层都有作用。凡是领导不作为，都是在蓄意生产制造注水文凭。凡是那些老师不认真授课的也是在生产注水文凭。凡是学生主动作弊或者和老师一起合谋作弊，或者和管理一起合谋作弊都是注水文凭生产的贡献者，没有什么说的。 真实文凭本质，它的本质是什么？它的本质是给你文凭证明你的人力资本达到了一定质量标准之上。那么你实际能力资本确实达到了合格品以上。那么这个证明书证明你的本质和实质是一致的。那就说明是真实文凭。那么真实文凭有什么用？如果那个文凭证明你自己的人力资本。你去找工作。实际给厂家给用人单位提供的信息是真实的。而不是虚假的。这是最核心的东西。真实文凭是证明你真实有能力的证明书。那么东西就是文凭。你拿给用人单位，就是一个信号。你的人力资本是合格的。这个真实的显示。 如果是注水文凭，那么就是一个虚假显示。那意味着你在欺骗用人单位。是不是在欺骗用人单位？我们下节课来分析什么样的制度环境需要注水文凭？我们现在休息十分钟。
三、经济组织的产权主体和注水文凭的需求
刚才，我们已经讲到，如果社会各个行业的竞争程度比较高，行业之间的竞争程度也比较高，而且竞争程度比较高的行业在社会所有行业中所占比重比较大，那么整个社会对注水文凭没有需求。这个时候，整个社会所需要的，是真实文凭，而不是注水文凭。 我现在想给你们追加一个问题——在整个社会竞争程度比较高，也就是社会各个行业竞争程度都比较高的环境下，是不是所有的经济组织就一定有动力需要真实文凭，或者高质量人力资本所有者呢？这些经济组织这个时候有没有可能还是不需要高质量的人力资本，而是需要水货呢？ 竞争程度的高低是一个维度，但是还有另外一个维度——经济组织的产权主体。社会各个行业竞争程度比较高，但是，竞争程度高的行业里面，企业的组织形式有不同种类私人企业和公有制企业等组织形式。 私人企业，它的各种产权比较明确，国有企业的产权结构则存在一系列值得探讨的现象。面临同等激烈市场竞争的条件下，从组织本身的优劣角度，现在有没有基本的共识——国有组织的组织效率低于非国有组织的组织效率？ 是不是一定就是非国有企业组织效率高？曾经有人问我，国有企业效率不高，为什么有些国有企业还搞得那么好呢？私营企业效率高，为什么还有那么多私营企业破产呢？我要告诉你们的是从制度经济学、产权经济学角度来分析，国有企业的组织效率从一般意义上确实要低于非国有企业。但是，这里不是我们今天分享的重点，我不想在这个地方给你们展开分析。 如果国有企业也在这个行业里面来竞争，那么它有可能怎样？在这个情况下它可能竞争不过其它企业，可能被淘汰。国有企业真正的产权主体是谁？或者说它真正的股东是谁？是全体国民。比如说，贵州省国有企业的所有者是谁？是贵州省四千万公众。当企业在市场竞争中确实竞争不过其他企业，就可能要失败，可能要被淘汰。这个时候国有企业真正的所有人没有在场，对自己的财产想关心，但无能为力。那国有企业所谓的经营者有没有可能把所有者的这一部分财产转换成他自己的一些利益、一些收益？转化以后，虽然国企亏损了，倒闭了，但是经营者会穷，会受损吗？穷庙富方丈，有没有这种可能？在公平竞争的环境下，国有企业未必就能竞争得过其他企业。又没有给国有企业的优惠政策。没有优惠政策，政府保护国有企业也不可能了。经营者知道去社会中生存太难了，就可能通过侵吞所有者的利益来为自己谋求后路。因为你所有者是四千万或者十三亿，你能来保护和关心国有企业的资产和经营吗？你明明知道企业里面有你的十三亿分之一的资产，经营者要吞占，你作为个体只能占十三亿分之一，你能怎么样？你去举报他，保护你这十三亿分之一的资产，行不行？你保护的成本支付很高，但是你的收益很低——你获得的只能是你保护资产中的十三亿分之一。 从经济学这个角度来看，你的行为是不是一个理智的选择？你的行为，从经济学角度来看，它的外部不经济非常大。你保护你的权益，所得收入的一减去十三亿分之一被别人拿走了，你只能获得十三亿分之一收益。几乎所有的保护成本都是由你来承担。 在这样一个环境下，请问，你明明看到你的利益受损了，作为个体，你有没有动力和积极性去保护你的所有者权益？这个动力是非常弱的。在这么一种情况之下，明明这个行业竞争程度比较高，面临这样一个体制，经营者有可能怎么样？企业的高利润是所有人的，是十三亿人的，跟经营者的利益关联不大。既然经营者的利益与所有者损益的相关性不强，那经营者为什么要努力发现、寻找高人力资本的拥有者去增加所有者的利润呢？高人力资本所有者让企业所有者获益了，但是我经营者收益没有增加，那我可不可以就用水货，而且水货还可以增加我的收益和效用。第一，你水货可以是我的亲戚，是我朋友，是我的裙带关系。第二，不是我的亲戚、朋友，可不可以通过雇佣水货，让他给我各种好处，货币的和非货币的，能使我的这个负责人的个人效用增加，来获得满足。这样，国有企业亏了，倒了，没有关系。你倒了，我这个经营者获得了最大收益。如果是这样一种环境，那是不是竞争程度越高，这样的企业组织对真实文凭需求就越高呢？我想也不一定。 所以这里提供了另外一个维度——竞争程度比较高，垄断程度比较低这一个条件隐含一个前提：企业组织形式的效率应该没有最根本的缺陷；还有，整个社会的法制，法律体系没有根本缺陷，法律的可执行性那也是相对比较健全的。 只有在这样一种环境下，你的竞争程度比较高，才是真实文凭所需要的这么一个环境。那也就是说，行业竞争程度高，社会各个行业之间竞争程度高，竞争程度高的行业在社会所有行业中所占比重比较大，本质意义上讲，它还有一个潜在假设条件，就是各个行业，或者说各种经济组织的组织形式没有根本缺陷。如果社会微观经济的组织形式违反一些基本的常理，那它的组织形式就不一定很高。 基本常理是什么呢？经济学常理讲，人是自我利益的最好看护人，也就是亚当·斯密的追求个人利益的人。但是，你在追求个人利益的同时，有没有这种可能性——在追求个人利益的同时不去损害别人利益。如果是这样的情况，不以损人利己来获取收益，那么你看好自己的利益，通过运用各种自己所拥有的投入要素获得各种使用机会，使自己的收益增加。这是社会的总财富的增加，是帕累托改进。 但是，如果你所拥有的资产或财富，你不能自己来保护它，或者说你作为一个所有人集合没有权利和能力保护自己的财产，反而只能让别人来保护你的财产，那么，假如别人有机会主义倾向，想要侵吞你的利益、你的财产的时候，你又没有办法保护它。请问这种状况是不是违反了个人是自己利益最好看护人这么一个基本的常理？ 上次课我给你们举一个例子。我说，假如你买了一辆铲车，铲车是你花了五十万去买的，肯定它是你的资产。但是这个铲车，你不会开。你雇了一个司机给你开。这个司机开这个铲车，经营你的财产的时候，你无法对你的铲车行使作为铲车所有人的全部职能，而是由你的雇佣人——司机来行使。他行使结果怎么样？铲车去挖土石方，每天挣的收益情况你不知道。然后就凭他给你讲收益情况。他讲了以后，你不能对他的行为和说法有任何怀疑。不仅如此，你还要表示永远忠于他。如果是这样一种情况，那他把你花五十万购买的铲车每天获得的收益吞占了，却对您说生意不好，没有利润，甚至是亏损。有没有这个可能？铲车及其利用铲车获得的收益本来是你的，他却把它看成他的，最后把你的变成他的。他是从他个人利益和个人效用最大化的角度，尽可能来蚕食你的资产。尽可能使你资产的利用，能够带来他个人利益和个人效益的增加。 这样一种状况，相当于你拿你的东西，去给别人办事情。请问，这个是不是违背最基本常识？我刚才讲组织形式实际也是这样。
四、注水问题的案例分析之一
——学院办公室资源配置与注水文凭的生产 截至现在为止，通过供给和需求两个视角，我们分析了注水文凭是怎么产生的，或者说，注水文凭存在的制度条件是什么？唯一可能导致注水文凭不存在，即真实文凭盛行的只有一种情况——那就是从需求角度，需求文凭的社会各个行业之间竞争程度非常高；从供给的角度，文凭供给行业的竞争程度也是非常高的。只有在需求和供给这两方面都竞争程度非常高的情况下，这个社会盛行的才是真实文凭。当然，即使在这种制度环境下，有没有可能有注水文凭？有可能有。但那样的注水文凭现象不是垄断制度产生的，是在信息不对称条件下产生的。这种情况所占的比例不是很大。 在其他的三种情况下，社会盛行的基本都是注水文凭。一种情况是整个社会各个行业竞争程度低，政府维持的行政垄断程度比较高，文凭供给行业的竞争程度高；另一种情况是整个社会各个行业竞争程度低，文凭供给行业是垄断程度比较高，或者垄断程度比较低；第三种情况是文凭供给行业、还是需求行业的竞争程度都低。这三种情况都是注水文凭盛行。这是我们的分析结论。 这些结论可不可靠？要通过案例来验证。今天我们主要是用案例来验证这些结论。我们还是按照顺序来逐一分析。
学院办公室资源配置问题。这个我曾经写过一篇小文章。就是《西部G大学J学院办公室资源的配置问题》。你看一下，这个问题是什么？2008年底，新的J学院领导班子到任后首先想到的是解决J学院领导成员的办公室问题。院长、书记的办公室就自然使用了上届院长、书记的办公室。副院长的办公室就把原来MPA办公室占用了。另外一位副处级组织员的办公室安排不详。当时的矛盾就是上一届一位副院长的办公室没有交出来。我猜想如果这间办公室交出来，这位副处级组织员的办公室问题不就解决了吗？所有领导不都圆满地解决了办公室问题了吗？当然西部G大学J学院以外的其他学院也是同样的做法。学院领导的办公室条件要优先考虑。我还没有见到哪一个学院会有反例。但是，我还是希望新的领导班子能够打破常规有新气息，我希望新领导能够暂时安顿下来，就现有的办公条件做一个统筹安排。院领导，各系科室，教授、博士各占一个比重。在这样的办公室资源分配中，院领导的比重就要下降，系科室和教授们都有一个办公的场所。虽然这样很紧张，很拥挤。可是现实让我失望了，领导班子优先考虑自己的办公场所，导致其他没有行政职务的教授、博士没有任何办公场所。要知道这些教授、博士一年带的各年级的研究生少则几人，多则十几人，他们和自己指导的学生进行交流讨论的场所都没有。这样一来，院领导班子就有了和学校领导讨价还价的砝码。学校给我的办公条件太少了。使学校的老师没有基本的办公条件。因此，学院教师条件的改善，要通过学校的努力，和学院没有关系。果真如此吗？学校的办公条件再扩大三倍，按照领导班子现有的思路，先满足行政领导和行政人员，落到教师头上的办公条件也会所剩无几。按照领导优先，行政优先的原则，办公室的条件改善了，院领导办公室的标准不就可以从独立办公室扩大到独立套间吗？两间室或者三间室的。行政人员也可以按照单人独立办公室的标准来配置。到那时教师的办公条件差还是可以成为向学校讨价还价的砝码——学校投入不足。如果是按照这样的逻辑，学校对各学院的办公条件的投入很难满足。如果院领导班子不是领导班子优先、行政优先的思路，而是本着教学优先、科研优先，统筹安排的思路，那么在现有资源紧张的情况下，至少在办公条件的配置中，可以按照教学人员，行政人员，行政领导给予一个大致的比例划分。然后在各个人群中，进行有利于更好开展工作的配置。办公室资源有限的条件下，院领导为什么不可以两个人三个人一个办公室？就一定要一个领导一个独立的办公室呢？就是中国大陆的高校中间，我见过三个院领导共享一间办公室的学院，也见过所有领导全部在一个办公室办公，各自使用独自工作平台的学院。当然由于他们的办公条件确实有限。没有行政职务的教授也没有办公条件。不知道这些学院的办公条件改善了，是不是也是领导优先、行政优先？如果我们的院领导放弃了自我优先，行政优先的思路，那么西部G大学J学院现有的办公资源完全可以配置一部分给没有行政职位的教学科研人员。在这样的条件下，老师们，导师、学生有一个交流研讨的平台。无行政职位的教学科研人员到了学院再也不会感觉无立足之地，不会感到是局外人。当有老师将这些情况讲给这个J学院领导时，获得的回应是嘲讽、讥笑。那个院领导甚至对这个老师说，我把我的办公室让给你使用吧。以为是这位老师在挑刺，在找麻烦。有的院领导则毫无反应地应付着。 为什么J学院领导班子要推行领导优先，行政优先的思路呢？为什么教授、老师们的办公条件得不到丝毫的统筹考虑呢。这背后的逻辑到底是什么呢？在一个什么样的制度环境下，J学院领导班子会去推行教师教授、博士优先和教学科研优先呢？如果有可能我会一一剖析。 我看到你们这么多人头这样趴在这下面的时候，我就知道我读那些东西对你们而言没有影响。 前不久，我到北京去，就是到北京大学去听了一门本科生的课，也令我很震惊，这不是中国第一学府吗？但是我看的是老师在上面上课的时候，下面学生大概有一半的学生，他们有的在睡觉，有的在玩电脑，有的在搞自己手中的活。这次我去北京大学中国经济研究中心跟他们讲，我是贵州大学的经济学教授，希望向他们学习，能听听他们的课。我只有半天时间，刚好他们给我查了课表，说有李玲教授在上卫生经济学。李玲教授，虽然我不认同她的一些学术观点，但是我认可她是一个很有学识的学者。但是最后令我很失望——研究生的课堂里面只有学生，没有老师。我问身旁的学生，老师哪里去了？答曰：老师开会去了。老师的课会不会补呢？答曰：一般情况不会补。老师即使到课堂上课，也是学生讲，老师听。这样的情况我们要深度思考呀。 今天我还听了一个非常令人震惊的消息。我是一个对生活非常好奇的人，知道吗？它们里面很多新的东西都会让我产生思考和联想。今天我碰到G大学一个博士也是G大学的所谓老师。 请问你博士是哪读的？ 答曰：就是在G大学读的。 学什么专业的？ 答曰：计算机专业的。 导师是谁？ 答曰：导师是某某某。 我说您导师是研究什么专业的？ 答曰：他老师的研究方向和他带的博士的专业完全不对口。但是这个人以前是领导，我跟了他以后，我到国内去进修，去听课，或者到国外去访问，他可以给我这些机会。所以，跟了他以后，这方面是有好处的。 他在专业方面有没有可能给你帮助呢？ 答曰：没有帮助。 我问他：如果说你自己换了另外一种情况：考博士的时候，考另外一个，比如说是世界一流学者，就是研究这个专业的。他知道国内最前沿、国际最前沿在哪个地方。你跟他一年甚至两年以后，你自己就已经进入前沿了。你那个时候考虑的问题，是突破前沿的问题。但是你现在和这个老师在一块，他不是研究这个专业的，却敢来这个专业带博士生。您没有感觉到会被耽误吗？ 他问我：假如说你有这个机会，不是研究这个专业，有机会在这个专业当博导，那您愿不愿意去当博导呢？ 我说我不会。 他说：那就是人和人确实不一样。 我说这是最基本的常识，同志。比如我不懂计算机方面的知识，我的计算机有问题，我找你帮忙修计算机。如果你不是计算机方面的行家，那么你肯定不会说，我来帮你忙，我给您修。你帮忙没有效果，修不好的。相反，你会说，计算机我真的懂得不多，不能帮您，但是我知道某某人对计算机很熟悉，他是个行家。你找他吧。他准能帮你解决问题的。 但是这就奇怪了。高校的老师也有专业分工。一个老师在这个专业很行，在其他专业很可能是白痴，你不可能懂那个专业的。您从事的专业没有博士培养资格，那你就别带博士生啊。你这个专业没有这个能力培养博士，你要去您不熟悉、不懂的专业去带博士是什么意思？我们的高校连最基本的常识都没有了。 这个学院办公室配置是什么问题吗？J学院办公室配置不是真正为教学服务的。它是按照谁拥有行政资源，谁拥有行政级别，谁就可以享用那些东西。它是行政优先，领导优先的，它不是科研优先，教学优先。这样一个办公室资源的配置，它和注水文凭的生产有什么关联，或者有什么关系？既然当了领导就有这么大的利益，那个有点能力，科研能力比较强的人，假如说行政领导是要通过科研能力强，教学能力强来选拔上去的话，那么他努力搞科研和教学的目的就是为了当官。假如说行政领导不是由于科研能力强、教学能力强被选拔上去的，那么那些聪明的知道怎样追求自己个人利益最大化的人就不会把自己的精力投入教学、投入科研。他会千方百计把他的精力放到能让他当官的人身上，能够让他当官的事情上。我们很多人都想当官，削尖脑袋去当官，因为当官才有搞头。当不了官的，想办法获得当官人的好感。然后让他们在配置资源的时候，给自己分一杯残羹。这些当官的人吃剩了的，也可以给你吃一部分，总比一点不给你分吃好啊。那如果是这样的情况，绝大部分人都是想办法当行政领导，忙去巴结行政领导以使自己能够在资源配置中有优先分配权，那么大家都这么干的结果是什么？我们每一个人的时间有限，精力有限，是稀缺资源。你把你的心思、时间和精力都放到哪个方面去了，请问你的教学你的科研能不能够有非常多的精力和时间投入？不能。不能的话，你的科研能力平庸，你的教学水平平庸，甚至完全不合格就很正常。教学和科研是什么关系？你能生产知识，搞出很好的科研，你的教学水平也是很优秀的。我们很难理解对学术没有任何思考的人，它能够把知识传播好。不可能的事情。如果是这样的情况，我们的老师没有足够的精力和时间投入来搞教学和科研，科研教学水平平庸，那么能不能够让学生获得一流的知识，能不能够对知识进行很好的传播？不可能。在这样的体制下，我们那些非常平庸的老师有没有羞耻感？他可以非常正当地没有羞耻感，为什么？我平庸，是因为你们鼓励我平庸。你们鼓励的是当官，当不了官我就想办法巴结当官的，抱着他们的大腿，也比搞教学、搞科研强得多。 通过这样的方式，老师的精力放到这样的地方去，而不是努力搞好科研和教学，那培养出来的学生是什么质量？既然如此，在这种情况下，请问这样的行政优先，领导优先的资源配置是不是在鼓励人们不要进行科研、教学努力的投入？既然如此，那十八节课给你上八节课的老师就不应该被认为很坏，有职业道德问题。这是她在特定环境下的正常行为选择。 那个18节课只上8节课的老师在特定制度环境下是理性的选择。我觉得这个老师没有问题。他那么干了以后，有没有损失？没有。但是他的成本投入少啊。他是理智的。但是我五十四课学时，除了法定假日放掉了，我没有补以外，其他任何情况，我都会上满的。而且考试是另外的时间。当然考试是研究生科来监考。我会改卷评卷。我这样上课和那个老师那样上课相比，还不说质量，仅看时间投入，他的投入是我的投入的百分之四十，他实际的单位课酬，按照出勤时间，是我的两倍多。从个人的投入和产出，成本和收益的角度，他聪明还是我聪明？他聪明。你之所以这么欢迎这样的老师，是因为他很聪明，他是聪明人。你们为什么恨我？因为我是蠢蛋，傻瓜。 你们给我支个招，我该怎么办？你们说我该怎么办？我是向他学习，还是坚持我现在的做法？您坚持让我继续做傻瓜？所以你们的心眼坏啊。明明知道我这样做是傻子的行为，非得让我做傻瓜，还鼓励我。什么意思？不怀好意。我开个玩笑。但是这个调侃也有意思，你们要思考。 所有第一个案例——学院办公室资源的配置问题，请问G大学J学院的这样的资源配置思路、他们对老师的做法，是不是本质意义上讲在管理环节就在生产注水文凭？所以工学院有个老师，可能不是一个老师，他们说，我就是不会认真上课，我就是上课的时候要糊弄那些学生。因为你这个管理层没有把我们的劳动进行尊重。他们是这样认为的，既然不尊重我，那我也不会尊重我的学生，就这么简单。 我看了以后，很伤心，很痛。我是搞教育的。我不希望这样的现象成为常态。我是研究经济学的。经济学，微观经济学最核心的就是激励和约束。组织目标如果是良性的，就会激励人们努力工作，约束人偷懒，实现组织的良性激励和约束。这些老师发出这样的心声证明情况正好相反，让我非常痛心。 学院办公室资源配置的案例分析表明在管理这个环节确实会导致注水文凭的生产。
五、注水文凭的案例分析之二
——教学委员会、学位委员会、学术委员会的调整和分离问题 第二个，西部G大学J学院学位委员会和教学委员会成员的调整问题。我们看看这个案例和注水文凭有什么关系？ 2008年新领导班子进入那J学院以后，他们没有经过任何的程序，就把以前教学委员会的成员和学位委员会的成员进行了调整。当然每个人的思路和理念不一样，要做调整，可不可以？可以调整。但是调整必须要有程序，必须要有规矩。调整的原则是什么？有没有进行调整的规则？依据什么来调整？调整的程序是什么？全都没有，就是主要领导一句话，某某人以前是学位委员会委员，现在就不是了；某人以前是教学委员会委员，现在就不是了。我想要谁，就要谁。哪些人进，哪些人不进，领导说了算，没有任何理由、规矩和程序。 我们知道在一个大学里面，最重要的是讲规则。大学里面凡是涉及教学、学术等方面的事务应该是由学术人中的一些代表来形成一定的规范，依据一定规范行事才行。但是这样地没有规矩和程序地调整学术委员会和教学委员会，请问给人的感觉是什么？首先，你的那些专家、教授，在这些掌握行政资源的人眼里没有任何地位。其次，你这些专家和教授是领导的工具。你看啊，我没有任何依据就可以调你，调了你以后，您只有干瞪眼。既然这次没有任何依据可以调整你，我下次也可以没有任何依据做其他的任何事情。原因很简单，就是因为我是领导，我是当官的，我有权。为什么我可以调你呢？因为你不是当官的，你不是领导就这么简单。 如果是这样的情况，它和刚才学院办公室资源的配置问题是不是一回事？既然当官的可以随心所欲地决定很多人的命运，可以将很多平台当作实现他个人欲望的工具——他想怎么搞就怎么搞，那么就会鼓励很多人也拼命争取去当官。如果当不了官，而当官的人又有这么大的权力——可以无条件决定您的命运和利益，那么没有当官的普通人就可以努力去巴结当官的——到你家去拜年，唯领导马首是瞻。我平时和你关系搞好，你到时候可以不排挤我。都成为你的兄弟伙了，然后有什么机会、好处都会考虑我。成为一个小的利益圈子后，整个J学院的资源在我的小兄弟、小范围之内分配。其他人是圈外人物，休想分得一杯残羹。 这样的一个制度安排，本质意义上是鼓励以主要领导为核心的行政领导班子掌控资源，掌握所有人的命运。你命运和前途，不是因为你教学好，科研好，不是因为您能力强。是因为各种各样的原因，这个领导就喜欢您。为什么喜欢？脸长得漂亮。为什么喜欢？讨人喜欢。我讨人喜欢，他就喜欢我。 如果是这样的情况——资源的配置，人力资本的激励不是依据业绩，不是依据能力，那么请问努力工作有什么用？你要搞科研，你要搞教学，你搞了半天起什么用？没有任何作用。既然老师明白现实就是这个状况，他们为什么要极力搞好科研和教学呢？ 曾经G大学G学院有个老师跟我讲，我就是不上课。上课就完成规定的工作量，多余的工作，尽可能找理由推脱不干。 她是博士。我比较敬重她的学识和能力。我觉得她是一个很聪明的女博士。当然我对她没有私人感情啊。知道没有搞头，所以只要不违规就够了。我只要不违规，随便应付应付就得过且过了。 但是如果有一个好的规则，我们这些聪明的博士、副教授、教授等教师，是会发挥出聪明才智在教学科研上的。 但是你这个搞法，你这个调整，你把那些专业的老师，那些资深的教授放在眼里吗？没有啊。而且调整的结果，第一，当时我看了，比如学位委员会调整以后，大部分教授被调整走了，留下相当一部分是副教授，系主任。刚好我那位教授朋友，那次很幸运没有被调整走，还是留在J学院的学位委员会里面。因为他以前也是学院学位委员会的委员。 我那个朋友在学位委员会发现他们做的事情和前届领导还是一样的，甚至还有过之而无不及的情况。我那个朋友很正直，就发言了。当时那个学院开展工作是怎么开展的呢？学位委员会其中有一个很重要的职能，就是遴选硕士生导师。J学院的硕士生导师，首先要在J学院讨论。我那朋友说，研究生导师是研究生培养质量的重要环节。只有遴选出优秀的硕士生导师，才可以培养优秀的研究生，才可以把研究生质量提高。既然如此，那么研究生导师遴选就要慎重，有体现良好观念的规则和程序。你们研究生科通知学位委员会委员开会的时候，委员连开会内容都不知道，上午通知，下午开会。开会以后，才知道是要进行遴选硕士生导师。 遴选导师的时候，连学位委员会的委员事先都不知道，请问其他老师，会不会知道？因为这个学院学位委员会的委员，他也是那个学院的老师。要遴选导师，至少要在十天之前把遴选导师的信息公布，挂在网上，让所有符合条件的老师都知道这个信息。比照这个条件来进行申报。只要信息公开透明，严格依据规则和程序，条件不合格的老师没有怨言，他有努力的方向，努力工作会有回报，会被肯定和承认。如果申报老师的基本条件合格，还要看质量方面有没有问题。学院学位分委员会再来把这个关。这些意见说了以后没有任何作用，反而起了反作用。就因为这些我那个朋友就很惨了——把主要领导得罪了。我把你弄进学位委员会，我就可以任何时候把你弄出去。我弄你进来，我是看得起你。看得起你，你还提意见，不给我面子，来给我讲什么学生培养质量。 你来讲学院培养质量的提高，行不行？不行。他不在乎那个东西。 紧接着遴选导师的时候，我那个朋友又讲道：遴选研究生导师，有些导师是从来没有带过研究生，当过硕士生导师。要把握好研究生的培养质量关，新导师根本没有任何带研究生的经验，初次遴选时，建议新导师只能担任一个专业的硕士生导师。通过带一届左右的学生，有经验了，确实各方面还不错了，新导师可以在研究方向相近的两到三个专业担任硕士生导师。这样好的建议也没有任何回应，也不听。甚至有些被遴选的新导师根本就没有经过学院学位委员会——亲戚、朋友，或者是用J学院的资源和另外单位进行资源交换等方式来将领导的自己人运作成为导师。遴选导师时，领导不通过学院学位委员会，直接把他中意的人弄成硕士生导师来带学生，谁也拿他没有办法。这样的做法和你提建议完全是相反的。那还提什么意见呢？我那朋友就再也不提意见了。不提意见，我那朋友的命运也难以逃脱被这些领导们整治和修理。怎么整治啊？好了，我们现在因为学校要报名单——学校文件规定学院学位委员会的委员名单必须在学校研究生院备案。那也就是学院学位委员会的委员对遴选导师要把关，对每年学生授学位要把关等职责将上升为学校行为，这个行为就不完全是学院行为了。你不是提建议有道理吗？我这个领导做的刚好与您提的意见是相反的。那我不让你参与学院学位委员会了。怎么不参与？搞个学位委员会和学术委员会。把你们那些提意见阻碍我搞潜规则的人弄到学术委员会去。然后其他听领导话的人就留在学位委员会。学位委员会要上报学校，学术委员会不上报学校。要报就报吧。这样弄了以后，这些对学院建设提合理化建议的人还是在学院的控制范围，要是再敢反对领导搞潜规则，那么他们还可以整你，收拾您。 学位委员会和学术委员会可不可以分设？可以的。也就是说学院学术委员会和学术委员会的分设是没有问题的。但是这个分设在学院是一个重大的问题。它也是需要相关的老师和相关的教授、博士或者研究生导师根据议事规则来进行，而不是领导随意指定部分教授来开一个论证会，充分听取大家的意见。行政领导层也可以先提出一个方案，经过教授委员会论证修改后，最后公示，没有重大修改意见就作为决议正式定下来。J学院是不是按照这样的规范和程序来确定学位委员会和学术委员会的分离呢？没有啊。领导想调就调。为什么？因为领导有决策权。为什么领导有决策权？因为领导是院长，有行政权力。 看到这样的事情，我想起张五常教授讲的事情。他在芝加哥大学任过教，在加州大学洛杉矶分校也任过教。在他所在的芝加哥大学，系里面，他们叫系，我们叫学院，真正有人事决策——进博士，进教授的权力在教授（资深教授）手里面。一般的资深教授，是不愿意去做领导职务、做系主任、做那个院长的。相反，有一些在研究方面不一定有多大成就，中等水平的教授做系主任。系主任本质意义上没有多少事情。因为系的教授委员会有决策权，相当于教授委员会在治系，治院。 我们J学院完全不一样。说不定领导那个教授都是蒙混过来的。混那个教授的目的就是为了当官。当了官以后，他说没有官职的教授再有本事也不算什么。我没有本事，我是领导，我可以把J学院的资源（钱财）拿过去，搞到哪个刊物吹捧我是这个领域那个领域的专家，实际却是不学无术的伪专家。就是这样搞的，不以为耻，反以为荣。 学院学位委员会和学院学术委员会的调整，从本质意义上讲，这些教授、博士和导师等搞学术的人，是行政权力拥有者手中的玩物。行政权力这么大，行政权力可以随心所欲地决定学院的一切事务。请问整个学院是这样一个导向，这些真正来搞教学来搞科研的人有没有前途？没有。从讲师，晋升副教授，晋升教授是不是通过个人努力工作、个人能力就能晋升上去？不是。既然如此，教师的精力和聪明才智被鼓励干什么？那肯定是想办法抱主要领导的大腿。抱大腿抱舒服了，一个可以获得资源，另一个可以获得自己想要的职位，甚至其他方面的东西都可以获得。既然如此，普通教师为什么要努力工作？为什么要去努力搞教学和搞科研？即使是个优秀的老师，他的精力也不会这样投入了。不是优秀老师的人更加不会这样投入了。结果会怎样？我们说真实文凭的生产绝对需要优秀老师。但是现实环境却是在鼓励人平庸，鼓励人成为不优秀的老师。所有的质量检查全部是为了应付，所有的那些东西都是为了表面的光鲜亮丽。既然如此，培养出来的学生质量会不会很高？从普遍意义上讲肯定不会。当然有个别的教师，虽然知道这个环境很糟糕，但是自己不甘心，私下去自学，拼命去钻，也不错。这是个案，而且当事人要付出很多的成本和代价。 学位委员会和学术委员会的分设，本质意义上已经讲是掌握行政权力的人为老大。他不得了。他没有把搞学术、搞专业的人放在眼里。既然是这样一种方式，人在这样的环境背景下会干什么？聪明的人为什么要搞教学？为什么想要搞研究？除非是疯子，是神经病。我那个朋友真悲惨了，真的就被学院主要领导在校领导面前，其他领导面前造谣为疯子，精神有问题。目的是什么呢？被他们在暗中精神病化以后，我那个朋友所说的所有话，包括对他们胡作非为的检举，上级领导都不要信，因为他神经有问题。你们说可怕不可怕？太恐怖了。当我那个朋友听到这个消息的时候，第一个反应是太吃惊了。自己那么优秀和真正，自认为还是满腹经纶的一个人，就被这个主要领导静悄悄地、不知不觉地精神病化了。这是第三个问题。 由此看来，J学院教学委员会、学位委员会的调整问题，学位委员会和学术委员会的分离问题，本质是尊不尊重教师、教授和专业人员，鼓不鼓励全体员工勤奋踏实、努力工作，领导干部胡作非为受不受到及时、有效的约束的问题。而这些问题对高校所生产的是真实文凭还是注水文凭至关重要。
六、注水文凭的案例分析之三
第四个问题是硕士点负责人的确定问题。你们再看这个案例是不是和注水问题有关系？我们培养出来的硕士研究生要想有真才实学，最后获得得文凭不是注水文凭，那么必须有一流的导师。一流的导师队伍肯定要求每个培养点有一流的负责人，或者学术带头人。 注意啊，我讲的J学院不是经济学院啊，J学院就是我假说的一个学院，你不要对号入座啊。你不要今后去跟我们学院的王院长说，杨老师说他们怎么样，那我不承认啊。我这里录了音的。 曾经我那个朋友也中过暗箭。我那个朋友曾经也是给研究生上课，讲类似的案例分析，J学院院长就事后去散布谣言——学生跟他反映，我那个朋友在课堂上三分之一时间在骂学校，三分之一的时间在骂学院，三分之一的时间在讲课。我的话绝不会像我那朋友那样，我录了音的。你们要去冤枉我的话，到时候我会不干的，我会找你们算账的。 你们说王院长是什么人？我怎么敢对他说三道四呢？对不对？开国际玩笑。白晶书记那也是不得了的人物。我一个小教授，我算什么？他们搞死我就像踩死一只蚂蚁一样容易。要这样看问题。 硕士点负责人的确立为什么和注水文凭有关系？到时候您们看是不是在生产注水文凭？硕士点的负责人的确定还不完全是个民主问题，因为学术还不能完全讲民主，每个点的导师有一个学术传承，应该是这里面学识比较渊博的老师在当这个点的领衔人。领衔人可以对这个点其他的导师有一定的推荐权，当然这个不是领衔人空口胡说，要根据这些老师平时进行学术讨论的情况——国外叫学术讨论会（seminar），根据他的公开发表文章的质量，根据他的其他方面情况，作出有依据的严肃的推荐意见。最终还要通过学院的学位委员会来判断他能不能做导师。 假如一个硕士培养点有五位导师，每年招收十名学生。这个点虽然每位导师在带自己的学生，但是怎么样来安排和协调导师的教学和学术活动，怎样使这个点整体的培养质量提高，还有老师之间怎么样经常性的开展活动，学生之间怎么样经常性的开展研讨。都需要有一个制度规范和学术领头人。如果是这样来要求，来确立硕士点负责人，那么请问谁最有资格来当这个点的负责人？在我说的刚才那种情况下，谁最有资格？绝对是学术水准、学术实力、学术资历起到很重要的作用。而且这个作用要和这个培养点的导师民主地在一起相互之间的举荐共同来决定硕士点的领衔人。最终是这个点的导师们及其这个点的学术传承、管理传统在决定谁来带领这个学术团队。 当然也可以有不同的规则。总之一点，决定权肯定是本专业导师有最终的发言权。但是那个J学院是怎么搞的呢？J学院就是哪个院长他想要哪个当硕士点的负责人就要哪个。他定了某个点的负责人以后，所有导师都不知道这个人是负责人。什么依据？没有依据。领导就是依据。 如果这样来确定硕士点负责人，那么会有一个什么样的结果呢？既然不是按照学术的标准，不是按照学术道德的标准，不是按照对学生培养质量的标准，而是我是行政领导人，是老大，我就可以决定。既然如此，其他导师也知道，之所以能够给自己分一个学生，那是领导的意愿和决定，自己根本没有发言权。所以培养学生也好，确定硕士点负责人也好，自己就麻木地接受吧。导师们有什么主动性带好学生，讲好课，搞好研究，关心学科建设和学院发展呢？ 在这个选拔机制和这样一个制度背景下，导师们会受到尊重吗，会受到鼓励吗？没有啊。既然没有，绝大部分人都是聪明人。他为什么去操那个心，为什么要去费尽心血关心学科和学院发展？只有谁会去操这个心？有些人讲了，第一居心叵测的人。第二，傻瓜。 谁居心叵测呢？如果那个院长的行为是正义的，是规范的，是正当的，那其他人要去胡乱说的话，那这个老师绝对是居心叵测。但是如果是相反的情况，这位老师站出来坚持正义，你还说这个老师居心叵测，那么你的良心叫狗给吃了。因为你没有是非感，不是一个有基本道德感的人。 为什么会有人去当傻瓜呢？因为这些人有良心，有为人做事的底线。不想那么沉沦，他想通过自己使环境变好，他不想象其他人一样做聪明人，因为他觉得良心有愧，所以他选择了和大多数人不一样的行事方式——努力、敬业、关心学术和教育发展。这样做，他受到伤害会很多，因此被这些胡作非为的领导和大多数人认为是傻子。 我们经济学有一个很重要的东西——当你的环境和你的个人行为发生偏离的时候，最好的解决办法是什么？是调整个人的行为选择。个人调整自己的行为，和环境相适应，是最好的，代价最低的行为选择。绝大部分人，确实是在调整个人的行为选择来适应外部环境。 假如整个制度环境不正常，个人适应环境的调整结果会怎么样？本质意义上讲，是群体道德水平的沦丧。真的，令人痛心啊。 同理，硕士点负责人选拔既然不正常，请问那些导师要努力上课吗？刚才我给你们讲的十八节课只上八节课的老师的案例，他那样上课，是不是正常的？在不正常的制度环境下，他是对的，是聪明的。他上课不努力对他个人而言至少和他努力上课是一样的结果，其实不努力净收益会更高。这说明上课努力没有意义。被这个胡作非为的领导这么搞了以后，不正常的行为变成了最正常、最理智的行为了。通过第四个案例，硕士点负责人的确立是不是在鼓励生产注水文凭？这样培养出来的研究生质量会提高吗？导师们有那个动力没有？答案是一目了然的。
七、注水文凭的案例分析之四
刚才我讲了四个案例。你们看这四个案例，从管理的角度，是不是生产注水问题的环节？是。这样搞下去以后，提高教育质量的很重要的参与者——管理者不会通过努力提高管理水平去使老师的聪明才智得到发挥，积极性得到提高来提升教学质量和研究质量；老师不会努力去工作。研究质量和教学水平也是高度相关的。那这样的话，肯定存在生产注水文凭的问题。 第五，系主任民主选举的问题。J学院有一个非常有意思的事情——就是院领导说各个系的系主任要民主选举，通过民主产生系主任。这是怎么一回事呢？就是新班子上任后把以前的两个系合并为一个系，合并以后教师总人数有三十五个人左右。选系主任的时候仅仅只有约十二位老师参加投票，大约占全体教师的三分之一。让大家投票以后，当场也没有验票，就收走了。收走以后，J学院党委书记说，J学院民主选举系主任的事情经得起历史的考验，绝对没有问题。 当时我那个朋友就想，来的三分之一左右的老师，连一半的人数都不到的投票怎么经得起历史的考验？那位朋友还好心地跟党委书记讲，系主任的产生其实可以不进行民主选举。你们就提出这个系主任任职的条件，并且你们认为某人适合担任这个职位，然后问大家有没有意见？你说一般领导说了话以后，中国人碍于情面，即使有意见他也不会说。这个时候，大家鼓掌通过。这不是逻辑上很通顺的吗？而且我那个朋友还讲，在高校里面的这些教师至少是本科的学历，有很多还是满腹经纶的人。你们作假，也得自圆其说。你做的完全不符合逻辑，那就有问题。您们要改进管理，提高管理水平和质量。 提了意见后，我那个朋友就倒霉了，惹了马蜂窝。这个党委书记背着我的朋友，暗中造谣说我那个朋友想当系主任。他想当，但是给他投票的人一个都没有。所有的票都投给他们钦定的人了。 就是这样的方式，去诬陷我那个朋友。我那个朋友以前当过系主任，但是他主动辞职。他知道在一定的制度背景下，要正直、尽职地去行事的话，他会累死，却不能改变局面和环境。不做系主任是自己最佳的选择。你说他怎么会去争那个系主任当呢？作为领导办事缺乏基本常识和公开透明，面对质疑却只有造谣生事，岂不令人悲哀？ 我那个朋友知道他们在背后散布谣言的时候，感到很震惊，很吃惊。这些人怎么是这样的一个人品？这样的人品连一个普通的人都不如，还可以当学院的党委书记，很有意思。 我就劝他，你要想得开。林子大了，什么鸟都有。林子大了，什么领导都有。你这么想，你就释怀了。 他们通过这样的违背基本常识的方式民主选举系主任，不依据学识，依据管理水平，依据大家认可，而且民主选举完全是一个假象。我那个朋友说，他们这是民主选举吗？他们那个方式去搞，不是糊弄人吗？这样搞，老师开会，来了也白来。所以那些老师都没有参与意识，参与积极性。当然他们可以污蔑那些没有参会的老师有问题。 但是老师不参会，本质意义是管理有问题，是领导自己的能力和水平有问题啊。他们没有尊重这些老师，没有把这些专业老师视为学生培养质量提高的最核心主体来尊重。请问，老师是这样一种境况，他们有动力来提高他们的教学质量和研究水平吗？没有动力，他们不能充分地把自己的人力资本充分释放出来。请问学生的培养质量如何？很差。如果很差，达不到基本的质量标准，那么说明什么问题？注水文凭是不是在这样的环节会产生？这样的管理不可能激励老师，让他们的聪明才智全身心地投入进去。这个制度环境，他们这样干的话，就是把那些本来没有水准的人弄进来应付，得过且过。这个案例也说明了注水文凭为什么会产生。
八、注水文凭的案例分析之五
学院公车的使用问题。你看和注水文凭有没有关系？J学院党委书记一伙人住家离学院比较远，就把以前学院领导班子用公款买的车子拿去主要用作自己这伙人上下班的交通工具。用了以后，每个月的油费、修理费等乱七八糟的开支都用公款支付。 我那朋友又多事了，给那个党委书记提了好心的意见。怎么提？就是你们离学校比较远，那个车子主要用作您们这部分人的上下班交通工具也正常，但是你们为什么不搞一个学院公车使用的制度规范出来呢？这个车不是你们几个人的专车，私车。搞一个管理规范条例——1、该车主要用于学院比较远的老师的上下班接送，特别是学院党委书记那个线路的老师都可以使用；2、该车用于整个学院来往客人的接送；3、该车用于一些教职员工的紧急情况，哪个老师生急病或者其他情况，确实需要学院来用车接送。这一公车管理规范出来以后，这个车子主要还是学院党委书记这帮人在用，但是已经纳入制度规范了。至少这从制度上来讲，是合理的，站得住脚的。 这又捅了马蜂窝。你这个建议不是把我作为领导的特权利益损害了吗？如果说用这样的制度规则，学院公车使用并不一定对他有利，那毕竟纳入规则管理了。因为他是学院的党委书记，公车私用，还可以每个月报销三四千块钱的养车费，而且这个车子不管是多少钱，四五万也好，七八万也好，十来万也好，毕竟是公款所购。这本质意义上，还不是因为我是领导，我就可以用这个车。注意，要按我国政府公车管理规定，事业单位处级干部没有资格享受公车专用。那学院职工会怎么想？看来当领导还是有搞头——没有规矩、没有依据就可以将公款用于购车，公车私用，还可以报销公车私用的养车费用。领导在公车方面都可以没有依据，那可不可以在其他方面也没有依据损公肥私，贪赃枉法？在其他任何事情上，他们都可以如法炮制，谁能奈何他哉？ 既然当领导这么有搞头和诱惑力，普通职工努力工作，努力搞科研，努力挣点课时费还不如别人一个月报假发票的收益高。那普通职工为什么要努力去做好本职工作？既然领导那么干，职工就可以效仿他。J学院的老师，只要是聪明的老师，就会想方设法去抱这个党委书记等领导的大腿，希望党委书记提拔他，或者想要党委书记给他好处。这样才有搞头。如果大家都在围绕领导竞争各种好处和利益，这些老师既然把聪明才智放到领导身上，放到这些掌握资源配置的人身上，放到有权就可以随意决定学院一切事务的人身上，那么请问他们会不会努力提高教学科研水平？会不会把精力放到J学院的学生身上？只有蠢蛋才会放，聪明的人不会放的。 最后结果怎么样？绝大部分人是聪明的。傻瓜、蠢蛋毕竟是少数。绝大多数聪明的人都不努力工作，最后的结果是注水文凭在这样的环境下又会产生。
九、注水文凭的案例分析之六
学院的财务公开问题。刚才说到的这一系列的问题，本质意义上是学院的政务问题。学院政务，没有规矩、没有程序，完全由掌握权力的人说了就算。如果是这样的情况，那么还不是一样的问题。不公开政务，领导们就可以自己胡乱搞。谁要想获得好处，你只有往权势人物办公室跑勤一点，往他家里跑勤一点，节假日往他家里跑勤一点，他生病，他生日，他父母生病，你都要跑勤一点。你不知道，就好好打听他的情况，搞清楚。你来了他不一定记得。你没有来，他一定记得，我跟你讲。您不去捧着他，敬着他，他在关键时候就可以整死你。 这样行事的结果是什么？因为你的各种好处、利益不是因为你努力工作，你努力培养学生，而是因为你投那些掌握权力的人的喜好。你的心都放到取悦权势人物上去了，你再聪明，也不可能把学生培养好。 财务公开也是一样的。新的班子来以后，开始的时候为了说明上一届班子政务、财务有问题，搞一大堆包袱和烂摊子留下来，公布了以前班子的财务情况。后面怎么样？就拖，就赖。还有一种情况是打着J学院的牌子去搞办学、搞培训以后，弄了很多假发票去搞，去报。最后再多的事情，再多的培训，只有二十万左右的纯收入，每个月够大家发点奖金就可以了，其他都是领导自己的利益。 这个J学院的领导没有想到他去做那些事情，打着G大学J学院的牌子和商誉，怎么就没有一点规范和程序呢？你打着J学院的牌子，J学院的员工有不同的分工，有些人从事科研，有的人投身教学，有的人创收也好或者怎么样。这是一个团队通过分工合作的方式来改善大家的待遇，同时也把教学质量和研究质量提高，管理质量提高，形成一个和谐的、欣欣向荣的环境。 但是他们怎么干的？不公开财务。如果是按照这样的方式来搞，不公开账务，那么他可以获得自己的好处，同时也可以让投自己所好的人获得好处。请问既然如此，其他人怎么有动力去努力工作，去努力搞好教学、科研？聪明人的精力肯定是要想办法放在政务和财务上。因为领导可以说了算，财务上也是领导说了算。对领导投其所好，可以获得一些利益。而这些利益的获得不是因为努力工作。那么你想一想，绝大多数聪明人，愿不愿意努力工作，愿不愿意来提高培养质量？只有傻瓜才愿意。 那个傻瓜明明知道J学院问题的严重性和可怕后果，他还去说，去挑明，那怎么不是精神有问题呢？所以就被精神病化了。这是第七个案例，我们看出来，照样是生产注水文凭的一个环节。
十、注水文凭的案例分析之七
硕士生导师的遴选问题。这个问题我们刚才已经讲过了。你比如说硕士生导师的遴选，新导师可以让他招两个专业，三个专业，四个专业的研究生吗？正常情况下是不行的，但J学院就行，原因有可能就是和领导关系好。 我还跟你讲一个更有意思的现象——关系不好，领导也可以让新导师第一次当两个、三个专业的导师。你知道为什么吗？这个J学院发生了一个很有意思的现象，很多和他关系不好的老师也参加导师的遴选。为什么呢？据说这个J学院马上面临领导干部任期三年期满，老师要对领导进行匿名投票。要投票的话，领导就想办法尽最大的努力把对立面减少啊。对立面减少，你们不是想当导师吗？我都让你们当导师。只有稍微沾点边的都过来当呀。你当了导师，我给了你们利益，你就要投我的票。 但是这样遴选导师的结果会怎么样？有很多不符合导师要求和条件的人，大量地进入导师队伍。那会不会使研究生培养质量提高？这是在牺牲学生利益、牺牲学校利益、牺牲专业利益为他谋求连任寻求好的名声，在慢慢运作，在做工作了。 所以说，硕士生导师遴选一方面就往我领导这伙人去弄，没有规范也不要紧。如果想要不相关的人对我有好感，那么就牺牲专业利益。其实前一种研究生导师遴选情况也是在牺牲专业利益、研究生培养质量。 像这样的硕士生导师遴选，请问能不能够把优秀的导师和优秀的老师选出来？这样遴选导师的结果，导师质量怎么来保证？就像刚才那个案例一样——连学位分委员会的成员都不知道下午开会的内容和议题，这是要遴选硕士生导师吗？学位分委员会的成员都不知道，更何况其他人呢？这不是在搞儿戏吗？如果管理真的规范有效，那么像这样胡乱管理的这些人，他还能在这里当领导吗？他在这里瞎混，是对纳税人的犯罪，对学生、学生家长也是犯罪。我是怎样认为的。这样胡搞乱弄把那些老师往哪儿引导？把那些学生往哪儿引导？ 硕士生导师的遴选，一要通过规范的程序，二要建立有效的规则。硕士生导师遴选就是把优秀的导师，有培养能力，合格的人选入这个队伍。如果不是这样，大量不合格导师带出来的学生怎么可能不是水货呢？ 我那个朋友非常郁闷，他指导学生很认真，但学生却不认真。为什么？学生说其他导师基本都是搞应付，走过场。要中期考评了，导师给学生签个字，很多连看都没有看，更不说指导修改了。既然其他人都这么行事，我也不能太不通情达理了吧。我那个朋友就想，干嘛要那么认真地对待自己的学生呢？那这样的话岂不对学生不公平？这些学生在别人那个地方就可以很轻松地过关，在他那里就有压力。那就确实太不公平了。搞得我的朋友没有办法坚持原则和标准。这是我那个朋友最郁闷的地方。所以我那个朋友没有人选他。没有人选他，他其实是想得开的。从他自己带的学生状况看，又有几个在这个环境下能够成才？ 既然这样的话，这个环境把我那个朋友淘汰了。这是我那个朋友的荣幸，知道吗？这个环境没有一个优胜劣汰的机制，不鼓励像我那个朋友一样有水平、有学识的老师。相反，这个环境却在鼓励干乌七八糟、乱七八糟事情的人，鼓励平庸，鼓励不学无术之人。我那个朋友在G大学很悲哀。这是我那个朋友的悲哀，也是那个J学院学生的悲哀，还是那个学院很多职工的悲哀。为什么？那个J学院的职工真的有一个好的激励和约束机制，他们有很多非常聪明，也是可以做出成就来的。 这是这个J学院硕士生导师遴选的案例讨论。请问这样的遴选方式是不是生产注水文凭的一个环节？
十一、注水文凭的案例分析之八
研究生上课的问题。这个我就不详细讲了。我讲过了。我给你们讲过两个案例。一个案例就是十八节课上八节课的案例。还有一个案例是关于《高级微观经济学》的案例。有一个教授用《高级微观经济学》的英文版上课，难度和哈佛博士生的教材一样，英文板书，全部数学证明，习题也要讲解，最后还要英文考试。另外一个老师五十四个学时，听说上了四次课，而且还是让学生来讲，他来点评。这个神奇的老师和那位敬业的老师可以拿一份虽很微薄，但却是相同的工资——就是课时费。不考虑授课质量的差异，仅仅考虑授课时数的差异，后一位老师的实际单位课时费就是那个敬业老师的三倍以上。如果把质量差异计算进去，那么两位老师实际单位课时、单位质量的课酬差距可能是几十倍。 像这样的研究生上课方式及实际单位课酬的差距是不是在鼓励人们向那个不敬业的老师学习。向那个十八节课只上八节课的老师学习。只要你是聪明人，你不是蠢蛋，你就要向他们学习。最后坚守职业操守的那些敬业老师，那些蠢蛋老师就会越来越少。 本身那个队伍里面像那个敬业老师的人就不是很多。在这个制度环境下，这个敬业的老师、这个蠢蛋老师会越来越少，最后会绝种。请问敬业老师，优秀的老师都绝种了，留下来充斥台面的是不敬业的老师，是很差劲的老师。这是一个逆向选择。最后的结果研究生培养质量会不会下降？最后会不会出现生产注水文凭？会还是不会？杨老师是不是在和你们乱说？好。如果你们觉得我给你们乱说的话，我就蛮伤心啊。怎么找不到一个知音呢？ 好了，这是研究生上课的问题；你们看它是不是生产注水文凭的一个环节。
十二、注水文凭的案例分析之九
我们再看学院博士点申报、硕士点专业结构调整问题。 博士点申报问题本质上和前面的问题是相似的。什么意思？我那个朋友所在的J学院要申报博士点。申报博士点的时候，这个J学院的院长居然没有在学院里通过教授委员会，或学位委员会或学术委员会或者相关专业导师开会，来论证也好，通气也好，通过一定的规则和程序来上升为学院决策意见——决定J学院是否申报博士点。院长个人意见就代表了学院意见——J学院放弃申报，配合G学院申报博士点，这就是院长的J学院和G学院联合申报博士点的决定。J学院院长说，他已经代表J学院和G学院谈好条件了——J学院不申报了，放弃申报博点。他们申报成功后给我们J学院设一个博士点方向——这就是院长自己和G学院谈的交换条件。 博士点申报问题是学院学术、学科建设方面一个重大的决策。院长可不可以提出自己学院不申报，配合其他学院申报博士点的方案？我觉得他提这个方案在开始的时候都是可以理解的。院长可以提，但是你提了以后，只能代表你个人意见。你的个人意见怎样才能形成学院意见？你首先要通过一定的程序，来论证，是不是？通过比如学术委员会，或者导师的代表来论证这个事情。我院长提的这个方案，你们大家有没有什么不同意见？通过严肃的规则和程序，院领导个人意见上升为学院意见——确实觉得我那个朋友那个学院在博点申报方面没有优势，那我们还不如支持某个学院某个专业来申报。这也可以。 问题是没有经过任何的程序，没有任何的规范，就他院长说了算。请问如果是这样的方式，那和刚才的问题是不是一样的。这样的重大决定就是因为我是院长，我掌握了行政权力，所以我就决定了。你们搞专业的那些人，我院长可以不让你们知道，可以不让你们参与。你们有什么发言权？我院长个人意见就代表这个J学院的意见。 院领导个人独断专行，是这样一个状况的话，那些搞专业的教授、老师完全没有参与学科建设重大决策的权力，完全由院领导的个人意见代表学院意见，请问在这样一个情况下，这些教授、老师对所谓博点申报，对所谓的硕士点的专业建设会有兴趣吗？还会努力形成合力吗？有热情吗？既然当了学院行政领导就有这么大的能量，那些浅薄之人，就会想我今后也去当院长。我当院长，当了这样的官以后，我就可以改变现在这样的局面。如果是这么看的人，那么我认为他是浅薄之人。那你说，他这么干，我掌权了也这么干，那本质上不是一样的吗？那还不是权力就是一切吗？即使您和他的干法不一样，干得比他好，本质上还不是迷信权力吗？有了权力就意味着有了一切吗？有了资源调动和决策的权力吗？ 那么最本源意义上怎么样改变这种权力的滥用和绝对权力？还得要教授治院，学术为大，规则、程序是最根本的。只有这样你那个J学院才有前途。否则，按照现有的激励规则，大家要么去抢他的院长位置，要么抱这个掌握权力的人的大腿。抱舒服了以后，就有搞头。这样的方式，这和前面讲的是一样的——职工往这些权势之人身上去投精力，投才智，不是将精力、才智用于搞研究，搞好教学，提高学生培养质量。 硕士点专业结构的调整问题也是一样的。硕士点专业结构可不可以调整？可以啊。根据社会需求，根据现在情况的变化，根据我的师资力量，招生需求可以调整的。问题是，在调整过程中，有没有程序？有没有规范？没有规则，没有程序，也是我院长个人说了算。也是我掌握权力的人说了算。那么这和刚才博士点的申报是不是一样的。 我还发现一个更有意思的东西。那个J学院曾经有理论经济学的一级学科硕士点专业，据说2006年就申请成功了。居然这个一级学科硕士点就没有了。后面说什么呢？院领导和学校领导商量，把这个理论经济学一级学科硕士点换取应用经济学一级学科硕士点。这个从学校专业建设的策略角度，可不可以？可以啊。但是得有基本的规范和程序啊。你院长跟学校提是可以的。但是你的个人方案上升到学校层面之前，首先要在学院层面和相关老师有一个通气，有一个沟通，大家有一个意见。要让你所在学院里面，你院领导的个人意见变成学院意见，然后再将学院意见上升到学校层面。这才是合乎基本常识和程序的一种决策行为嘛。 可是实际情况是学院其他人没有你的戏唱。你们没有作用和发言权，就是由我这个院长说了算。请问个人意志就完全可以代表学院的意志？个人观点就可以代表这个J学院的集体意见？这样的办学理念行不行？不行。这样的搞法，只要不是混饭吃的老师，他们对这种行事方式要么是抵制，要么是沉默，但是心里肯定是不认同的，对你肯定没有好感。既然专业老师在专业培养、学科建设方面没有任何发言权，他们还搞什么呢？这个学院都办成了你这个掌握权力的人的私人单位了，你个人的单位了，请问能不能够有效地激励其他人努力工作，努力提高培养质量？ 从这个案例，我们可以看出来，这个环节是不是在生产注水文凭？这些老师有没有动力，努力去搞好自己的本职工作？你本质意义上是把他们当作外人了。能够进入你那个圈圈的，不是依据规则，不是依据程序可以进去的，而是依据你的主观偏好进去的，没有依据。您这个院领导也可以形成一伙人，但是形成一伙人，对这个学院长期发展有没有意义，有没有价值？这个学院的学科建设，学院建设，专业建设能不能够形成良性循环这样一个状态？不可能的事情。
编辑：周志刚 校对：程筱筱 翻译：戈冰
The Economic Logic of Diluted Diplomas
Author: Yang Shaozheng
Abstract: From the perspective of economics, this paper analyzes the formation mechanism, fraudulent essence, and destructive impact of “diluted diplomas” (zhushui wenping) on educational quality and social trust.
I. How Are Diluted Diplomas Generated?
A diploma is a documentary proof that a student’s professional skills and comprehensive quality have met or exceeded a certain quality standard through a specified period of study. Reaching or exceeding a certain quality standard in professional competence and comprehensive quality refers to the following aspects:
Coursework study. Every academic major has a specific number of courses required for study. Each course has a mandated number of class hours. Through learning for a certain number of class hours, the student passes the examinations.
Practical training. Through a certain period of practical teaching and fieldwork, the student’s performance is evaluated as passing or above.
Graduation thesis and design. Under the guidance of a faculty advisor, the student undergoes training and cultivation of their capacity to comprehensively analyze and research problems by applying their acquired knowledge or theories. The research output is reviewed and achieves a passing grade.
Fulfilling other prescribed requirements stipulated by the academic institution for professional study.
If a student meets or exceeds the standards recognized by the school in all four of the aforementioned training segments, it demonstrates that the student’s professional skills and comprehensive quality have reached or exceeded the prescribed quality standards. The graduation diploma obtained by this student then serves as a certificate of verification that their professional skills and comprehensive quality have met or exceeded the designated criteria.
Conversely, if at least one of the aforementioned four segments fails to reach the standard, it indicates that the student’s professional skills and comprehensive quality have not met the criteria, and they shall not be entitled to receive a graduation diploma that certifies compliance in professional skills and comprehensive quality. If a student’s professional skills and comprehensive quality fail to reach the standard, yet the school nevertheless issues a graduation diploma certifying that the student’s professional skills and comprehensive quality have met the standard, then this graduation diploma is a “diluted diploma” (water-injected diploma). The essence of a diluted diploma lies in passing off substandard products as compliant, quality products.
A diluted diploma confers graduation credentials via covert means upon students whose professional skills and comprehensive quality have substantially failed to meet the required standards. While the aforementioned four training segments may substantially fail to reach the standard, they can superficially achieve the standard in form and in terms of assigned grades. Take coursework study as an example: the student’s actual hours of study may fail to meet the prescribed requirements, the cause of which may stem from violations by the teacher, or from infractions by the student. A student’s examination performance may fail to reach the standard, which could result from deficiencies in the teacher’s instructional quality, or from a lack of diligence and input on the part of the student. The true condition of these issues is ultimately reflected in the student’s academic grades, demonstrating that this specific course failed to enable the student to reach the prescribed quality standard. If a student inherently deserves a failing grade in a course but ultimately receives a passing grade in the final evaluation, then this student is passing off a substandard performance as compliant within that course; other courses and training segments can be inferred by analogy. Such grades, which appear compliant on the surface, are in essence substandard. Ultimately, from the outward appearance and formal presentation of each training segment, the student appears to have reached the prescribed quality standards and thereby obtains the corresponding graduation certificate; however, in substance, the individual remains a substandard product. Consequently, the diploma they obtain is, in its very essence, a diluted diploma.
Providers of diluted diplomas can obtain additional gains. If diluted diplomas are proactively produced by the school, it is because the quality and quantity of various input factors for producing diluted diplomas can be lower and fewer than those for compliant diplomas. Under given prices for various input factors, lower-quality input factors and insufficient input quantities can reduce the input costs of the school, thereby obtaining more additional gains than producing compliant products. If a diluted diploma is not the production objective pursued by the school, under given returns for various input factors, the less production time the various input factors require and the lower the intensity of input, the higher the returns per unit of time and per unit of input will be. Therefore, proceeding from their own self-interest, owners of various factors possess an active motivation to cut corners and skimp on work.
To produce a compliant product, the time input of various input factors must be guaranteed, and the intensity of input must be guaranteed. That is to say, only sufficient production time and work intensity of various input factors will yield a greater proportion of outputs that meet or exceed compliance standards; conversely, less time input and lower work intensity of various input factors will yield a greater proportion of non-compliant products. When various input factors pursue lower time and quality inputs—which may lead to a greater proportion of non-compliant products—if the school desires to pursue a reduction in the proportion of diluted diplomas, it must strengthen management in order to increase the inputs of full time and quality of various input factors. Strengthening management can mean reinforcing management and improving management, so that the input quantity and quality of each input factor can be measured more accurately; it can also mean establishing compensation systems and incentive-restraint mechanisms that motivate various input factors to increase input time and effort. These various inputs for strengthening management will all bring about an increase in costs, though they will certainly cause a large-scale reduction in the proportion of diluted diplomas. If the entire society holds the exact same preference for diluted diplomas and authentic diplomas, or if society even prefers diluted diplomas, then the school’s reinforcement of management aimed at reducing the proportion of diluted diplomas is not only acting against the broader social macro-system and macro-environment, but will also increase the school’s cost inputs. If this is the case, then the school would be extremely irrational. Under such conditions, the rational choice for the school is to reduce management inputs, or even proactively pursue the production of diluted diplomas, so as to lower the school’s production and management costs.
From this perspective, under the condition that the entire society makes no distinction in its demand between diluted diplomas and authentic diplomas, or even prefers diluted diplomas, the production of diluted diplomas will be a rational behavior and a common phenomenon for diploma providers to satisfy social needs; whereas providing authentic diplomas will be acting against the social macro-environment—an effort that is laborious but thankless, and destined to be weeded out by this so-called macro-environment. Therefore, the scarcity, or even the extinction, of authentic diplomas, and the rampant prevalence of diluted diplomas, are the inevitable outcomes of individual rational choices under specific social rules.
II. The Nature of Diluted Diplomas
To analyze diluted diplomas from the perspective of demand, one must first understand: what is a diluted diploma? What is an authentic diploma? We can borrow the concept of “water-injected pork” (zhushui zhurou) to scrutinize the diluted diploma. I remember that television stations used to broadcast news about water-injected pork frequently. Do you know how water-injected pork is generated and produced? Pork vendors inject water into fresh pork. After the water injection, the weight of the pork increases. Supposing the fresh pork weighs two hundred catties (jin), after injecting twenty catties of water, the total weight of the water-injected pork becomes two hundred and twenty catties; the twenty catties of water within it are sold at the price of pork, yet the price of water is exceedingly low. Therefore, the essence of water-injected pork is to sell water as meat through the form—this outward appearance—of pork. The pork vendor can obtain high profits, while the pork buyer pays more money and suffers a loss. The act of selling water-injected pork is termed a fraudulent act in economics. Similar to water-injected pork, gutter oil (digou you), toxic milk powder (du naifen), and the like are all instances of commercial deception and commercial fraud.
What, then, is a diluted diploma? I once read a report stating that among the doctoral students who enrolled at Southwest University around 2009, over 50% were government officials. I have also watched news in the past about Party Schools (Dangxiao) indiscriminately issuing diplomas. Later, it was discovered that the gold content—the intrinsic value—of Party School diplomas was very low, and compared to other full-time universities of the same category, the gap was immense. It is said that due to reasons like this, Party School diplomas are not recognized in many work units (danwei). Currently, it is estimated that the Central Party School is an exception, as the Central Party School recruits doctoral and master’s postgraduate students. However, many provincial-level, municipal-level, and county-level Party School diplomas are rumored to have quality issues. When I myself was studying for my master’s degree, out of the one hundred and eight master’s postgraduate students in our entire grade across the university, not a single one was an in-service (zaizhi) student. Everyone was completely released from regular work (quantuocan) to study. By the time I was studying for my doctorate, many of my classmates in my grade were government officials and enterprise bosses, yet basically, they very rarely came to class. As I was not a teacher at the time, I dare not make reckless comments on how their grades were ultimately evaluated without attending classes. However, it is an undeniable fact that many of them still obtained doctoral degrees.
Officials, particularly those at the departmental/bureau level (tingji) and above, are reportedly extremely busy, handling a myriad of daily state affairs. Being this busy, when they pursue doctoral degrees, master’s degrees, or correspondence courses, can their basic study time be guaranteed? Can the quality of each training segment be guaranteed? If it cannot be guaranteed, then can the diplomas obtained by these officials prove that they are compliant products? If not, then they are fake, counterfeit, and substandard products. This is what we refer to as diluted diplomas.
A diploma is merely a piece of paper. This piece of paper proves that—if you are an undergraduate student—you have studied at a university for four years, and have passed every training segment. According to university regulations, you are permitted to graduate and are conferred a bachelor’s degree. By the same token, if you are a master’s or doctoral postgraduate student, you can be conferred a master’s or doctoral degree. Permitting you to graduate essentially means that you have at least met the basic quality requirements of each training segment recognized by the school. Once these requirements are met, it demonstrates at the very least that your comprehensive quality and professional skills have reached a minimum level of compliance; you are a compliant product, permitted to leave the factory, and permitted to leave the school.
This is equivalent to a product manufactured by an enterprise, which, having gone through production and inspection at each stage, is permitted to leave the factory; this demonstrates at the very least that the product has reached a level of compliance or above. Conversely, if a product is non-compliant or defective, what will an ordinary manufacturer do? In a highly competitive market environment, non-compliant products are not permitted to leave the factory. Once non-compliant products leave the factory and are sold to consumers, they will damage the reputation of the manufacturer. In a highly competitive market, the demand for that enterprise’s products will decrease drastically, and customers will be drawn away to its competitors. Therefore, whether a product is compliant or non-compliant is of vital importance to the survival of an enterprise.
By the same token, the essence of a diploma is a certificate proving that an individual, through a specified number of years of study and training segments, has caused their human capital to reach a prescribed standard or above. That is to say, your diploma proves that you are a compliant product—your human capital has at least reached the recognized standard of compliance.
What is the essence of a diluted diploma? We say that an authentic and genuine diploma, in its essential meaning, proves that your human capital has reached the level of a compliant product or above. The essence of a diluted diploma is that your human capital has not met the minimum quality standard, yet you are still issued a diploma certifying that your human capital has reached that minimum quality standard. Consequently, your actual human capital is far lower than the level of human capital required by the diploma. You are issued a diploma, and from its surface appearance, this diploma does not differ from any other diploma. However, what this piece of paper essentially seeks to prove is that your capability has reached the compliance standard or above, whereas in reality, you have failed to meet the requirements.
It is in essence a non-compliant product, yet you are issued a certificate of compliance and allowed to leave the school. This is the very essence of a diluted diploma. The essence of a diluted diploma is the phenomenon of non-compliant human capital passing itself off as compliant human capital, and it is also an act of deception and fraud.
Is there a difference between a diluted diploma and an authentic diploma? The difference between a diluted diploma and an authentic diploma is immense; it is the difference between a compliant product and a non-compliant product. This is the difference in its original and true sense.
Is there still a difference between water-injected pork and a diluted diploma? If a pork buyer knows that the pork has been injected with water, will he buy it? He absolutely will not buy it. But what about a diluted diploma? Do you know who needs a diluted diploma? You come here to study because you need a diploma. Your parents spent money for you to come here to study, and they also hope that you will obtain a diploma. However, you will find that in the production process of diluted diplomas, the demanding party of the diploma is directly involved. The demanding party of the diploma is fully aware that the diploma has been diluted, and furthermore, they proactively participate in the dilution. This demonstrates that the demanding party of the diploma is willing to have a diluted diploma, and that there is a demand for it.
The difference between water-injected pork and a diluted diploma is that the production of water-injected pork is due to the existence of information asymmetry—under conditions of information asymmetry, the person buying the pork is deceived by the person selling the pork. However, the demander of the diploma clearly knows it is a diluted diploma, yet will still pay to acquire it, and will moreover collude with the diploma producer to manufacture the diluted diploma.
In the sales process of water-injected pork, the selling party is counterfeiting unilaterally. But the demanding party of the diluted diploma—which means you, including your parents—knows that the diploma has been diluted, yet still wants this diluted diploma. May I ask, has the demanding party of the diploma been deceived? No. The demanding party of the diploma is itself colluding with the producer of the diluted diploma to manufacture the diluted diploma.
I once heard of such a case. I have a friend who teaches classes to postgraduate students. He uses an all-English textbook of equal difficulty to a Harvard University doctoral course, lectures in English, writes on the blackboard entirely in English, and conducts all explanations and proofs of exercises in English, and furthermore, the examinations are entirely in English. He teaches the full 54 class hours. However, another person, for a 54-class-hour course, only holds class 4 or 5 times, and during these 4 to 5 times, the students are merely told to read the content of Advanced Microeconomics on their own after class; during class time, the students come up to present, and the teacher gives comments. Everyone sitting here, please go and read Advanced Microeconomics and see if you can understand it? If a teacher does not possess genuine and solid mastery, can he lecture through Advanced Microeconomics? Yet, very strangely, among the students participating in the study of this course, not a single one questioned or objected to this teacher’s behavior. May I ask, did these students and this teacher collude to manufacture a diluted diploma in this course of Advanced Microeconomics? This example demonstrates that diploma demanders do not obtain diluted diplomas due to being hoodwinked; they are aware of this dilution process, and they even conspire with the producing party to manufacture the diluted diploma. The writing of a master’s thesis is intended to make a postgraduate student’s research capacity reach a certain standard, and to elevate their research level to a specific quality standard. Yet, the acknowledgment sections of two postgraduate students I advised could actually be completely identical. One of them could unexpectedly port the official institutional profile of Guizhou University in its entirety into his master’s thesis. He certainly knew that this was the manufacturing of a diluted diploma, yet he was willing to do it. He knew that if he could muddle through the barrier of his advisor, pass and receive recognition from the review and defense committee teachers, and satisfy other conditions, he would be able to obtain his master’s diploma. May I ask, does such a student not possess a strong motivation of his own accord to be willing to produce a diluted diploma?
From the above, it can be known that a diluted diploma, in its essential sense, is the phenomenon of a substandard product passing itself off as a compliant product. Its substance is that the human capital level of the diploma demander has failed to reach the prescribed minimum quality requirements, yet passes itself off as having reached or exceeded the minimum human capital quality requirements. If a certificate verifying the fulfillment of the minimum human capital quality requirements is provided to these students who have failed to meet the minimum prescribed human capital standards, then this certificate is a diluted diploma. The definition of this concept is relatively important. You must understand this matter clearly. If this problem is not understood clearly, we will be unable to discuss what follows.
The production flow of diluted diplomas, and the role of students within the production flow of diluted diplomas, I will roughly outline here. I will still explain it in detail during the case analysis. Students are the demanding party of the diplomas, and in the process of producing diluted diplomas, they act as collaborators in the production of diluted diplomas. Without the participation of students, diluted diplomas cannot be produced. Or rather, they would not be easily produced. This is one category of students.
There is another category of students—for instance, when students proactively cheat during examinations, is there a teacher involved? The teacher did not tacitly permit you to cheat; you proactively and covertly cheated on your own accord.
Am I talking nonsense? I say that some students proactively cheat. Have you ever proactively cheated? Up until now, have you ever cheated? Can you guarantee that you will not cheat on any examinations during your three years at Guizhou University? Can you guarantee it? Not necessarily. Let me tell you.
I have an article here—”Reflections After Reading Professor Yang Shaozheng’s Collection of Essays”—written by a student of mine. Let me show it to you.
“After reading the articles you wrote, I think there is a truth I must tell you. Just as you said, if a political party intends to reform and return to the right path, it should dare to face its ugly past. As far as I know, among the 2008 cohort of postgraduate students in the School of Economics, the proportion of students who plagiarized and cheated in the final examinations of various subjects was one hundred percent. You taught us Intermediate Microeconomics and Advanced Microeconomics. Through two examinations, I discovered that if one does not cheat, the grades will definitely be low, whereas if one cheats, there is absolutely no risk. Furthermore, the grades will not be too bad, will not disappoint the teacher, and will not affect the evaluation of scholarships. If I chose to report it, I would offend the majority of my classmates. I would become an anomaly among my peers and suffer isolation. Ever since primary school, I never cheated on examinations. But here, after weighing the pros and cons, I had no choice but to choose to cheat along with everyone else. However, I want to say that I truly listened to the lectures well. I also listened to the lectures attentively. And I reviewed conscientiously. If everyone did not cheat, the score I exam-tested would definitely be lower than the cheating scores, but looking horizontally compared to other classmates, it would definitely be higher than most of them. Under the condition of a fair examination, it would be more advantageous for me to obtain a scholarship, because a gap could be widened between me and them. But under an abnormal institutional environment, everyone is forced to cheat on examinations.”
What are your thoughts after hearing this? I used to think they exam-tested very well. An examination in English is no joke. I taught two cohorts. From what I learned afterward, it wasn’t just my subject where cheating occurred; the subjects with cheating were simply too numerous.
According to my understanding, when the majority of teachers give classes, teaching half of the 36 class hours is considered quite excellent. Teaching classes the way Professor Yang does is absolutely being an idiot. Do you know that? An idiot. That is why you dislike me very much. An idiot is giving us classes. If we take classes with teachers who cut corners and skimp on work, we can still play—how relaxing and easy!
Among so many of my students, I value this student the most. He said: “An upright person like you, Professor Yang, will certainly fight against examinee cheating. However, looking at your analysis of diluted diplomas, if you have an upright and responsible mindset, you would severely crack down on cheating during examinations, causing a portion of the students to fail the courses. This behavior of yours is originally a righteous act, but you might be framed by some students who have no conscience. They might report their own teacher, just like the student mentioned in one of the articles you wrote. If you fail students, and the fact that Guizhou University students cheat spreads outside, the school leadership will feel that you are stirring up trouble. Therefore, you will exert effort but receive no thanks. Furthermore, it will be just as you said in your article—under the condition that the entire society makes no distinction between diluted diplomas and authentic diplomas, or even more highly prefers diluted diplomas, the production of diluted diplomas will be a rational behavior and a normal phenomenon for diploma producers to satisfy social needs; whereas providing authentic diplomas is a foolish thing that interferes with and runs counter to the social macro-environment, exerting effort but receiving no thanks, and is destined to be weeded out by this so-called macro-environment. Therefore, the scarcity or extinction of the authentic, and the prevalence or rampant nature of diluted diplomas, are the inevitable outcomes of individual rational choices under specific social rules.”
This is the case and its analysis regarding students proactively cheating in the production flow of diluted diplomas that I just discussed.
Is there a possibility of producing diluted diplomas in the teacher segment? The evidence for this teacher segment was not written by me. It was also written by my student: “Last year, during the final examination for Political Economy right after we enrolled, a certain teacher asked us to add his system just before the exam. Moreover, there was news before the examination. The exam questions were the exact original questions from inside the system, and they were accompanied by answers. I did not believe that such a thing could happen anywhere. That time, I grounded myself and sat in the Shensi Building reviewing for a whole week. The night before the exam, my classmates got hold of the exam paper and were memorizing Political Economy in the corridor. I turned off the light and memorized Political Economy under my quilt. Although the examination was very easy, I truly believed it then. Original questions, not a single one missing. This time, I really broadened my horizons. The only thing to be thankful for was that I exam-tested well. Otherwise, I would have fallen ill from anger. But what is loathsome is that even under the circumstances of leaked questions, the classmates were still plagiarizing and cheating. I had never seen such unconfident students before. Look at this, if the process is like this, there is no need for us to yearn for fairness in the results. Because in such an environment, anyone who speaks the truth and does solid work will not receive respect. Those students who cherish teachers, and those teachers who cherish students, are all anomalies.”
Is there a possibility of generating diluted diplomas in the management segment? Likewise, this is evidence written by the same student: “Last semester, due to the 9th National Traditional Games of Ethnic Minorities, four students in our class served as volunteers and did not participate in the Microeconomics examination. According to the document from the Academic Affairs Office, the subjects for which they applied for exam exemption were to be treated as 75 points. But the final result was that the 4 of them were absent from the exam. Later, these students took certificates to find the teacher to modify the scores, all to 75 points. But this is a very serious issue. The official seal of the Academic Affairs Office, or the instructions of a leader, could allow a student who did not even participate in the examination to get a high score of 75 points (a score of 75 points in this subject is a high score in our class; out of forty-two classmates in the class, more than ten failed the course). They did not participate in the examination, so how could they possibly have scores? Teachers have their own rights and interests, and administrative orders cannot make a teacher lie. Furthermore, they did not reach the teacher’s passing standard. Later, because the number of classmates failing the course in our class was too large, the college leadership criticized this teacher, saying, ‘Why don’t you cherish your students?’ Haha, what is called cherishing? Could it be that reviewing ten questions for students just before the exam and testing five of them is cherishing? Is your way of cherishing students simply not letting students fail the course?”
This is what this student said. Because this teacher did not follow the administrative order to give 75 points, this college leader threatened and scolded the teacher severely, but still did not get their way, so they went to a higher-level leader to lodge a malicious complaint. If the teacher does not evaluate and give a score of 75 points to the students who did not take the exam, it does not matter; can’t we administrative leaders directly issue an order to let the management personnel go into the Academic Affairs Office system and directly fill in the scores for these students who did not reference the exam?
May I ask, working in this place of Guizhou Province, is this teacher willing to go against the provincial leadership and the school leadership, including the college leadership? He knows that going against these people will bring him no good end? How would he dare to go against them? He often says that his courage is very small. He has never opposed students engaging in more extracurricular activities under the premise that studying is the principal focus. Doing a good job in studying is an important link for the improvement of professional skills. Participating in extracurricular activities is an effective path for the cultivation and improvement of students’ comprehensive quality. Higher education institutions must cultivate students who possess relatively strong professional skills and also cultivate students who possess relatively high comprehensive quality. Therefore, this teacher has never opposed students actively participating in extracurricular activities, including the National Traditional Games of Ethnic Minorities. However, there is a prerequisite condition—extracurricular activities must not impact or disrupt the teaching order, and extracurricular activities, including other activities that cultivate students’ comprehensive abilities, must take the safeguarding of the students’ normal teaching order as a prerequisite. If this major prerequisite is not handled accurately and is not safeguarded, it demonstrates that our school is, at the very least on this issue, somewhat biased.
In its essential meaning, a volunteer refers to the voluntary behavior of a person who is enthusiastic about public welfare undertakings. When Guizhou Province recruits volunteers, it can either recruit within the province or recruit volunteers nationwide. Of course, students can also voluntarily become volunteers. If administrative orders are used to make students serve as volunteers for the National Traditional Games of Ethnic Minorities, and the students are then promised that by participating as volunteers for the games, they do not have to attend classes and their scores will be directly evaluated as 75 points—then if other students also do not come to class, how is the teaching order to be maintained? This is precisely the situation. The behaviors of the government departments, the school-level stratum, and the college leadership involved in this incident demonstrate that, in an essential sense, they do not believe that producing that kind of compliant diploma in this course is of vital importance. They believe that even if these students have not met the minimum quality standards, I can still give you a score above the minimum passing rate. May I ask, as the management stratum, are they suspected of providing diluted diplomas?
This student provided yet another piece of evidence: “One very interesting time, I went to the Academic Affairs Office to handle some matters. I met Classmate C at the door and asked him what he was doing. He said embarrassedly, ‘I failed a course, so I came to look for Teacher Luo. Even I feel ashamed; I’ve looked for him eight times already.’ Haha, scores can not only be achieved through examinations, but can also be changed. Even if such situations apply to a minority, or to people with special connections and capabilities, the malignant impact it inflicts is inestimable. What, then, is an average score? What is a comprehensive evaluation grade? Scores are all like this. The comprehensive evaluation no longer needs to be further falsified and debunked.”
This is not spoken by me. I have always spoken only to the extent that the evidence allows, and spoken only to the extent that the facts permit. Speaking this way makes some students feel very uncomfortable upon hearing it. In their hearts, they hate Professor Yang to death. You have exposed all of our secrets. Is that not so? The one who wrote the article is a student with a conscience.
I do not need to give more examples for the rest; your own class has them. I will just cite this example. There are eight international students here among you. They have been continuously coming to entreat me—asking whether the examinations for international students could be treated differently? The underlying implication is: since we are international students, please show some consideration and make the difficulty a bit lower. That means making it different, seeking preferential policies. However, the result of preferential policies is simply that your gold content—your intrinsic value—is a bit lower than theirs. The same 80 points you get would not be the same as the 80 points of other classmates. Therefore, I tell you, the standard is the same. You still have so much time now. They are running, and you can run even faster.
Undergraduate students are also the same. Several international undergraduate students in International Economy and Trade (Guomao) made requests to me many times, from the very beginning until the very end, hoping for special consideration. That is of no use. They are definitely treated equally without discrimination. In the end, they participated in the unified examination; out of the 5 international students, 2 passed on the first attempt, and 3 also cleared the benchmark through the makeup examination (bukao). This demonstrates that through their own efforts, international students can make it too.
Note that for my examinations, is it guaranteed that one will definitely pass the makeup examination? Not necessarily. There was once an undergraduate student who did not pass even up until the final clearance examination (qingkao). One year after graduation, he took the exam again and actually scored above 60 points. I do not know whether he obtained the exam questions in advance by means of cheating, or by giving several cases of Moutai wine to a certain administrator? Regarding circumstances I do not know about, I cannot talk nonsense. On my part, I saw this situation.
Therefore, is the provision of diluted diplomas and the provision of water-injected pork the same thing? No, it is not. The production flow of diluted diplomas is an extremely long process. The demanding party is likewise inside it. In the production and provision of diluted diplomas, students, teachers, and the management stratum all play a role. Wherever leaders choose to be derelict in their duties, they are deliberately producing and manufacturing diluted diplomas. Whichever teachers do not conscientiously deliver lectures are also producing diluted diplomas. Whichever students proactively cheat, or collude with teachers to cheat, or collude with the management to cheat, are all contributors to the production of diluted diplomas, without question.
The essence of an authentic diploma—what is its essence? Its essence is that issuing you the diploma proves your human capital has reached above a certain quality standard. Then your actual capable capital has indeed reached above the level of a compliant product. Thus, this certificate proves that your outward form and your substance are consistent. That demonstrates it is an authentic diploma. Then what is the use of an authentic diploma? If that diploma proves your own human capital, when you go to look for a job, the information actually provided to the factory and to the employer unit is true, rather than false. This is the most core element. An authentic diploma is a certificate proving that you truly possess capability. That thing is the diploma. When you bring it to an employer unit, it serves as a signal that your human capital is compliant. This is a true disclosure.
If it is a diluted diploma, then it is a false disclosure. That means you are deceiving the employer unit. Is it or is it not deceiving the employer unit? In our next class, we will analyze what kind of institutional environment requires diluted diplomas. We will now take a ten-minute break.
III. Property Rights Subjects of Economic Organizations and the Demand for “Watered-Down” Diplomas
Just now, we discussed how if the degree of competition within various industries in society is relatively high, the degree of competition between industries is also relatively high, and these highly competitive industries account for a large proportion of all industries in society, then society as a whole will have no demand for watered-down diplomas. At this time, what the entire society requires are authentic diplomas, not watered-down ones.
Now, I would like to pitch an additional question to you—in an environment where the degree of overall social competition is relatively high, meaning that the degree of competition within various industries across society is high, do all economic organizations necessarily have the incentive to demand authentic diplomas, or owners of high-quality human capital? Is it possible that, even then, these economic organizations still do not need high-quality human capital, but instead require “shoddy goods”?
The level of competition is one dimension, but there is another dimension—the property rights subjects of economic organizations. Even when the degree of competition within various industries in society is relatively high, within these highly competitive industries, the organizational forms of enterprises vary, including various types of private enterprises and public-owned enterprises.
For private enterprises, their various property rights are relatively well-defined, whereas the property rights structure of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) exhibits a series of phenomena worth exploring. Under the condition of facing equally intense market competition, from the perspective of the inherent merits and demerits of the organizations themselves, is there currently a basic consensus that the organizational efficiency of state-owned organizations is lower than that of non-state-owned organizations?
Is it absolutely certain that non-state-owned enterprises possess higher organizational efficiency? Someone once asked me: “Since state-owned enterprises are inefficient, why are some state-owned enterprises run so well? And since private enterprises are efficient, why do so many of them go bankrupt?” What I want to tell you is that, analyzing from the perspectives of institutional economics and property rights economics, the organizational efficiency of state-owned enterprises is indeed lower than that of non-state-owned enterprises in a general sense. However, this is not the focus of our share today, and I do not wish to expand the analysis for you here.
If state-owned enterprises also come to compete in this industry, what might happen to them? Under these circumstances, they might fail to outcompete other enterprises and could be eliminated. Who is the true property rights subject of a state-owned enterprise? Or rather, who is its true shareholder? It is the entire citizenry. For instance, who is the owner of the state-owned enterprises in Guizhou Province? It is the forty million public citizens of Guizhou Province. When an enterprise genuinely fails to outcompete other enterprises in market competition, it may face failure and elimination. At this moment, the true owners of the state-owned enterprise are absent; they wish to care about their own property but are powerless to do so. Is it possible, then, for the so-called managers of state-owned enterprises to convert this portion of the owners’ property into certain benefits and returns for themselves? After this conversion, even though the state-owned enterprise suffers losses and goes bankrupt, will the managers become poor or suffer losses? “A poor temple but a rich abbot”—is such a possibility real? In an environment of fair competition, state-owned enterprises may not necessarily outcompete other enterprises. Moreover, no preferential policies are granted to the state-owned enterprises. Without preferential policies, it becomes impossible for the government to protect state-owned enterprises as well. Knowing that surviving in society is too difficult, the managers might seek a way out for themselves by embezzling the interests of the owners. Because you, the owners, number forty million or 1.3 billion, can you come to protect and care about the assets and operations of the state-owned enterprise? You clearly know that you hold a one-in-1.3-billion share of the assets within the enterprise, and that the manager intends to swallow and occupy it, but as an individual, you only account for one-1.3-billionth—what can you do? If you go to report him in order to protect your one-in-1.3-billion share of the assets, will it work? The cost you pay for protection is extremely high, but your return is extremely low—what you obtain can only be one-1.3-billionth of the protected assets.
From the perspective of economics, is your behavior a rational choice? From an economic standpoint, your behavior carries massive negative externalities. You protect your rights and interests, but one minus one-1.3-billionth of the resulting income is taken by others, while you only obtain one-1.3-billionth of the returns. Almost all of the costs of protection are borne by you alone.
In such an environment, may I ask, when you clearly see that your interests are being damaged, do you, as an individual, have the incentive and motivation to protect your rights as an owner? This motivation is extremely weak. Under these circumstances, even though the degree of competition in this industry is relatively high, when faced with such a system, what might the manager do? The high profits of the enterprise belong to everyone, to the 1.3 billion people, and have little correlation with the interests of the manager. Since the correlation between the manager’s interests and the owner’s profits or losses is weak, why should the manager make the effort to discover and seek out owners of high human capital to increase the owner’s profits? High human capital owners benefit the enterprise owners, but my returns as a manager do not increase. In that case, can I just use shoddy goods? Furthermore, using shoddy goods can even increase my own returns and utility. First, the shoddy good could be my relative, my friend, or part of my nepotistic network. Second, even if they are not my relative or friend, can I increase my personal utility as the person in charge and gain satisfaction by hiring shoddy goods in exchange for various benefits they give me, both monetary and non-monetary? This way, it does not matter if the state-owned enterprise suffers losses or goes bankrupt. If it goes under, I, the manager, have already obtained the maximum return. If it is this kind of environment, is it necessarily true that the higher the degree of competition, the higher the demand of such enterprise organizations for authentic diplomas? I think that is not a certainty either.
Therefore, this provides another dimension—the condition that the degree of competition is relatively high and the degree of monopoly is relatively low implies a prerequisite: there should be no fundamental defect in the efficiency of the enterprise’s organizational form; additionally, the rule of law and the legal system of the entire society must have no fundamental defects, and the enforceability of the law must also be relatively sound.
Only in this kind of environment does a higher degree of competition become the precise environment required for authentic diplomas. That is to say, when the degree of industry competition is high, the degree of competition between various industries in society is high, and the highly competitive industries account for a large proportion of all industries in society, in an essential sense, there is still a latent underlying assumption, which is that the organizational forms of various industries, or rather various economic organizations, have no fundamental defects. If the organizational form of the society’s micro-economy violates certain basic common sense, then its organizational efficiency is not necessarily very high.
What is basic common sense? Common sense in economics dictates that the individual is the best guardian of their own self-interest, which refers to Adam Smith’s individual who pursues personal interest. However, while you are pursuing personal interest, is there such a possibility—that while pursuing personal interest, you do not damage the interests of others? If such is the case, where returns are not obtained by harming others to benefit oneself, then you look after your own interests, and by utilizing the various input factors you possess to obtain various opportunities for use, you increase your own returns. This represents an increase in the total wealth of society; it is a Pareto improvement.
However, if you cannot protect the assets or wealth you own by yourself—or rather, if you, as a collective of owners, have neither the right nor the capacity to protect your own property, but instead can only allow others to protect your property for you—then, should those others have opportunistic tendencies and wish to embezzle your interests and your property, you have no way to protect it. May I ask, does this kind of situation violate the basic common sense that the individual is the best guardian of their own self-interest?
In our last class, I gave you an example. I said, suppose you bought a forklift, and you spent 500,000 yuan to buy this forklift; it is definitely your asset. However, you do not know how to drive this forklift. You hire a driver to drive it for you. When this driver drives this forklift and operates your property, you cannot exercise the full functions of a forklift owner over your forklift; instead, they are exercised by your employee—the driver. What is the result of his exercise of these functions? The forklift goes out to excavate earth and stone, and you do not know the status of the daily earnings it generates. Then, it relies entirely on what he tells you about the earnings. After he speaks, you cannot have any doubt about his behavior or claims. Not only that, you also have to express eternal loyalty to him. If it is this kind of situation, he may swallow and occupy the daily earnings generated by the forklift you spent 500,000 yuan to purchase, yet tell you that business is bad, there is no profit, or that it is even suffering losses. Is such a scenario possible? The forklift, along with the earnings obtained by utilizing it, originally belonged to you, but he treats it as his own, ultimately turning what is yours into what is his. From the perspective of maximizing his personal interest and personal utility, he encroaches upon your assets as much as possible. He makes the utilization of your assets bring about an increase in his personal interest and personal utility as much as possible.
This kind of situation is equivalent to taking your own things to handle affairs for someone else. May I ask, does this not violate the most fundamental common sense? The organizational form I just spoke about is, in reality, exactly like this.
IV. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 1 —The Allocation of Resources within College Administrative Offices and the Production of Diluted Diplomas
Up to this point, we have analyzed how water-diluted degrees are generated, or rather, what the institutional conditions for the existence of water-diluted degrees are, through the dual perspectives of supply and demand. The only situation that could possibly result in the non-existence of water-diluted degrees—meaning that authentic degrees prevail—is one single scenario: from the perspective of demand, the degree of competition among the various social industries demanding degrees is exceptionally high; and from the perspective of supply, the degree of competition within the degree-supplying industry is also exceptionally high. Only under the condition where the degree of competition is exceptionally high on both the demand and supply sides will authentic degrees prevail in this society. Of course, even within such an institutional environment, is it possible for water-diluted degrees to exist? It is possible. However, that kind of water-diluted degree phenomenon is not generated by a system of monopoly; rather, it is generated under the condition of information asymmetry. This situation accounts for a relatively small proportion.
In the other three scenarios, what prevails in society are basically water-diluted degrees. One scenario is that the degree of competition among various industries across the entire society is low, the degree of administrative monopoly maintained by the government is relatively high, and the degree of competition within the degree-supplying industry is high. Another scenario is that the degree of competition among various industries across the entire society is low, and the degree of monopoly within the degree-supplying industry is relatively high, or the degree of monopoly is relatively low. The third scenario is that the degree of competition is low in both the degree-supplying industry and the demanding industries. In all three of these scenarios, water-diluted degrees prevail. This is our analytical conclusion.
Are these conclusions reliable? They must be verified through case studies. Today, our primary focus is to use case studies to verify these conclusions. We will still follow the established order to analyze them one by one.
The problem of resource allocation in college offices. I once wrote a short article on this topic, titled “The Problem of Office Resource Allocation in the J School of Western G University.” Take a look at what this problem is. At the end of 2008, after the new leadership team of the J School took office, the first thing they thought of was resolving the office issue for the leadership members of the J School. The offices of the Dean and the Party Secretary naturally utilized the offices of the previous Dean and Secretary. The Associate Dean’s office then occupied what was originally the MPA office. The office arrangement for another organizational officer at the deputy division chief level (fu chuji) was unconfirmed. The contradiction at the time was that the office of an Associate Dean from the previous leadership team had not been handed over. I suspect that if this office had been handed over, wouldn’t the office issue for that deputy-division-level organizational officer have been resolved? Wouldn’t the office problem for all leaders have been resolved perfectly? Of course, other schools and colleges outside the J School of Western G University followed the exact same practice. The office conditions of college leadership must be given priority consideration. I have yet to see a single counterexample in any college.
However, I still hoped that the new leadership team could break away from routine and bring a fresh atmosphere; I hoped the new leaders could settle down temporarily and make an overall, unified arrangement based on the existing office conditions. The college leadership, various departments, administrative sections, professors, and PhDs would each occupy a certain proportion. In such an allocation of office resources, the proportion for college leadership would have to decrease, so that the departments, administrative sections, and professors would all have a place to work, even if it might be very tight and crowded. Yet, reality disappointed me. The leadership team prioritized their own workspaces, leaving other professors and PhDs who held no administrative posts without any workspace whatsoever. One must realize that these professors and PhDs supervise anywhere from a few to over a dozen graduate students across various year levels annually, yet they do not even have a venue to communicate and hold discussions with the students they guide.
Consequently, the college leadership team gained bargaining chips to haggle with the university leadership: “The office conditions the university provided me are too deficient, leaving the university’s teachers without basic working conditions. Therefore, the improvement of conditions for college faculty must come through the university’s efforts and has nothing to do with the college itself.” Is that truly the case? Even if the university’s office conditions were expanded threefold, according to the leadership team’s existing mindset of satisfying administrative leaders and administrative staff first, the office conditions trickling down to the teachers would still be next to nothing. Under the principles of “leadership priority” and “administration priority,” once office conditions improve, wouldn’t the standard for a college leader’s office simply expand from an independent office to an independent suite—consisting of two or three rooms? Administrative staff could also be allocated according to the standard of individual, independent offices. By then, the poor working conditions of teachers could still serve as a bargaining chip to haggle with the university—claiming insufficient investment from the university.
If we follow this kind of logic, it will be very difficult for the university’s investment in the office conditions of each college to ever meet demand. If the college leadership team did not possess a mindset of “leadership priority” and “administration priority,” but instead operated with a mindset of “teaching priority,” “research priority,” and overall planning, then under the current tight resource constraints, they could—at the very least in the allocation of office conditions—assign a rough proportion among teaching staff, administrative staff, and administrative leadership. Then, within each group, they could carry out allocations conducive to better executing their work. Under conditions where office resources are limited, why can’t two or three college leaders share one office? Why must every single leader have an independent office? Even among universities in Mainland China, I have seen colleges where three college leaders share a single office, and I have also seen colleges where all leaders work entirely out of one office, each using their own individual workstation. Of course, because their office conditions were indeed limited, professors without administrative posts also lacked working conditions. I wonder, if the office conditions of those colleges improve, will it also become a matter of “leadership priority” and “administration priority”?
If our college leaders abandoned the mindset of “self-priority” and “administration priority,” then the existing office resources of the J School of Western G University could completely allocate a portion to teaching and research personnel who hold no administrative positions. Under such conditions, teachers, advisors, and students would have a platform for communication and seminar discussions. Teaching and research personnel without administrative posts would no longer feel as though they have no place to stand or feel like outsiders upon arriving at the college. When a teacher explained these circumstances to a leader of this J School, the response received was mockery and ridicule. That college leader even said to the teacher, “How about I let you use my office?” assuming this teacher was just nitpicking and looking for trouble. Other college leaders simply brushed it off with absolute indifference.
Why does the leadership team of the J School push for a mindset of “leadership priority” and “administration priority”? Why are the working conditions of professors and teachers not given even a shred of holistic consideration? What on earth is the logic behind this? Under what kind of institutional environment would the leadership team of the J School push for “faculty, professor, and PhD priority” and “teaching and research priority”? If possible, I will dissect these questions one by one.
When I see so many of your heads slumped down like this below me, I know that my reading of those texts has had no impact on you.
Not long ago, I went to Beijing—specifically to Peking University—to audit an undergraduate class, and it shocked me greatly. Isn’t this China’s premier institution of higher learning? Yet what I saw was that while the teacher was lecturing up on the podium, about half of the students below were either sleeping, playing on their computers, or busying themselves with their own tasks. During this trip, I went to the China Center for Economic Research at Peking University and told them that I am an economics professor from Guizhou University, wishing to learn from them and audit their classes. I only had half a day, and they happened to check the class schedule for me, saying that Professor Li Ling was teaching Health Economics. Although I do not agree with some of Professor Li Ling’s academic viewpoints, I recognize her as a highly knowledgeable scholar. In the end, however, I was deeply disappointed—inside the graduate classroom, there were only students and no teacher. I asked a student beside me, “Where did the teacher go?” The answer was, “The teacher went to a meeting.” “Will the teacher make up the class later?” The answer was, “Generally, they won’t make it up.” Even when the teacher does show up to class, it is the students who present while the teacher just listens. We must deeply reflect upon this kind of situation.
Today, I also heard a highly shocking piece of news. I am a person who is immensely curious about life, you know? Many new things within it prompt me to reflect and form associations. Today, I ran into a PhD holder from G University who is also a so-called teacher at G University.
“May I ask where you obtained your PhD?”
The answer was: “Right here at G University.”
“What was your major?”
The answer was: “Computer Science.”
“Who was your advisor?”
The answer was: “My advisor was So-and-So.”
I said, “What field of expertise does your advisor research?”
The answer was: “His advisor’s research direction is completely mismatched with the major of the PhD students he supervises. However, this person used to be a leader. After I aligned myself with him, when I went to do advanced studies or audit classes domestically, or went abroad as a visiting scholar, he was able to grant me those opportunities. Therefore, following him yields benefits in these aspects.”
“Is it possible for him to offer you any help in your academic field?”
The answer was: “No help.”
I asked him: “What if you looked at it from an alternative scenario: when you were applying for your PhD, you applied to study under a different advisor—for instance, a world-class scholar who actually researches this field. They would know exactly where the domestic cutting edge and the international cutting edge are. After spending one or even two years with them, you would have already entered the vanguard of the field yourself. The problems you would be considering at that point would be about breaking through that frontier. But now, being with this current teacher who does not research this field, yet dares to come into this discipline to supervise PhD students—didn’t you feel that you would be held back and compromised?”
He asked me: “Hypothetically speaking, if you had this opportunity—even if you didn’t research this field, but had the chance to become a PhD advisor (bodao) in this discipline—would you be willing to take it?”
I said, “I would not.”
He said, “Then people truly are different from one another.”
I said, “This is the most fundamental common sense, comrade. For example, if I lack knowledge in computers and have an issue with mine, I will look to you for help in repairing it. If you are not an expert in computers, you certainly will not say, ‘Let me help you out, I’ll fix it for you.’ Your help would be ineffective, and it wouldn’t be fixed. Instead, you would say, ‘I really don’t know much about computers and can’t help you, but I know So-and-So is highly familiar with them; they are an expert. Go find them. They can definitely resolve your problem.’
Yet, this is where it gets bizarre. Higher education faculty also have specialized divisions of labor. A teacher might be highly proficient in one discipline, but in other disciplines, they could very well be a complete ignoramus; it is impossible for you to understand that other field. If the discipline you are engaged in does not possess the authorization to confer doctoral degrees, then simply do not supervise PhD students. Your own field does not have the capacity to train doctoral students, so what does it mean when you insist on entering a discipline you are unfamiliar with and ignorant of to supervise PhD students? Our institutions of higher learning no longer possess even the most fundamental common sense.”
Is this arrangement of the college offices just a simple problem? The office configuration of the J School does not truly serve teaching. It is based on the principle that whoever possesses administrative resources and whoever holds administrative rank (xingzheng jibie) is entitled to enjoy those perks. It is characterized by administration priority and leadership priority; it is not research priority or teaching priority. What correlation, or what relationship, does such an allocation of office resources have with the production of water-diluted degrees?
Since becoming a leader brings such enormous benefits, if we assume that administrative leaders were to be selected and promoted based on strong research capability and strong teaching ability, then a capable person with relatively strong research aptitude would strive to do research and teach purely for the purpose of becoming an official (dang guan). On the other hand, if we assume that administrative leaders are not selected and promoted due to strong research and teaching capabilities, then those clever individuals who know how to maximize their own personal interests will not invest their energy into teaching or research. They will try every possible means to direct their energy toward the people who can make them officials, and toward the matters that can make them officials. Many of us want to be officials and rack our brains to climb into officialdom, because only by becoming an official can one make it big. Those who cannot become officials find ways to win the favor of those who are. Then, when those in power allocate resources, they can hand down a share of the leftovers. Whatever these officials leave uneaten can be given to you in part, which is always better than getting nothing at all.
If this is the case, where the vast majority of people are finding ways to become administrative leaders or keeping busy currying favor with them to secure priority in resource allocation, what is the collective result of everyone acting this way? Each individual’s time and energy are limited; they are scarce resources. If you direct your mind, time, and energy toward those political endeavors, may I ask whether you can still invest a vast amount of energy and time into your teaching and research? You cannot. If you cannot, it is completely normal that your research capability remains mediocre, and your teaching level stays mediocre or even completely substandard. What is the relationship between teaching and research? If you can produce knowledge and generate excellent research, your teaching level will also be outstanding. It is difficult for us to comprehend how someone who has given absolutely no thought to scholarship could ever disseminate knowledge well. It is an impossibility. If our teachers lack sufficient energy and time to invest in teaching and research, resulting in mediocre research and teaching, then is it possible for students to acquire first-rate knowledge? Is it possible for knowledge to be well disseminated? It is impossible.
Under such a system, do our utterly mediocre teachers feel any sense of shame? They can quite Justifiably feel no shame at all. Why? “I am mediocre because you encourage me to be mediocre. What you encourage is becoming an official, and if I cannot become an official, I will find ways to flatter those who are and cling to their thighs, which is far better than doing teaching and research.”
When teachers’ energy is directed toward these things through this method, rather than toward making an effort to do well in research and teaching, what will be the quality of the students produced? Since things are like this, under these circumstances, may I ask whether this office resource allocation based on “administration priority” and “leadership priority” is encouraging people to not invest efforts into research and teaching? Since things are like this, then a teacher who only gives you eight sessions out of an eighteen-session course should not be considered terrible or viewed as having an issue with professional ethics. This is her normal choice of behavior under a specific environment.
For that teacher who only taught eight out of eighteen sessions, it was a rational choice under a specific institutional environment. I feel there is nothing wrong with this teacher. After he did that, did he suffer any losses? No. Yet his cost investment was low. He is rational. But for my fifty-four-credit-hour course, except for statutory holidays that were dropped and which I did not make up, under any other circumstances, I will teach every single session to the full. Furthermore, examinations are scheduled at a separate time. Of course, the examinations are proctored by the Graduate Section. I will grade the papers and evaluate the exams. Comparing my way of conducting classes with that teacher’s way of conducting classes—setting aside quality for a moment and looking strictly at the time investment—his investment is forty percent of mine, meaning his actual unit lecture fee, calculated by attendance time, is more than double mine. From the perspective of individual input and output, cost and benefit, is he smart or am I smart? He is smart. The reason you welcome this kind of teacher so much is because he is very smart; he is a clever person. Why do you hate me? Because I am a dummy, a fool.
Give me some advice, what should I do? What do you say I should do? Should I learn from him, or persist in my current way of doing things? You persist in wanting me to continue being a fool? Therefore, your intentions are wicked. Clearly knowing that my doing this is the behavior of an idiot, you absolutely insist that I be a fool, and even encourage me. What is the meaning of this? You harbor ill intent. I am playing a joke. However, this banter is also meaningful; you must reflect on it.
So, regarding the first case study—the problem of office resource allocation in the college—may I ask whether this line of thinking in resource allocation by the J School of G University, and their treatment of teachers, means in an essential sense that they are already producing water-diluted degrees right within the management link? That is why a teacher in the College of Engineering—and probably not just one teacher—said, “I simply will not teach classes conscientiously, and I will just hoodwink those students when I lecture. This is because you, the management layer, have failed to respect our labor.” They believe that since you do not respect me, I will not respect my students either; it is just that simple.
When I read this, I felt very sad, a deep pain. I am engaged in education. I do not wish for this kind of phenomenon to become the norm. I study economics. In economics, the absolute core of microeconomics is incentives and constraints. If the organizational objective is benign, it will incentivize people to work hard and constrain people from slacking off, achieving the organization’s benign incentives and constraints. The fact that these teachers expressed such heartfelt sentiments proves that the situation is exactly the opposite, which pains me deeply.
The case study analysis of office resource allocation in the college demonstrates that within the management link, it truly does lead to the production of water-diluted degrees.
V. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 2 —The Adjustments to and Separation of the Teaching Committee, the Degree Committee, and the Academic Committee
The second point concerns the adjustment of the members of the Degree Committee and the Teaching Committee at J College of G University in the western region. Let us examine how this case relates to diluted diplomas.
After the new leadership team took office at J College in 2008, they adjusted the membership of the former Teaching Committee and Degree Committee without following any due process. Granted, different people have different mindsets and philosophies, so is it permissible to make adjustments? Yes, adjustments can be made. However, adjustments must follow procedures and adhere to rules. What were the principles governing the adjustments? Were there rules in place for making them? On what basis were they adjusted? What was the procedure for the adjustments? None of this existed. It came down entirely to a single word from the principal leader: so-and-so used to be a member of the Degree Committee, but now they are not; so-and-so used to be a member of the Teaching Committee, but now they are not. Whomever I want, I take. As for who gets in and who stays out, the leader alone has the final say, without any reason, rule, or procedure.
We know that within a university, the most important thing is to abide by rules. In a university, all matters involving teaching, academics, and similar domains ought to be governed by certain norms formulated by representatives among the academic staff, and actions should be taken in accordance with these norms. However, when the Academic Committee and the Teaching Committee are adjusted in such a manner—completely devoid of rules and procedures—may I ask, what impression does this leave? First of all, your experts and professors hold absolutely no status in the eyes of those who control administrative resources. Secondly, you experts and professors are merely tools for the leadership. Look at this: I can replace you without any basis whatsoever, and once you are replaced, you can do nothing but stare blankly in helplessness. Since I can adjust your position this time without any basis, I can do anything else next time without any basis either. The reason is simple: it is because I am the leader, I am the official, and I hold the power. Why can I adjust your position? Because you are not an official, you are not a leader—it is as simple as that.
If this is the case, is it not the exact same issue as the previously mentioned allocation of college office resources? Since officials can capriciously decide the fates of many people and turn various platforms into tools to fulfill their personal desires—doing whatever they please—it will encourage many people to strive desperately to become officials themselves. If they cannot become officials, and yet those who are officials wield such immense power—capable of unconditionally deciding your fate and interests—then ordinary people who are not officials can only work hard to curry favor with them, going to your home to pay New Year visits and hanging on the leader’s every nod. If I maintain a good relationship with you in my daily life, you might not marginalize me when the time comes. Once people become part of your inner circle of cronies, then whatever opportunities or benefits arise, you will consider me. After forming a small interest circle, the entire resources of J College are distributed within my small band of brothers and narrow scope. Everyone else is an outsider, unable to even dream of getting a share of the leftovers.
Such an institutional arrangement, in its essential meaning, encourages the administrative leadership team—centered around the principal leader—to control resources and master everyone’s fate. Your fate and future depend not on whether your teaching is good, whether your scientific research is excellent, or whether your capabilities are strong. Rather, it is because of all sorts of miscellaneous reasons that this leader happens to like you. Why does he like you? Because your face is good-looking. Why does he like you? Because you are pleasing to him. If I make myself pleasing to him, he will like me.
If this is the situation—where the allocation of resources and the incentivization of human capital are not based on performance, and not based on capability—then may I ask, what is the use of working hard? You want to conduct scientific research, you want to engage in teaching, but after busying yourself for so long, what purpose does it serve? It serves absolutely no purpose. Since the teachers understand that reality is exactly in this state, why should they do their utmost to excel in scientific research and teaching?
There was once a teacher at G College of G University who told me, “I simply will not teach extra classes. When it comes to teaching, I just complete the mandatory workload; for any additional work, I look for reasons to evade it and not do it as much as possible.”
She holds a doctorate. I quite respect her scholarship and capability. I think she is a very intelligent female PhD. Of course, I have no personal feelings toward her. She knows that there is nothing to be gained, so as long as she does not violate the regulations, that is enough. As long as I do not violate the regulations, casually muddling through and scraping by is sufficient.
Yet, if there were a set of good rules, our intelligent teachers—such as these PhDs, associate professors, and professors—would bring their intelligence and talent into full play within teaching and scientific research.
However, with your way of doing things, with your adjustment, do you show any regard for those professional teachers and those senior professors? Not at all. Furthermore, regarding the outcome of the adjustment, first of all, as I observed at the time, after the Degree Committee was adjusted, most of the professors were pushed out through the adjustment, leaving behind a considerable portion who were associate professors and department chairs. It so happened that my professor friend was very fortunate that time not to be pushed out by the adjustment, and remained on the Degree Committee of J College. This was because he had also been a member of the college’s Degree Committee previously.
My friend discovered that what they were doing on the Degree Committee was identical to what the previous leadership had done, and in fact, it was a case of going even further and worse. My friend is very upright, so he spoke up. How was work being carried out in that college at the time? One of the very important functions of the Degree Committee is the selection of master’s student supervisors. The candidates for master’s student supervisors at J College must first be deliberated upon within J College. My friend said that graduate student supervisors are a vital link in the quality of graduate student cultivation. Only by selecting outstanding master’s student supervisors can we cultivate outstanding graduate students and improve the quality of graduate students. Since this is the case, the selection of graduate student supervisors must be approached prudently, with rules and procedures that reflect sound concepts. When your Graduate Studies Section notified the members of the Degree Committee to attend a meeting, the committee members did not even know the content of the meeting; they were notified in the morning, and the meeting was held in the afternoon. Only after the meeting began did they find out that they were there to conduct the selection of master’s student supervisors.
When selecting supervisors, even the members of the Degree Committee did not know about it in advance; may I ask, would the other teachers know? Because a member of this college’s Degree Committee is also a teacher in that college. To select supervisors, the information regarding the selection of supervisors must be publicized at least ten days in advance, posted on the internet, so that all teachers who meet the criteria know this information. They can then submit applications in light of these criteria. As long as the information is open and transparent, and strictly based on rules and procedures, teachers whose qualifications fall short will have no grievances; they will have a direction to strive toward, and their hard work will yield rewards, being affirmed and recognized. If the basic qualifications of an applicant teacher are met, it remains to be seen whether there are any issues regarding quality. The college’s Degree Sub-Committee should then perform this gatekeeping role. After these opinions were voiced, they had absolutely no positive effect; instead, they produced a counter-effect. Precisely because of this, things turned out very badly for my friend—he offended the principal leader. “Since I brought you into the Degree Committee, I can kick you out at any time. I brought you in because I regarded you highly. I regarded you highly, yet you still raise objections, failing to give me face, and coming here to lecture me about the quality of student cultivation.”
You think you can come here to lecture him about improving the college’s quality of student cultivation—will that work? No. He does not care about that sort of thing.
Immediately following that, during the selection of supervisors, my friend spoke up again: “When selecting graduate student supervisors, some have never guided graduate students before or served as master’s student supervisors. To keep a firm grip on the gatekeeping of graduate student cultivation quality, given that new supervisors have absolutely no experience in guiding graduate students, it is recommended that during the initial selection, a new supervisor should only be allowed to serve as a master’s student supervisor for a single major. Once they have guided about one cohort of students, gained experience, and proved to be genuinely competent in all aspects, the new supervisor can then serve as a master’s student supervisor in two to three majors with similar research directions.” Such an excellent recommendation received absolutely no response and was simply ignored. In fact, some of the new supervisors selected had never even gone through the college’s Degree Committee—the leadership maneuvered their own cronies into becoming supervisors through methods like nepotism, cronyism, or using the resources of J College to exchange resources with other units. When selecting supervisors, the leadership bypassed the college’s Degree Committee entirely and directly made his favored individuals master’s student supervisors to guide students, and no one could do anything about him. This kind of practice is completely antithetical to you offering recommendations. In that case, what was the point of raising any more objections? My friend never raised objections again. Yet even without raising objections, my friend could hardly escape the fate of being targeted and fixed up by these leaders. How did they target him? Well, because the university required the submission of a roster—university documents stipulated that the roster of the college’s Degree Committee members must be kept on file at the university’s Graduate School. This meant that the responsibilities of the college’s Degree Committee—such as gatekeeping the selection of supervisors and gatekeeping the annual conferment of degrees to students—would be elevated to a university-level action, meaning this action was no longer entirely an internal college matter. “Didn’t you raise recommendations that made perfect sense? Well, what I, the leader, do happens to be completely antithetical to the opinions you voiced.” Therefore, I simply will not let you participate in the college’s Degree Committee anymore. How to stop your participation? Create a Degree Committee and an Academic Committee separately. Shunt those of you who raise objections and obstruct my implementation of hidden rules into the Academic Committee. Then, keep the others who listen to the leadership on the Degree Committee. The Degree Committee has to be reported up to the university, whereas the Academic Committee does not. If it must be reported, then let it be reported. After making this arrangement, those individuals who raised rational recommendations for college construction remained within the college’s scope of control; if they ever dared to oppose the leadership’s implementation of hidden rules again, they could still target you and clean you up.
Can the Degree Committee and the Academic Committee be established separately? Yes, they can. That is to say, the separate establishment of the college’s Degree Committee and Academic Committee is perfectly fine in itself. However, this separate establishment is a major issue within a college. It also needs to be carried out by the relevant teachers, professors, PhDs, or graduate student supervisors in accordance with rules of procedure, rather than a leader arbitrarily designating a segment of professors to hold a demonstration meeting to fully listen to everyone’s opinions. The administrative leadership tier can also propose a plan first, which, after being demonstrated and revised by the Professor Committee, is finally publicized; if there are no major objections or suggestions for revision, it is officially finalized as a resolution. Did J College follow such norms and procedures to determine the separation of the Degree Committee and the Academic Committee? Not at all. The leadership adjusted it whenever they wished. Why? Because the leadership holds decision-making power. Why does the leadership hold decision-making power? Because the leader is the dean and possesses administrative power.
Seeing such things reminds me of what Professor Steven N.S. Cheung once discussed. He taught at the University of Chicago and also at the University of California, Los Angeles. In his department at the University of Chicago—they call it a department, whereas we call it a college—the true power for personnel decision-making, such as bringing in PhDs and professors, rests in the hands of the professors (senior professors). Generally, senior professors are unwilling to take on leadership roles, serve as department chairs, or become deans. Conversely, some professors of mediocre standing, who might not have achieved significant accomplishments in research, serve as department chairs. In an essential sense, a department chair has very little to do. Because the department’s professor committee holds decision-making power, it is equivalent to the professor committee governing the department and governing the college. Our J College is completely different. It is entirely possible that the leader muddled through just to acquire that professorship. The sole purpose of scrambling for that professorship was to become an official. Once he became an official, he claimed that professors without official positions amounted to nothing, no matter how capable they were. “I may have no ability, but I am the leader. I can take the resources (funds) of J College and use them to get certain journals to flatter and praise me as an expert in this or that field, when in reality I am an unlearned and incompetent pseudo-expert.” This is exactly how it is done—not viewed as a shame, but rather boasted as an honor.
The adjustment of the college’s Degree Committee and Academic Committee means, in an essential sense, that those who engage in academics—such as these professors, PhDs, and supervisors—are mere playthings in the hands of those who possess administrative power. Administrative power is so immense that it can capriciously decide all affairs within the college. May I ask, when the entire college is driven by such an orientation, is there any future for those who genuinely come to do teaching and scientific research? None. Can one rise from a lecturer to promote to associate professor and promote to professor purely through personal hard work and personal capability? No. Since this is the case, what are the teachers’ energy, intelligence, and talent being encouraged to do? They will undoubtedly find ways to hug the principal leader’s thighs. If you hug the thighs snugly, for one thing, you can obtain resources; for another, you can obtain the positions you desire, and you can even obtain things in other aspects. Since this is the case, why should ordinary teachers work hard? Why should they strive to excel in teaching and scientific research? Even if a teacher is outstanding, their energy will no longer be invested in this manner. Those who are not outstanding teachers will be even less inclined to invest themselves this way. What will the result be? We say that the production of authentic diplomas absolutely requires outstanding teachers. Yet the realistic environment is encouraging people to be mediocre and encouraging people to become substandard teachers. All quality inspections are entirely for the sake of coping with inspections, and all of those things are merely for a brilliant and beautiful facade. Since this is the case, can the quality of the students cultivated be very high? In a general sense, certainly not. Of course, there are individual teachers who, despite knowing how terrible the environment is, refuse to resign themselves to it; they study on their own in private and delve into their work with all their might, which is also quite good. But these are isolated cases, and the individuals involved must pay a heavy price and cost.
The separate establishment of the Degree Committee and the Academic Committee means, in an essential sense, that the person who possesses administrative power reigns supreme as the boss. He is absolute. He shows no regard whatsoever for those who engage in academics and professional work. Given this type of approach, what will people do under such an environmental background? Why should intelligent people bother with teaching? Why would they want to conduct research? Unless they are madmen or lunatics. My friend truly met a tragic fate; he was genuinely slandered by the principal leader of the college in front of university leaders and other officials as a madman with psychological issues. What was the purpose behind this? Once they quietly pathologized him as mentally ill behind his back, superior leaders would not believe a single word my friend said—including his reports denouncing their reckless and lawless behavior—because he had psychological problems. Tell me, is this terrifying or not? It is utterly horrific. When my friend heard this news, his first reaction was sheer shock. A person as outstanding and upright as himself, who considered himself full of learning and scholarship, was quietly and imperceptibly pathologized as mentally ill by this principal leader. This is the third problem.
Viewed in this light, the issue of adjusting the Teaching Committee and Degree Committee at J College, and the issue of separating the Degree Committee from the Academic Committee, is fundamentally a question of whether teachers, professors, and professionals are respected; whether the entire staff is encouraged to be diligent, conscientious, and hard-working; and whether leading cadres face timely and effective constraints when they act recklessly and lawlessly. And these issues are absolutely crucial to whether what higher education institutions produce are authentic diplomas or diluted diplomas.
VI. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 3
The fourth issue is the determination of the head of a master’s program. Look at this case again: does it have something to do with the issue of “watering down”? If the master’s students we train are to have true talent and real learning, so that the diplomas they ultimately obtain are not watered-down, then there must be first-class advisors. A first-class team of advisors certainly requires each training program to have a first-class person in charge, or an academic leader.
Pay attention, the “J College” I am talking about is not the College of Economics; J College is just a hypothetical college I made up, so do not try to match the seat to the person. Do not go to our college’s Dean Wang in the future and say, “Professor Yang said this and that about them”—I will not admit to that. I have this recorded.
Once upon a time, that friend of mine was also stabbed in the back. That friend of mine also used to teach graduate students and lecture on similar case studies. Afterward, the Dean of J College went around spreading rumors—claiming that students had reported to him that my friend spent one-third of the class time cursing the university, one-third of the time cursing the college, and one-third of the time lecturing. My words will absolutely not be like my friend’s; I have this recorded. If you try to falsely accuse me, I will not let it slide when the time comes; I will settle scores with you.
What kind of person do you say Dean Wang is? How would I dare to gossip or criticize him? Right? What an international joke. Secretary Bai Jing is also an extraordinary figure. I am just a minor professor; what do I amount to? For them, crushing me to death is as easy as stepping on an ant. That is how you must look at the matter.
Why is the establishment of the head of a master’s program related to watered-down degrees? When the time comes, you can see for yourselves whether they are producing watered-down degrees. The determination of the head of a master’s program is not entirely a democratic issue, because academia cannot fully rely on democracy. The advisors in each program have an academic lineage, and it should be the teacher with the most profound learning herein who serves as the leading figure of this program. The leading figure can have a certain right to recommend other advisors within this program. Of course, this is not the leading figure talking nonsense out of thin air; it must be based on the situation of these teachers’ usual participation in academic discussions—what abroad is called a seminar—based on the quality of his publicly published articles, and based on his other aspects, to make an evidenced and serious recommendation opinion. Ultimately, it must still pass through the college’s degree committee to judge whether he can serve as an advisor.
Suppose a master’s training program has five advisors and enrolls ten students each year. Although each advisor in this program is supervising their own students, how to arrange and coordinate the teaching and academic activities of the advisors, how to improve the overall training quality of this program, and how teachers can regularly carry out activities and students can regularly carry out research seminars—all of these require institutional norms and an academic leader. If this is how we demand and establish the head of a master’s program, then may I ask who is the most qualified to serve as the head of this program? Under the circumstances I just described, who is the most qualified? Absolutely, the academic standard, academic strength, and academic seniority play a very important role. Moreover, this role must be combined with the advisors of this training program democratically gathering to mutually recommend and jointly decide on the leading figure of the master’s program. Ultimately, it is the advisors of this program, along with its academic lineage and management tradition, that decide who will lead this academic team.
Of course, there can also be different rules. In short, on one point, the power of decision must rest on the advisors of this specific major, who have the final say. But how did that J College handle it? In J College, whichever person the dean wanted to be the head of a master’s program became the head. After he appointed a certain person as the head of a program, none of the other advisors even knew that this person was the head. What was the basis? There was no basis. The leadership was the basis.
If the head of a master’s program is determined this way, what kind of result will follow? Since it is not based on academic standards, not based on standards of academic morality, and not based on standards for the quality of student training, but rather on “I am the administrative leader, I am the boss, so I get to decide.” Since this is the case, the other advisors also know that the only reason they are assigned a student is due to the will and decision of the leadership; they themselves have absolutely no say. Therefore, whether it comes to training students or determining the head of a master’s program, they just numbly accept it. What initiative would the advisors have to guide students well, lecture well, do good research, or care about discipline construction and college development?
Under this selection mechanism and within such an institutional background, will the advisors feel respected? Will they feel encouraged? No, they will not. Since they do not, the vast majority of people—being smart people—will ask: why should they bother? Why should they exhaust their heart and soul caring about the development of the discipline and the college? Who are the only ones who would bother? As some people have noted, first, people with hidden, malicious motives; second, fools.
Who is it that has hidden motives? If the dean’s behavior were righteous, standardized, and legitimate, and someone else were to speak out wildly, then that teacher would absolutely be someone with hidden motives. But if it is the opposite case, where this teacher stands up to uphold justice, and you still claim this teacher has hidden motives, then your conscience has been eaten by dogs. Because you have no sense of right and wrong and are not a person with a basic sense of morality.
Why would anyone go and play the fool? Because these people have a conscience and have a bottom line for how they conduct themselves and do things. They do not want to sink into degeneration; they want to use their own efforts to make the environment better, and they do not want to be “smart people” like the rest, because they would feel a guilty conscience. Therefore, they choose a path of conduct different from the majority—working hard, dedicated to their profession, and caring about academic and educational development. By doing this, they will suffer a lot of harm, and as a result, they are regarded as fools by these misbehaving leaders and by the majority of people.
In our economics, there is a very important concept—when your environment and your personal behavior diverge, what is the best solution? It is to adjust your personal behavioral choices. For an individual to adjust their own behavior to adapt to the environment is the best behavioral choice with the lowest cost. The vast majority of people are, indeed, adjusting their personal behavioral choices to adapt to the external environment.
If the entire institutional environment is abnormal, what will be the result of individuals adjusting to adapt to the environment? In an essential sense, it is the ruin of the collective moral standard. Truly, it is heartbreaking.
By the same token, since the selection of the head of a master’s program is abnormal, may I ask, will those advisors put effort into their classes? Take the case I just told you about, the teacher who only taught eight out of eighteen class hours; was teaching classes that way normal? In an abnormal institutional environment, he was right, and he was being smart. Putting no effort into his classes yielded, for him personally, at least the same result as putting effort in; in fact, by not putting in effort, the net benefit is higher. This demonstrates that putting effort into teaching classes is meaningless. After things are run this way by this misbehaving leader, abnormal behavior becomes the most normal and rational behavior. Through this fourth case, isn’t the establishment of the head of a master’s program encouraging the production of watered-down degrees? Will the quality of graduate students trained this way improve? Do the advisors have that motivation? The answer is clear at a glance.
VII. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 4
I have just discussed four cases. Looking at these four cases from a managerial perspective, are they not the very links where the problem of watered-down diplomas is produced? Yes, they are. If things continue in this manner, the managers—who are highly crucial participants in improving educational quality—will not strive to elevate their managerial standards so that the teachers’ intelligence and wisdom can be brought into play and their enthusiasm enhanced to raise the quality of both teaching and research. Consequently, teachers will not work hard. The quality of research and the standard of teaching are also highly correlated. If that is the case, it is certain that the problem of producing watered-down diplomas exists.
Fifth, the issue regarding the democratic election of department chairs. A very interesting thing happened at J College—the college leadership stated that the department chairs of each department were to be democratically elected, generating department chairs through democracy. What was this all about? It turns out that after the new leadership team took office, they merged two former departments into one, bringing the total number of faculty members to around thirty-five after the merger. When it came time to elect the department chair, only about twelve teachers participated in the voting, accounting for approximately one-third of the entire faculty. After everyone voted, the ballots were collected on the spot without being verified or counted at the scene. After they were collected, the Party Committee Secretary of J College declared that J College’s democratic election of department chairs could withstand the test of history, and that there was absolutely no problem with it.
At that time, my friend thought to himself: with only about one-third of the teachers present—not even reaching half the number of total faculty members—how could such voting withstand the test of history? Out of goodwill, that friend even suggested to the Party Committee Secretary that the generation of department chairs actually did not require a democratic election. Instead, the leadership could simply set forth the criteria for the department chair position, state whom they deemed suitable for the post, and then ask if anyone had objections. My friend noted that generally, once the leadership has spoken, Chinese people will not voice their objections even if they have them, for the sake of sparing people’s feelings and saving face. At that moment, everyone could just clap to pass the decision. Wouldn’t that be perfectly coherent and smooth in terms of logic? Furthermore, my friend also pointed out that the faculty members in universities hold at least a bachelor’s degree, and many are highly learned and full of wisdom. If the leadership is going to fake it, they must at least make it plausible and self-consistent. If what they do completely defies logic, then there is a problem. The leadership needs to improve management and raise managerial standards and quality.
After offering these suggestions, my friend fell on hard times and stirred up a hornet’s nest. Behind my friend’s back, this Party Committee Secretary secretly spread rumors, claiming that my friend wanted to become the department chair—that he wanted the position, but did not receive a single vote, as all the ballots were cast for their pre-selected, hand-picked candidate.
In this exact manner, they framed and slandered my friend. My friend had actually served as a department chair before, but he resigned on his own initiative. He knew that under a certain institutional background, if he were to act with integrity and diligence, he would exhaust himself to death without being able to change the overall situation and environment. Choosing not to be a department chair was his best option. How could he possibly fight to become the department chair? For a leader to handle affairs with a complete lack of basic common sense and open transparency, and to resort only to fabricating rumors and causing trouble when facing questioning—is this not profoundly deplorable?
When my friend found out they were spreading rumors behind his back, he was deeply shocked and astonished. How could these people possess such low moral character? Individuals with character traits inferior even to those of ordinary people can actually serve as the Party Committee Secretary of a college—it is quite intriguing.
I then advised him, “You need to open your mind and not take it to heart. In a forest so vast, all kinds of birds can be found. In a world so large, all kinds of leaders exist.” Thinking about it this way, you will be able to let it go.
They democratically elected the department chair through a method that flies in the face of basic common sense. The selection was not based on academic scholarship, managerial competence, or public consensus; instead, the democratic election was completely an illusion. My friend remarked, “Can they even call this a democratic election? Carrying things out in that manner, aren’t they just fooling people?” Operating this way, when teachers attend meetings, their presence is utterly pointless. Consequently, those teachers have entirely lost any sense of participation or enthusiasm to get involved. Of course, the leadership can always slander the teachers who did not attend the meeting, claiming there is something wrong with them.
However, when teachers do not attend a meeting, the fundamental meaning is that there is a problem with the management, and that the leaders themselves lack capability and competence. They have failed to respect these teachers, and they have failed to respect these professional faculty members as the absolute core agents for improving the quality of student cultivation. May I ask: with teachers placed in such a predicament, do they have any incentive to improve their teaching quality and research standards? Lacking motivation, they cannot fully unleash their human capital. May I ask, then, what becomes of the quality of student cultivation? It becomes very poor. If it is very poor and fails to meet basic quality standards, what does that indicate? Isn’t it precisely in these links that watered-down diplomas are generated? This kind of management cannot possibly incentivize teachers to whole-heartedly dedicate their intelligence and wisdom. Under this institutional environment, by behaving in such a way, they simply bring in people who originally possess no competence just to cope with the work and muddle through. This case also illustrates exactly why watered-down diplomas are produced.
VIII. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 5
The issue concerning the use of the institute’s official vehicles. Do you see any connection between this and “watered-down” diplomas? The cohort led by J Institute’s Party Secretary lived quite far from the campus, so they took the vehicles previously purchased with public funds by the former institute leadership and used them primarily as their own personal means of transportation for commuting to and from work. Once they started using them, all sorts of messy monthly expenditures, such as fuel costs and repair fees, were completely covered by public funds.
That friend of mine poked his nose into other people’s business again and offered some well-meaning advice to the Party Secretary. How did he propose it? He suggested that since they lived far from the school, it was only normal for the vehicles to be used primarily to commute this particular group of people back and forth, but why not establish a formal set of institutional regulations and standards for the use of the institute’s official vehicles? These vehicles were not the exclusive, private cars of just a few individuals. He proposed creating a set of management regulations and clauses: 1. The vehicles shall primarily be used to transport faculty members who live far from the institute to and from work, particularly allowing any faculty members along the route of the institute’s Party Secretary to use them; 2. The vehicles shall be used to transport guests visiting the entire institute; 3. The vehicles shall be used for emergencies involving faculty and staff, such as when a teacher falls acutely ill or encounters other situations where the use of an institute vehicle is genuinely required for transport. Once these management regulations for official vehicles were established, the vehicles would still primarily be used by the Party Secretary’s clique, but they would now be incorporated into an institutional framework. Structurally speaking, at the very least, this would be reasonable and justifiable.
Yet, this stirred up a hornet’s nest once again. Wouldn’t such a suggestion compromise my privileged interests as a leader? If these types of institutional rules and regulations were applied, the use of the institute’s official vehicles might not necessarily work in his favor, as it would ultimately be brought under regulated management. Because he was the Party Secretary of the institute, using an official vehicle for private purposes allowed him to still reimburse three to four thousand yuan a month in vehicle maintenance expenses; and regardless of how much the car cost—be it forty to fifty thousand, seventy to eighty thousand, or around one hundred thousand yuan—it was, after all, purchased with public funds. In essence, does this not just mean that because I am a leader, I am entitled to use this vehicle? Note that according to the official vehicle management regulations of the Chinese government, division-level (chuji) cadres in public institutions are not qualified to enjoy exclusive access to an official vehicle. What would the institute’s staff think then? It seems that being a leader still yields lucrative perks—with no rules or legal basis, public funds can be used to buy cars, official vehicles can be used for private purposes, and the maintenance costs incurred from such private use can even be reimbursed. If the leadership can operate without any basis regarding official vehicles, could they also operate without any basis in other areas to damage the public good for private gain, commit corruption, and break the law? In any other matter, they could simply follow suit in the exact same manner, and who could possibly do anything to stop them?
Since being a leader yields such lucrative perks and temptation, ordinary staff members working hard, putting effort into scientific research, and striving to earn a bit of class-hour fees cannot even match the monthly gains others get from submitting fake invoices. Why then should ordinary staff members strive to do their own jobs well? Since the leadership behaves that way, the staff can simply follow their example. Any teacher at J Institute, as long as they are clever, will find every possible way to latch onto the thighs of the Party Secretary and other leaders, hoping that the Party Secretary will promote them or grant them benefits. Only then can they get a piece of the action. If everyone is competing around the leadership for various benefits and interests—since these teachers are directing their intelligence and talents toward the leaders, toward those who control the allocation of resources, and toward those who can arbitrarily decide all matters of the institute just because they hold power—then may I ask, will they work hard to improve the quality of their teaching and scientific research? Will they focus their energy on the students of J Institute? Only fools would do so; clever people will not.
What is the ultimate result? The vast majority of people are clever. After all, idiots and fools are the minority. When the vast majority of clever people choose not to work hard, the ultimate result is that “watered-down” diplomas will once again be produced under such an environment.
IX. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 6:The Issue of the College’s Financial Disclosure
The series of issues just mentioned are, in essence, matters of college governance (Zhengwu). In college governance, when there are no rules and no procedures, everything is decided entirely by those who hold power. If this is the case, it leads to the exact same problems. When governance is not transparent, leaders can simply act blindly and arbitrarily. If anyone wants to secure advantages or benefits, your only option is to run more frequently to the offices of powerful figures, run more frequently to their homes, and run more frequently to their homes during festivals and holidays. If they fall ill, if it is their birthday, or if their parents fall ill, you must run to them more frequently. If you do not know the details, you must make inquiries to find out exactly what their situation is. If you show up, they might not necessarily remember you; but if you fail to show up, they will absolutely remember it, let me tell you. If you do not flatter them and revere them, they can ruin you completely at critical moments.
What is the consequence of acting in this manner? It means that your various advantages and interests are attained not because you work hard or because you diligently cultivate students, but because you cater to the preferences of those who hold power. When your heart and mind are entirely focused on pleasing powerful figures, no matter how clever you are, it is impossible for you to educate and cultivate students well.
Financial disclosure operates under the exact same logic. When the new leadership team arrived, at the beginning, in order to demonstrate that the previous leadership had issues with governance and finances—leaving behind a massive pile of burdens and a complete mess—they disclosed the financial situation of the former team. What happened afterward? They resorted to stalling and evasion. There is also another situation where, under the banner of the J College to operate academic programs and training courses, they used a large number of fake invoices (Fa-piao) to make claims and reimbursements. In the end, no matter how many things were done or how many training sessions were held, there was only about 200,000 RMB left in net income, which was just enough to distribute some monthly bonuses to everyone, while the rest was swallowed up for the leaders’ personal interests.
It never crossed the minds of the leadership at J College that when they undertook those activities, trading on the banner and goodwill of G University’s J College, there ought to be some regulations and procedures. When you utilize the banner of J College, the employees of J College have different divisions of labor; some engage in scientific research, some devote themselves to teaching, and some generate revenue, or whatever it may be. This is a team working through division of labor and cooperation to improve everyone’s compensation, while simultaneously elevating the quality of teaching, research, and management, thereby creating a harmonious and thriving environment.
But how did they actually behave? They refused to disclose the finances. If things are run this way, keeping the financial accounts hidden, then the leader can secure personal benefits while simultaneously allowing those who cater to their preferences to obtain benefits as well. May I ask, under such circumstances, how could anyone else have the motivation to work hard, or to diligently improve teaching and research? The energy of clever individuals will certainly be directed toward finding ways to manipulate governance and finances. Because the leader has the final say, and in financial matters, the leader also has the absolute say. By catering to the leader’s preferences, one can obtain certain interests. Yet the acquisition of these interests does not stem from hard work. Therefore, think about it: would the vast majority of clever people be willing to work hard? Would they be willing to improve the quality of student cultivation? Only a fool would be willing to do so.
That fool clearly knew the severity of the problems at J College and their terrifying consequences, yet he still went ahead to speak out and expose it all—so how could he not be viewed as having a mental illness? Consequently, he was institutionalized and branded as mentally ill (Bei Jing-shen-bing-hua). This is the seventh case, and as we can see, it remains a distinct link in the production line of diluted diplomas.
X. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 7: The Selection and Appointment of Master’s Supervisors
The issue regarding the selection and appointment of Master’s supervisors is a point we have just discussed. For instance, in the selection of Master’s supervisors, under normal circumstances, should a newly appointed supervisor be allowed to recruit graduate students across two, three, or even four different academic disciplines? Normally, this is absolutely impermissible. However, at J College, it is entirely possible. The underlying reason may simply be that these individuals maintain good personal relations with the leadership.
Yet, let me share an even more intriguing phenomenon with you—even when relations are poor, the leadership may still allow a newly appointed supervisor to serve as a mentor across two or three disciplines during their very first appointment. Do you know why? A highly fascinating phenomenon occurred at J College: many faculty members who shared a poor relationship with the leadership also participated in the supervisor selection process. Why did this happen? Reportedly, J College was on the precipice of reaching the end of the leadership cadre’s fixed three-year term of office, at which point the faculty would cast anonymous ballots to evaluate the leaders. Facing an upcoming vote, the leadership naturally attempted to make every possible effort to minimize the size of the opposition. To reduce the opposition—since you all desire to become supervisors—I will simply allow all of you to become supervisors. Anyone whose field is even marginally related is encouraged to come forward and take a position. Once you become a supervisor and I have granted you these institutional benefits, you are expected to cast your vote in my favor.
However, what will be the ultimate consequence of conducting supervisor selection in this manner? A vast number of individuals who fail to meet the requisite standards and criteria for supervisors will enter the ranks of the graduate faculty en masse. Will this lead to an improvement in the quality of graduate student cultivation? This is a slow, calculated operation, a deliberate maneuvering to seek safe reelection and secure a favorable personal reputation for the leader by sacrificing the interests of the students, the interests of the university, and the interests of the academic disciplines.
Therefore, the selection of Master’s supervisors is, on one hand, funneled entirely toward the leadership’s own faction, and it matters little that there are no standardized regulations in place. On the other hand, if leaders wish to garner goodwill from unaffiliated individuals, they do so by sacrificing the interests of the academic disciplines. In reality, the former scenario of graduate supervisor selection similarly sacrifices both the interests of the disciplines and the quality of graduate student cultivation.
With this mode of selecting Master’s supervisors, I must ask: is it truly possible to select excellent supervisors and outstanding teachers? When supervisors are selected through such means, how can the quality of the faculty be guaranteed? It is just like the case we discussed moments ago—where even the members of the Academic Degree Sub-Committee were completely unaware of the contents and agenda of the afternoon meeting. Is this supposed to be the selection of Master’s supervisors? When even the members of the Degree Sub-Committee are kept in the dark, what can be said for everyone else? Is this not turning administration into a mere farce? If administrative management were truly standardized and effective, could these individuals who manage things so chaoticly still remain in leadership positions? Their idling and blundering here constitute a crime against the taxpayers, and a crime against the students and their parents alike. This is my firm conviction. Where is this chaotic and reckless conduct guiding those teachers? Where is it guiding those students?
The selection of Master’s supervisors must, first and foremost, pass through standardized procedures, and secondly, establish effective rules. The true purpose of supervisor selection is to bring excellent mentors—individuals who possess actual cultivation capabilities and meet the qualified standards—into this cadre. If it is not done this way, how can the students brought up by a vast number of unqualified supervisors fail to become “watered-down” products?
My friend is deeply disheartened. He is highly conscientious in guiding his students, yet the students themselves are not conscientious. Why? The students openly state that almost all the other supervisors merely cope with their duties as a matter of routine and go through the motions. When the time comes for the mid-term evaluation, the supervisors simply sign their names for the students; many do not even look at the work, let alone guide them through revisions. Since everyone else conducts themselves in this manner, I cannot afford to be perceived as entirely unreasonable or inflexible either. My friend then began to reflect: why should he treat his own students with such strict conscientiousness? If he continues to do so, would it not be fundamentally unfair to the students? These students could pass their milestones with extreme ease under other mentors, yet they face immense pressure under him. That would indeed be profoundly unfair. This state of affairs has left my friend with no way to uphold his principles and academic standards. This is precisely what dishears my friend the most. Consequently, no students choose him as their mentor. Regarding the fact that no one chooses him, he is actually quite at peace with it. Looking at the actual condition of the students within this environment, how many of them could truly grow into talented individuals?
Since things have come to this pass, this environment has effectively eliminated my friend. Yet, this is actually my friend’s honor, do you understand? This environment completely lacks a mechanism for the survival of the fittest; it does not encourage faculty members who, like my friend, possess genuine capability and scholarship. On the contrary, this environment rewards those who engage in foul, chaotic, and undisciplined practices; it encourages mediocrity, and it rewards those who are completely devoid of learning and skill. My friend’s situation at G University is profoundly tragic. This is a tragedy for my friend, a tragedy for the students of J College, and a tragedy for many staff members within that college as well. Why? If J College truly possessed a sound mechanism for incentives and constraints, many of its staff members are remarkably intelligent and entirely capable of achieving great success.
This concludes our case discussion on the selection of Master’s supervisors at J College. Let me ask: is this method of selection not a definitive link in the production line of diluted diplomas?
XI. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 8
The issue of graduate student coursework. I will not go into great detail on this since I have already discussed it before. I have given you two cases. One case is about a professor who only taught eight out of eighteen scheduled sessions. The other case involves an Advanced Microeconomics course. One professor taught the class using the English edition, with a level of difficulty on par with the textbooks used for Harvard PhD students; he wrote his board notes entirely in English, provided full mathematical proofs, thoroughly explained the problem sets, and ultimately administered the final exam in English. Another teacher, allotted fifty-four credit hours, reportedly only held class four times, and even then, had the students give presentations while he simply offered commentary. This “miraculous” teacher and that dedicated teacher receive a meager yet identical wage—the lecture fee. Setting aside the differences in teaching quality and focusing solely on the difference in actual teaching hours, the second teacher’s real wage per credit hour is more than three times that of the dedicated one. If the disparity in quality is factored in, the gap in their real remuneration per unit of credit hour and unit of quality could be dozens of times over.
Does this kind of graduate teaching method and the resulting gap in real unit remuneration encourage people to learn from that derelict teacher? To learn from that teacher who only taught eight out of eighteen sessions? As long as you are a clever person and not a fool, you will learn from them. In the end, those dedicated teachers who stubbornly hold onto their professional ethics—those “foolish” teachers—will become fewer and fewer.
To begin with, there were never that many people like that dedicated teacher in the faculty ranks. Under this institutional environment, these dedicated teachers, these “foolish” teachers, will become fewer and fewer, and will eventually go extinct. Let me ask you: once the dedicated and excellent teachers have gone extinct, and those left behind to dominate the podium are derelict, subpar teachers—this is a classic case of adverse selection. As an ultimate consequence, will the quality of graduate cultivation not decline? Will it not ultimately lead to the production of watered-down degrees? Will it or will it not? Is Teacher Yang just talking nonsense to you? Fine. If you all feel that I am talking nonsense, I would be quite heartbroken. How is it that I cannot find a single kindred spirit?
Alright, so this is the issue of graduate student coursework; see for yourselves whether it constitutes a link in the production of watered-down degrees.
XII. Case Analysis of the Production of Diluted Diplomas: Part 9
Let us look further at the issues of applying for doctoral programs and adjusting the professional structure of master’s programs within the colleges.
The issue of applying for doctoral programs is essentially identical to the previous problems. What do I mean by this? College J, where my friend works, was planning to apply for a doctoral program. When it came to applying for this doctoral program, the Dean of College J actually bypassed the College’s Professors’ Committee, Degree Committee, Academic Committee, and the relevant program advisors. He did not convene a meeting to either demonstrate feasibility or brief them, nor did he pass this through established rules and procedures to elevate it into an official policy decision of the college—namely, deciding whether College J should apply for a doctoral program or not. The Dean’s personal opinion directly represented the opinion of the college: College J would abandon its application and coordinate with College G to support their application for a doctoral program. This was the Dean’s decision for College J and College G to jointly apply for the doctoral program. The Dean of College J stated that he had already negotiated the terms on behalf of College J with College G: College J would drop its application and give up applying for the doctoral program. In exchange, once their application succeeded, they would set up a doctoral sub-field concentration for our College J—this was the trade-off condition that the Dean had negotiated on his own with College G.
The application for a doctoral program is a major decision regarding the academic and disciplinary development of a college. Can a Dean propose a plan where his own college withdraws from applying and instead coordinates with another college’s application? I believe that proposing this plan at the very beginning is completely understandable. The Dean can make the proposal, but after you propose it, it can only represent your personal opinion. How can your personal opinion be transformed into the collective opinion of the college? First of all, you must pass it through certain procedures to demonstrate its feasibility, right? You need to justify this matter through bodies like the Academic Committee, or through representatives of the faculty advisors. As the Dean, I propose this plan, do any of you have any dissenting opinions? Through rigorous rules and procedures, the personal opinion of the institutional leadership is elevated into the college’s opinion—if everyone truly feels that my friend’s college has no competitive advantage in applying for a doctoral program, then we might as well support a certain program in a certain college to apply. This would also be acceptable.
The problem is that it did not go through any procedure, nor did it have any regulatory standard; it was decided solely by the Dean’s word. I ask you, if it is done in this manner, is it not exactly the same as the previous problem? Such a major decision is made simply because I am the Dean and I hold the administrative power, so I decide it. For those of you who actually engage in the specialized disciplines, I, as the Dean, can keep you in the dark and exclude you from participating. What right do you have to speak? My personal opinion as the Dean represents the official opinion of College J.
If the institutional leadership acts in such an absolute, dictatorial, and arbitrary manner, and if the professors and teachers who actually engage in the specialized disciplines are entirely deprived of the power to participate in major decisions regarding disciplinary development, with the personal opinion of the institutional leadership completely substituting for the opinion of the college, I ask you: under such circumstances, will these professors and teachers have any interest in the so-called applications for doctoral programs or the so-called programmatic development of master’s programs? Will they still strive to form a cohesive force? Will they have any enthusiasm? Since becoming an institutional administrative leader grants such immense power, those shallow individuals will think, “I will also strive to become a Dean in the future. Once I become the Dean and attain such official rank, I can change the current situation.” If someone views it this way, then I consider them a shallow person. If you say, “He acts this way, and once I seize power, I will also act this way,” then is that not essentially identical? Does it not still mean that power is everything? Even if your way of operating is different from his, or if you do a better job than he does, does it not essentially still constitute a blind fetishization of power? Does having power mean having everything? Does it mean having the absolute authority to mobilize resources and make decisions?
How, then, in the most fundamental sense, do we change this abuse of power and absolute power? It must still come down to professors governing the college, academic supremacy, and above all, rules and procedures being the most fundamental cornerstone. Only in this way can your College J have a future. Otherwise, according to the current incentive rules, everyone will either scramble for his position as Dean, or they will cling to the thighs of the person who holds the power. Once you flatter and please them comfortably, there will be something in it for you. This approach is exactly the same as what was discussed previously—the staff invest their energy and talent into these people of power and influence, rather than devoting their energy and talent to conducting research, doing a good job in teaching, and improving the cultivation quality of the students.
The issue of adjusting the professional structure of master’s programs is exactly the same. Can the professional structure of master’s programs be adjusted? Yes, it can. It can be adjusted based on social demand, based on changes in the current situation, based on my faculty resources, and based on enrollment needs. The problem is, during the process of adjustment, is there any procedure? Is there any regulatory standard? Without rules and without procedures, it is still decided solely by the Dean’s word. It is still decided solely by the person who holds the power. Then, is this not exactly the same as the application for doctoral programs we just discussed?
I also discovered something even more interesting. College J once possessed a first-level discipline master’s degree program in Theoretical Economics, which was reportedly successfully applied for as early as 2006. Incredibly, this first-level discipline master’s program simply vanished. What was the explanation given later? The institutional leadership, in consultation with the university leadership, exchanged this first-level discipline master’s program in Theoretical Economics for a first-level discipline master’s program in Applied Economics. From the perspective of the university’s programmatic development strategy, is this permissible? Yes, it is. However, there must be fundamental regulatory standards and procedures. It is perfectly fine for you, as the Dean, to propose this to the university. But before your personal proposal is elevated to the university level, there must first be a briefing and communication with the relevant teachers at the college level, so that everyone can form an opinion. You must allow your personal opinion as the institutional leader to be transformed into the collective opinion of the college within your own college, and only then elevate that college opinion to the university level. This is the only type of decision-making behavior that accords with basic common sense and procedures.
Yet, the actual situation is that the other people in the college have no part to play in your show. You have no function and no right to speak; it is decided solely by me, the Dean. I ask you, can an individual’s will completely substitute for the will of the college? Can an individual’s viewpoint represent the collective opinion of this College J? Is this kind of educational philosophy viable? No, it is not. With this way of operating, any teachers who are not merely coasting along to secure a paycheck will either resist or remain silent toward this manner of conduct, but in their hearts, they certainly do not approve, and they will definitely harbor no goodwill toward you. Since the specialized teachers have absolutely no right to speak regarding professional cultivation and disciplinary development, what else are they supposed to do? This college has effectively been run into the private domain of you, the person who holds the power—into your personal enterprise. I ask you, can this effectively incentivize others to work hard and strive to improve the quality of cultivation?
From this case study, we can clearly see: is this particular link not actively producing watered-down diplomas? Do these teachers have any motivation to strive to perform their own regular duties well? In the most fundamental sense, you have treated them as outsiders. Those who can enter your inner circle do not get in based on rules or based on procedures; rather, they enter based on your subjective preferences, with no objective basis whatsoever. You, as the institutional leader, can certainly form a faction, but does forming a faction hold any meaning or any value for the long-term development of this college? Can the disciplinary development, institutional development, and programmatic development of this college form a state of positive cycle? It is an absolute impossibility.
Editor: Zhou Zhigang
Proofreader: Cheng Xiaoxiao
Translator: Ge Bing
